GakuseiDon

Yes, I think that's a fair point. I've always said that due to the little evidence for a HJ the question of his existence is worth asking, and that the onus is on the HJ proponent. Personally, I think Paul is enough to conclude that a HJ probably existed. The problems come when trying to show that Paul's Christ was the Gospel one, which is a different argument.

aa5874

What little evidence do you have that one of the persons called "Paul" is enough to conclude that an HJ probably existed when all the "Pauls" probably didn't exist in the 1st century?

karlmarx

There is nothing wrong with pursuing speculative theories in physics, particularly if they are "elegant". It's also perfectly legitimate to hypothesize reasons for why a certain prediction fails to be observed - this does not make a theory unfalsifiable, it simply shifts the need for evidence somewhere else. That is the way physics advances - it's not all chance discovery. It takes a speculative theory to design a groundbreaking experiment and discover an extraordinary finding.

String theory is such a speculative theory. I don't think there is an issue with pursuing such a theory - except that it is currently being pursued almost to the exclusion of all else. Currently, much effort is being spent on string theory when there is little to show - as yet - that it's definitely the right path.

No physicist worth his salt believes that string theory is up there with general relativity or quantum mechanics. Any respectable physicist knows that string theory is speculative. The issue is whether it should be pursued to the exclusion of all else. Some physicists may be surprised if string theory was shown to be wrong through experiment, but I doubt any would continue to pursue it under those circumstances. Physics is not religion.

In the case of religion, it seems that "believers" have already made up their minds as to what the truth is, and no amount of evidence will change their minds. Evolution has already disproved Genesis, and yet the hardcore still persist. This shows that the mindset is different.

So no, I don't think there is an analogy here.

andrewcriddle

In a purely formal sense, the hypothesis that there was a HJ but that he was too insignificant to leave traces in contemporary secular records, could be falsified by finding a contemporary secular record referring to Jesus. eg a message from Pilate to Rome noting that in the interests of public order it had been necessary to execute a controversial Galilean preacher called Jesus despite the vagueness of the specific charges against him. The hypothesis predicts that such a document will not be found. It is possible (though IMO unlikely) that such a document will be discovered. Hence in a purely formal sense the hypothesis is not unfalsifiable.

As a more substantive response to what you are saying; I think there is a diference between claims that say ESP/psychic powers exist but are prevented from working by the presence of a skeptic, and claims that a historical figure really existed although all our evidence happens to come directly or indirectly from his followers.

Even people like me, who reject Popperian falsifiability as a criterion for choosing between hypotheses, tend to feel that there is something really wrong with the first type of claim whereas the second type of claim does not seem primafacie implausible at all.

(I'm reluctant to comment on the specific case of supersymmetry because IIUC and IMVHO the problem of making verifiable/falsifiable predictions is as much about the intractable nature of the mathematics involved as it is about the need to reach energies beyond what is currently technologically feasible.)

Andrew Criddle

gstafleu

If it continues to be untestable for long enough, it will stop to be considered as a serious hypothesis. It is one thing to propose something that is not yet testable, that has happened before. But at some point it has to become testable. Smolin's point is (I think, I haven't finished the book yet) that the untestability of string theory is an issue that is seroious enough to warrant the dumping of the theory.
No, but if it turns out to be impossible to get a testable theory about it, the exercise will simply be put on hold. Or, as you say, it will simply remain speculation, that is fine.

So, to get back to BC&H, it is fine to speculate that there was an HJ, as long as it is flagged as speculation and not as theory. Due to the soft circumstances you describe, it is possible that we can never do more than that. If so, we should accept that. We should then say that we simply cannot establish what the facts were. Maybe there was an HJ, maybe there was not, we'll never know. Unless some more evidence pops up, I suspect we should leave it at that.

Except of course if there is a competing hypothesis that explains the data and that is testable. You asked if an MJ theory shouldn't be required to show that there was a belief in a mythical figure. Aren't the gospels and the epistles sufficient to establish that a prima facie? The question, I think, is not if there was such a belief, that is a given. It is: where did the belief come from. If it can be shown that it is not unusual for such a belief to arise without a historical person at its basis, then I think that this would make MJ a viable hypothesis.

Can this be shown? Well, isn't that what is generally assumed about many myths? So maybe we are awaiting some progress in mythology (as in: the study of myth). If this will show that most myths which contain a human figure did start with a historical core, then HJ gains strength in spite of the lack of evidence. If, on the other hand, it will be shown that many myths that figure a human start without such a core, then, given the lack of other evidence for an HJ, MJ should win the day.

Gerard Stafleu

gstafleu

I think the difference between the two scenarios you describe can be illustrated by the following. Let's assume that we can somehow establish that there likely was an HJ. For example, progress is made in the field of mythology such that it becomes generally accepted that myths like the Jesus story usually start with a historical core. At that point the small footprint theory becomes a reasonable explanation for the scarcity of evidence. But only after it has first been established by some other means that an HJ is likely. It is, on the other hand, hard to see the "presence of a skeptic" excuse as anything but just that. That is probably because we do have the equivalent of an accepted MJ theory in this case, to wit: science.

So I see two possibilities to settle the HJ/MJ debate. Mythology could show that either the one or the other is more likely. Or a specific developmental model could be made for Christianity that shows how it developed as a myth without a historical core. The latter is of course what Doherty is trying to do (whether or not you agree with him is a different matter).

Gerard Stafleu

Amaleq13

Why? There appears to be no good reason to assume such a thing about the quantum level of reality. In fact, it is the nature of the existing evidence that points Greene in precisely the opposite direction of your assertion. We are, after all, talking about "stuff" that has proven itself resistant to accurate measurement by its very nature. The scientific rigor to which you aspire is founded upon reliable measurement. And that goes back to what I've been saying all along. It is the nature of the evidence that determines how rigorously one can apply scientific standards. Complaining about the inapplicability of that rigor is a complaint against the nature of the evidence (ie unrealistic).

Again, suggesting that any consideration of available evidence might be "put on hold" simply because it cannot be studied with scientific rigor is contrary to everything known about the way humans think as well as the history of science, itself.

Oh, please. Even in the "hard" sciences, the speculative nature of any given "theory" varies according to the nature of the available evidence.

It is a good thing for modern science that such a notion was not accepted by our ancestors. Surely you cannot be ignorant of the rampant speculation based upon inadequate evidence which formed the necessary foundation of modern science? You cannot find anything in the fog without first fumbling blindly.

Since the character depicted in the Gospels is explicitly placed in a specific time in history and interacting with specific figures from history, the answer to that question is quite obviously "No". That character is clearly not depicted as entirely mythical. Doherty's entire thesis argues against the "first appearance" of Paul's letters as actually describing a figure in history.

It is certainly not a given that there was a belief in a purely mythical figure that never actually existed in history. I would be very much interested in evidence to the contrary but even Earl acknowledges that no such direct evidence exists. So much for the rigorous testability of the MJ theory.

youngalexander

No. This is entirely mistook. The analogy fails.

Physics finds itself in a difficult, but not unusual position. Having been extremely successful in explaining the mechanisms governing the physical universe in the 20C, we find that at the end of that C and ongoing to the present, there are a number of fundamental problems, as instanced by the OP. It is clear that a (or several) new paradigms are required to resolve these problems. Such new ideas do not come easily, especially when they are dealing with (what seems to us at present) the ultimate questions - ie. TOE (Theory of Everything).

The OP describes one set of difficulties and a means of surmounting them (String Theory) which appear to involve a negation of an essential scientific precept - falsifiability!
Have no fear, gentle Historians. Physicists are not about to relinquish the requirement for predictive empirical evidence to support a theory. String Theory has dug a hole from which it must escape. If it does not, then - poof!
Then so much the worse for it.

What has this to do with MJ/HJ? Very little as far as I can see. The physical analogy in the first quote fails both theoretically and empirically.

Theoretically, because in physics a 'new paradigm' may be anything (ie. any weird idea), provided it is consistent with current observation and leads to verifiable predictions. It has no other constraints. Historically, the options for Jesus are decidedly more limited.

It may appear superficially that waiting for 'something to turn up' in an underground vat of heavy water or desert urn has some similarity, but surely we are missing the other physical alternative - build a bigger machine! Take the LHC for instance. It may or may not produce particles which confirm current theory, but it has a very high probability of producing new evidence which will need to be explained. Contrast this with the Biblical situation which has a very low probability of turning up new evidence - when?

The essential difference is that we are virtually guaranteed that there is new evidence in the physical case (it only requires Congress to vote the funds ...):Cheeky: Given that, success is virtually assured.

We have no such confidence in the biblical situation. New evidence may never have existed, it may have existed in abundance and been destroyed, or it may remain forever lost. In any case, we can only seek it with the gravest misgiving and unlikelyhood of success.

HJ/MJ will have to be argued upon its merits with the current data set - unless something turns up!:huh:

gstafleu

youngalexander,

I think what you are saying is that physicists are more likely than (some) biblical scholars to let go of a cherished idea once either evidence to the contrary pops up, or confirmation fails to pop up for long enough. I agree that this is likely the case. What I was doing in the OP is point out the human tendency of liking nonfalsifiable beliefs, simply because with them one's cherished notions cannot be disconfirmed. That is of course why we have the principle of falsifiability in the first place. I think that analogy stands. But I would agree that it is likely that physicists will, at some point, drop a theory for which evidence is lacking, while at least some religious people may never do so. (Notice the "some." A Lloyd Geering type Christian is much more likely to drop such a religious theory than a fundy, e.g.)

Gerard Stafleu

gstafleu

Amaleq13,

First of all, I agree that in the history of science we find many instances where a perfectly valid theory started with speculations for which evidence was lacking. My point, though, is that at some point this changed and evidence did become available. At that point speculation changed to theory (OK, speculations were often called theories, the words are a bit fuzzy, but I hope you get my point).

Now, as to the falsifiability criterion (ignoring for now whether a minimal HJ is or is not falsifiable), if you can show that a theory is non-falsifiable, then you can show that it can never be tested. Hence you then have no hope of turning speculation into theory. Hence the requirement of falsifiability.

How can you show it can never be tested? You might think that confirmatory evidence is still possible. True, but an unfalsifiable theory does not commit to anything: if non of its predictions (e.g. there should be detectable historical evidence) shows up, that is still quite OK with the theory. That is why such a theory does not count.

Gerard Stafleu