Cross Examiner

And this, in my view, is enough cause to move us from a presumption of inerrancy to agnosticism with regards to the particulars of the case.

You're right. I'm talking about misapplication, not violation. Thanks for the correction.

His counterexamples are theoretical only since he calls them 'surface anomalies'.

Regards,
BGic

Clutch

You're totally welcome.
Well, I don't quite know what you're saying here, but I do know that it doesn't bear on whether there's a false dichotomy. If Vinnie gives purported counterexamples that fail, for some reason to do with their being merely "theoretical", to count as successful counterexamples, then his argument will have false premises and be unsound. But it will still not be invalid, neither on false dilemma grounds or any other; viz., if his counterexamples work, his conclusion will follow -- the very definition of validity.

Cross Examiner

Clutch,
It seems to me that this statement:
"But any argument against inerrancy based on counterexamples is ipso facto an argument for errancy."
becomes this statement:
"But any argument against inerrancy based on [theoretical]counterexamples is ipso facto a [theoretical] argument for errancy."
in consideration of 'surface anomalies' as opposed to actual counterexamples of inerrancy.

Regards,
BGic

funinspace

So why do you put the word "theoretical" only on the errancy side, if you want a neutral middle? Not that I really want to play this tit-for-tat word game that looks to be starting.

DK

Cross Examiner

My point is that a 'surface anomaly' is not the same thing as an actual counterexample of inerrancy (i.e. example of error). Clutch uses the idea of counterexamples as an ipso facto argument for errancy being the default position. But if the alleged counterexamples are only possible (i.e. theoretical) errors as is intimated by 'surface anomaly' then these cannot constitute an argument for errancy being default. While it is generally true that works of human artifice are prone to error we should presuppose nothing with regards to some work in particular. For example, I do not presuppose that Dawkin's The Blind Watchmaker is erroneous merely from the fact that a man wrote it and men make mistakes. Only after I have demonstrated that there is an error in actuality can I say that this work of man in particular is erroneous. Thus, I maintain that both sides (i.e. errancy, inerrancy camps) have a burden to move us from agnosticism with regards to the claims about the Bible's internal/external accuracy.

Regards,
BGic

Clutch

BGiC,

Sorry, I don't see what you mean. Is it just this:

As long as it's uncertain whether Vinnie's premises offer genuine counterexamples, it will be uncertain whether his argument by counterexamples genuinely refutes inerrancy.

?

Because that is surely correct. I just don't see the point of saying it.

Cross Examiner

I might be confused and confusing. Let me show you my thought process from the top. I take Vinnie to be arguing firstly that:

A1.
P0. Generally, human works contain errors
L1. If some work in particular is a human work then it is likely errant (A1.P0)
P2. The Bible is a human work
C3. The Bible is likely errant (A1.L1, A1.P2)

and secondly to be arguing that:

A2.
P0. Either errancy or inerrancy is our default position with regard to the Bible in particular
P1. If a work in particular is a human work then it is likely errant (A1.L1) and if it also contains 'surface anomalies' then our default position is errancy.
P2. The Bible is a human work (A1.P2) that is likely errant (A1.C3) and is even more so if it also contains 'surface anomalies' (A2.P1)
P3. The Bible contains 'surface anomalies'
C4. Our default position is a presumption errancy (A2.P0, A2.P1, A2.P3)

and lastly to be arguing that:

A3.
P0. If our default position is a presumption of errancy then inerrantists have the burden to move us from said default position
P1. Our default position is a presumption of errancy (A2.C4)
P2. Inerrantists have the burden of proof (A3.P0, A3.P1)
C3. RobertLW is an inerrantist who has taken the position of inerrancy in this debate and so he has the burden of proof

Now, before I start analyzing, before I get ahead of myself, do you believe the above is what Vinnie is arguing? Do you want to add/modify/delete anything? Clutch, you in particular seem well versed in logical argumentation so feel free to correct any technical problems with my formulations. I certainly appreciate the help. Thanks.

Regards,
BGic

the fonz

This is correct.

No, this is not right. Another possible default position could be agnosticism, but it's one Vinnie has ruled out through argument, not from the start.

This isn't right either. Regardless of the surface anomalies, the default position is errancy. The surface anomalies-->the conclusion of errancy.

As far as A3, it is correct.

To answer an earlier objection...

But....

1. Yes, you can argue that some work in particular is likely to have human error unless evidence is given to presume otherwise. (It's called induction.)

2. With regards to Dawkins, he is a learned scientist speaking on something he has a lot of training in. Therefore, we shouldn't presume that work to be errant until proven otherwise because we have good independent reason to think it is reliable.

Point 2 doesn't apply to the Bible. Not only that, but given the vastly different time eras it was written in (keep in mind that the bible is a collection, not just one book), it is likely to contain errors.

That's about it. Good argument from Vinnie, btw.

Clutch

Ah, what's wrong with 1, 2, 3 for the lines in an argument?

Matter of taste, I guess. But A1 sounds right.
The fonz is correct. The second conditional of A2.P1 is logically correct as stated, but has false implicatures: the default is errancy not because of "human work" plus "surface anomalies", but by the meaning of "likely" and the truth of the first conditional of A2.P1. (Even with all these premises you've got complex premises of conjoined conditionals in here.)

So the connection between "surface anomalies" and default errancy is a red herring, hence both A2.P2 (second half) and A2.P3 are red herrings.

Sure.

For what it's worth, I think this "surface anomaly" stuff is just a matter of prima facie errors. Divvy up the issues this way:

For some substantial historical document, A1 introduces grounds to expect errancy. These grounds are presumably defeasible, but would not count as defeated merely by a lack of prima facie errors. This is familiar; often I will proof my work and conclude that, while I didn't see any obvious problems, I have excellent inductive grounds to believe there are some problems there anyhow.

This is sufficient for default errancy.

Now, if we have default errancy and actual p.f. errors, then we have far more than grounds for default errancy. We have positive warrant specific to this document, licensing the (again, defeasible) conclusion that our general default position was correctly applied to this case. This detaches the "default" operator from our reasoning. A plausible reply that obviated the p.f. error would leave us still with default errancy. A plausible argument that exempted the document from that general inductive reasoning altogether would dispose of the default errancy. Those are the arguments that an inerrantist owes in the face of A1 and p.f. errors.

My take, anyhow.

NOGO

In another thread Vinnie was arguing that the story of Jesus praying while his disciples slept just before his capture need not be fiction.

Maybe his disciples heard him pray before falling asleep etc..

I suggest that the bit about Jesus praying falls very well in what Vinnie is saying here.

Different truths for different occasions.