jlowder

Check out the definition of "moral objectivism" I provided in reply to Beastmaster. On that definition of "moral objectivism," the fact that the universe is indifferent is irrelevant to whether moral objectivism is true.

Jeffery Jay Lowder

jlowder

I don't think (1a) entails absolutism. At least, there is a significant sense of absolutism that doesn't follow from (1a). From the fact that right and wrong exist as a property of things independent of the human mind, it doesn't follow that moral principles are necessarily exceptionless.

I also don't see the point in distinguishing (1a) from (1b). If right and wrong exist as a property of things, then right and wrong are factual matters. Moral statements would be true or false. So it seems to me there is no difference between (1a) and (1b) .

Jeffery Jay Lowder

jlowder

Moral principles are binding only on moral agents. There is no reason in principle why a non-human animal could not be a moral agent; having a "human mind" is not the issue. But, as a matter of contingent fact, human beings are the only known animals that are moral agents. If some other form of intelligent life were discovered, say, the kind depicted in Star Trek shows, they would also be considered moral agents.

There are two different ways a moral principle might "apply" to something. In the first sense, a moral principle applies to a thing in the sense that the thing is the beneficiary of the moral principle. For example, a rabbit could benefit from the moral principle, "Don't inflict physical pain unnecessarily," even though the rabbit has no obligation to abide that principle. According to the second sense, a moral principle applies to a thing if it creates an obligation for that thing. For example, the moral principle, "Don't inflict physical pain unnecessarily," applies to humans because they are moral agents. It does not apply to rocks because rocks are not agents, much less moral agents. Rocks do not have a mind or a physical brain and hence do not exhibit behavior.

Jeffery Jay Lowder

Ronin

Can I still shoot the raging boyfriend holding the gun to his girlfriend's 11 year old son's head without having to think so hard about it?

I may or may not, I suppose...or even do so in time.

It would only matter to a select few, including me, if the child or the boyfriend dies...and only for a limited amount of time.

Morality is only signficant on this real and personal level...not on a universal level ~ as pointed out by christ-on-a-stick.

That is the significance and the motivation to define what is moral.

Wiploc

Okay, let's have an example. Suppose Don't wear hats indoors is a moral rule. Is an indoor rock doing a bad thing if you put a hat on it? No, because every moral rule has unexpressed subtext that runs something like, "if you've got a choice."

Other inferable subtexts:
- if you understand that it is wrong to break this rule.
- if you understand the difference in right and wrong.
- if nobody is making you do it at gunpoint.
- etc.
crc

LHP Adept

beastmaster wrote:
So, is that the benchmark? A moral principle is objective if "no one can disagree" with it? [I assume "cast in stone" is a gratuitous metaphor].

old man wrote:
Insert the word reasonably "....can reasonably disagree". People disagree with it all the time. A bank robber disagrees with it, because whereas he regards it right that everyone else should create wealth, he alone is at liberty to steal from the wealth created by others.

I respond:
I hardly think (most) criminals beleive that it is 'right' for them to steal. People can choose to do things that they know/feel to be wrong. That's free will for you. People often make decisions based practical utility instead of morality.
The fact that someone does a thing cannot be taken as equivalent to their asserting that it is 'right'.



beastmaster wrote:
Aren't you really saying that no one *should* disagree with your anti-hypocrisy principle?
How is that in any sense objective? What we agree on is still based on synthesizing our subjective moralities.

old man wrote:
I am saying no-one can reasonably disagree, just as no-one can reasonably disagree that the earth is spherical, rather than flat.
Its objective because it is open to proof and disproof. About any judgment that you make, I could enter into an inquiry to determine whether or not you applied the same standard to yourself, and arrive at a true/false conclusion.

I respond:
You can arrive at an objective conclusion as to whether they are following your non-hypocrisy rule, not as to whether the rule is valid.
The roundness of the earth is directly observable. The wrongness of hypocrisy is not.
You have affirmatively asserted that hypocrisy and double standards are wrong. It is up to you to show why that assertion should be accepted. The lack of a 'reasonable' rebuttal (for the moment, let's assume no logically coherent rebuttal has been made) is not itself proof of your assertion, any more than my nondisproof of god means there is a god (argumentum ad ignorantium). The burden is still on you, Old Man.
In your opinion, hypocrisy and double standards are wrong. Well, I agree with you, that's also my opinion, but that does not make it 'true'. Even if we asked every (adult, competent) person on earth and they all agree, that still does not make it obvectively true (argumentum ad populi).



old man wrote:
The only basis for disagreeement (with the above statement) is the notion that society ought to be inherently amoral. In other words, disagreement with the principle is shown to subvert the whole of morality, rather than a mere part of it.

I respond:
This is not a statement about the moral rightness of the principle, but about its practical utility. If we accept that a society would be better off if its people were less hypocritical, does it then follow that hypocrisy is wrong? Indeed, one may make that claim (and I would likely agree), but it is a point which could be reasonably disputed, and which IS disputed.



old man wrote:
In a sense, a society's overall moral sensibility can be determined by the extent to which it puts the hypocrisy principle into practice.

I respond:
That is your opinion, not an objective fact.

Wiploc

At issue is not whether a majority of bank robbers believe they are right. At issue is the question of whether any of them could reasonably assert that it is okay for them to rob a bank. Some of them will pull this off.
crc

jlowder

Actually, even that (whether the robbers could reasonably assert ...) isn't the issue. All that moral objectivism entails is that there is an objective fact of the matter regarding whether an action is morally required, permissible, or forbidden.

Jeffery Jay Lowder

beastmaster

OK, it sounds like there are at least two distinct meanings to moral objectivism:

(1) Objectivism as the opposite of subjectivism: moral principles exist outside the human mind. Morality is like geometry: geometry works even if there is no mathematician.

(2) Objectivism as the opposite of relativism: moral principles should be based on non-case-specific criteria. Morality is like laws: constructed by humans for humans but built for general applicability to all situations. [general applicability, but not necessarily absolute....]

It seems like Plato and theists would adhere to the first definition, whereas Ayn Rand would adhere to the second conception.

Am I off base?

The second definition isn't what I would intuitively consider as being objectivism at all, but rather, it seems to be subjectivism making an appeal to reason (or perhaps a subjectivism that rejects relativism).

jlowder

Yes, I think you are off base. I'm not an authority on Ayn Randian Objectivism, but based on what little I know, I don't think (2) reflects the Randian position. More importantly, (2) is NOT moral objectivism. Whether moral principles are based on non-case specific criteria has nothing to do with whether the truth of moral principles is objective, inter-subjective, or subjective.

Jeffery Jay Lowder