Alonzo Fyfe

I do not believe that this is so certain. We can "certainly" feel that we like or dislike something, but there is an often ignored leap from this to conclusions of "right" and "wrong". The latter contains implications and assumptions that mere feeling cannot justify.

Feelings are subjective. Likes and dislikes are subjective. But there is reason to believe that morality refers to something more than just individual likes and dislikes -- such as the fact that my being disgusted by the thought of somebody eating raw oysters on the half shell hardly justifies my (moral) condemnation of those who engage in this practice.

Alonzo Fyfe

Value exists in the real world as a relational property -- like location. It describes a relationship between desires and states of affairs in the world.

Desires are "in the brain" (thus subjective) -- but they are a part of the real world, as real as, for example, the structure of a gem and the structure of a water molecule.

Different value terms can be distinguished according to the elements that fit into the three components of value.

(1) The desires that are relevant.
(2) The states off affairs in the world that are relevant to the evaluation.
(3) The relationship (direct or indirect) between the relevant desires and the relevant states of affairs.

In the case of moral value, the answer to these three components are:

(1) All desires are relevant (without exception).
(2) The ultimate object of moral evaluation are desires themselves.
(3) Both direct and indirect relationships are evaluated.

A desire counts as bad (evil) if it is the type of desire that tends to lead (directly and indirectly) to the thwarting of other desires; a desire is good (virtuous) if it tends to lead to the fulfillment of other desires.

An action is right if it is an action which a person with good desires would perform; an action is wrong if it is an action which a person with good desires would not perform.

There is a right answer to all moral questions. However, it is subject to change (like all relational properties -- these relationships change over time), and it is often the case that determining the right answer to moral questions is very difficult.

Lobstrosity

Thanks for the link. I will read through it when I have a bit more time on my hands.

It's seems to me the name of the game could be something as simple and objective as survival. We band together in societies first and foremost to enhance our chances of survival (this is taking the most basic view possible). Therefore, what we hope to get out of society is protection. If everyone puts in a certain amount, you get a society that can protect its individuals. This is tempered by the fact that each individual will primarily be concerned with his own survival and will not want to squander the resources it takes to look out for the wellbeing of others. This can be viewed as a math problem to be inspected under the light of game theory, perhaps. Survival's not good or bad, it's just what organisms are primarily concerned with--hmm, so maybe it's actually good. Humans above all else want to live (well, the ones that aren't suicidal). I see morals as a sacrifice humans make on their personal liberties designed to increase their own chances of survival. To me that's a pretty objective definition (at least I think it has the same objectivity as a descriptive statement about the nature of honeybee pollen-gathering strategies).

Essentially, the objectivity I want to reach is the same objectivity an alien researcher would have as he tried to observe and characterize human behavior from space. He would note morality as an essential component of human nature (or more aptly he would note that human societies function because of the presence of a code of ethics) and would try to quantify it.

Lobstrosity

Just in case you or anyone else is interested, here is a rather verbose yet simple set of objective moral rules I came up with four or five years ago. It is by no means complete or rigorous. I view it merely as a groundwork for a survival-based (and hence what I hope is objective) view of morality. I see you promote a self-propagating view of morality (in that desires are good so any desires which lead to more desires must be good), which is very interesting to say the least, although I'm not sure how justified it is (I need to actually sit down and think about this for a while). I, on the other hand, promote an evolutionary view of morality (in that any behaviors that increase odds of survival for the individual are "good" because, in my opinion, only while you are alive can you fulfill your desires).

Valmorian

How can it not be? I personally find the idea of rape to be repugnant. I'm not so deluded to think that this makes the statement "Rape is morally wrong" to be objectively true.

Again, even if EVERYONE agrees on something, that doesn't make it true. Since morality is a code of behaviour, it depends upon what your desired outcome is. You could say that not raping people is good for maintaining a society. I would agree with that.

However, suppose someone doesn't care about that. How can you convince someone who doesn't believe it is wrong to commit a rape that it is OBJECTIVELY wrong?

Valmorian

However, with the complete lack of any evidence to support the objectivity of morals, it's a fairly good indicator, wouldn't you think?

What exactly is this 'objective morality'? How does one reach it? Since a person's code of behaviour depends upon their desired outcome, how can it be anything other than subjective?

Majestyk

Ask the question: Is altruism a learned or innate behavior?

I say there is evidence that suggests that it is an innate characteristic of humankind. Whether it is encouraged and how it manifests itself is dependent on the environment to which the individual is exposed.

dk

So morality means censorship?

Now I'm really confused, if we censor all terms of traditional morality(as immoral), how can morality possibly serve to regulate conduct?

Alonzo Fyfe

Censorship?

I am saying -- under the assumptions that I am criticizing -- we should not be using moral terms to explain and justify our behavior for the same reason we not be using terms like "ghost" and "gremlin" to explain sounds and mechanical malfunctions.

They do not refer to anything real.

Not that we should censor those who make these types of claims, we should simply dismiss them on the basis of error.

Primal

Well first off the subjectivist rarely says what a moral is.

All they say is: well they are subjective. Well ok. So does that mean morals are literally whatever we define them as or believe them to be on whim? Can I not then define morals as "celestial objects" and say "well those are certainly objective"? No, because such a definition has no basis in regards to the phenomenon called "morality". When we think of morality we know we are not thinking of celestial objects, so obviously there are some ground rules in regards to what we are talking about.

Morality simply isn't a belief pulled out of nowhere.

Then do they mean instead a standard based totally on culture? Perhaps, but I doubt all our standards come from culture(there is biology) so that then appears to be wrong.

Perhaps they mean "paticular to a person" however this itself seems to be wrong as many people seem to share the same morals.

A big problem on the issue lies in ambiguity.

If you go by the dictionary definition subjective simply means "pertaining to the mind and not the external world."

Now I believe morals do pertain to the mind as part of the external world....so what does that mean? Unless they mean by "external world" simply what is not in mine or anyone else's mind....well then I would somewhat agree. I'm not sure as morals to me are a behavioral trait, an emotion, and are emotions part of the mind? Or merely part of the brain? Do they mean the same?

This definition is also not at odds with the definition of "objective" which states:


I could claim morality is subjective while still being able to say it is objective given my definition. For example I do believe morals exist as emotions, and it can be claimed that emotions exist "in the mind" at least partially. I also think emotions are real, material, and observed to an extent(in the behavioral sense and in regards to brain scans). (They are at the very least experienced.) However definition 3a obviously cannot be the case given this.

So are the morals now objective? Yes and no.

Does a moral's being subjective imply that it isn't real or anything goes? Not necessarily. All it means is they are "contained in the mind" (which I somewhat disagree with depending on how broad you are with the word "mind".) This may still leave certain patterns depending on how the mind is structured and this certainly rules out ideas of morality which are based on superstition and such. Finally when we evlaute moral systems and practices it likewise does not mean "anything goes" as certain practices can be said to satisfy the mind more then others.