Alonzo Fyfe

Error.

Celsus

Alonzo,

Is your form of utilitarianism methodologically individualistic? You wrote:

• A desire is good to the degree that the desire tends to cause actions that fulfills desires generally -- such as a desire to help others. A desire is bad to the degree that the desire tends to cause actions that thwarts the fulfillment of desires generally, such as a desire to rape or kill.

This can only be fulfilled in a social context--but normally, utilitarianism is methodologically individualistic. I'm a little confused. If it is social (as you adduce further down), then you end up with a fairly regular socialist/leftist view of things, which has little to do with orthodox (for want of a better word) utilitarianism.

Joel

Alonzo Fyfe

I do not understand how you are using the concept methodologically individualistic in this sense.

Utilitarianism has always been "social" in that its concern has always been for "the greatest good for the greatest number." It sees nothing wrong with imposing a minor sacrifice on one group of people in order to obtain a major benefit for a different group of individuals.

Indeed, this tendancy has been one of the greatest source of objections against utilitarianism.

Yet, I do not believe that it shows any type of bias in favor of socialist/leftist view of things. Capitalists often defend capitalism on the grounds that it promotes wealth and generally makes people better off. The bottom 20% in a capitalist society are still significantly better off than the average person in a non-capitalist society. Again, quite consistent with a "greatest good for the greatest number" theory of value.

Sarpedon

My code of ethics includes some utilitarian principles. #3 is the principle of mathmatical ethics, where things of greater number are assigned a greater weight than things of lesser number (of the same type). For example, it is always better to save two people instead of one. #4 is the principle of an ethical hierarchy, where certain things are ranked more highly ethically than other things. (A. peoples lives. B. peoples rights. C. peoples material interests. D. people's "feelings". E. non-human animals. F. ideas and inanimate objects.)

These are somewhat similar to what utilitarianists have as value equations.

Unas

Hedonism is a joke, the code of the fear-enchained herd. Here is a refutation of utilitarianist ethics: Suffering is embedded in the heart of reality and is absolutely ineradicable. The desire to stamp out suffering results from anxiety-soaked mental illness. Agony is natural and should be embraced as a potential stimulus of transformation, not hysterically denied and hunted down. How degraded, how timid, how antigrowthful, how infantile is the idea that pleasure should be the measure of all things! What a cheapening destructive philosophy! A convenient rationalization for comfort-addicted vegetative nihilism.

Zulu

The neat phrasing aside, I hope your being facetious here? I suppose opposing Room 101 Orwellian type torture is simply vegetative nihilism? I'd consider Utilitarianism the antithesis of nihilism actually. [Negative utilitarianism is a different question, but even then it's certainly not nihilistic]

-Zulu

DRFseven

Wow; since everything we do is for comfort, poor us. We're all degraded, timid, antigrowthful infants!

Dr. Retard

You are lame.

Zulu

Dr. Retard, I'd be much obliged if you had a look at my post a bit further up...thanks.

-Zulu

Alonzo Fyfe

Yes, hedonism is a joke. It is a 19th-century theory that, at least in professional circles, did not survive live past the turn of the century, and for good reason.

The following example illustrates the problem with hedonism (as well as eudaemonism, egoism, egotism, and similar theories).

Assume that a person and her child have been taken prisoner by a sadistic dictator who gives her the following choice:

(1) Option 1, her child will be tortured mercilessly, but she will be caused to believe that he is living a healthy, happy, fulfilled life.

(2) Option 2, her child will be caused to live a healthy, happy, fulfilled, safe life, but she will be caused to believe that he is being tortured mercilessly.

Fill in the details however you want so that the person making this choice believes that these, in fact, are her genuine options.

Hedonism, egoism, and all other self-regarding all hold that option (2) will not even be tempting. A person may lie -- in order to preserve her status among others -- in stating that a preference for option (1) but option (1) in fact could never be seriously considered under any type of self-regarding theory. The welfare of the child is merely secondary to the adult's concern for his or her own welfare.

Now, certainly, no experiment can be conducted to prove these results. But those who hold a self-regarding theory must still account for the phenomena that what people tend to report is entirely opposite from what self-regarding theories predict would be the most tempting option.

Another theory handles this type situation much better, and is the dominant (though by no means the only) theory proposed today.

This theory holds that actions are caused by an interaction of beliefs and desires. Both of these are "propositional attitudes" -- states encoded into the human mind that define a mental attitude toward a proposition P.

A "belief that P" is an attitude encoded into the mind that the proposition "P" is true. So, a person who has a belief that snow is white has a mental attitude that the proposition "snow is white" is true. A person who has a belief that a red dragon is waiting outside his house to swollow him up has a mental attitude encoded in his brain that the proposition, "A red dragon is waiting outside my house to swollow me up" is true.

A "desire that P" is an attitude encoded into the mind that the proposition "P" ought to be made or ought to be caused to remain true. Such a person is motivated, to a degree proportional to the strength of the desire, to make the proposition P true. A person with has a desire that her child be well off has a mental attitude encoded in her brain that motivates her to make or keep the proposition "my child is well off" true.

All issues of pleasure, or happiness, or satisfaction over the choice are irrelevant. The individual might also have a second desire for these effects, but this second desire is insufficient to explain the bulk of human choices.

Take this theory and apply it to the hypothetical situation above. The prisoner has a desire that her child be well off -- a mental attitude that will dispose her to act (to a degree proportional to the strength of the desire) in such a way as to make or keep the proposition "my child is well off" true.

Then, given the two options above, under the assumption that she believes that these options are genuine, this desire will cause her to choose option 2 over option 1.

The person may also have a desire for the peasure, happiness, or satisfaction (a desire "that I be happy" or "that I experience pleasure") that would result from choosing option 1, but those desires are insignificant when put up against the greater weight of the desire "that my child be well off" that is recommending option 2.

Now, this view is consistent with the idea that each person only acts to fulfill his or her own desires. But to say this is to stay that the only brain connected in the right way to the muscles that are used in a particular action is the brain of the person performing that action. Your beliefs and desires cannot cause my actions because your brain is not connected to my muscles in the right way.

But, still, those desires need not all be self-regarding desires; indeed we have good reason to believe (as illustrated in the example above) that desires can also be other-regarding. It is perfectly compatible with this theory that a person can have a desire, for example, that no child will ever go hungry (be moved to cause the proposition "no child will ever go hungry" to be true). Or a person can value freedom for all people (a desire that no person live under tyranny) more than he values his own life (a desire to continue living, in other words, a desire that "I am alive" continues to be true).

Desire-utilitarianism holds that a desire is good to the degree that the desire tends to have good consequences in virtue of the actions caused by that desire. It is not a hedonistic or egoistic theory or suffer from any of the problems that plagued those old 19th century versions of utilitarianism.