hedonologist

But what is disrupted?

The hypothetical illustrates a flaw in the concept that "we" survive, if our brains maintain a certain arrangement. If we intend to "help ourselves" we live for the interest of this abstract "singular identity", who is "one person" through time, but maybe we are really just like a person with "someone else's" memories, subconsciously benefiting some future person, when we think we are benefiting "ourselves".

In another sense, we are benefiting ourselves, because our brain rewards us for making it (our brain) survive, but this does not contradict the point I'm trying to make.

excreationist

Well assuming that the person is unconscious during the copying, I think there aren't any problems - the original is copied while being unconscious and then killed. The copy is revived. But if the original is conscious during or after the copying at all, then there are problems - one version of that person knows that they will die. (At least during the copying, the only one who wakes up knows that they will be alive)

Yes, that's true, but we've got to just assume that we are this person who we seem to be in whatever life we find ourselves in. Otherwise we might make bad decisions that have long-term consequences.

Yes, we feel pleasure (behavioural reinforcement) when we perceive that we are overcoming danger. I guess this would also apply if we think our future copied self is going to survive, who is half us. (The other half is destroyed while we're unconscious after the copying) But I guess we haven't really lost anything.... (unless death means eternal torture in hell)

hedonologist

The person who is being copied, will know "they" are going to "die" and pay for "someone else" to come to life, before they are copied, if they just consider this hypothetical.
So you are saying that in this case "good decisions" are based on a false premise? Correct me if I am wrong but it looks like your basis for calling the decisions bad, is the belief that we are the same person throughout time.

How do you know that believing that we are not the same person through time will lead to things you wouldn't like? Maybe it would just shift our values to being less "selfish" or IOW we might consider it to be "selfish" to benefit our neighbor?

How do you judge a decision to be good or bad?

If it is really a false belief that we can benefit "ourselves", maybe we need to reevaluate all of our intentions so that we are not merely slaves to our body (or to someone else).
Why do you say these beings are "half" us? Seems to me they are as "different" from the original as two people are from each other. The only thing that connects us to a future being we "become" is this natural empathy, which is so deep, we think of this future being as "ourselves". They are "ourselves" because so often, what is beneficial to them is beneficial to us. We hate the thought of future suffering, and avoid it like it was our present suffering. Is this any different from having empathy for another person? Only in terms of the degree of empathy. (I'm speaking on one side of the paradox when I say that.)
It wouldn't be "us" in hell, it would be another future person, who we would only have empathy for if we knew he would exist in hell.

Jamie_L

I guess in a way I really don't buy into the idea of "me" being a precise brain state. In the case of copies, I don't feel that it is the divergent experiences that really separate "me" from the copies. Rather, it's the fact that "I" am the result of the original brain, not the new one.

Sure, our cells get replaced, and no I can't prove I'm the same person that went to bed last night. But my perception and consciousness seem (through my experience) clearly tied to this body and this brain. I have no reason to believe that making copies of my brain would change this.

If my brain dies, I'm dead. Doesn't matter if there's another brain in the room just like it.

Jamie

hedonologist

hehe But saying that you are the result of an original brain, refers to what I would call a "brain state".
But what connects "you" to the experiences of the original brain, throughout time?
Your perception and consciousness are tied to that body and brain. The person whose perception and consciousness were tied to that body and brain, last night when you went to bed, probably felt the same way.
I wasn't suggesting it would.
True. The question is, whether "you" live if your brain lives or IOW whether you just came to life at this instance.

God Fearing Atheist

I agree with Searle when he suggests the whole Cartesian "mind-body" distinction is hopeless out of date and altogether useless.

God Fearing Atheist

Sounds alot like Kripke and Putnam's "Twin Earth" argument against the description theory of reference.

Searle's reply is to suggest the intentional content of a belief (its "aboutness") has a self-referentiality. The satisfaction condition of my seeing the color red is that *I* see the color red, and that what I have seen is indeed red (or green, or a car, or whatever). This way, we can sort out which intentional content belongs to whom.

hedonologist

I'm trying to figure out what that means in terms of it implications regarding your behavior. If buying and installing a new brain of whatever physical structure you could imagine, were as easy as installing a new hard drive, might you consider getting an "upgrade"?

excreationist

I'd get more RAM (short term memory or working memory) - I think that is the most important thing. I don't need any more long term storage though. My brain could be overclocked from something like 20-40 cycles per second to 1000+ Hz. It would be like upgrading parts of a computer. If you totally replaced the computer then it is no longer the same computer - it is just a new brain in your old body.

hedonologist

Would you do that?