Freethought & Rationalism Archive

CavemanUg · 03-18-2003, 08:59 PM

Isn't the real question behind this "does randomness exist?"

I can say that I don't have free will when I hold my breath because something had to influence me to want to hold my breath. My holdign my breath is only a reactionary response to my enviroment. If I decide to flip out and start killing people there has to be some reason I began to flip out and kill people right? Whether it be chemical imbalance, shell shock, abject poverty, a bad day, there is still always soemthing that triggered that event.
I get up. I walk to the kitchen. I get food. I go back to the computer (with food for consumption) and start typing. Is this free will? I had the choice, in theory, but there was something that triggered that choice. Isn't the goal of psychology to figure out why we do the things we do? Give somebody a stimulus record how they respond. If you record enough reactions will you find correlations between upbringing/genes?
Now why did I even bring randomness into this? Because to me that seems to be the really question. Is anything in existance unexpanible (ecluding existence)? Bodies of matter (atoms, molecules, planets, etc.) follow laws of physics and laws of chemistry. If you throw a rock up in the air it falls back down. If you put water vapor in a pressurized room (that is above 100�C) and keep increasing the preasure you will eventually get water in its liquid form. So is there any cases where a reaction defys the laws and if so, is in inexpicable why it defys the laws? If the answer is yes, then i believe in free will. But if not, then I do not believe in free will, because it seems that all things can be predicted given enough information and the human experiance is far from exempt from this principle.
But I think life is a lot like Space Mountian� (that roller coaster in Diseny Land where the whole thing is in the dark)... It might be predetermined, but we can't tell before we get there, and isnt that the real fun of life?

King's Indian · 03-19-2003, 06:02 AM

Hello, Kip
Having gone through your piece in more detail, I have to thank you in explaining such a complicated position so well. Unfortunately, there is still some confusion in my mind, so I would like your elaboration on a few points if that�s OK. (I take it that �freedom of action� only refers to the degrees of freedom an entity like ourselves is capable of, with no concession that we can make conscious choices).
It seems to me that throughout, you bring in concepts that depend on an idea of �freedom to make choices� for their force: here are some examples.

Quote:

�I am quite critical of positions which show every sign of ulterior motives. My suspicion is that libertarianism is motivated by a desire [�]�

My point here is that motive becomes strictly meaningless when applied to entities that are entirely the product of themselves and their environment, with no question of free will, even if they seem to do things (a comparison I made elsewhere was with clouds, which isn�t such a bad thing to be compared to).

Quote:

� Consider the person A whom brain surgeons manipulate so that A will take action X and that A immediately does so[�]

This seems misdirected. Of course if a surgeon tinkers about with someone�s mind so he behaves as behaviourism would expect, then all we have shown is our power to reduce someone�s complexity: and we would see it as a reduction The thing would be more compelling if a surgeon put in a clockwork i/o mechanism, and we couldn�t see anything different. In any event, the interesting question of motivation in this gedankenexperiment is always going to attach to the surgeon.

Quote:

No matter which distinction is suggested, B seems to be as essentially predictable (at least to an omniscient being)[�]

Essentially this is my first point: We must disallow any such omnipotent observer as a consequence of the phenomenon under discussion. He can be no more or less real as a concept than one of �free will�.

Quote:

I maintain that this feeling of freedom is a subtle illusion that results from the heterogeneous nature of the human brain[�]

Again, the idea of illusion draws its strength from the idea that there is a choice-making entity who is misled into making the wrong choice (in this case, on what to believe as true).
In short, part of your article�s strength comes from precisely by having one foot in the �free will� camp.
There are a few more points, but I don�t want to dazzle you with my insight all at once hem hem, and I look forward to your clarification.
Take care,
KI.

jpbrooks · 03-19-2003, 11:05 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by Kip

This is a very interesting experiment. I do not think that this example undermines my conclusions, however, for at least two possible reasons.

1. You seem to commit the same fallacy I mention in my essay by regarding human beings as perfectly rational beings who only consider relevant differences while deciding. This is not the case. Not only may a man prefer one woman to another because she is prettier, he may also prefer her because the weather was somewhat more humid, or because he saw her in his peripheral vision first, or for any number of irrelevant reasons.

[/B]

Exactly! And saying that any one combination of that large number of possible causes could have been the actual cause of the man's choice doesn't demonstrate that some phenomenon outside of the "self" is what causes its choices.

Quote:

Indeed, the vast majority of this considerations are unconscious.

If the cause of one's choices can be "internal" to the individual, then that seems to confirm "self determinism" rather than "hard determinism".

Quote:

This must be the case, or how else would a human being produce apparently random output? If a human being knows that two outputs are equally likely, there is no relevant reason to choose one over the other, and yet humans have the remarkable ability to do so? How does the human accomplish such a fantastic task? Irrelevant difference and unconscious decision processes (whims or flights of fancy) are responsible and not some mystical "free will".

But the problem is that humans don't always make choices the same way. Sometimes they make choices on the basis of "whim", but sometimes they do not. So how does the "hard" version of determinism explain the cause of one's decision to follow, or not to follow, one's "whims"? We can usually choose whether or not to behave randomly.

Quote:

2. That criticism may be missing the point. You might respond by suggesting that not only were the relevant differences the same but ALSO irrelevant differences. Indeed, assume that the conditions for both choices are mathematically identical and further than the human has absolute equal knowledge of both. This is the same point that Aristotle's "a donkey would starve before choicing between two equidistant meals" illustrates. My first response to this suggestion is that these conditions are vanishingly improbable. This situation simply never exists. If you were to press me and ask, "but what if it did", my response would be that this would be singularity. The situation in which a rational agent must choose between two perfectly equal choices is like asking a computer to divide by zero. Perhaps the man would simply be paralyzed and refuse to do so. Perhaps the universe would come to a halt. I do not know.

The universe need not come to a halt.
Nothing impossible will have occurred. In this situation where there is absolute similarity in the conditions of the alternatives (apart from mental considerations), the one difference would be the consciousness of the person who is to make the choice. The person's "attention" can only be focused on one alternative at a time. And this difference (caused by consciouness) between the two alternatives, can serve as the basis for a choice.

Quote:

What possible differences might these be?

Well, those related to consciousness (as I alluded to above), for example, such as "feelings", that can serve as motivating factors for making choices.

I have to run.

DRFseven · 03-19-2003, 11:26 AM

Something I would like to add to this discussion:

1. We have a whole strata of unconscious memories contributing to add up to the plus/minus determination of a decision. We are unable to prevent this.

2. We rely on memory, conscious as well as unconscious, to make decisions. Memories comprise experience, which categorizes the process of conclusion-making as experientially motivated.

3. Whether we are hard determinists or not, we must admit that we do not bootstrap ourselves. Even as we make choices and direct our lives, we are not naive enough to think we have orchestrated that ability to become the person who made those choices. As Strawson says, "Luck swallows everything."

Kip · 03-19-2003, 10:34 PM

Quote:

It seems to me that throughout, you bring in concepts that depend on an idea of �freedom to make choices� for their force: here are some examples. My point here is that motive becomes strictly meaningless when applied to entities that are entirely the product of themselves and their environment, with no question of free will, even if they seem to do things (a comparison I made elsewhere was with clouds, which isn�t such a bad thing to be compared to).This seems misdirected. Of course if a surgeon tinkers about with someone�s mind so he behaves as behaviourism would expect, then all we have shown is our power to reduce someone�s complexity: and we would see it as a reduction The thing would be more compelling if a surgeon put in a clockwork i/o mechanism, and we couldn�t see anything different. In any event, the interesting question of motivation in this gedankenexperiment is always going to attach to the surgeon.Essentially this is my first point: We must disallow any such omnipotent observer as a consequence of the phenomenon under discussion. He can be no more or less real as a concept than one of �free will�.Again, the idea of illusion draws its strength from the idea that there is a choice-making entity who is misled into making the wrong choice (in this case, on what to believe as true).
In short, part of your article�s strength comes from precisely by having one foot in the �free will� camp.
There are a few more points, but I don�t want to dazzle you with my insight all at once hem hem, and I look forward to your clarification.
Take care,
KI. [/B]

Let me respond by first saying that since posting my essay I have recognized at least three major problems:

1. I say that humans do not possess either internal or external freedom. This is false. Humans possess external freedom to the extent that differences in the person's state of mind (mood) account for different answers to the same decisions.

2. I claim that my ethic is informed by hard determinism to treat humans like hurricanes. This is too strong. Rather, there is a continuum between holding people as perfectly rational, morally responsible agents and regarding people as mindless phenomena like hurricanes. By claim is that hard determinism pushes a person towards the hurricane end, away from a natural inclination, in our ignorance of human's mechanical nature, that is too far towards personal responsibility. I also claim that the distinction between hurricanes and humans is more quantitative than qualititative, in that verbally commicating is simply physically manipulating a very complex system with audio waves. In that sense humans are no different than any other physical system that presents a danger to humans, only more complex.

3. My argument only applies to a narrow, though historical and important, notion of moral responsibility.

My first response to you is one of confusion. You assert that some adverse consequences follow from my premises but I do not see anything close to a reasonable arguments as to why these should follow. You also seem to jump from claim to claim.

For example, you claim (I understand) that my arguments should undermine:

1. Sensations. For example, I should deny pleasure in having written the essay. Pleasure is perfectly compatible with what I have written. Perhaps you are claiming that I may feel pleasure but that this pleasure is undeserved? That is a more subtle, and much more respectable criticism. You may be correct. But our pleasure reward system is a result of evolution and can hardly be "thought away". I am not sure if this is a sufficient reply. Indeed, if you are correct, you have only demonstrated that, in my taking pleasure in my essay, I am not fully appreciating the consequences of my own logic. In that case I am being a hypocrite, and if my rational logic contradicts my natural feelings - so much the less for my natural feelings.

2. Intelligence. You compare an intelligent system such as the brain to clocks and clouds. In one sense, which I think is irrelevant, that is true. The laws of physics are operating equal on every part, whether that particle is a part of the brain or cloud. But that fails to consider the importance of patterns and also that computation can be reducible. I wish to emphasize that what I have written is perfectly compatible with intelligent systems. I should hope that my robot example would have demonstrated this. If you disagree, you need to provide a better argument than simply asserting that brains are like unintelligent systems such as clouds.

Quote:

This seems misdirected. Of course if a surgeon tinkers about with someone�s mind so he behaves as behaviourism would expect, then all we have shown is our power to reduce someone�s complexity: and we would see it as a reduction The thing would be more compelling if a surgeon put in a clockwork i/o mechanism, and we couldn�t see anything different. In any event, the interesting question of motivation in this gedankenexperiment is always going to attach to the surgeon.

As I argue in my essay, the difference between the clock is one of only degree and not kind. You twist the knobs of intelligence and complexity and the clock becomes a brain. So, from the premise, the conclusion might be that this difference is irrelevant.

I also argue that the motivation of the surgeon is irrelevant. If a surgeon maliciously manipulates you - we deny your responsibility. But if an a surgeon mindlessly performs the same action with no motivation, we STILL exempt you from responsibility. The surgeon's motivations are irrelevant. This is the heart of probably the strongest argument for hard determinism.

Here is an important point:

Quote:

Essentially this is my first point: We must disallow any such omnipotent observer as a consequence of the phenomenon under discussion. He can be no more or less real as a concept than one of �free will�.

But whether or not he can be real is irrelevant! Of course he cannot be real. The point is that he is conceivable! This is the heart of the matter, because from this conclusions follows all of the consequences that I emphasizing: the humility, the sympathy, the feelings of being subjected to fate. It is not the possibility of such a being that is humbling - it is our recognition of our own mechanical, predetermined nature, regardless of whether or not anyone exists who is wise enough to use that nature against us.

the_cave · 03-20-2003, 05:13 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by CavemanUg
Isn't the real question behind this "does randomness exist?"

I agree with this claim. If there are random events at any level of sentient thinking, then a sort of real freedom could ensue. It might not be exactly like the sort of free will we're used to, but it would still be freedom, and would also account for our sense of making free choices--in other words, our "free will". I think there could be other explanations for "common-sense" freedom (meaning, freedom beyond a lack of external restraint), but this one would do. I admit it's speculative, in that we haven't yet determined whether there are random events at any level of sentient thinking (though if Roger Penrose is right about the quantum nature of consiousness, it seems to me there are.)

King's Indian · 03-20-2003, 05:36 PM

Kip,

Thanks for responding with another clearly-written reply. And also thank you for mentioning when it seems to you that one of my points can be interpreted with more subtlety, and that you didn�t write me off as hopelessly confusing. I�m even relieved, in a way, that my points were hopping about like tree-frogs: I was worried that I was banging on about the same point over and over. (Namely, �In short, part of your article�s strength comes from precisely by having one foot in the �free will� camp.) I found it difficult how the hardest determinism can usefully employ concepts like �motivation by a desire�, �fondness�, �malice� etc. In fact, this is why I applauded your clarity: you could have gone through your piece with a blue pencil striking out all the words that appeared a bit �free will�-y, which would have made things more difficult to follow. Since your modifications help even more with clarification (and seems to throw off more useful lines of thought), I offer the blather below in the hope of reciprocation, and not as any putative rebuttal. I�ll finish by addressing some points to one of your modifications, as it is interesting in its own right. And now I know I misjudged the extremity of your position, I can retract those points on which they depend.
1) Sensations
My point about taking pleasure (from the post before the one quoted) does tend towards the latter interpretation: Of course we feel pleasure, but the hardest determinism teaches this as an inevitable �mechanical� response by our bodies, with brain activity as a focus. This is well answered by your �perfectly rational morally responsible agents/hurricane continuum� (PRMRA/H for short). I�m not so quick to discount my feelings, by the way. They seem to be too useful. I�ve even heard how particle physicists found such feelings as pleasure and intellectual excitement a help in motivating their research. Not that that refutes your position.
2) Intelligence
Again, now you mention the continuum, I can do a bit better than just mentioning clouds. Even though, as you rightly add, they are both physical systems, this is a trivial comparison. In this sense, the laws of physics are wide enough to encompass explanations for both, without one necessarily being subordinated to the other. But you seem to wish to go further: � The laws of physics are operating equal on every part, whether that particle is a part of the brain or cloud�. Do we need to insist that the only laws that really concern us are those that help us to understand particles? Planetary motion, for example, seems fully understood without such laws, although we also know that planets are ultimately comprised of them. My trivial point translated would be something like stating that two entities may be found at divergent points on our �consciousness continuum�, and then trying to explain the behaviour of one end by making reference to the other. That these entities can be represented as points on a line, is the least interesting thing about them. We are more concerned with fruitfully elaborating the differences.
Forgive my weak attempt at surgical humour. I was just thinking I wouldn�t like to be under his care (particularly if I had gone in for appendicitis). I still think (in terms of the continuum) that if we change the state of an entity (our poor sod of a patient) so that it slides down from one end to the other, we can�t use any information from the entity in its new place to help explain the position from where it started. (Other than confirming the validity of a continuum as such). If you say that, in the example �You twist the knobs of intelligence and complexity and the clock becomes a brain. So, from the premise, the conclusion might be that this difference is irrelevant�, the example itself might come under the heading of that same �irrelevance� that applies to clouds and people, given that the difference in complexity of behaviours in both cases is so vast. I myself, think that the clock/brain difference is far from irrelevant.
A quick point about robots, prostheses etc. As far as I know we use these terms to describe products of our technology. Of course robots and computers can be made to echo aspects of a biological entity�s behaviour, but we have some way to go before we can state that in both cases the explanatory mechanism is the same: we will have to eventually account for the differences between bioogical development (inc. evolution) and human manufacture , for example. How far we can trust �determinism� as the product of deterministic brains? the concept may be due to forces we have no idea of yet.
3) The omnipotent observer: I didn�t, and I�m afraid to say, still don�t think he�s irrelevant, as you put him into a position of judgment. It�s not allowable that he can merely be conceivable: after all, free will is conceivable too. My point is that w have no evidence for such a being. I think, though, what would be allowed is something along the lines of a mechanism we can build that can distinguish and identify ranges of behaviours to an infinitely painstaking degree. If the mechanism can�t distinguish, then that will be very interesting (although still leaving the questions of (homologous?) mechanisms to one side).
The PRMRA/H Continuum.
This is really good. I�ll never have to mention clouds again as examples. I welcome your thoughts on the following:
I would be happier in my own mind if the former term were something representing our position. If there is no evidence for PRMRA�s, we can�t allow them as one end of the continuum. We�re not such beings: because we show a fondness for our examples, we can�t be perfectly rational. Computers, which are, have some way to go before evidence of moral distinctions become apparent. I don�t discount the possibility, even though they may become so by different paths than the ones we seem to have taken. I also tend away from supernatural entities, on grounds of evidence. In your opinion, by the way, in marking off one end of the continuum by such PRMRA�s are they allowable as a real possibility? One wonders, in that case, whether biology will ever be up to the job. Perhaps technology will?
To close, I want to stress that I�ve only addressed those points where my confusion leads to differences of opinion. I could have written half as much again on the points I agree with. I�ll just mention a couple of examples. Firstly, I agree entirely with the moral conclusions that you draw from our not having the free will you identify as �badly-defined�. Of course humility is necessary, once we start imagining that we are too special to be characterized as more than just mere animals. I also agree with your dismissal of the �unopposed will�. I wish you would treat more explicitly the idea whether an opposed will has any place in the continuum. Finally, I can have no complaint with the following: �Pleasure is perfectly compatible with what I have written�.
Looking forward to more of your essays,
KI.

PS: Obviously you won�t have time to write any more if I keep bothering you. Just reply to the points that you deem fit, while I study your posts some more.

DRFseven · 03-21-2003, 05:35 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by the_cave
If there are random events at any level of sentient thinking, then a sort of real freedom could ensue. It might not be exactly like the sort of free will we're used to, but it would still be freedom, and would also account for our sense of making free choices--in other words, our "free will". I think there could be other explanations for "common-sense" freedom (meaning, freedom beyond a lack of external restraint), but this one would do.

How could this be consistent with "free will?" Even if random blips set off a chain of associations, we are still using memory, which, being all we have, is what we must use. Experience has already provided and associated these memories; how could random events, even if they happen, change this?

the_cave · 03-21-2003, 12:22 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by DRFseven
How could this be consistent with "free will?" Even if random blips set off a chain of associations, we are still using memory, which, being all we have, is what we must use. Experience has already provided and associated these memories; how could random events, even if they happen, change this?

If there are random mental events, it would mean that memories would not always determine decisions, by definition.

Besides, memories aren't all we have--we also have our desires, and our abstract reasoning, which are not the same thing as memories (though memories do I think influence our desires.) But again, if there are random mental events, then even desires and reasoning wouldn't determine behavior--because sometimes, they would occur randomly.

DRFseven · 03-21-2003, 05:48 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by the_cave
If there are random mental events, it would mean that memories would not always determine decisions, by definition.

Besides, memories aren't all we have--we also have our desires, and our abstract reasoning, which are not the same thing as memories (though memories do I think influence our desires.) But again, if there are random mental events, then even desires and reasoning wouldn't determine behavior--because sometimes, they would occur randomly.

But there is no thinking at all without memory; everything we know, all information we have is memory. We wouldn't even have words without memory. In short, without memories, there is nothing to use to think with, and no cues to use to reach the information you don't have anymore. Excreationist has posted some good information on the relationship of cognition to thinking, but I can supply you with links if you'd like.

Another problem; even if random mental events could happen and make sense without any context, there would be no way to "bring them back" to recognize them and ponder them. And to top it all off, you still wouldn't be willing anything because it would be random.

03-18-2003, 08:59 PM	#11
CavemanUg Junior Member Join Date: Mar 2003 Location: Petaluma, Ca Posts: 14	an idea Isn't the real question behind this "does randomness exist?" I can say that I don't have free will when I hold my breath because something had to influence me to want to hold my breath. My holdign my breath is only a reactionary response to my enviroment. If I decide to flip out and start killing people there has to be some reason I began to flip out and kill people right? Whether it be chemical imbalance, shell shock, abject poverty, a bad day, there is still always soemthing that triggered that event. I get up. I walk to the kitchen. I get food. I go back to the computer (with food for consumption) and start typing. Is this free will? I had the choice, in theory, but there was something that triggered that choice. Isn't the goal of psychology to figure out why we do the things we do? Give somebody a stimulus record how they respond. If you record enough reactions will you find correlations between upbringing/genes? Now why did I even bring randomness into this? Because to me that seems to be the really question. Is anything in existance unexpanible (ecluding existence)? Bodies of matter (atoms, molecules, planets, etc.) follow laws of physics and laws of chemistry. If you throw a rock up in the air it falls back down. If you put water vapor in a pressurized room (that is above 100�C) and keep increasing the preasure you will eventually get water in its liquid form. So is there any cases where a reaction defys the laws and if so, is in inexpicable why it defys the laws? If the answer is yes, then i believe in free will. But if not, then I do not believe in free will, because it seems that all things can be predicted given enough information and the human experiance is far from exempt from this principle. But I think life is a lot like Space Mountian� (that roller coaster in Diseny Land where the whole thing is in the dark)... It might be predetermined, but we can't tell before we get there, and isnt that the real fun of life?

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03-19-2003, 11:26 AM	#14
DRFseven Veteran Member Join Date: Mar 2001 Posts: 2,322	Something I would like to add to this discussion: 1. We have a whole strata of unconscious memories contributing to add up to the plus/minus determination of a decision. We are unable to prevent this. 2. We rely on memory, conscious as well as unconscious, to make decisions. Memories comprise experience, which categorizes the process of conclusion-making as experientially motivated. 3. Whether we are hard determinists or not, we must admit that we do not bootstrap ourselves. Even as we make choices and direct our lives, we are not naive enough to think we have orchestrated that ability to become the person who made those choices. As Strawson says, "Luck swallows everything."

03-20-2003, 05:36 PM	#17
King's Indian Regular Member Join Date: Feb 2003 Location: Croydon: London's Second City Posts: 144	Kip, Thanks for responding with another clearly-written reply. And also thank you for mentioning when it seems to you that one of my points can be interpreted with more subtlety, and that you didn�t write me off as hopelessly confusing. I�m even relieved, in a way, that my points were hopping about like tree-frogs: I was worried that I was banging on about the same point over and over. (Namely, �In short, part of your article�s strength comes from precisely by having one foot in the �free will� camp.) I found it difficult how the hardest determinism can usefully employ concepts like �motivation by a desire�, �fondness�, �malice� etc. In fact, this is why I applauded your clarity: you could have gone through your piece with a blue pencil striking out all the words that appeared a bit �free will�-y, which would have made things more difficult to follow. Since your modifications help even more with clarification (and seems to throw off more useful lines of thought), I offer the blather below in the hope of reciprocation, and not as any putative rebuttal. I�ll finish by addressing some points to one of your modifications, as it is interesting in its own right. And now I know I misjudged the extremity of your position, I can retract those points on which they depend. 1) Sensations My point about taking pleasure (from the post before the one quoted) does tend towards the latter interpretation: Of course we feel pleasure, but the hardest determinism teaches this as an inevitable �mechanical� response by our bodies, with brain activity as a focus. This is well answered by your �perfectly rational morally responsible agents/hurricane continuum� (PRMRA/H for short). I�m not so quick to discount my feelings, by the way. They seem to be too useful. I�ve even heard how particle physicists found such feelings as pleasure and intellectual excitement a help in motivating their research. Not that that refutes your position. 2) Intelligence Again, now you mention the continuum, I can do a bit better than just mentioning clouds. Even though, as you rightly add, they are both physical systems, this is a trivial comparison. In this sense, the laws of physics are wide enough to encompass explanations for both, without one necessarily being subordinated to the other. But you seem to wish to go further: � The laws of physics are operating equal on every part, whether that particle is a part of the brain or cloud�. Do we need to insist that the only laws that really concern us are those that help us to understand particles? Planetary motion, for example, seems fully understood without such laws, although we also know that planets are ultimately comprised of them. My trivial point translated would be something like stating that two entities may be found at divergent points on our �consciousness continuum�, and then trying to explain the behaviour of one end by making reference to the other. That these entities can be represented as points on a line, is the least interesting thing about them. We are more concerned with fruitfully elaborating the differences. Forgive my weak attempt at surgical humour. I was just thinking I wouldn�t like to be under his care (particularly if I had gone in for appendicitis). I still think (in terms of the continuum) that if we change the state of an entity (our poor sod of a patient) so that it slides down from one end to the other, we can�t use any information from the entity in its new place to help explain the position from where it started. (Other than confirming the validity of a continuum as such). If you say that, in the example �You twist the knobs of intelligence and complexity and the clock becomes a brain. So, from the premise, the conclusion might be that this difference is irrelevant�, the example itself might come under the heading of that same �irrelevance� that applies to clouds and people, given that the difference in complexity of behaviours in both cases is so vast. I myself, think that the clock/brain difference is far from irrelevant. A quick point about robots, prostheses etc. As far as I know we use these terms to describe products of our technology. Of course robots and computers can be made to echo aspects of a biological entity�s behaviour, but we have some way to go before we can state that in both cases the explanatory mechanism is the same: we will have to eventually account for the differences between bioogical development (inc. evolution) and human manufacture , for example. How far we can trust �determinism� as the product of deterministic brains? the concept may be due to forces we have no idea of yet. 3) The omnipotent observer: I didn�t, and I�m afraid to say, still don�t think he�s irrelevant, as you put him into a position of judgment. It�s not allowable that he can merely be conceivable: after all, free will is conceivable too. My point is that w have no evidence for such a being. I think, though, what would be allowed is something along the lines of a mechanism we can build that can distinguish and identify ranges of behaviours to an infinitely painstaking degree. If the mechanism can�t distinguish, then that will be very interesting (although still leaving the questions of (homologous?) mechanisms to one side). The PRMRA/H Continuum. This is really good. I�ll never have to mention clouds again as examples. I welcome your thoughts on the following: I would be happier in my own mind if the former term were something representing our position. If there is no evidence for PRMRA�s, we can�t allow them as one end of the continuum. We�re not such beings: because we show a fondness for our examples, we can�t be perfectly rational. Computers, which are, have some way to go before evidence of moral distinctions become apparent. I don�t discount the possibility, even though they may become so by different paths than the ones we seem to have taken. I also tend away from supernatural entities, on grounds of evidence. In your opinion, by the way, in marking off one end of the continuum by such PRMRA�s are they allowable as a real possibility? One wonders, in that case, whether biology will ever be up to the job. Perhaps technology will? To close, I want to stress that I�ve only addressed those points where my confusion leads to differences of opinion. I could have written half as much again on the points I agree with. I�ll just mention a couple of examples. Firstly, I agree entirely with the moral conclusions that you draw from our not having the free will you identify as �badly-defined�. Of course humility is necessary, once we start imagining that we are too special to be characterized as more than just mere animals. I also agree with your dismissal of the �unopposed will�. I wish you would treat more explicitly the idea whether an opposed will has any place in the continuum. Finally, I can have no complaint with the following: �Pleasure is perfectly compatible with what I have written�. Looking forward to more of your essays, KI. PS: Obviously you won�t have time to write any more if I keep bothering you. Just reply to the points that you deem fit, while I study your posts some more.

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