Alonzo Fyfe

Allow me to rephrase the point.

If intersubjectivism determines fright from wrong, and unanimity in intersubjectivism is an unreasonable demand that can never be met, then . . .

If enough people in a culture intersubjectively approves of rape, or slavery, or genocide, or sadistic torture, then this activity would be morally justifiable. Nothing can be said on behalf of the victim - - - consistent with the intersubjectivity criterion of right and wrong - - - that they are being treated in any way inappropriately. Appropriateness is determined by dominant intersubjectivity.

Now, I am not talking about your APPROVAL in this, because I will assume that your subjective preferences are not consistent with those of the hypothetical dominant intersubjectivity assumed in the above question. What I am talking about is the logical consistency of your statements.


This seems to be confusing a number of different points. I am arguing that subjectivism contains a logical mistake, and that traditional moral language contains a false ontological assumption. It can be said that subjectivism and traditional moral language are compatible in the sense that they contain a coincidence of errors (the two routes of error lead to the same conclusions in many cases).

Now, by "subjectivist" I do not mean "anyone who denied that moral judgments can be evaluated as objectively true or false." This is because I believe that there is an overlapping ground where objectivity (so defined) and subjectivity overlap -- there is no mutual exclusion at work.

The views that I defend lie within this region where objectivism (so defined) and subjectivism (defined as the thesis that there are no intrinsic values) overlap.

The sense of "subjectivist" that I am raising my objections against is the subjectivist that says that the welfare of others is merely contingent upon the agent, assessor, or some sufficiently large portion of the population happening to have a concern for those others. That where that concern is lacking on the part of the agent, assessor, or sufficiently large community with shared intersubjective likes and dislikes, in such a circumstance no moral objection follows from the harm, rape, genocide, or torture of those others.

dk

posted by Alonzo Fyfe:
(snip)
and that traditional moral language contains a false ontological assumption.
(snip)
dk: Traditional morality has come up several times in this thread, and I have no idea what it means. Could you tell me...

1. What is traditional morality?
2. What is traditional moral language?
3. What is the false ontological assumption traditional language contains?

DRFseven

Oh, I see. Unlike your posts which are peppered with comments that others' posts are "irrelevent", "without substance", and "mistaken." Truly, I didn't mean it to be insulting; I meant it to avoid what you characterized as an unnecessary, and "long story". That is, a description of how objectification must come into play in the working of our subjective system of morality.

Don't mind if I do.

OK, we're born, and, under most circumstances, we bond with our caretakers, which enables internalization of caretakers' attitudes, through a mechanism similar to a process known in other animals as "imprinting". We learn what to think and feel is good and what to think and feel is bad, and later we learn that there are reasons for thinking things are good and bad and some of the reasons are better than others. We perceive, as we attain maturity, that some of the conventional moral behaviors are good for us and some aren't. Though our opinions are remarkably like those of our parents, having grown up in a world that is not identical to that of our parents, we perceive things slightly differently, and pass along these opinions to our own children, along with the attached emotions. Our children, then, learn a slightly different set of "true values", which they, in turn, modify slightly and pass along and so on. In this way, a society's moral temperament reflects the reality of their own world; not someone else's world. Don't humans rock? I mean every once in a while we do something right.

Alonzo Fyfe

Moral terms -- words like "right" and "wrong" that we learn as a child -- are theory-laden. They contain the assumptions of a theory in the very meaning of the words, and as we learn to use the words "correctly" as native speakers of a language, we learn the theory contained within the meaning of the words. We do not learn this theory explicitly such that we can readily rattle off all of the elements of the theory. We learn it implicitly, as it is written into the words that we use as native speakers of a language.

To make the elements of the theory explicit we need to find what set of assumptions makes the most sense of the way that native speakers use these words.

I agree with those who hold that if you look at the way that people use moral language, the types of arguements that they form, and the type of assumptions that they consider to be valid or invalid, the implicit theory contained within that language is an intrinsic-value theory.

This is not my idea, a great many moral realists (and error theorists such as J.L. Mackie) hold that traditional moral language presumes intrinsic values or "moral realism."

The fact that this theory is presumed in our moral language provides no proof that they theory is correct. Indeed, on this issue I agree with J.L. Mackie's thesis that traditional moral language contains a presumption of intrinsic value, and that presumption is false. Therefore, the arguments and implications that we are taught to think of as "sound" in learning to use moral terms as native speakers of English are, in fact, unsound.

Subjectivists and error theorists alike hold that the assumption of intrinsic (absolute) values is false. Error theorists hold that this creates a problem for traditional moral language. Forms of argument and inferences widely accepted as valid are, in fact, invalid. On the other hand, some subjectivists continue to use moral language in its "traditional" way even though they reject the assumption that is built into that language.

Subjectivists do have the option of showing that traditional moral language does not contain the presumption of intrinsic values -- that traditional language and the arguments that use it remain valid.

However, I do not think they can succeed. Subjectivists, for example, must make concern for the welfare of others CONTINGENT on the agent or assessor having concern for welfare of others. Traditional moral language holds that concern for others is NECESSARY. Subjectivists cannot account for the NECESSITY of concern for others in traditional moral language. This NECESSITY can only be argued for under the presumption that the welfare of others has intrinsic value independent of the agent's or assessor's subjective preferences.

Alonzo Fyfe

I still do not see the relevance of this description. I do not see anything in the description that justifies or even explains the assessment that "every once in a while we do something right."

What is "right" about it? More importantly, "As compared to what? What would be "wrong" and how would we recognize it as such?"

It still appears to me as if, somehow, describing the inner workings of a high school chemistry course is supposed to have some relevance to the atomic weight of potassium. Can a description of how a child learns racism and hatred from his parents in any way be used as an argument that in teaching the child to be a racist we ". . . do something right?"

You assert that this description of how we learn somehow lends support to a conclusion that we ". . . do something right," and I am still not seeing any type of link between the two.

DRFseven

That last line was just a little ironic comment, you know, with the winky-face? Because, as a subjectivist, my mechanism of objectifying internalized mandates is supposed to be "wrong". You said it was in error, and I'm showing you that not only is it not wrong, it's elegant. From the top...

1. We acquire moral feelings of right and wrong through socialization, mainly in childhood from our parents.

2. Later, through reasoning, we attribute results that we perceive as "beneficial" to implementation of most of this moral code. Some few of our moral code behaviors are judged, as per experience, in need of change.

3. We pass along this slightly modified moral code to our own children and so on, and, in this way, moral codes evolve in response to current circumstances.

End of explanation of mechanism. Conclusion: The objectification of moral codes, as we mature, enables moral codes to become fluid and, thus, work. Codes of conduct that don't work will either be dropped or the society that practices them will cease to exist (Shakers, who believed in strict celibacy for all, are a good example).

Is existence necessary? No, it is the subjective opinion of most of us that we should work toward survival.

Alonzo Fyfe

(1) The objectification of value is a mistake that gives those with sufficient power reason to disregard and cast as "outsiders" who are in some way "defective" or "deficient" or "degenerate" in some way those who are different. They do so by casing the value that they find in certain objects as being in the object itself, from which it follows that those who have different values must be suffering from some defect because of their inability to "perceive" and respond appropriate to the value that is out there. It gives us permission to elevate our own likes and dislikes above those of others because our likes are tied to a value in that being evaluated and their likes are simply hanging out there without support, foundation, or merit.

(2) The word "work" is a value-laden term. Somehow or another "works" is good and "doesn't work" is bad. So, we cannot say that a particular system "works" without having a theory of value to apply to the "good" that is built into the meaning of the word. Slavery "works" for the slave owners - or at least for some of them. Torture "works" for the tyrant. Deception "works" for the politician and the con artist.

The AntiChris

Alonzo Fyfe

I had hoped that my last post cleared up this misunderstanding. I'll try once more.

My intention was only to challenge your (absurd, in my opinion) assertion that it was somehow logically inconsistent for subjectivists to participate in the coercion of others when their personal preferences are threatened. I certainly did not say, nor did I intend to imply, that intersubjectivity was any criterion for the "rightness" or "wrongness" of an action.


I hope I've clarified the confusion. If you still believe that my statements are logically inconsistent, I'd be interested to know why.
What else could "welfare of others" be contingent upon?
Might there not be "moral objection" from those who who weren't too fond of "harm, rape, genocide or torture"?

Chris

Alonzo Fyfe

You are correct. That would be an absurd opinion, and your attributing that opinion to me is equally absurd.

There is nothing, really, to refrain a subjectivist from acting violently to obtain fulfillment of their personal preferences unless that person happens to have a preference to not act violently.

The logical inconsisency that I am talking about is in stating that, (1) subjectivism is true, and (2) consideration for the welfare of others is a necessary component of moral value.

[Note: At times I also talk about another inconsistency in subjectivism, that (1) subjectivism is true, and (2) all others ought to share, or at least in all times act as if they share, my moral preferences.]

These two propositions are inconsistent, which is why a person who holds that subjectivism is true cannot argue against -- under some circumstances -- the moral virtue of rape, genocide, sadistic torture, and the like. Because, under subjectivism, the consideration for the welfare of others is CONTINGENT, not NECESSARY.


This question begs the question by presuming that "welfare of others" MUST BE contingent.


That's the whole point, the wrongness of rape, genocide, and torture depends upon contingent facts.

There might be some "moral objection" from those not too fond of these types of activities, but if this "moral objection" is not sufficiently intersubjective then the activities are not wrong. If, for example, they are shared only by that 2% of the population being raped, slaughtered, or tortured, nothing of substance can be said against their rape, slaughter, or torture. The intersubjectivist must, in this case, say not only that the minority will be raped, slaightered, or tortured, but that they should be as well.

Now, one option for the intersubjectivist is to retreat from here into individual subjectivism (agent-subjectivism or assessor-subjectivism). At this point the should of this rape, slaughter, or torture is contingent on the attitudes of the individual, rather than depending on the intersubjective preferences of a sufficiently large group.

agent-subjectivism would still hold, however, that those doing the raping, slaughtering, and torturing should do so because their preferences (those of the agent) tell them that they should.

assessor-subjectivism, at the same time, must also hold that the proposition that this minority ought not to be raped, slaughtered, or tortured is still only contingently true and, in this case, 2% true and 98% false.

dk

1. 
   What is traditional morality?
2. What is traditional moral language?
3. What is the false ontological assumption traditional language contains?

Posted by Alonzo Fyfe:
Moral terms -- words like "right" and "wrong" that we learn as a child -- are theory-laden. They contain the assumptions of a theory in the very meaning of the words, and as we learn to use the words "correctly" as native speakers of a language, we learn the theory contained within the meaning of the words. We do not learn this theory explicitly such that we can readily rattle off all of the elements of the theory. We learn it implicitly, as it is written into the words that we use as native speakers of a language.
dk: Everything a child contains beyond physical appearances forms the basis of one theory or another. If your point is that morality implicitly teaches a infant, toddler, child, and teenager about themselves in relationship to others and then the world at large, I agree. How language is formed or informed by moral conduct and language is another theory. However this isn’t a theory in any rational sense, but an objective fact.

Posted by Alonzo Fyfe:
To make the elements of the theory explicit we need to find what set of assumptions makes the most sense of the way that native speakers use these words.
dk: You must first assume that a person’s native language implicitly communicates a moral theory, and I personally don’t see much evidence to support the assumption, at least not any more than geography, family structure or religion.

Posted by Alonzo Fyfe:
I agree with those who hold that if you look at the way that people use moral language, the types of arguements that they form, and the type of assumptions that they consider to be valid or invalid, the implicit theory contained within that language is an intrinsic-value theory.
This is not my idea, a great many moral realists (and error theorists such as J.L. Mackie) hold that traditional moral language presumes intrinsic values or "moral realism."
dk: Mackie is a moral skeptic, now I’m really confused. “Mackie defends moral skepticism with three specific arguments.” ---- Moral Skepticism
(snip)