Malaclypse the Younger

Tom Piper

Singer's reasoning (or at least your summary of it) is unsound.

Even if we accept POE and the definition of speciesism, Singer's argument is unsound.

To prove the conclusion from these premises:

We must find that speciesism contradicts the POE. One way to do so is to find that a definition of "what we may eat" that approves-of the eating of cows (for example) necessarily leads us an absurd conclusion, for example that must entail (if we are rational and honest) that we approve-of eating Vulcans and/or human (or vulcan) children.

The most obvious way to approach this problem rigorously is with ordinary set theory. The operators 'v' represents union, '^' represents intersection, and '~' represents complement.

Let set H be "all members of the species homo sapiens". Membership is objectively determinable through genetics (at least until genetic engineering advances significantly).

Let set C be "all members of the species 'cow'" (I'm too lazy to look up the formal name). Again membership is objectively determinable (for now) through genetics.

Let set V be "all members of the species homo Vulcanis (Vulcans)"; we will declare this hypothetical set also to be genetically determinable.

Let set S be "all beings capable of sapient (adult-humanlike) thought." We can construct an objective definition of this so that otherwise ordinary but sleeping or reversibly comatose adult humans (or Vulcans) are members, but catastrophically brain-damaged humans and Vulcans, and human and Vulcan children under 2 years are excluded. Set ~S is thus the set of all beings who are not sapient.

First, it is clear that the sets H, C, and V are disjoint; the intersection of any two of these sets is the empty set ((H ^ C) == null). It is also obvious from these definitions that neither set H nor S is a subset of the other; there are humans that are not sapient, and there are sapients that are not human (~(H ^ S) ^ H (or S) != null).

We can now define some metasets (sets of sets). For convience I will arbitrarily label metasets with a '.

Metaset R' (the "racial" metaset) is the set of all sets where the members of those sets can be determined genetically. It is clear that H, C, and V are members of R'.

Metaset P' (sapient races) are those races that have some sapient members. A member set m in R' is in P' iff (m ^ S) != null).

Metaset ~P' (nonsapient races) is obviously then the set of all races that have no nonsapient members.

We can then define E' as equivalent to ~P'. We can eat any member of a nonsapient race. This individual being membership of this metaset is well-defined (members of sets who are members of E'), objectively determinable, and accounts for the non-edibility of nonsapient members of sapient species and thus does not entail an absurdity.

It is simply a matter of opinion, not self-contradiction, that we can treat members of sapient races and nonsapient races uniformly within each set and differentially between each set.

[ March 31, 2002: Message edited by: Malaclypse the Younger ]</p>

The AntiChris

tronvillain:

My understanding, from what Pompous Bastard said, is that a claim that "I consider it immoral for myself and others to eat meat" can only be justified if you know what knowledge-base and value system "others" are using. This appears to me to be virtually impossible.

A distinct possibility.

Thanks for your time.

Chris

Pomp

The AntiChris,

So, in order to make such a case, I would need to know what knowledge "others" have and what values "others" subscribe to.

I'd have to answer with a qualified "yes." You do have to have some idea what others value if you are to make a convincing case, but most of us subscribe to a rather large pool of common values (survival, comfort, freedom, etc.) that you can use in your argument.

Whilst this is theoretically possible when making the case that an individual subjectivist may be acting immorally, is it not, for all practical intents and purposes, impossible to make the case for all "others"?

If your argument makes use of commonly held values, you can make a general case that an act is immoral for "others," but bear in mind that there will nearly always be specific cases where the general argument does not hold.

I'm sure you're right. So would I be correct in thinking that this thread is essentially a subjectivist/objectivist debate, and the issue of vegetarianism is largely irrelevant?

While we do tend to get easily sidetracked into objective'subjective arguments around here, that is not necessarily the case. There are objectivists who have no problem with meat eating and there are subjectivists who do. I would personally enjoy seeing an objectivist defend an objective prohibition against meat eating against another objectivist.

Pomp

The AntiChris,

My understanding, from what Pompous Bastard said, is that a claim that "I consider it immoral for myself and others to eat meat" can only be justified if you know what knowledge-base and value system "others" are using. This appears to me to be virtually impossible.

A slight clarification: you don't have to provide any justification if you say "I consider it immoral for myself and others to eat meat." You are merely stating that you disapprove of the behavior of meat eaters. You only have to provide justification if you say "You also ought to consider it immoral for yourself and others to eat meat."

In short, you are entitled to your own opinion and do not have to justify it, but you had better have a good case if you advocate that others adopt your opinion as their own.

The AntiChris

Pompous Bastard

Thanks for the clarification.

Chris

tronvillain

The AntiChris:
As I suspected, you are confused about subjectivism itself. What Pompous Bastard said applies to knowing whether eating meat is immoral from the perspective of other people. It's much faster and more practical to infer their position from what they say and how they behave.

Now, it is as trivially easy to justify "I consider it wrong for others to eat meat" as it is to justify "I consider it wrong for me to eat meat" is. It is simply a subjective judgement - a fact about the way you feel.

tronvillain

Ah, I see Pompous Bastard has already dealt with this.

The AntiChris

tronvillain

I see, the distinction is between the purely personal "I consider it" and the prescriptive "it is".

Thanks.

Chris

Gurdur

Indulge me, Bill Snedden, I'm kinda slow, but I fail to see how you can make any valid categorical differention (as opposed to a practical differention based on derivation) between "foundational" and "value" statements; at the heart of every ethical system there needs be a set of ultimately irreducible and arbitrary value judgments, no?

Bill Snedden

Rather uncharacteristically sarcastic of you, no?

It's a valid point; obviously a "foundational" value must be irreducible. At least, in the sense that no other value judgements could precede it. That is the sense in which I was making my point about the alleged "foundation" to spin's moral system; it couldn't be foundational because I could (and did) reduce it at least one step.


However, it does seem to me that the nature of value judgements leads ineluctably to a rather messy infinite regress. One can always ask "why?" when presented with any allegedly foundational value. That is, unless one can present a value that is accepted by all valuers (an intersubjective value), demonstrate a contradiction inherent in denying the foundational value, or successfully defend the existence of an objective value.

In that sense, I'm not sure that the "foundational" value need be "chosen arbitrarily". If there are objective or intersubjective values, their "choice" could not be labeled arbitrary. Likewise, if the denial of the foundational value encumbered a logical contradiction, it would also not be arbitrary.

What I'm really taking issue with here (as many other posters have apparently realized) is that the method in which spin's value statement was proposed assumed its objective status without argument. I'd just like to see some real argument behind the statement. Not necessarily in favor of moral objectivism, but some delineation of the value or values that ground an ethical argument against the consumption of meat.

Regards,

Bill Snedden