Freethought & Rationalism Archive

kennethamy · 08-29-2007, 07:04 AM

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Originally Posted by everettf

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Originally Posted by kennethamy

What has that question to do with the problem of evil? What would you accept as evidence? For example, would you accept the appearance of design in the universe? Obviously, unless you tell me what you would accept as evidence (and my guess is, it might be nothing at all) the discussion will be a futile one.

Anything not hearsay. If you or any theist is in direct communication with these gods tell them to answer us atheists.

Not all evidence is direct evidence, Some is indirect. Otherwise there would be no evidence of electrons.

Biff the unclean · 08-29-2007, 07:49 AM

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Originally Posted by kennethamy

Pangloss seems to be wrong because (as I pointed out) it is empirically unlikely that all evils are necessary for goods, and even more unlikely that those goods compensate for those evils. But that doesn't show that Leibniz was wrong is arguing that the existence of evil does not make it logically impossible for there to be an all good and all powerful God, as has been argued. The error (if there is one) is in thinking that the fact that it is logically possible means that it is empirically possible.

With God ALL things are possible....oops, most things....er, um, some things...aaaa....
You do understand that you have turned God from the Almighty into the Pipsqueak, don't you. Your excuses have left you with something that is no longer God.

kennethamy · 08-29-2007, 08:03 AM

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Originally Posted by Biff the unclean

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Originally Posted by kennethamy

Pangloss seems to be wrong because (as I pointed out) it is empirically unlikely that all evils are necessary for goods, and even more unlikely that those goods compensate for those evils. But that doesn't show that Leibniz was wrong is arguing that the existence of evil does not make it logically impossible for there to be an all good and all powerful God, as has been argued. The error (if there is one) is in thinking that the fact that it is logically possible means that it is empirically possible.

With God ALL things are possible....oops, most things....er, um, some things...aaaa....
You do understand that you have turned God from the Almighty into the Pipsqueak, don't you. Your excuses have left you with something that is no longer God.

Have you a rational argument that accompanies these emotional expressions? It is often agreed that God cannot do what is logically impossible, but can do everything that is logically possible. The argument is that it is logically impossible to have certain goods without having certain evils, and, therefore to have a world without evil which is better than a world with some evil.

Dante Alighieri · 08-29-2007, 08:41 AM

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Originally Posted by kennethamy

Have you a rational argument that accompanies these emotional expressions? It is often agreed that God cannot do what is logically impossible, but can do everything that is logically possible. The argument is that it is logically impossible to have certain goods without having certain evils, and, therefore to have a world without evil which is better than a world with some evil.

As I try to explain here, the theist has a rather strong burden to show then. It can't be, for instance, that God had it within His power to create the world without evil, for if it were in His power, given His goodness, the world would be without evil. So, it must be logically impossible for God to have created the world without evil. But, no contradiction follows from God creating the world without evil, therefore, His creating it without evil is logically possible; and from that, I think, we can argue that no theodicy or skeptical theist approach could work since theists have the very weighty burden of showing a logical contradiction in God creating the world without evil.

I mean, consider sympathy, and so on. Sympathy would only exist in worlds that contain some amount of suffering in the first place. Why, precisely, would the good of sympathy warrant the existence of evil? For this is a good in response to evil, an evil that need not obtained. Is there is some sort of logical impossibility of a world bereft of evil but filled with good? If not, then what exactly is the theist claiming here?

kennethamy · 08-29-2007, 01:46 PM

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Originally Posted by Dante Alighieri

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Originally Posted by kennethamy

Have you a rational argument that accompanies these emotional expressions? It is often agreed that God cannot do what is logically impossible, but can do everything that is logically possible. The argument is that it is logically impossible to have certain goods without having certain evils, and, therefore to have a world without evil which is better than a world with some evil.

As I try to explain here, the theist has a rather strong burden to show then. It can't be, for instance, that God had it within His power to create the world without evil, for if it were in His power, given His goodness, the world would be without evil. So, it must be logically impossible for God to have created the world without evil. But, no contradiction follows from God creating the world without evil, therefore, His creating it without evil is logically possible; and from that, I think, we can argue that no theodicy or skeptical theist approach could work since theists have the very weighty burden of showing a logical contradiction in God creating the world without evil.

I mean, consider sympathy, and so on. Sympathy would only exist in worlds that contain some amount of suffering in the first place. Why, precisely, would the good of sympathy warrant the existence of evil? For this is a good in response to evil, an evil that need not obtained. Is there is some sort of logical impossibility of a world bereft of evil but filled with good? If not, then what exactly is the theist claiming here?

It seems to me that Leibniz is making two claims: a logico-metaphysical claim, and a moral claim. The former is that it would be logically impossible for there to be sympathy unless there were those who needed sympathy, or better, situations which called for sympathy. The latter claim is a moral claim, namely that a world with sympathy and situations which called for sympathy, is better than a world without situations which called for sympathy, and therefore, sympathy. These claims, the logico-metaphysical, and the moral seem to be logically independent. You seem to be admitting the first, but disputing the second. It is (I think) according to L. not impossible there should be a word with no sympathy and, therefore, no suffering, but it would be a less good world than the actual world. And that is on the ground that the actual world is the best possible world. And why is that? Well, on the ground that God is totally benevolent, and, as Leibniz put it, "is inclined, but not necessitated", to create the best of all possible worlds. So that is what the Leibnizian theist seems to be claiming. This whole issue is beautifully discussed in the "The Grand Inquisitor Chapter" of Dostoyevski's The Brothers Karamozov where one of the characters accept the logical claim, but rejects the moral claim, and denies that some goods are worth the suffering that necessitates them. Of course, there is the whole issue of whether it is true that these goods could not be attained differently, or, at least, that there need not be the amount of suffering required for those goods. But that is a different issue.

Dante Alighieri · 08-29-2007, 02:09 PM

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Originally Posted by kennethamy

It seems to me that Leibniz is making two claims: a logico-metaphysical claim, and a moral claim. The former is that it would be logically impossible for there to be sympathy unless there were those who needed sympathy, or better, situations which called for sympathy.

This much is true, insofar as that it follows of what it means to be "sympathetic."

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The latter claim is a moral claim, namely that a world with sympathy and situations which called for sympathy, is better than a world without situations which called for sympathy, and therefore, sympathy.

You are correct that this is what I contest. That said however, why suppose that there is such a thing as a "best of all possible worlds" to begin with? (Plantinga makes this same point in the Nature of Necessity, Chapter 9, in the section entitled "Leibniz's Lapse.") In any case though, what sort of logical contradiction arises from that God (who is ultimately benevolent) creates a world without sympathy, but instead, a world filled with intrinsic goods, that includes, for instance, free ("free" in the compatibilist sense, since I do not believe libertarian free will to be possible, let alone a worthy form of freedom) creatures are in loving, eternal union with Him? What logical contradiction arises from that at all?

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These claims, the logico-metaphysical, and the moral seem to be logically independent. You seem to be admitting the first, but disputing the second. It is (I think) according to L. not impossible there should be a word with no sympathy and, therefore, no suffering, but it would be a less good world than the actual world.

Yup, that describes my position exactly.

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And that is on the ground that the actual world is the best possible world. And why is that? Well, on the ground that God is totally benevolent, and, as Leibniz put it, "is inclined, but not necessitated", to create the best of all possible worlds.

Well, first of all, if God is not necessitated to create the best of all possible worlds (presuming such an idea is coherent), then that entity does not seem to be God, for God is ultimately benevolent. I suppose this has something to do with libertarian free will perhaps (please correct me if I am mistaken; I'm far more familiar with modern philosophers than Leibniz and other such greats), but I don't believe that LFW is even a worthy form of freedom, let alone a coherent concept.

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So that is what the Leibnizian theist seems to be claiming. This whole issue is beautifully discussed in the "The Grand Inquisitor Chapter" of Dostoyevski's The Brothers Karamozov where one of the characters accept the logical claim, but rejects the moral claim, and denies that some goods are worth the suffering that necessitates them.

Yes, I remember reading that. It was an excellent book.

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Of course, there is the whole issue of whether it is true that these goods could not be attained differently, or, at least, that there need not be the amount of suffering required for those goods. But that is a different issue.

Well, I think there are a few issues here. First, consider some variable good G. Now, the question arises of whether G requires evil. I think this must analytically follow from G, otherwise, there is no contradiction in G obtaining without a corresponding evil obtaining. The second is that even if G is logically impossible without evil is that whether G is required at all on the part of God. And I personally find no good reason to suppose that it is logically impossible for God to refrain from creating G (which would require evil) and instead create goods that do not require evil, for instance, that free creatures are in eternal, loving union with Him.

Cheerful Charlie · 08-29-2007, 08:57 PM

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Originally Posted by vovaciouslyveronic

QUOTE=Cheerful Charlie;4739625]

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All wrong. The Universe is not designed nor has any obvious features that can only be from design.

If science at this point in time cannot fully explain abiogensis, it only means that AT THIS POINT IN TIME, science cannot fully explain abiogenesis. It does not mean that it will not be explained in the future. And it most certainly does NOT mean that abiogenesis is in principle not explainable, which is what religion needs to do and cannot do to claim only God can explain it. We don't know if that is true, maybe there is a God but abiogenesis is a natural thing and God has nothing to do with it or creation of any universe. You cannot show God exists at all, much less what that God is, is capable of and is not capable of.

Without being able to actually prove God exists, theism has no explanation for anything, much less abiogenesis.

Fine tuning is something that has been explained. (Guth, Linde and others). The universe consists of infinite island universes of which a small, small, small percentage are so fine-tuned. But within finite numbers of island universes existing, even if small, small, small percentages of them are "fine-tuned", there are then, infinite fine-tuned universes capable of life. No God is needed. Life is not explicable or of infinitelly small chance but a dead certainty.

God is a self contradictory idea which is ruled out by these self contradictions, an impossibility.

CC

To a certain degree I know what your saying. On the other hand you just used string theory to explain away the fine tuning of the universe. Even though I am not even close to an expert on string theory I do know that there is reasonable controversy on if its really true. Besides have we even seen these other universes? The answer is a resounding no, your theory is just as non testable as mine, again you show your dogmatic fundamentalist athiesm.

Cheers

No string theory at all here. Guth explained inflation, and this leads back toDirac andcasamirandtehdiscovery of the fact that virtual particles pop in and out of existence. The islandUniversewe are instarted as a virtual particle weighing about 40 kilograms and less than the size of a proton.
As this universe ages, many more such particles with form in distant age and a few will become similar universes. One of an infinite number.

No string theory needed.

CC

Alf · 08-30-2007, 01:31 AM

To me Leibnitz argument appear bogus.

What is this "greater good" that you have to have and which is so important that an all good all powerful god would allow it? Does there exist any such thing? People has mentioned sympathy. However, sympathy along with most other such "good" things is essentially a "cure" to remedy the fact that there is evil in the world. True enough, if there were no evil and no person suffered then there wouldn't be anyone whom you could have sympathy with but the point is you wouldn't need to either!

To argue then that this is a greater good that necessitates suffering is similar to saying that we must have AIDS or otherwise the AIDS medicine which is good would be useless.

True, it would be useless but I doubt anyone can argue that that would be a bad thing.

Alf

Alf · 08-30-2007, 01:40 AM

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Originally Posted by kennethamy

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Originally Posted by Alethias

Bad teeth are part of the existent world. I guess that makes them logically necessary for root canals to exist, which are logically necessary for my wife to feel sympathy for me when I have to have one. So that means that it is logically necessary for a god to have created me so that I'd have bad teeth so my wife would feel sympathy for my root canals? I have a sister that's never had a bad tooth in her life. Why is it logically necessary for me to have bad teeth and not her? That is where this type of argument doesn't follow. It simply isn't consistent; it only applies when people want to make it apply to fit a convenient circumstance.

The argument is more complex than that. Leibniz makes two points. (1) that some evils are logically necessary in order to certain goods to exist. It is a good to pity a cripple, and to aid him. If there was no cripple, there would be no pity for him. So, being a cripple (for instance) is logically necessary in for there to be the good of pity. The second point is that in general, a world with pity and sympathy in it is a better world than one without sympathy in it, and that since pity and the evil necessary for the pity are a "package deal" (if you see what I mean) the "package" pity plus evil, is better than no pity and no evil. God could certainly have created a world with no evil in it. But, Leibniz simply assumes that a world with no evil in it would not be so good as a world with evil and with the good for which the evil was logically necessary. For Leibniz (who separately from Newton invented the calculus) God (the supreme mathematician) is faced with a minimax problem (a large one!). Of all the infinite set of possible worlds, which world has the least amount of evil logically compatible with the greatest amount of good? It is that world which would be "the best of all possible worlds". So, for Leibniz, a world with no evil in it would not be as good as a world with some evil in it as long as the latter world's good compensated for the evil necessary for it. For in such a world, the total amount of good would be greater than a world with no evil in it. Notice, what Leibniz is trying to do is to solve the logical problem of how it is possible for an all-good and loving God who is also all-powerful, to allow there to be evil, so that the mere existence of evil would be enough to show that such a God could not exist? He is trying (in other words) to show that the three propositions, God is all good and loving, God is all powerful, and evil exists, do not constitute an inconsistent set of propositions where one of them must be false on pain of contradiction. And, I think he, in fact does so. Notice, as David Hume pointed out, in his Dialogues on Natural Philosophy, that even if Leibniz has solved the logical problem and shown that the existence of evil does not show that the idea of God is a self-contradiction he has not shown that the existence of evil is not overwhelming evidence against an all-loving and all-powerful God. Showing that the existence of evil is compatible with such a God is one thing, but showing that the existence of evil is not evidence against such a God is a very different thing. And, that, by the way, is what Voltaire brilliantly argued in his novel, Candide where he points out how preposterous it is that all the evils in the world (earthquakes, floods, rapes, and murders, to name just a few) are compensated for by some greater good. But, to repeat, that doesn't show that Leibniz has not solved the logical problem of evil which was an attempt to show that the existence of evil was logically inconsistent with the existence of an all good and all powerful God. It is logically possible, but empirically highly unlikely.

Leibnitz is wrong in both points.

1. PIty and sympathy is as such a construct we have evolved to have because we are social animals and feeling pity and sympathy with someone who is suffering will in general cause us to help that individual who are in need of our help and that is as such for the betterment for our species. No, I don't want to hear the old dogmatic stance that evolution doesn't operate on groups etc, it is bogus and has always been. Consequently, if nobody suffered we wouldn't NEED pity and sympathy since everyone was doing just fine.

2. Is the world really a better place with evil + pity and sympathy? I don't think so. You look at pity and sympathy as somethi9ng that is good on its own but you just argued that we need evil to have pity and sympathy. Consequently, PIty and sympathy is useless on its own it is useful BECAUSE there is evil. It is then false to next argue that pity and sympathy is so good for its own sake that we then have to allow some evil in order to have it. It is like arguing that this medicine is so wonderful that we have to get people sick so they can take the medicine.

So Leibnitz is wrong on both accounts. His rebuttal is worth zip.

Alf

everettf · 08-30-2007, 03:00 AM

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Originally Posted by kennethamy

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Originally Posted by everettf

Anything not hearsay. If you or any theist is in direct communication with these gods tell them to answer us atheists.

Not all evidence is direct evidence, Some is indirect. Otherwise there would be no evidence of electrons.

Please describe your god. You really need to get this god of yours out in the open. You theists want us to believe this god exist, bring him out.

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08-30-2007, 01:31 AM	#178
Alf Veteran Member Join Date: Nov 2004 Location: Oslo, Norway Posts: 3,189	To me Leibnitz argument appear bogus. What is this "greater good" that you have to have and which is so important that an all good all powerful god would allow it? Does there exist any such thing? People has mentioned sympathy. However, sympathy along with most other such "good" things is essentially a "cure" to remedy the fact that there is evil in the world. True enough, if there were no evil and no person suffered then there wouldn't be anyone whom you could have sympathy with but the point is you wouldn't need to either! To argue then that this is a greater good that necessitates suffering is similar to saying that we must have AIDS or otherwise the AIDS medicine which is good would be useless. True, it would be useless but I doubt anyone can argue that that would be a bad thing. Alf

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