FRDB Archives

Freethought & Rationalism Archive

The archives are read only.


Go Back   FRDB Archives > Archives > IIDB ARCHIVE: 200X-2003, PD 2007 > IIDB Philosophical Forums (PRIOR TO JUN-2003)
Welcome, Peter Kirby.
You last visited: Today at 05:55 AM

 
 
Thread Tools Search this Thread
Old 09-30-2002, 08:14 AM   #301
Amos
Guest
 
Posts: n/a
Post

How about "I AM"? "I AM" is equal to "You Are" if you know who you are, and therefore just as I am God you are God. Period.

It is only because we, as humans, do not know who we are that the question "who AM I" arises and so theism is one way to help humans come to the realization that they, each in their own way, are the centre of the universe which is equal to the I AM of each individual. Atheism is another such position except that atheists do not realize that there is possibly an end to theism.

Atheism, in this sense, is much the same as protestantism which itself does not realize nor recognize that theism is just a statement of belief until the truth is found.

God is amoral and humans are not. Morality is a social construct to serve those who do not know who they are.

[ September 30, 2002: Message edited by: Amos ]</p>
 
Old 09-30-2002, 08:27 PM   #302
Senior Member
 
Join Date: Jul 2000
Location: South Bend IN
Posts: 564
Post

Quote:
Originally posted by Bill Snedden:
<strong>

I don't know if you're still around to see this, but...

I don't see how the existence of grue-like predicates would necessitate the "failure of induction." If the universe is ordered (a necessary condition for this objection to be even considered a problem), then the existence of grue-like predicates simply means that no particular inductive determination can ever be considered final. But that's nothing new; inductive reasoning only leads to higher probabilities of truth, not absolute determinations.

The "justification" of induction rests on the principle of order. If order exists, then induction can be justified, regardless of how "disorderly" that order may appear. The key is that there are no "arbitrary" states arising in the future; all are ordered. If this is true, then in principle, induction is still valid.

To return to the example to which you linked, if there were a property of an emerald that caused its color to change based upon the time of observance, then that property could be discovered by empirical observation and would then become part of the body of knowledge concerning emeralds. We would no longer consider emeralds to be "green", but of two or possibly more colors (as is actually the case with other gemstones like sapphires & diamonds). In other words, empirical observation would still allow us to detect & catalogue the existence of grue-like predicates and refine our knowledge accordingly. Far from being a "failure of induction", this is actually what induction is.

Regards,

Bill Snedden</strong>
Hello Bill,

Actually, I don’t think you are giving Goodman’s paradox the credit it deserves. Inductive reasoning involves making probabilistic conclusions concerning future events and experience based on past and present events and experiences. The classic problem of induction revolves around the fact that the uniformity of nature principle which such reasoning is based on seemingly cannot be justified in a non-circular way (to say that we expect nature to continue to be uniform in the future because it has been so in the past assumes the very uniformity which has been called into question).

Goodman’s paradox revolves around a different problem associated with inductive reasoning. Even if it is legitimate to make extrapolations concerning future experience from past experience, Goodman’s paradox posses the problem of what sort of extrapolations it is legitimate to make. In the specific case of emeralds, our natural inclination is to project from the fact that all emeralds observed thus far are green that emeralds observed in the future will likely also be green. However, it would seem that all the evidence favoring the proposition “All emeralds are green” applies with equal weight to the proposition “All emeralds are grue” where grue is the property of being green if observed before a certain specified future time, t, and blue if observed after t. Thus, there is just as much evidence that our inductive generalization that all emeralds are green will fail at any arbitrarily specified future date as there is that it will succeed. And since anything else could be construed to have grue-like properties, this applies to all our inductive generalizations. Consequently, all of our inductive generalizations are just as likely to fail in apparently arbitrary ways (even if they are not truly arbitrary failures due to the presence of grue-like properties) as they are likely to succeed.

Now, one might be initially inclined to maintain that grue constitutes a more complex property than green and then argue that the proposition “All emeralds are green” gets more weight from the evidence by invoking some principle of parsimony. Alas, however, it is not the case that grue is anymore complex a property as green. Consider the property of being “bleen,” the property of being blue if observed before t and green if observed after t. Now we can define green in terms of the properties grue and bleen: an object is green if it is grue before t and bleen after t. Thus, we see that when defined in terms of one another, green, grue, bleen and blue are all equally complex.

Goodman’s paradox is deep, and I don’t see any way out of it analytically. On the other hand, I’m not really worried about grue-like predicates popping up in my daily experience anytime soon. Neither is anyone else, I imagine. The reason for that, I believe, is that we all have a basic rational intuition that the universe just doesn’t work that way. Our cognitive faculties are not inclined towards projecting grue-like predicates and we intuitively trust the sort of inductive projections that our cognitive faculties are inclined towards. As to whether that trust is warranted, that depends on whether or not our basic intuitions concerning the way the world works are warranted. If not, then we must allow skepticism to win the day.

Incidentally, I do not think that such intuitions could be warranted if they are merely the result of some sort of naturalistic process of adaptation to our environment. At best, such a theory might explain why we have such intuitions, but such a theory would not entail that such intuitions are grounded in the actual nature of things. Thus, it would seem that naturalism itself collapses into skepticism. But, that is another lengthy discussion I suppose.

God Bless,
Kenny

[ September 30, 2002: Message edited by: Kenny ]</p>
Kenny is offline  
Old 09-30-2002, 09:32 PM   #303
Contributor
 
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Barrayar
Posts: 11,866
Post

The reason for that, I believe, is that we all have a basic rational intuition that the universe just doesn’t work that way. Our cognitive faculties are not inclined towards projecting grue-like predicates and we intuitively trust the sort of inductive projections that our cognitive faculties are inclined towards. As to whether that trust is warranted, that depends on whether or not our basic intuitions concerning the way the world works are warranted.

The universe does work that way, everything is constantly in change and flux, but we percieve things as discrete entities. Our cognitive processes cut grue into blue and green. They may or may not be "warranted" but they are certainly effective.

Vorkosigan
Vorkosigan is offline  
Old 10-01-2002, 09:31 AM   #304
Veteran Member
 
Join Date: Jan 2002
Location: Sweden
Posts: 2,567
Post

Amos...

Quote:
Atheism, in this sense, is much the same as protestantism which itself does not realize nor recognize that theism is just a statement of belief until the truth is found.
I don't know about this, Amos.
ALOT of theists uses the T word when describing or teaching/preaching their beliefs.
If theism really was about the search for truth, then why are religions often forced to accept new scientific discoveries and change their belief accordingly, often with great reluctance?

Quote:
Morality is a social construct to serve those who do not know who they are.
So... if a person knows who he is, then he becomes amoral?
And this is a good thing?
Theli is offline  
Old 10-01-2002, 12:27 PM   #305
Amos
Guest
 
Posts: n/a
Post

Quote:
Originally posted by Theli:
<strong>Amos...

I don't know about this, Amos.
ALOT of theists uses the T word when describing or teaching/preaching their beliefs.
If theism really was about the search for truth, then why are religions often forced to accept new scientific discoveries and change their belief accordingly, often with great reluctance?
</strong>

You are correct with regard the forcefull and often sly preaching of protestant religions and I will add that Catholics can't be Catholic because of the marauding wolves that are placed in their midst. A wolf in sheeps clothing is one who tries to convert the converted and therefore has a coat of the same color.

The search for Truth is not found in science but in the discovery of who we really are. I capitalize Truth to distinguish this from scientific truths that have ben discovered after the hypothesis has been extrapolated from Truth. The difference is that Truth is a vision of the whole (Ultimate Form or Parousia) while truths are a vision of the parts (forms or ousia's).

The possibility exists that we can have a vision of this Ultimate Truth and when we do we will know who we are. "I am the Truth" means just that and Jesus wants us to be like him and become our own Truth.

Religious beliefs are vague images of these forms and because they are vague they demand a second look so we can come to an understanding of them and in doing so we will/might come to an understanding of who we really are. Faith seeking understanding

The Church should never apologize for anything they have ever taught because in the end, we, each on of us, is the centre of the universe if and when we know who we really are. It has nothing to do with the physical centre of the universe.

This same is true with evolution because Gen.1,2,and 3 explain the intricated details of evolution if you allow creation to be the effective force of evolution (to stop evolution we must sterilize creation).

But I understand, the Church does this to be nice and politically correct while I think it is a slap in the face of the faculty of science.

I'll give you an example here and all you have to do is read the bible without preconceived notions. In Gen.1 God creates but does not form anything. In Gen.2 Lord God forms that which was created in Gen.1. From here we can conclude that essence precedes existence wherein essence is the intelligent design found within the created, ie. God.

Then in Gen.3 "like-god" is created but never gets formed to have a bodily existence. It is here that our ego is created (conjectured) wherein we are divided with our own identity as man. Of course this (our ego) is good because to reinforce our dominion as the species man our ability to cope with a changing environment is important (knowledge of good and evil and the fact that we will die). We claim to have dominion but the lion king would say the same thing, as would the grizzly bear and others while the fox will have his own story to tell.
Quote:
<strong>

So... if a person knows who he is, then he becomes amoral?
And this is a good thing?</strong>
Amoral, is free from moral laws. It is because of the understanding of nature and natural law that such a person can be free from moral laws. It can be said that he is circumsized by natural law as in "a broken reed he shall not crush."
 
Old 10-01-2002, 01:11 PM   #306
Veteran Member
 
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Greensboro, NC, U.S.A.
Posts: 2,597
Cool

Quote:
Originally posted by Kenny:
<strong>Actually, I don't think you are giving Goodman's paradox the credit it deserves.</strong>
And I think you're giving it too much...

Quote:
Originally posted by Kenny:
<strong>The classic problem of induction revolves around the fact that the uniformity of nature principle which such reasoning is based on seemingly cannot be justified in a non-circular way (to say that we expect nature to continue to be uniform in the future because it has been so in the past assumes the very uniformity which has been called into question).</strong>
Does anyone really attempt to justify induction in this manner? It seems to me that induction can be justified in principle as following from the law of identity, which is accepted axiomatically.

Quote:
Originally posted by Kenny:
<strong>Consequently, all of our inductive generalizations are just as likely to fail in apparently arbitrary ways (even if they are not truly arbitrary failures due to the presence of grue-like properties) as they are likely to succeed.</strong>
That's understood and agreed, but it really doesn't speak to the warrant of induction in principle, does it? If the law of identity holds, then repeated observation of an object will enable the elimination of measurement errors and allow the determination of actual properties, including any grue-like ones. The fact that such determinations are subject to future determination of additional grue-like properties (and hence, the inability to state that such and such a determination is absolutely true) speaks more to the kind of knowledge it's possible to have, not how we obtain it, doesn't it?

In other words, as I see it, it's possible to know the Truth, but it's not possible to know that you know the Truth. The only things (IMHO) that we can declare "absolutely true" are those things that we accept axiomatically; those concepts upon which we base all of our reasoning. If they are not true, then the rest of this discussion is truly moot.

As both Goedel and Cantor (ala Patrick Grim) have demonstrated, the existence of such "meta-knowledge" is problematic at best, impossible at worst.

Quote:
Originally posted by Kenny:
<strong>Incidentally, I do not think that such intuitions could be warranted if they are merely the result of some sort of naturalistic process of adaptation to our environment. At best, such a theory might explain why we have such intuitions, but such a theory would not entail that such intuitions are grounded in the actual nature of things. Thus, it would seem that naturalism itself collapses into skepticism. But, that is another lengthy discussion I suppose.</strong>
Oddly enough, I think that such intuitions are more likely to be warranted if they are the result of naturalistic processes, but you're right, that's a much lengthier discussion!

Regards,

Bill Snedden

[ October 01, 2002: Message edited by: Bill Snedden ]</p>
Bill Snedden is offline  
Old 10-01-2002, 08:20 PM   #307
Senior Member
 
Join Date: Jul 2000
Location: South Bend IN
Posts: 564
Post

Bill,


Quote:
Does anyone really attempt to justify induction in this manner? It seems to me that induction can be justified in principle as following from the law of identity, which is accepted axiomatically
Pardon my skepticism, but I seriously doubt it. This sounds like something from Ayn Rand. If I recall correctly, Rand argued that the principle of induction could be justified from the logical tautology “A is A,” which she (misleadingly, I believe) called “the law of identity.” She argued that since things have identity, this endows them with certain properties which, in turn, govern their behaviors in a particular and orderly manner in such a way that induction is affirmed.

In my estimation (and probably the estimation of the vast majority of the philosophical community), this argument leaves much to be desired. First of all, as a simple tautological statement in first order predicate logic, “A is A” is semantically empty. It literally says nothing and is true by virtue of syntax alone. “A is A” has no real content, and thus says nothing meaningful about the nature of reality. Rand’s blatant misuse of “A is A” in several areas is a serious blight on her philosophical credibility in my opinion. Second, the mere fact that things have certain properties contributes nothing to the problem of induction. The problem of induction isn’t about whether or not things have properties, it’s about whether or not those properties are stable and whether or not they change in predictable ways, and whether or not there are underlying causal connections which govern how properties change.

At any rate, if this is the usual Rand stuff (sorry, I’ve never have been a fan), I see it as nothing but a blind ally. However, since your comments were brief, I’m not even sure that’s what you really had in mind.

Quote:
That's understood and agreed, but it
really doesn't speak to the warrant of induction in principle, does it? If the law of identity holds, then repeated observation of an object will enable the elimination of measurement errors and allow the determination of actual properties, including any grue-like ones. The fact that such determinations are subject to future determination of additional grue-like properties (and hence, the inability to state that such and such a determination is absolutely true) speaks more to the kind of knowledge it's possible to have, not how we obtain it, doesn't it?
I agree that, in principle, the presence of grue-like predicates does not undermine the principle of induction. However, a world in which grue-like predicates cannot be dismissed is practically equivalent to a world in which induction fails. In practical terms, the results are exactly the same. Our repeated observation of a certain property apparently exhibited by the world or things in it in no way raises the probability that such a property is truly characteristic of what we observe because of the equal confirmation such evidence gives to an infinite number of grue-like properties. To make things concrete, if grue-like properties cannot be ruled out, then our inductive evidence that the sun will rise tomorrow applies with equal strength to the proposition that the sun will fail to rise tomorrow due to the presence of grue-like properties which predict such an outcome. Inductive reasoning, under such circumstances, would never make any future prediction any more likely than another. Hence, inductive reasoning becomes absolutely worthless as a guide to making predictions, in such a world and we could never rule out measurement errors under such circumstances. This isn’t about the lack of certainty associated with inductive reasoning; this is about induction failing to be a guide even to probability.

Finally, there is a connection between the classical problem of induction and Goodman’s paradox. It may be that the universe itself is described by a grue-like predicate which entails that it manifest uniformity up to a certain point in its history and then cease to exhibit any sort of uniformity. And, without being able to rule out grue-like predicates, this would mean that all of our observations of the uniformity of nature contribute nothing to the probability that such uniformity will continue after any given moment.

God Bless,
Kenny
Kenny is offline  
Old 10-01-2002, 09:03 PM   #308
Regular Member
 
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
Posts: 374
Post

Kenny:
Quote:
Finally, there is a connection between the classical problem of induction and Goodman’s paradox. It may be that the universe itself is described by a grue-like predicate which entails that it manifest uniformity up to a certain point in its history and then cease to exhibit any sort of uniformity. And, without being able to rule out grue-like predicates, this would mean that all of our observations of the uniformity of nature contribute nothing to the probability that such uniformity will continue after any given moment.
And, we could all be brains inside jars in reality and what we are now perceiving could be nothing more than a dream. So what? How is the fact that our knowledge cannot ever be 100% certain (which is basically what I am gathering from your posts) a problem?

In other words, what you say could be true, and all of our induction could be utterly useless; but probably not.

Quote:
The classic problem of induction revolves around the fact that the uniformity of nature principle which such reasoning is based on seemingly cannot be justified in a non-circular way (to say that we expect nature to continue to be uniform in the future because it has been so in the past assumes the very uniformity which has been called into question).
I disagree that induction cannot be justified in a non-circular way. It certainly can be, through simple trial and error.

[ October 02, 2002: Message edited by: Devilnaut ]</p>
Devilnaut is offline  
 

Thread Tools Search this Thread
Search this Thread:

Advanced Search

Forum Jump


All times are GMT -8. The time now is 02:58 PM.

Top

This custom BB emulates vBulletin® Version 3.8.2
Copyright ©2000 - 2015, Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd.