Scrutinizer

Hi Transworldly Depraved,

Well, I'm kind of teetering on the line between evidentialism and presuppositionalism at the moment. Presuppositionalists are often good at making assertions but often don't support them. Nevertheless, I think there is more to presuppositionalism than some of the more staunch Van Tillians make it out to be. Frame's presentation of presuppositionalism is quite good, in my opinion. It's still a bit vague in parts, and there are many objections that go unanswered (but that's probably because there isn't enough space for him to counter all the existing ones!), but I do suggest you read it, even if you find presuppositionalism nonsensical at this point in time.

I don't want to turn this very good thread into another thread on presuppositionalism, but the regular response to this objection is that you cannot help but "beg the question" to a degree when dealing with the ultimate starting point for rationality. The metaphysical naturalist can no more justify autonomous human reasoning without begging the question than the Christian can justify God without begging the question.

Anyway, enough said! This thread is a good one, and I hope to see some good discussions come out of it by the time I get back from my holiday.

Just for some insight, I'm just starting to think that perhaps presuppositionalism is unavoidable if someone holds that God is the most fundamental aspect of reality and the ultimate reference point rather than simply a powerful being. Because, if God is this "ultimate reality", everything is dependent upon his existence, including logic. Without God, there would be no logic, and therefore without implicitly "borrowing" from God, one cannot use logic. Note: I'm not arguing that this is the case, I'm just thinking that if this view of God is correct, maybe presuppositionalism is implied.

I'm not sure, I'm just letting my thoughts flow without really taking them in or assessing their validity, so feel free to criticize!

Yes, I found that interesting as well. I'm not an expert on comparative religions by any means, but I think (though I may of course be wrong) that one of the other apologists brought this issue up briefly and disagreed that the Biblical God is the only personal conception of God.

Regards,

- Scrutinizer

[ January 02, 2002: Message edited by: Scrutinizer ]</p>

Transworldly Depraved

CodeMason:

Thanks for your response.

You said:

I am not proposing anything along these lines. Here is a quote from Paul Tillich which I take to be definitive of his position:

The position I am suggesting the theist accept does claim that there is one more being to be added to our ontology. However, viewing the matter in terms of what is fundamental about reality is not merely the addition of one more entity. I believe that viewing it in terms of what is ultimate better captures and distills the ideas the theist normally associates with God. Given this position, the theist would have to defend the existence of God. This is not Tillichian.

By claiming that God is at the ground floor of reality, I meant simply that given a hierarchy of causes in the world the theist must believe that a personal being is at the bottom in terms of causal dependence. Maybe the word "ground" and the appearance that I was denying that a god exists lead you to believe I was agreeing with Tillich.

You asked the rhetorical question:

If by "existence or being itself" you just mean "the sum total of what there is" then this in effect denies that there is a hierarchy of causes. This leads into the holism/reductionism debate. Some philosophers and scientists would argue that living systems are wholes that cannot be completely described in terms of their parts. Causation among part/wholes can be either top-down or bottom-up. Roughly the idea is that wholes can act as causes distinct from the mere activity of its parts or that wholes have properties that cannot be reduced to the properties of the parts. And of course, on this view, parts can act on wholes. So the theist should want to avoid reductionism and assert some kind of holism.

You also asked:

Assuming that this is also a rhetorical question, I do not see why an object cannot possess properties if it is the cause of the instantiation of properties in things distinct from itself.

Then you asked:

In my original post, I made the point that the atheist would either not believe that the ground floor of reality is personal or believe that it is impersonal. I have not claimed that either theism or atheism is true. I have merely suggested a way the theist should conceive of God.

Further, it is not clear to me that Occam's razor applies to anything other than scientific theories. Why believe it can be applied to metaphysical systems? If such a principle should be used to choose between metaphysical schemes then it seems that there are absurd metaphysical schemes that are better supported than naturalism. If applying Occam's razor leads to absurd results that is evidence it does not apply to this area.

The reasoning would be that theism includes everything that naturalism includes except that theism adds one more being. The claim would continue by arguing that we do not have to add God to account for anything. But notice that naturalism includes everything that solipsism includes except that naturalism adds billions of fundamental particles and fields of force. So we have - personal observations, the physical world, and God. The theist includes all three, the naturalist includes the first two, and the solipsist includes only the first. For a solipsist only he exists and his "observations" are nothing more than visual, auditory, etc. sensations that are simply brute facts not in need of explanation. So if Occam's razor it to be the determining factor then you should be a solipsist.

Next, you asked:

I do not see that the problem of evil becomes greater if God is ultimate. The problem would still arise and the theist must attempt to answer it. The theist already believes that evil is dependent on God in some way. However, the theist will argue that evils are logically necessary conditions for greater goods which outweight the evil and that it is not obvious that a world that contains evil is less great than a world without evil. The theist will claim that God is justified in causing or permitting evil because of these sorts of considerations. These claims are not obviously false.

Lastly, you claimed:

And another possible explanation is that there actually exists a god of some kind and the evolutionary adapation you mentioned correctly leads people to believe he/she/it exists. Now we want to know which of these is more reasonable. If the purpose is to debate which of these is true we cannot assume one or the other at the beginning.

Transworldly Depraved

Tercel:

Thank you for your reply.

You said:

I do not know which of those is more easily conceived. However, a Hume-style argument given by Michael Martin seems relevant here. He argues as follows:

(1) In terms of our experience, all created entities of the kinds that we have so far examined are created from preexisting material.
(2) The universe is a created entity.[Supposition]
(2a) If the universe is a created entity, it is of the same kind as some of the created entities we have so far examined.

[Probably]
(3) The universe was created from preexisting material.
(4) If the Christian God exists, then the universe was not created from preexisting material.
(5) Therefore, the Christian God does not exist.

The kind of causal dependence the theist seems to require does not seem to be the kind we actually observe when we create things. And if Martin's inductive argument works then it seems to suggest that it is unlikely that an ultimate personal being exists. The reason is that we are not aware of ourselves as sustaining things in existence but rather observe ourselves manipulating what is already there. So the only uncontroversial examples of personal beings of which we observe their causal activity do not actually cause higher level properties. So we should conclude that any personal being we believe exists also merely manipulates what is already there.

And you asked:

Yes, I think a theist in general could believe this. However, I think that traditional western theists have wanted to assert the doctrine of creation and that God is the greatest possible being. Creation requires that at least some aspects of reality be dependent on God's causal activity. Also, thinking of God as the greatest possible being would seem to suggest that the theist should conceive of everything apart from God being dependent on his creative activity. If only some things were so dependent then it seems that a greater being would be possible.

Dr. Retard

Just a quick point. Occam's Razor is only supposed to decide between otherwise equally successful theories. Its application presupposes a big ceteris paribus clause. And, at least prima facie, naturalism better predicts our observations than does solipsism. For, on solipsism, we have no reason to expect any regularity whatever in our perceptions; in contrast, naturalism directly implies that the world be governed by natural law, and readily accomodates the proposition that our perceptual faculties are largely reliable. So, Occam's Razor would not come into play, since naturalism is such a better theory than solipsism.

Of course, we can load solipsism with enough ad hoc epicycles to grant it the same predictive success as naturalism. But then it is unclear that, when brought in to decide between the competing theories, Occam's Razor would favor solipsism after all.

Transworldly Depraved

Dr. Retard:

Thank you for your response to my thread.

You said:

What reason does the naturalist have that suggests that the physical world would be orderly? What causes the natural world to act orderly or behave according to natural laws?

Datheron

Dr. Retard,

Good doctor, I hope you don't mind me commenting here.

TD,

Was it you, TD, that I argued about solipsism about? It was somebody, and there was another that continued that argument, but memory...so....foggy....

But you're asking about the fundamental basis of which the worldview is constructed from, which has to exist in order to create that worldview. Note that anybody can ask an infinite series of "why/how did this come to be?" - the solipsist position and the theist position also face the same troubles. And just as a theist would claim that asking where God came from is meaningless, and how a solipsist believes that the origin of himself is meaningless, the origin of naturalism is also by analogy pointless and answerless.

Dr. Retard

There are two separate questions suggested by your first.

(1) "What justification can be given for the claim that naturalism implies that the world exhibits causal regularity?" The answer: Just an examination of what naturalism claims. And, the way I understood it, naturalism is the thesis that the world is governed by natural laws and that nothing exists beyond the purview of these laws. The questioned implication is then straightforward.

(2) "What justification can be given for the claim that the world exhibits causal regularity?" This is a much harder question. Presumably the answer will appeal to our observations -- the thesis of causal regularity seems to explain our observations better than does the contrary.

But really, the first interpretation is the only one directly relevant to my original point. In order to decide between two competing hypotheses on the basis of Occam's Razor, it must first be true that both hypotheses are otherwise equally good.

Now we take it as a given that our observations, or perceptions, exhibit regularity. The question is: which hypothesis better explains this perceptual regularity, is it naturalism or solipsism? My claim is that, prima facie, naturalism does better. This is because naturalism implies causal regularity, and causal regularity renders likely perceptual regularity, given perceptual reliability. In contrast, solipsism implies nothing that would lead one to expect perceptual regularity -- the phenomenon is a complete surprise. So, on this score, naturalism is superior.

So, unless there is some score on which solipsism wins, naturalism is a better hypothesis in general. And that would mean that Occam's Razor cannot decide between the two, as they are not equally good hypotheses.

Your second question seems irrelevant to me. But in any case, I would suppose that it shall either remain a mystery or be seen as a bad question. We cannot say that a further natural law causes causal regularity, because then that further natural law would be part of the causal regularity that needs explaining -- a vicious circle. It is bizarre to say that a personal agent causes the causal regularity, for every personal agent with which we are acquainted is causally dependent upon natural laws for its behavior -- this, too, would be a vicious circle -- and the concept of a supernatural personal agent raises further embarrassing questions about how agency could arise completely independently of a causal order, much less a brain-like physical state for the realization of consciousness. So perhaps there is no explanation for the causal regularity. This might be made more palatable by noting that all explanations with which we are familiar presuppose causal regularity. Perhaps explanation cannot be given without invoking causal regularity and consequently the question "What explains causal regularity?" is nonsense akin to "What is the last natural number?"

Synaesthesia

Transworldly Depraved,
However you slice it, theism constitutes a loss of parsimony if you cannot independently test the existence and personhood of God.

It seems to me that a great deal of discussion regarding the putative tension between holism and reductionism is based upon confusion. That the arrangement of the parts is important, (as in biological systems) does not mean that we cannot exhaustively account for biological systems from a reductionist standpoint.

Occam’s razor is the principle that plurality should not be posited without necessity. Do not be so sure that the solipsist’s position is favored by the principle simply because it involves less- all of the entities postulated by materialists are well substantiated empirically. Since materialistic hypotheses have been abundantly more fruitful and elucidating, it does not sacrifice parsimony without good evidential justification.

They are obviously self-contradictory if we are speaking of those things which god, an omnipotent god, considers evil. How powerful could the fellow be if he so depend upon that which is against his will?

Kenny

Yes. I would argue that the view you describe here is the position of classic theism as well as orthodox Christianity, since both maintain that God exists necessarily and is the creator and sustainer of all things other than Himself. In fact, a while back I posted something almost along these exact same lines
<a href="http://ii-f.ws/ubb/ultimatebb.php?ubb=get_topic&f=4&t=002293&p=3" target="_blank">here</a>

I think that the classic notions/definitions of God as being necessary being, the being which exemplifies maximal greatness, and the ground of being are all very closely related and perhaps even entail one another. The notion that God is the ground of all being, for instance, implies that God exists in all possible worlds (since God is necessary for anything else to be). Of course, the Ontological argument typically attempts to argue for God’s necessary being from the definition of maximal greatness, but I think that the notion of maximal greatness also manifests an intuitive relationship with the notion that God is the ground of all being. It makes sense that the ground of all being, which is the source of all the properties held by finite objects, holds within itself all basic positive properties (i.e. properties which describe fundamental aspects of being as opposed to negative properties which describe how something lacks in particular aspects of being or non-basic properties which merely reduce to sets of basic properties). Something is finite, one might maintain, by virtue of it’s lacking certain aspects of being, but the ground of being itself is infinite by virtue of the fact that it manifests all aspects of being. If consciousness is itself a basic positive property, then the ground of all being would be conscious as well. The same holds for personhood.

At any rate the above paragraph is just some ideas that I have been tossing around and have not fully developed yet. Regardless, I think you are right on the mark in your basic characterization of classical western theism and the theism of Christian orthodoxy. I think atheistic arguments that appeal to such things as Occam’s razor to argue against the existence of God or equate the concept of God with concepts such as the Invisible Pink Unicorn miss the mark terribly in this regard.

God Bless,
Kenny

[ January 03, 2002: Message edited by: Kenny ]</p>

Transworldly Depraved

Datheron:

You asked:

I have discussed solipsism and Occam's Razor on the Secular Web, so it could have been me. I do not know if anyone else has discussed it.

Then you said:

The point I made with regard to Occam's razor is that if one should not postulate entities beyond necessity and this is the determining factor in accepting a metaphysical view then solipsism is to be preferred to naturalism just as naturalism is to be preferred to theism. The solipsist will say he does not have to postulate the existence of the physical world. Rather, he could simply believe his sensations (observations) are brute facts not in need of explanation. The naturalist does the same thing with regard to the physical world. He will say that he does not have to postulate the existence of anything in order to explain the physical world. The solipsist will reply to the naturalist in the same way the naturalist will respond to the theist. The solipsist and naturalist both believe in sensations (ie. observations) yet the solipsist does not see a good reason to go beyond them and rather believes that adding the physical world would be nothing more than excess metaphysical baggage.

What is it about sensations that demands an explanation that the physical world lacks?