Alonzo Fyfe

I am one who holds that morality is objective, in a sense. But not in the sense that would be required by your argument.

This type of argument only survives if it assumes, hidden within its premise, some sort of intrinsic value.

(Note: The only values that exist in the real world are relational values -- values anchored in desires. Without desires, nothing is good or bad. Intrinsic value claims assert that something has value independent of desire -- that it just is good, even if nobody cares about it. Such properties have no explanatory power -- every thing we observe happening in the universe can be explained without mentioning them. Thereby, by Occam's Razor, we have no reason to postulate their existence.)

David Hume demonstrated how most "vulgar systems of morality" argue from a series of "is" premises to a series of "ought" premises (from fact to value). Yet, "is" and "ought" are two different types of relationships. It order for the inference to work, one needs to explain how an "ought" can be derived from an "is" (how a value can be derived from a factual claim).

The hidden intrinsic value assumption rests in the core "is" statement within such an argument. The only way to go from "is" to "ought" is with a hidden assumption that the "is" contains an intrinsic value.

You begin to import "ought" judgements when you say "survival is innate with life's existence." It is true that all living things are surviving. But the fact that it does survive does not imply that it ought to survive. From the point of view of an indifferent universe, it doesn't matter one way or the other while life continues on Earth, or the whole thing gets blown away in some huge planet-wide catastrophy.

It is as if you are saying that whatever survives ought to continue to survive. But, why?

Values are also imported without justification where you write:

societies are dependent on their well being

I presume this means that "societies are dependent on their well being for survival."

But, "well-being" is a value-laden concept. What is the "well being" of a society? Morality, under your argument, becomes no more objective then "well being" is objective.

Or are you simply defining "well being" as that which is consistent with the society's survival?

If so, what type of society are we talking about? Could this be a slave society? That society's well being depends on the continuation of slavery. If slavery is abolished, the slave society ceases to exist -- and ceasing to exist seems contrary to its well being. So, the abolition of slavery would be immoral.

Unless we define "society" differently. Then we need to ask if this definition of society is question-begging. Are we not importing values (e.g., the wrongness of slavery) into our definition of society so that we may justify the elimination of the slave society? In which case, again, where is the objectivity of the well-being of society if we import subjective values into our definition of society?

Finally, your claim that survival depends on well-being is false. I know a man who took a significant blow to his well being 40 years ago --in an airplane crash. He's now 82.

Is all that matters the survival of a society, or its well-being? If actually all that matters is survival, then this is a rather minimal conception of morality. It takes a something quite significant to actually threaten the survival of society -- and, thus, on this standard very few things would actually be immoral. If it is well being that is important, then from where comes the value of well being that does not threaten survival?

Yet, we still come back to the question of whether some societies (e.g., the slave society) should survive.

[ May 18, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

dk

dk: Nobel believed if he could build weapons systems so destructive they would make war unreasonable. The relationship between humankind and evolving technologies is quintessentially a moral subject. People construct good machines from the laws of nature to suite human nature. People construct bad machines from the laws of nature to denigrate human nature. Morality constructs terms of good and bad from human nature TO REGULATE CONDUCT with reason. Ethic is a science that applies objective moral truths in different circumstances and situations. To suggest the physical sciences and morality are disjoint endeavors puts every creature on the planet earth at risk by denying reason for the sake of power. Sometimes I think people confuse morality with ethics.
dk: - When people break the moral law they become immoral people. Immoral people behave unreasonably with a mob mentality. A mob mentality denies people access to reason. One need only count the # of kids that suffer or die from drugs, gang violence, drunk driving, STDs, teen pregnancy, public school terrorism, absentee parents, dysfunctional homes and suicide to make a hard connection.
dk: - An honest person tells the truth when a lie would serve them better. A dishonest person tells a lie when the truth would serve them better. Arguments of utility, proportionalism and relativism rationalize the lie and the truth by degrees of moral equivalence. But if we consider that a dishonest person deprives themselves of self knowledge to falsify their identity for power, gratification or some goal, then the pieces begin to fit. Without self knowledge people lack the capacity to act in their own self interest. Moral people wonder where on earth charismatic leaders like Adolph Hitler, David Koresh, Saddam Hussein, Jim Jones, Marshall Applewhite, or Charles Manson find their followers. The answer is quite simple, absent faith and hope anyone may forsake reason to fulfill (or escape) some personal, spiritual or emotional delusion. The consequences of immorality impact non-participants so causal relationships weave a tangled web difficult to unravel. An good person may never hear the bullet that kills him, but he is still the victims of an objectively immoral act.

[ May 18, 2002: Message edited by: dk ]</p>

Alonzo Fyfe

Yes.

First, I would like to note that both objective and subjective moral propositions can exist in the same community, simply by allowing that different people mean different things when they use moral terms.

It is not impossible for one person who says "X is wrong" to mean "X is not the best thing -- all things considered", and for another who says "X is wrong" to be saying "God disapproves of X", and yet another to be saying, "I don't like X."

We, then, have three different meanings of the word -- some objective, some subjective, existing in the same community at the same time.

Language is an invention. It helps if we all use words the same way, assigning them the same meaning. But, like all human inventions, those inventions are not always perfect.

Moral terms are theory-laden; they get a part of their meaning by the theory behind them. Thus, when a subjectivist and an objectivist get into a dispute, each imports the meanings of their own theory, and end up talking about two different things. They only think that they disagree.

I play on this ambiguity in the meanings of moral terms in the thread I started called "Morality is Evil." This seems like a contradiction, but it actually shifts from one type of moral theory to another. "Morality" is used in the context of internalism, which states that what a person morally ought to do is what he would do if fully informed, looking only at the reasons he has for doing or not doing some action. "Evil" is used in the context of an externalist moral theory that bases moral evaluations, not on the reasons the agent has, but on the suffering that would be imposed on others. Two different theories, two different sets of meanings, and no contradiction.

Another way that subjectivity and objectivity can exist together is through the possibility of making objective claims about subjective states.

Let's say that Paul believes that God exists. If this is the case, then "God exists" is true for Paul. Which means that Paul will always behave in a way that is consistent with the way one would be expected to behave if "God exists" were true.

The proposition that "Paul believes that God exists" is also true -- objectively true ex hypothesi. So, we have an objectively true statement about a subjective state. It is, at the same time, a fact about the universe that is dependent on belief, because it is a fact about what a person believes. Yet, it is no less objective than any scientific claim.

When I speak about objectively true value claims, I talk about claims of this type -- claims about the relationship between things in the world and desires. No value exists independent of desire. But desires do exist, and desire-dependent values are real. A claim that can is at the same time both objective (objectively true or false) and subjective (dependent on the subjective state of desire to be true).

The question that then comes up in my mind is "Whose desires are then relevant in moral propositions? Yours alone? Mine alone? All men? All white people?"

The answer that I defend is that moral values are based on all of the desires that exist, regardless of who has them. Such propositions are capable of being objectively true or false. But they are not fully independent of human mental states since they are objectively true and false claims about all the desires that exist.

dk

By any degree or perspective (subjective or objective) morality orders human conduct by serving justice. Justice requires people to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate suffering; to offer those that suffer illegitimately closure, empathy, support and/ or remedy. Clearly not all suffering is immoral, and in fact courage is a virtue that celebrates people's resolve to suffer for a just cause. I have to disagree with 99. I think slavery is bad because people aren't suited to be slaves. The notion of racial or cultural inferiority is a scientific explanation to justify an unacceptable institution.

[ May 18, 2002: Message edited by: dk ]</p>

vixstile

How does any of this address what I wrote?
What is your point?

SO WHAT! Acting in a way that has been defined as objectively immoral doesn't necessarily equate acting in a way that is irrational.

The rest of your statement is completely nonsensical to me. I don't understand your mode of thinking there.

An honest person deciding to tell the truth when a lie would better serve them, would be completely irrational. Just as, someone deciding to act in a way that has been defined as objectively moral ,when acting in a way that has been defined as objectively immoral would better further there goals, would be irrational
(Again, the rest of your statement makes no sense to me . )

The existence of an objective morality would provide no rational reason to adhere to that objective moral code. Unless of course, by some coincidences, the objective morality perfectly coincides with your goals, want's, needs and desires.

99Percent

Alonzo Fyfe: You begin to import "ought" judgements when you say "survival is innate with life's existence." It is true that all living things are surviving. But the fact that it does survive does not imply that it ought to survive. From the point of view of an indifferent universe, it doesn't matter one way or the other while life continues on Earth, or the whole thing gets blown away in some huge planet-wide catastrophy.

The living has to survive in order for it to be living. In the case of the living that depend on reason such as human beings morality is important for survival. In the more wider scheme of things life is meaningless. But we are living therefore it is important for us, in fact it is fundamental so an ought is intrinsically derived. Its like dismissing the importance of a game by saying "its just a game", but by saying so you automatically lose the game as the game becomes nonexistent to you.

It is as if you are saying that whatever survives ought to continue to survive. But, why?

Because that is what life is, it is its nature of being. Like a the nature of being of a boat is to float over water, it has to float, or else its nature of existence is defeated - it is no longer a boat. The nature of being of a cup is to hold liquids, if it has a hole at the bottom it no longer holds water - it ceases to be a cup.

Your fallacy is to not look at the nature of being of things but to see them as simply as a bunch of molecules that have no meaning. Your scope of vision is too wide, you have lost focus. You are looking at life as any other inert matter. It is self defeating because you are alive and worse, you can perceive life yourself.

If so, what type of society are we talking about? Could this be a slave society? That society's well being depends on the continuation of slavery. If slavery is abolished, the slave society ceases to exist -- and ceasing to exist seems contrary to its well being. So, the abolition of slavery would be immoral.

Well being of life is dependent on the individual organisms that make up life. The well being of a society depends on the well being of the individuals of such a society. Slavery is not well being for those in slavery and therefore it is not well being for the society, therefore slavery is immoral, not its abolition.

Are we not importing values (e.g., the wrongness of slavery) into our definition of society so that we may justify the elimination of the slave society? In which case, again, where is the objectivity of the well-being of society if we import subjective values into our definition of society?

The wrongness of slavery is not subjective. It is objectively wrong because it goes against the free will of men, this free will is necessary for productivity of men being life a force of production and transformation.

Finally, your claim that survival depends on well-being is false. I know a man who took a significant blow to his well being 40 years ago --in an airplane crash. He's now 82.

Non-sequitur. One component of this man's life does not make up his whole life. Besides the airplane crash was accidental. If someone repeatedly goes his own reason of being well, he will be consistently undermine his length and quality of life.

dk: By any degree or perspective (subjective or objective) morality orders human conduct by serving justice. Justice requires people to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate suffering; to offer those that suffer illegitimately closure, empathy, support and/ or remedy.

Suffering is a result of injustice, not the injustice itself. To distinguish injustice we look at the objective facts, not at the suffering of people. There can be a great injustice with little perceived suffering, or a lot of suffering with no injustice whatsoever. That does not mean we cannot offer closure, empathy or support to those suffering justified or not.

Clearly not all suffering is immoral, and in fact courage is a virtue that celebrates people's resolve to suffer for a just cause.

Suffering is not immoral, it is a feeling as a consequence or not of moral or immoral actions.

I have to disagree with 99. I think slavery is bad because people aren't suited to be slaves. The notion of racial or cultural inferiority is a scientific explanation to justify an unacceptable institution.

Slavery has nothing to do with racial or cultural inferiority or even science. Slavery is the forceful subjugation of one man's will over another man's will and that is what is immoral about it.

The Anticris: Objectivism/Subjectivism
Objectivist: Moral propositions are either true or false independent of belief.
Subectivist: Moral propositions are merely statements of opinion or taste.

The above is probably a gross simplification (or just plain wrong), but it does appear to be an aspect of this debate which seems to polarise opinions.

Its fairly accurate, IMO.

Neither of the two statements fits well with my view of morality. For me, at one end of the spectrum, moral pronouncements can be nothing more than declarations of preference, whilst at the other it is quite possible that the truth or falsity of a moral proposition would be quite evident to all possible moral agents.

But moral agents need to have the means to determine with honesty the truth or falsity of a moral proposition and that is reason. That some people are not honest or aren't willing to commit reason to their morals, or just don't have the capacity of reason is another matter entirely.

Is it possible that some elements of morality are subjective and others objective?

The morality that deals with other people must be necessarily objective in order for it to have any meaning at all, because you are a communicative and reasonable human being. You can communicate your reasonable desires and your aversions with others. You build objective value by producing actual physical values of which you can then trade with others who have also communicated their reasonable desires and aversions with you.

The morality that deals specifically with your own self can be subjective (although I think it would be better to try to be as objective as possible meaning reasoning out the most desireable long time benefit to your self). For example you might value getting wasted tonight at the cost of waking up feeling like shit the next day.

dk

I gave an example and explanation of how the Laws of Physics reflect upon morality, and visa versa. Perhaps I should have just said moral philosophy and the Laws of Physics are interdependent by definition.
I know several honest people that won’t tell a lie to save their skins. But when the human law contradicts objective moral law then people live lawlessly. For example under the reign of the NAZI German Government people lived lawlessly.
I don’t understand the meaning of “no rational reason”; is that like “irrational reason”?

0n0w1c

i do not use values, i stated an action has an effect. any action that is a no harm or is benefical to the well being of society is moral. the interpretation of the "value" of the effect however, is subjective to the observer. the action will have an effect on society, such as murder... this reduces the membership of society, it causes fear, it disrupts society's well being, thus it is immoral.

[ May 18, 2002: Message edited by: 0n0w1c ]</p>

vixstile

interdependent? I don't see how philosophy and physics interdependent.

Again, something being defined as objectively lawless(in some moral sense) does not automatically provide a rational incentive to NOT act lawlessly.

wouldn't provide a rational reason

Assuming actions can be objectively defined as ether moral or immoral, why act morally?

The AntiChris

Alonzo Fyfe

This is certainly the impression I've gained from observing many of the exchanges here.

I agree, using your criteria, "such propositions are capable of being objectively true or false".

However, can we ever know the truth or falsity of such propositions?

If not, how does this help us with moral discourse?

Chris