mnkbdky

This structure you speak of philechat intrigues me. Does this structure remain the same? And what is it that contains this structure and does it remain the same?

mnkbdky

Why is no one looking at or reply to my P-ness?

Guillaume

I do not agree with this ridiculous assumption at all, making your whole argument meaningless.

Cells are replaced BY A COPY OF THE ORIGINAL, thru it may be argued that the individual doesn't really change from moment to moment.

mnkbdky

It is not enough merely to disagree with the assumption. "You" must tell me why "you" do not and suggest an alternative. Would you say that someone who thinks they are a different person from moment to moment is rational. That is, if you and I met, introduced ourselves to each other and I told you that I was from Utah; then when you asked me what part of Utah I was from I asked you who you were and why you were talking to me and what made you think I was from Utah, would this be a rational response?

What does a copy matter? Let me ask you this, If I placed you in a human copy machine and made an exact duplicate of you, would there now be two of you? No. It is impossible that there be two of you. There can only be one you.

Hopefully this is all coherent, I am getting tired.

Michaelson

Quick aside: Where does your theory leave plants, then?

Unless you're suggesting plants have souls, the tree that I walk past as I go to the shops, is not the same tree that I pass on the way back.

I could argue against this, but I don't want to if I don't have to. What's your opinion? Is the tree the same?

I reckon it is.

mnkbdky

No, the tree is not the same. Nothing can be the same thing unless it has an immutable substance, which tree's do not have. At least there is nothing to suggest that they do. It might be argued that intellegent animals such as chimps and dolphins do, but trees and plant, I am not sure how that would look.

It is very easy to see that the tree is not the same. Let's say you pass by it on your way to the mall. While you were at the mall a stiff wind blew a couple of the trees leaves off. Then we you pass by it again you think it is the same tree. However, it is not. The tree you passed by had two more leaves on it. Think about the tree cycle--fall, winter, spring and summer. It is the same tree from year to year. No. The leaves are replaced with new ones. It may look the same, but it isn't.

Michaelson

Is it Parfit who gave the teleportation example?

Imagine a teleportation machine that operates by scanning the object's molecular structure precisely, transmitting it at the speed of light to the destination. The object of teleporatation is destroyed at the point of departure(X), and reformed at the point of arrival(Y). The person at the end of arrival is identical to the one who left in all respect. He shares the original's memories, personality, capabilities and ambitions.

Is this the same person? If all you're looking at is continuity of soul, then shouldn't the person who arrives at Y be considered the same person who left from X?

Depending on your response, it is might be interesting to consider also what your view would be assuming the machine breaks down and, a) fails to destroy the subject at X; or b) jams at Y and produces multiple subjects.

Another thought experiment: Pretend you have a brain tumor, however the only operation that you can undergo will result in you losing all memory and experiencing a drastic personality change. Are you still the same person after the operation? How would you feel if you knew that after the operation you would experience intense pain for an extended period?

Please note, I don't have any answers. I only know the questions. I'll have to write an essay about this sort of stuff in a few weeks, so I'm glad it came up.

mnkbdky

I have not read Parfit's book Reasons and Persons, yet. I just got it for Christ-mass. However, Keith E. Yandell gives a great discussion about the same question in his philosophy of religion book. Since I am tired and getting ready to go to bed I will be quick. First you have to be clear by what you mean by destroyed. Do you mean that the person was completely annihilated? or merely transformed or scattered into some other type of substance and then re-assembled? If it was the former then there is no way that person could ever come back. If it is the latter, then, I would ask, do these scattered or transformed particals remain the same, numerically indentical to themselve's, or are the replaced by copies. If they are copies then, no, it cannot be the same person, but a copy. You mention that it shares the "original" memories, but in order for them to be the original memories then they would have to belong to the person who experienced them. But they are not according to the scenario. They are copies of the original memories. Copies are not the same, that is why they are called copies.

You then say that I am looking at continuity of soul. What does that mean. I am looking at an immutible soul. Something that does not change in its essential properties. Something may change in its accidental properties and remain the same, but it cannot change in it essential properties and remain the same.

Hope this answers some of your questions. If not re-post them and I will get to them in the morning.

Michaelson

So by your reasoning, it would be crazy to refer to it as a particular tree. Just like you emphasise use of the word 'you' to those who deny your first assumption, I ask how you would refer to that tree in general conversation?

And with regards to non-intelligent animals, was I mistaken to give a name to my pet dog? Is he the same continuous being, or a constant stream of new dogs with every replaced cell?

I think your second and third premises are questionable.

Firstly, I think the idea of a person is undoubtedly tied up with the notion of consciousness. A corpse is not a prson. A person dies when they lose brain activity, etc etc

However, if we take it that in your argument you are refering to a tree, (seeing as you deny that a tree remains the same through time), instead of accepting your third premise:

3) a tree must retain their original parts (e.g., leaves, branches, cells, etc) in order to remain the same person.

Couldn't you argue that a tree's identity has something to do with its spatial and temporal continuity, instead? If the tree that exists on the way back from the mall, extra cells or no extra cells, maintains a location in space and time that can be traced back to the tree which you passed on the way to the mall, then it can be said to be the same tree. There is no way to conceive of that tree all of a sudden existing in a separate place, or ceasing to exist.

Except now I'm thinking about that, and I guess it doesn't hold, because if you sent the tree back in time or something it'd still be the same tre, so I don't know what to make of that...

But I still asked some other questions before, and they remain relevant.

VivaHedone

'I' am made from something intangible. It is not the soul, it is my sensations. These sensations, specifically memory of past sensations, are what give us our sense of identity. These memories are produced by brain structure, so as long as the brain structure is unchanged, it does not matter whether the actual cells are replaced with copies.