jlowder

In a <a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=14&t=000607&p=" target="_blank">previous post on this board</a>, I argued that moral objectivism and moral realism are not synonymous. I wrote:

SingleDad challenged this paragraph, arguing that realism cannot be decoupled from objectivism. I tried to clarify matters by quoting extensively from Louis Pojman's book, <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0534551815/internetinfidelsA/" target="_blank">Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong</a>. Then, in a separate post, I quoted the explanation provided by David Brink, in his book <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0521359376/internetinfidelsA/" target="_blank">Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics</a>. But having now re-read the entire thread, I'm no longer satisfied with what I wrote. I still believe there is a distinction between ethical realism and ethical objectivism, but I didn't explain the difference clearly.

What follows is my latest attempt to clearly explain the distinction between ethical realism and ethical objectivism. It was inspired by (and taken from) the introduction to <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0801495415/internetinfidelsA" target="_blank">Essays on Moral Realism</a>, edited by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord. According to Sayre-McCord:

Sayre-McCord then notes the following about his definition of realism: "Yet, in the account I offer, there is no mention of objectivity or existence...." (p. 5). "To get realism, the disputed claims must not only have truth-values, some of them must have the truth-value true.." (p. 10)

What, then, is the relationship between realism and objectivism? Sayre-McCord notes that there are three basic types of realism: objectivism, intersubjectivism, and subjectivism.

Some other interesting quotations from Sayre-McCord:

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I hope at least one person find Sayre-McCord's explanation as helpful as I did.

Regards,

Jeffery Jay Lowder

[ August 01, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]

[ August 01, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]</p>

Toad Master

Edit: I must apologize to SingleDad for the following quotation. I got all mixed up in following the thread from jlower's post. The quote below is really out of context since it is from another archived thread. (Edited Aug. 4th 2:30 PM PST)

Quote:
SingleDad: "The presumption of objectivity in ethics is no more falsifiable than the presumption of objectivity in ontology or theology. Since no logically possible argument--not even the absolute lack of evidence--can rebut the presumption of objectivity, neither for morality nor an ontological entity nor for a god, we do not have a basis to communicate about these issues."

What would falsify that there is a presumption of objectivity in morals in common language is if we spoke of our moral judgements in a similar manner to the way we speak of our tastes for food, which is with a presumption of subjectivity.

For example: if there were an assumption of subjectivity and if, say, we observed someone bullying someone else (torturing him for fun), we might say something like "well, I think bullying is wrong myself, but there's no accounting for taste."

I don't think, morally speaking, we regard bullying as a matter of personal taste. What about the poor sucker being bullied? I presume his tastes count too, in making a moral judgement, and that makes the matter at least intersubjective.

-Toad Master

[ August 04, 2002: Message edited by: Toad Master ]

[ August 04, 2002: Message edited by: Toad Master ]</p>

The AntiChris

jlowder

In what sense do you think "moral truths" might "make up an independent reality"?

As a layman I have to say I have great difficulty understanding the distinction you make between realism and your description of objectivism, particularly in view of this from your previous thread:

You say:

If anyone does find this explanation helpful, I'd be grateful if they could explain the distinction to me in plain english.

Chris

The AntiChris

Toad Master

I don't think that there can be any doubt that there is a presumption of "objectivity" in common moral language - at least for most people.

However, as you seem to be suggesting, I think this so-called "objectivity" is really a tacit understanding, by most people, that there are certain, basic, universally accepted inter-subjective moral values shared by all rational people. This is clearly not objectiveness in its purest sense and certainly not "objective" as understood by most subjectivists and opponents of objectivism.

It seems to me that the prevailing view on this board is one of entrenched subjectivism that appears to view any mention of moral objectivity as equivalent to dabbling in witchcraft and the supernatural. Whilst I personally do not believe that there are such things as "independent moral truths", I'm not sure all objectivists do either.

I can't help feeling that if the subjectivists and objectivists could get over their semantic battles, there's a potentially interesting debate to be had about whether basic "universal" moral values exist and if they are at all of any practical use.

Chris

Toad Master

The AntiChris:

I pretty much agree with what you said.

The presumption of objectivity seems to have the effect that where people disagree, they debate it and try to come to an agreement. In doing so, they are forced into an "all things considered" perspective. Objective morality seems to be boot-strapped into existence by the mere assumption of its existence. It probably wouldn't work or be useful unless there were substantial shared values.

You: "It seems to me that the prevailing view on this board is one of entrenched subjectivism that appears to view any mention of moral objectivity as equivalent to dabbling in witchcraft and the supernatural."

The irony is that while religious ethics are technically objective, in practice, insofar as they are faith based, they are subjective.

I also agree that the debate is very much confounded by the ambiguity of the terms "subjective" and "objective." I think morality is clearly both but in different respects.

-Toad Master

RogerLeeCooke

I'm not sure how this comment interweaves with your very well-put point, but there is a difference between moral judgments and judgments of taste that is quite objective, namely that moral judgments are expressions of the kind of society one wishes to live in. Judgments of taste do not have this social component. It is in the nature of the preference itself if I (in common with everyone else I know) want to live in a society where bullies are suppressed, then I will of course try to suppress bullies, just as I, having a taste for the music of Johann Sebastian Bach, will try to acquire specimens of it and resist attempts (if such can be imagined) to suppress it.

If that difference in context merits the description "intersubjective," then I must admit that I believe morals are intersubjective. But all I mean by the term is what I said above: that their content is my wishes about the kind of society I am to live in.

jlowder

All,

Having read the various responses on this thread, I now regret even referring to the archived thread. Although I referenced an archived thread where I discussed a "presumption of objectivity," in THIS thread I didn't intend to discuss THAT issue here. I had simply intended to focus on whether there is a distinction between moral realism and moral objectivism.

Please disregard that sentence from my archived thread. I'm not trying to defend that claim. Indeed, I'm not even sure if I still agree with it. I'm merely discussing whether there is a distinction between moral realism and moral objectivism.

Moral realism is the view that two conditions obtain: (1) moral claims are either true or false, and (2) some moral claims are literally true. Now note that since moral realism is a "meta-ethical" view, not a "normative view," it doesn't specify which moral claims are literally true. Moral realism simply entails that there are moral claims that are literally true.

For example, consider the following claim:

MC. You should not set babies on fire for fun.

Noncognitivists say that MC is neither true nor false. On their view, MC is a meaningless sentence. Noncognitivists deny the truth of condition (1) listed above.

Cognitivists include everyone else who believe that MC is either true or false. Thus, cognitivists agree with (1).

There are two types of cognitivists. Members of the first group are called "error theorists." This is because members of this group believe that ALL moral statements (including MC) are in error. Although moral statements have a truth value (they are either true or false), error theorists believe that ALL moral statements are false. Therefore, error theorists deny condition (2) above and are not realists.

The second group of cognitivists could be called "success theorists." Success theorists believe that some moral claims "succeed" in the sense that they are actually true. Again, although realism does not require that MC be true, probably most success theorists believe that MC is true. But when a success theorist says that MC is "true," what do they mean?

There are three types of success theorists. First, there are subjectivists. Subjectivists might say that MC is true because they (the individual subjectivist) believes MC is true.

Second, there are intersubjectivists. If an intersubjectivist believed that MC is true, he would say that MC is true because of some fact about groups of people. For example, an intersubjectivist might say that MC is true because an entire culture is against MC. Or an intersubjectivist might say that MC is true because it undermines or denies the natural desires of the human species.

Third, there are objectivists. Unlike subjectivists and intersubjectivists, an objectivist would say that if MC is true, whatever makes MC true has nothing to do with the opinions, conventions, or capacities of people (either as individuals or in groups).

So let me attempt to put this in plain English. A moral realist believes that some actions are, quite literally, wrong. (For example, a moral realist might believe setting newborn babies on fire is really wrong.) The objectivist goes a step further than the realist. The objectivist says that not only are some things really morally wrong (e.g., burning newborns), but that the reason such things are morally wrong has nothing to do with the opinions of individuals, cultures, societies, etc.

I hope this helps!

Regards,

Jeffery Jay Lowder

Toad Master

That was my fault. I didn't realize the referenced thread was closed, and then I mistakenly posted a reply intended for that thread here. My apologizes.

After reading and rereading your two posts, I think I'm clear on realism vs. objectivism and subjectivism vs. intersubjectivism vs. objectivism.

What I'm now totally confused about is where my own moral philosophy fits into this scheme!

-Toad Master <img src="confused.gif" border="0">

Toad Master

If I may nitpick this, seems to me that the "one" would have to be a moral person, otherwise his/her judgements about their own or other peoples behavior may not be "moral" judgements. A moral person takes into account the interests of others in making judgements (if only to stay out of trouble?), imo.

I also don't see why the converse could not be true: that the society one wishes to live in is determined by ones moral judgements. E.g.: you don't want to live in a society that allows bullying because you judge bullying to be wrong.

Just some thoughts,
-Toad Master

[ August 12, 2002: Message edited by: Toad Master ]</p>

Vorkosigan

Jeff,

I'm not clear on what you mean by "true" in the context of moral claims. It seems to me that the moral realist can be a relativist, but that is not what I think of when I think of moral realism. For example, the MC "It is bad to set babies on fire" might be true in Cincinnati, but not in Cleveland. Does the "true" here mean "somewhere at some time" or "true everywhere on earth at all times." Leaving aside the question of whether such an MC would be normative, does simply refer to "having objective and verifiable existence somewhere at some time?"

Vorkosigan