Vorkosigan

I hope you'll both excuse my skepticism, but i don't accept that your knowledge of instrumentalism is so poor as to suppose this to be much of an argument against it, or even against social constructivism, any more than there is a similar difficulty for anti-foundationalists in epistemology.

Yes, constructivists always accuse their critics of not understanding what is going on. It saves them deploying actual arguments and such. There's no feeling like being accused of naivete by a fellow grad student who thinks that there has been no improvement in maternal survival after childbirth since the 18th century. Yes, I was "naive" for believing that there had been.

What do you think constructivism is, Hugo? Anti-realism, as Leplin wrote, originated as the denial that explanation counts at all.

Moreover, you have a long way to go before this example shows that realism isn't Laudan's "ultimate petetitio principii".

That's a cute assertion of Laudan's. But as Giere pointed out, philosophy is pretty hopeless at understanding science, and SSK is not any better. Neither ever talks about cognition, but that's really what this discussion is about, isn't it? How humans think about reality. And on that score the kind of twofold structure that sociologists typically use to understand how humans interact with their social world simply fails to say anything.

The problem is that the irrealists draw on either philosophy or sociology to make their case. And neither explains nor even deals with, cognition in a scientific setting.

It doesn't matter how many philosophers line up against realism, or how many theologians, or how many Hindu mystics. None of them possess reliable and useful methodologies for explaining what's out there. And "what's out there" includes the activities of scientists. As Giere argues, it is going to take a scientist to explain why science works.

Instead, i wonder if you would address what i asked: viz., is it possible for science to arise without realist assumptions? I'm not sure that it is.

I agree that it isn't possible. That was (yet another) reason the Chinese failed, for they incorporated irrealist approaches into so much of their empirical work. See the use of the Yi Ching in the study of chemistry, for example. What's your point with regard to Christianity? Can we make a case for arguing that Christianity encouraged belief that there really was something out there?

At the moment i wonder if the two of you even know what instrumentalism or irrealism are, since pointing me to Higher Superstition is hardly going to help with Goodman or van Frasssen.

Are you referring to Van Frassen's rejection of abduction? Goodman's paradoxes of confirmation? Those are refuted by the continuing success of science. The fact is that science works. It actually does produce reliable and useful knowledge of the world. The reality is that Goodman, in arguing that confirmation poses a paradox, has made an error.

If you want to discuss the warrant for scientific realism then it really needs another thread.

<shrug> I thought that was the issue we raised. Can we connect it back to the debate over Christianity and origins?

Vorkosigan

Vorkosigan

Sorry to flood this thread with posts....

Let's go back to John Ray, active at the end of the 17th century (1628-1705).

Here's Ray. "A devout Christian, Ray expounded his belief in "natural theology," the doctrine that the wisdom and power of God could be understood by studying His creation, the natural world." (from website above) Ray wrote that:

• There is for a free man no occupation more worthy and delightful than to contemplate the beauteous works of nature and honour the infinite wisdom and goodness of God.

The site goes on to discuss the problems Ray encountered with fossils of organisms not now alive.

Now, we have a basic explanatory gap in any constructivist/irrealist program. Where did Ray get the idea that those patterns in rocks were extinct animals? If you want to answer, like a good constructivist, from somewhere in his social milieu, you cannot rid yourself of this problem. Even if you want to take some position that attempts to incorporate a mysterious interaction with the real, you are still stuck.....moreoever, the idea that fossils are extinct animals is cross-culturally supported; the Chinese, Arabs, and Indians all made the same observation.

But if we start talking about cognition, about pattern matching, innate modules for recognition of animals and plants (why was Ray so interested in plants anyway?), then we can have a much fuller explanation that enables us to explain BOTH Ray's theology -- a hegemonic ideology of power that humans interact with, create, adapt, and change -- AND Ray's ability to step outside of this system of thinking and observe that fossils are imprints of extinct animals, and contemplate the consequences for his theology. Ray's inbuilt pattern matching systems are part of a set of cognitive resources he has, which also include his theological beliefs, his training and background, etc.

The problem of irrealism is that it simply dismisses the properties of the mind itself as a potential issue in developing explanations for scientific explanation. In other words, the whole SSK field is stuck with 17th century notions of mind-body duality, although, because of the sophistication of SSK prose, one hardly realizes how astoundingly backward they really are. Irrealist thinkers behave as though Chomsky and the whole cognitive revolution of the 1950s have never happened.

Ray (from site above):

"Yet on ye other side there follows such a train of consequences, as seem to shock the Scripture-History of ye novity [newness] of the World; at least they overthrow the opinion generally received. . . "

If there is no conflict, then what is Ray wrestling with here?

Vorkosigan

Hugo Holbling

:banghead:

Vorkosigan

Good fallback position, Hugo.

Vorkosigan

Hugo Holbling

My apologies to everyone reading this thread, but i'm too busy at work at the moment to debate with headbangers who think the "continuing success of science" is enough to solve myriad problems in the philosophy of science.

Vorkosigan

No problem. I, on the other hand, have plenty of time to waste with people who think that philosophy is capable of answering questions about the world.

BTW, Hugo, can you think of any problem in philosophy of science of that philosophy has actually solved?

Vorkosigan

Hugo Holbling

Nice try, but this question doesn't do what you want it to. Think it through, perhaps, although i doubt it'll achieve much. No kidding though - i'll probably be too busy for a few days, maybe more, while there's a more interesting discussion under way in politics i want to keep an eye on.

Working weekends is no fun.

Vorkosigan

Nice try, but this question doesn't do what you want it to.

What, get you to see the problem as I do? That will take a lot more work. The problems that philosophy thinks it is raising can only be solved by scientific approaches; neither philosophy nor SSK possesses the appropriate methodologies. Just re-read that paper on Laudan you referenced above, and note two things. First, that Laudan (and the others) spend all their time discussing human cognitive behavior, and yet have no model of that, nor do they appear to have familiarized themselves with the field. Second, please note the following summary of Laudan, with the quote

• "In other words, the history of science matters to normative epistemology; meta-methodology can no longer be conceived of as an a priori enterprise. The main reason for this, as Laudan put it, is that 'science has been successful at producing the epistemic goods' (1987, p.28). Thus, the first move toward understanding this sense of naturalism is to recognize that there is a critical connection between the processes by which we acquire our beliefs and the ones by which we ought to acquire our beliefs.

I guess you can number Laudan among the head-bangers, eh?

Just keep reminding yourself of all the money you're making.

Vorkosigan

Hugo Holbling

Still here, suffering from a thirteen-hour day yesterday...

Take a moment to talk to Joel via PM, Michael. I don't care if i'm annihiliated here or if i "win" a debate; i intentionally take up minority positions because they're so much more challenging. In this case i do think realism is shaky, but i would assert it anyway just to give a discussion more sides (how many irrealists or anti-realists are there here? I can think of two, perhaps...). I reference Laudan because his paper is interesting for anyone who has never considered such things and because it's easier to locate than the stuff i have in my library; whether i agree with him or not is moot (i don't). Consequently, i'm unimpressed by your quote.

I "see the problem"; i don't agree that the failure of philosophy in solving a problem implies anything about its disutility (as you are no doubt aware); and i would oppose you in any case because we all learn more that way. Am i trolling, or walking a fine line betwixt those dark regions and proper debate? You be the judge...

I'm making alot of money but it perpetuates a world i want no part in, so the thought brings no solace. Thanks anyway.

Gurdur

I once had a friend in Australia nicknamed Gollum, who was a true anarchist.
I found out he worked for the Australian Commonwealth Bureau of Statistics (at that time, his actual work was to ring up people in Liverpool, Sydney, and ask them how many chickens they owned, and enter it all in the stats).

I asked me flat out how he reconciled his anarchism with working as a civil servant.
He looked at me a trifle shame-facedly, bent closer to me and whispered:
"When I enter the stats for chickens, I lie about the actual numbers."
___________

We all find our own ways to square things.