Freethought & Rationalism Archive

Ojuice5001 · 12-29-2001, 05:25 PM

One of the items in the II library that attacks the Fine-Tuning Argument is by Ted Drange, and is called<a href="http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/tuning.html" target="_blank">Fine-Tuning</a>. The main reason I like the Fine-Tuning Argument is because all rebuttals of it look to me as if they left it standing. Let me go into detail about this one.

The premise that Drange mostly attacks is that theism is the "best explanation" of fine-tuning. I should note that he doesn't argue very hard against the premise that "some explanation of our physical constants is needed. He says that the God hypothesis is inadequate in itself, and not as good as the alternatives. I just now abandoned belief in the God hypothesis, as he defines it. To see why, read my last and next-to-the-last posts in the thread "Are Atheists and Fanatics the Same?" But he and I disagree about which alternate hypothesis is better. He says it is the B hypothesis, which says that the physical constants are just brute facts for which we shouldn't seek a cause. I say it is the F hypothesis, which is like the God hypothesis only with finite fine-tuners that are not necessarily omnipotent, creators of the universe, etc. What I don't really understand is why he calls the B hypothesis an explanation. It sounds to me like saying there is no explanation.

Here's an analogy. Why is the sky blue? Because of the reflective properties of air. That's an explanation. Why is the experience of seeing blue what it is? That would fall under a brute-fact hypothesis. This brute-fact hypothesis is true, but precisely because there is no explanation. It doesn't make sense to say that invoking the idea of a brute fact is explaining things; it does not do at all the same thing that was done with the question "Why is the sky blue?"

So if the B hypothesis is not an explanation, it can't be the best explanation. By default, the best explanation is either F, or a theory of everything (which may or may not be possible), or conceivably something else. I think it's F.

I know I may be missing something. It seems strange that a great thinker like Ted Drange would make a mistake like that. But I am 99.6% sure that the paper itself does not address the objection that B is a pseudo-explanation that is not really a candidate at all. And since I think that B is not an explanation, I think what this paper really proves is the likely existence of one or more finite fine-tuners.

CodeMason · 12-29-2001, 05:43 PM

Certain, popular interpretations of quantum mechanics allow for FT, and in fact, predict it. I see FT as merely the consequence of living in a naturalistic universe, ie., infinite Big Bang events, resulting in infinite universes and infinite physical configurations.

SingleDad · 12-29-2001, 05:59 PM

Ojuice5001

Quote:

But he and I disagree about which alternate hypothesis is better. He says it is the B hypothesis, which says that the physical constants are just brute facts for which we shouldn't seek a cause. I say it is the F hypothesis, which is like the God hypothesis only with finite fine-tuners that are not necessarily omnipotent, creators of the universe, etc.

Well, your F hypothesis suffers from the same failing as as the B hypothesis; in your case, it is merely a brute fact that the universe creators exist. You are correct that the "brute fact" hypothesis is not an explanation; at some point, however, there must be some brute fact.

The anthropic principle does not explain why the universe has life, but, given that there is life, it states the obvious conclusion that we would always see a life-friendly universe, even if the constants of that universe were simply a brute fact.

Probably the most through mathematical treatment of the Naturalistic Anthropic Principle can be found at <a href="http://quasar.as.utexas.edu/anthropic.html" target="_blank">The Anthropic Principle Does Not Support Supernaturalism</a>.

Datheron · 12-29-2001, 06:00 PM

Ojuice5001,

I think that what you're truly asking here is perhaps "why do we draw axiomic lines where they are?" Allow me to explain.

What you're saying, in quick summary, is that the constants as they way they are are insufficient as an explanatory device, and should go further; a deeper layer, if you will. For example, theists may argue that even with all physical laws held, they are that way because of God's divine creation/interference. Scientists, on the other hand, will simply take the constants and laws themselves as basic/axiomic, and will not try to delve any further beyond in the realm of explanations. Also note that all worldviews inhibit this behavior, for the theist must assume that God(s) is/are axiomic, the solipsist must assume that he is axiomic, etc.

Then the obvious question is, "why stop at that particular point?" There can always be a string of "why is this so?" questions to any explanation, the fine-tuning argument included: one can ask why the constants are so (because God made them to be that way), then one can ask why God made them so, etc. Similarly, with GUT's, one can ask why there exists a beautiful and symmetric unification of all natural laws and properties. To beat a dead horse, seeing blue would be explained by the various quantities of light that are reflected by the surface which appears to be blue. Why? We haven't figured that out yet.

Hence, Drange's argument merely attempts to bring it a step up from and name that axiomic - i.e. that the "brute fact" is that the constants are the way they are. This idea is further embellished in the scientific Anthropic Principle, which simply states that if the constants were not exact, we would not be here and wondering about how the constants got their precise values. Whether that in itself is a convincing argument, I'll leave up to you, but rest assured that it is explanatory and valid.

Ojuice5001 · 12-30-2001, 08:26 AM

Okay, I suppose the B hypothesis is legitimate in principle, but I'm not satisfied that it is better than F. The F hypothesis is better because it appeals less to coincidence. We know that a lot of coincidence is required for carbon-based life, but we don't have similar knowledge about what is required for a fine-tuner god to exist. It's quite tenable that much less coincidence is required.

I'm not satisfied that Drange's paper makes B seem like less of a coincidence (even though that rolling-ten-dice analogy is a lot of fun

). He says that other universes might have entities just as interesting as complex life, but this seems to involve inattention to what a de-tuned universe would be like. For instance, say we're talking about a universe where gravity is 90% what it is in actuality (everything else is the same). Even a much smaller change would prevent the formation of large stars that produce heavy elements, so it is reasonable to assume that a 90% change would prevent any stars from existing. The whole universe would resemble the outskirts of a nebula. No offense to people who are interested in nebulae, but that universe simply does not have the appearance of fine-tuning.

Liquidrage · 12-30-2001, 10:47 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by Ojuice5001:
For instance, say we're talking about a universe where gravity is 90% what it is in actuality (everything else is the same). Even a much smaller change would prevent the formation of large stars that produce heavy elements, so it is reasonable to assume that a 90% change would prevent any stars from existing. The whole universe would resemble the outskirts of a nebula.

This is a classic case of assuming the donkey comes before the carrot. I see it far too often in the physics that I read where the author is rather metaphysical.

We simply do not know what would happen if gravity were different then it is now.
Perhaps different forms of *matter* would have then been created.
Perhaps instead of clumping the universe would be a big ocean. Your nebula could still allow for the formation of life.
We just don't know and anything here is speculation. Speculation does not prove nor disallow.
There is no reason to assume that a vastly different universe could not support some form of *matter* that is capable of reproduction. There is also no reason to assume it would. Hence it should not be the foundation for any theory.

SingleDad · 12-30-2001, 10:56 AM

Ojuice5001

Quote:

Okay, I suppose the B hypothesis is legitimate in principle, but I'm not satisfied that it is better than F. The F hypothesis is better because it appeals less to coincidence.

The B hypothesis does not appeal to coincidence. For a coincidence to be found, you must have at least two events occur, where the probability of each occurring independently is demonstrably low.

In the case of the Fine Tuning argument, we have only a single presumably improbable event (a life-friendly universe); the existence of our own life is clearly dependentent on that occurance. So there is no "coincidence" that is in need of explaining.

Quote:

We know that a lot of coincidence is required for carbon-based life, but we don't have similar knowledge about what is required for a fine-tuner god to exist. It's quite tenable that much less coincidence is required.

Well, no "coincidence" is required, merely one occurance out of the possibility space of possible physical constants. Since presumably each of these constants must have some value, it is not really apt to call the collection of such constants a "coincidence".

But it may well be that the existence of a fine-tuner is more probable than the existence of a life-friendly universe. For instance, if I describe the particular state of the air molecules in my room, the probability that they will all be in some particular positions is not really a "coincidence" of each one being in a particular position.

Until there is actual evidence for such a position, there is no reason to prefer the brute fact of a fine-tuner over the brute fact of the universe existing as it does; and, since we can actually observe the existence of a life-friendly universe (and can only infer the brute fact of a fine-tuner and indeed, as yet, only define the nature of the fine-tuner in terms of the facts of this universe. Since, without additional evidence, we are essentially just shuffling the exact same brute facts around, seems that the fine-tuner hypothesis fails on the basis of Occam's Razor.

Quote:

I'm not satisfied that Drange's paper makes B seem like less of a coincidence (even though that rolling-ten-dice analogy is a lot of fun

). He says that other universes might have entities just as interesting as complex life, but this seems to involve inattention to what a de-tuned universe would be like. For instance, say we're talking about a universe where gravity is 90% what it is in actuality (everything else is the same). Even a much smaller change would prevent the formation of large stars that produce heavy elements, so it is reasonable to assume that a 90% change would prevent any stars from existing. The whole universe would resemble the outskirts of a nebula. No offense to people who are interested in nebulae, but that universe simply does not have the appearance of fine-tuning.

Naturally. The probabilistic form of the Fine Tuning argument (either for naturalism, supernaturalism, theism, or neutrality), assumes a priori that it is meaningful to speak of the collection of logically possible universes, some being life-friendly, others being not. Since each specific universe is equally improbable as any other, unless an actual coincidence can be found, there is no reason to think that this particular universe is any but the selection of one universe from the logical probability space.

And again, it should be noted that the existence of life is entirely dependent on a life-friendly universe; it is entirely unsurprising that life forms, were they to exist, would observe a life-friendly universe.

Tercel · 12-30-2001, 01:52 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Ojuice5001:
What I don't really understand is why he calls the B hypothesis an explanation. It sounds to me like saying there is no explanation.

You are correct in this objection. The B hypothesis is in fact an argument that no explanation is needed in the face of the finetuning argument. He is arguing that the best explanation for the finetuing argument is that no explanation is necessary. This is rather trivially self-contradictory, but we can still understand what he means: It is simply the age old "we don't need an explanation because of the anthropic principle" argument dressed up to look like an "explanation" when in reality it is an argument that no explanation is necessary.

Quote:

So if the B hypothesis is not an explanation, it can't be the best explanation.

Agreed. I don't know why he is hiding B under the guise of being an "explanation": Is he being dishonest, or is he less intelligent than we give him credit for?

Quote:

And since I think that B is not an explanation, I think what this paper really proves is the likely existence of one or more finite fine-tuners.

Which is all the theist was ever arguing for in the first place!
Look at his straw-man P4: The very best explanation of the given fact is that our universe, with the particular combination of physical constants that it has, was created out of nothing by a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, all-loving, eternal, and interested in sentient organic systems, and that he "fine-tuned" those constants in a way which would lead to the evolution of such systems.
I don't know who in their right mind would attempt to argue that. A better P4 would read "The best explanation is that the physical constants have taken their values as a result of the actions of an intelligent being(s)."

Tercel

[ December 30, 2001: Message edited by: Tercel ]

Datheron · 12-30-2001, 02:53 PM

Ojuice5001,

Quote:

Okay, I suppose the B hypothesis is legitimate in principle, but I'm not satisfied that it is better than F. The F hypothesis is better because it appeals less to coincidence. We know that a lot of coincidence is required for carbon-based life, but we don't have similar knowledge about what is required for a fine-tuner god to exist. It's quite tenable that much less coincidence is required.

I'm not satisfied that Drange's paper makes B seem like less of a coincidence (even though that rolling-ten-dice analogy is a lot of fun

). He says that other universes might have entities just as interesting as complex life, but this seems to involve inattention to what a de-tuned universe would be like. For instance, say we're talking about a universe where gravity is 90% what it is in actuality (everything else is the same). Even a much smaller change would prevent the formation of large stars that produce heavy elements, so it is reasonable to assume that a 90% change would prevent any stars from existing. The whole universe would resemble the outskirts of a nebula. No offense to people who are interested in nebulae, but that universe simply does not have the appearance of fine-tuning.

I don't see how you can say that the F hypothesis is better than the B - I can just as easily ask the question "why are the non-supernatural constraints the way they are?" In other words, what mechanism controls the constraints themselves such that life is possible - if such an underlying mechanism is not sentient and not thinking, is that not also by coincidence that the underlying constraints and mechanisms sum up to the correct conditions for life?

You are still running around the same problem as before, in asking beyond the basic axiomic principles, which obviously lies outside the realm of those principles in the first place. It makes no sense within the Anthropic Principle to say that it is a coincidence; the "brute fact" itself is the fact that our constants are the way that they are. Once again, I would like to emphasize the fact that all worldviews necessarily share this beginning point where one cannot ask further "why"'s - I just applied that question to the F hypothesis, and I can just as easily ask that of God existence in the case of the theist (Tercel, take note, for your entire post fails to note that same problem with your worldview and "explanation").

GunnerJ · 12-30-2001, 04:20 PM

Tercel- While I fully agree with you that the writer's summation of P4 is a straw man, I disagree with your underlying theme- that B is a non-explaination; a fallback that life needs no explaination, and is therefore a silly conceit. However, as far as I can see it, life doesn't need an explaination.

The only reason we would have to explain why the universe exists in such a way that sentient life exists is if sentient life was somehow important. Oh, sure, I think it's important that I'm both alive and sentient, but this is just my own, and several billion other persons, subjective opinion. How does our own self importance translate into an objective declaration of our existance's signifigance?

This is the fundamental weakness of the FT argument- that our existance is in some way so sifnifigant that we must explain its unlikeliness. It is an appeal to emotion that easily degenerates into a tautology.

12-29-2001, 05:25 PM	#1
Ojuice5001 Veteran Member Join Date: Jul 2001 Location: A city in Florida that I love Posts: 3,416	The F Hypothesis One of the items in the II library that attacks the Fine-Tuning Argument is by Ted Drange, and is called<a href="http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/tuning.html" target="_blank">Fine-Tuning</a>. The main reason I like the Fine-Tuning Argument is because all rebuttals of it look to me as if they left it standing. Let me go into detail about this one. The premise that Drange mostly attacks is that theism is the "best explanation" of fine-tuning. I should note that he doesn't argue very hard against the premise that "some explanation of our physical constants is needed. He says that the God hypothesis is inadequate in itself, and not as good as the alternatives. I just now abandoned belief in the God hypothesis, as he defines it. To see why, read my last and next-to-the-last posts in the thread "Are Atheists and Fanatics the Same?" But he and I disagree about which alternate hypothesis is better. He says it is the B hypothesis, which says that the physical constants are just brute facts for which we shouldn't seek a cause. I say it is the F hypothesis, which is like the God hypothesis only with finite fine-tuners that are not necessarily omnipotent, creators of the universe, etc. What I don't really understand is why he calls the B hypothesis an explanation. It sounds to me like saying there is no explanation. Here's an analogy. Why is the sky blue? Because of the reflective properties of air. That's an explanation. Why is the experience of seeing blue what it is? That would fall under a brute-fact hypothesis. This brute-fact hypothesis is true, but precisely because there is no explanation. It doesn't make sense to say that invoking the idea of a brute fact is explaining things; it does not do at all the same thing that was done with the question "Why is the sky blue?" So if the B hypothesis is not an explanation, it can't be the best explanation. By default, the best explanation is either F, or a theory of everything (which may or may not be possible), or conceivably something else. I think it's F. I know I may be missing something. It seems strange that a great thinker like Ted Drange would make a mistake like that. But I am 99.6% sure that the paper itself does not address the objection that B is a pseudo-explanation that is not really a candidate at all. And since I think that B is not an explanation, I think what this paper really proves is the likely existence of one or more finite fine-tuners.

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12-29-2001, 05:43 PM	#2
CodeMason Regular Member Join Date: Feb 2001 Location: Australia Posts: 226	Certain, popular interpretations of quantum mechanics allow for FT, and in fact, predict it. I see FT as merely the consequence of living in a naturalistic universe, ie., infinite Big Bang events, resulting in infinite universes and infinite physical configurations.

12-29-2001, 06:00 PM	#4
Datheron Senior Member Join Date: Jul 2001 Location: Berkeley, CA Posts: 553	Ojuice5001, I think that what you're truly asking here is perhaps "why do we draw axiomic lines where they are?" Allow me to explain. What you're saying, in quick summary, is that the constants as they way they are are insufficient as an explanatory device, and should go further; a deeper layer, if you will. For example, theists may argue that even with all physical laws held, they are that way because of God's divine creation/interference. Scientists, on the other hand, will simply take the constants and laws themselves as basic/axiomic, and will not try to delve any further beyond in the realm of explanations. Also note that all worldviews inhibit this behavior, for the theist must assume that God(s) is/are axiomic, the solipsist must assume that he is axiomic, etc. Then the obvious question is, "why stop at that particular point?" There can always be a string of "why is this so?" questions to any explanation, the fine-tuning argument included: one can ask why the constants are so (because God made them to be that way), then one can ask why God made them so, etc. Similarly, with GUT's, one can ask why there exists a beautiful and symmetric unification of all natural laws and properties. To beat a dead horse, seeing blue would be explained by the various quantities of light that are reflected by the surface which appears to be blue. Why? We haven't figured that out yet. Hence, Drange's argument merely attempts to bring it a step up from and name that axiomic - i.e. that the "brute fact" is that the constants are the way they are. This idea is further embellished in the scientific Anthropic Principle, which simply states that if the constants were not exact, we would not be here and wondering about how the constants got their precise values. Whether that in itself is a convincing argument, I'll leave up to you, but rest assured that it is explanatory and valid.

12-30-2001, 08:26 AM	#5
Ojuice5001 Veteran Member Join Date: Jul 2001 Location: A city in Florida that I love Posts: 3,416	Okay, I suppose the B hypothesis is legitimate in principle, but I'm not satisfied that it is better than F. The F hypothesis is better because it appeals less to coincidence. We know that a lot of coincidence is required for carbon-based life, but we don't have similar knowledge about what is required for a fine-tuner god to exist. It's quite tenable that much less coincidence is required. I'm not satisfied that Drange's paper makes B seem like less of a coincidence (even though that rolling-ten-dice analogy is a lot of fun ). He says that other universes might have entities just as interesting as complex life, but this seems to involve inattention to what a de-tuned universe would be like. For instance, say we're talking about a universe where gravity is 90% what it is in actuality (everything else is the same). Even a much smaller change would prevent the formation of large stars that produce heavy elements, so it is reasonable to assume that a 90% change would prevent any stars from existing. The whole universe would resemble the outskirts of a nebula. No offense to people who are interested in nebulae, but that universe simply does not have the appearance of fine-tuning.

12-30-2001, 04:20 PM	#10
GunnerJ Banned Join Date: Sep 2001 Location: a place where i can list whatever location i want Posts: 4,871	Tercel- While I fully agree with you that the writer's summation of P4 is a straw man, I disagree with your underlying theme- that B is a non-explaination; a fallback that life needs no explaination, and is therefore a silly conceit. However, as far as I can see it, life doesn't need an explaination. The only reason we would have to explain why the universe exists in such a way that sentient life exists is if sentient life was somehow important. Oh, sure, I think it's important that I'm both alive and sentient, but this is just my own, and several billion other persons, subjective opinion. How does our own self importance translate into an objective declaration of our existance's signifigance? This is the fundamental weakness of the FT argument- that our existance is in some way so sifnifigant that we must explain its unlikeliness. It is an appeal to emotion that easily degenerates into a tautology.

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