Celsus

Actually, I was wrong. Thinking about it, Plantinga's original argument, as I recall, he made an argument for "Augustinian science"--employing human knowledge (well, Christian knowledge/faith/belief + science) in his program. That he traces it to Augustine's Civitas Dei I believe shoots himself in the foot, because science came to more or less a standstill between that point and the Enlightenment. It's not the same argument as Bede's which is why I didn't think about it from that angle. That said, Plantinga's target was primarily attacking methodological naturalism.

Joel

hezekiah jones

Originally posted by Celsus
Thinking about it, Plantinga's original argument, as I recall, he made an argument for "Augustinian science"--employing human knowledge (well, Christian knowledge/faith/belief + science) in his program.

Yes, Plantinga is concerned with "Christian science," but not the Mary Baker Eddy variety. Regardless, it seems pretty lame to me. "Christian science," "Muslim science," "Heaven's Gate science," whatever. If they have spooky metaphysical components, they're basically useless to legitimate scientists.

Originally posted by Celsus
It's not the same argument as Bede's which is why I didn't think about it from that angle.

To be honest I haven't read the entire thread, just a few things that popped out at me. So I don't know what Bede's argument is. But I did see a lot of references to history, and historical figures. The philosophy of science is mixed up with the history of science ever since Kuhn.

But the point is it doesn't matter what any of those people believed. They may have got down on their knees after a day in the lab or at the telescope and prayed to Vishnu, for all I know. But was their science methodologically sound, and did their inferences conform to the observable universe and its measureable phenomena? That's what counts to us today.

Originally posted by Celsus
That said, Plantinga's target was primarily attacking methodological naturalism.

Pretty much, which as far as my admittedly limited knowledge takes me, is a fairly unassailable concept for science.

The point is, if a devout believer such as McMullin can so effortlessly and stylishly make Plantinga look like a rank amateur in the philosophy of science, all the while maintaining his own personal beliefs, who needs religion in science at all. They're mutually exclusive, it seems to me, and the great thing about McMullin is that he knows this, can demonstrate it effectively, yet is perfectly capable of simultaneously inhabiting both "magisteria," to coin a phrase.

I think that point sorely needs to be made in this debate, and McMullin is the best example I can think of with which to make it.

Now if you don't mind, I'll return to more frivolous pursuits, like "baiting" Radorth.

BioBeing

OK – so here is my understanding to date:

• Universities were starting around 11 to 12 century CE.
• The Universities were fundamentally Christian in outlook – in fitting with the powers that be in those times
• The majority (all?) of the people entering the Universities would have been selected from an educated, Christian, pool
• Some of the Universities (e.g. Oxford) may have studied science as well as theology – but I would guess (without seeing the syllabus) that this would have been a study of science as a study of God’s handiwork
• Views that did not fit with the Church’s position were suppressed

OK – so if Christianity was necessary and sufficient for the development of a modern science, why did modern science not appear in the 12 century? Duhem-Jaki said that modern science started in 1277 following the condemnation (such a lovely euphemism!) of Aristotle by Tempier. However, this view is apparently countered by modern historians, who say that science flourished much later. How much later? The Enlightenment period started when, the mid 16thC? So what happened to science between 1277 and the mid-16th C? We are talking a gap here of 300 years. Why did science not evolve during this period? Obviously, something was missing that was not provided for by Christianity in its form at the time.

Conditions necessary for science to develop: (The list you have been waiting for, Hugo

1. Peace
2. talents
3. organization
4. A lack of overt mythological dogma
5. Freedom to pursue the data wherever it leads
6. A quorum of scientists

1 to 3 come from the Duhem-Jaki link you provided earlier – I agree that they are required. I added 4 thru 6. Let me explain
4. Lack of dogma: The articles you have posted have been big on saying that the best thing that happened to science was the removal of Aristotelian thinking. OK. Maybe I can provisionally accept that. However, was it replaced with free thought, or with another dogma? Maybe scientists of the time could now discuss alternate ideas, but only as theories. [Sounds familiar to the “equal time” crap the creationists want nowadays. “Evolution is only a theory”].

5. Freedom: one cannot truly do science or partake in intellectual conversations in an oppressive environment. The Condemnations of Tempier et al and the later Inquisition seem, to this humble scientist, to be an attempt by the powers that be to limit free thought. Certainly not to stimulate the discussion of new ideas!

6. A quorum: A critical mass was required for science to flourish. Science and intellectual thought require, to a large extent, the interplay of ideas with others of similar and dis-similar views. OK – so I will grant that in the nascent Universities etc there may just have not been enough students, period. However, I would also suggest that to divert a large number of the students away from science to theology was not in the interests of developing science.


I’ll include a quick analysis of Bede’s points here too:
I agree that preservation of past works is important. But EXCLUSIVELY responsible? A big claim. Now, the even ignoring the debate about the library of Alexandria, are there no valid reports of Christians ever burning books? Not even during the inquisitions? [Going back to the OP – the question we are actually debating is did Christianity hinder science. This discussion we have going, which I would characterize as “Was Christianity responsible for the rise of modern science”, while related, is slightly off topic.]

But they were searching for God in nature, were they not? By studying the laws of nature they were studying the laws of God. And, given any conflict, the bible was the ultimate authority?

OK, reasonable, but related to the above point.

Once again – the same as above.

Now – to draw some kind of conclusion: Christianity in the general sense laid the groundwork for science to develop. I never said it didn’t. Science arose in the west, in a predominantly Christian culture. Was Christianity absolutely required for the rise of science? I see no evidence here to suggest that it was, and Hugo, you have stated that its requirement was not absolute. Was it merely required? Repressing the thoughts that may have hindered science does not equal the claim of being required. Preserving some of the books of past generations, although noble, does not equal required. Would those books have been destroyed if the Christians never rose to dominance? Who knows what would have happened to Aristotelian thought in the absence of Christianity? Obviously we can never know, but to claim therefore that it was because of Christianity seems disingenuous, to say the least.

However, if Christianity was required and sufficient for the rise of science, why did science not rise in the 13th, 14th or 15th centuries? What was holding science back in those years? Was it the central dogmas of the Biblical Christian religion – the need for the Bible to be the ultimate source of authority? Did something happened to Christianity during the Enlightenment years that changed it such that it was now suitable for the rise of science? Did cherry picker christians gain dominance in the Church (I guess the foundation of the Puritan Church would be the answer, not cherry pickers). If the answer to any of these is a YES, then it could be argued that while the Christianity of the time laid the groundwork for science, it also hindered its progress. It was not until those shackles were removed that science could prosper. Hence my earlier comment, that the fluidity of Christianity, and the absurdity of a literal bible [which we can say, based on SCIENTIFIC evidence] were required for the rise of science. Of course, the Inquisition was over, there was that wave of Humanism that Bede alluded to earlier…


PS Bede - ever go the the Wheatsheaf in Oxford? I used to pull pints there to pay my bills.

Hugo Holbling

BioBeing:

Thanks for your interesting post. I of course disagree with your account and i hope to explain why.

Grant describes the idea that "something was missing", the general negative influence of medieval natural philosophy and the thesis that the development of science owed little or nothing to the intervening five centuries as:

He goes on to say:

(This latter point, incidentally, is one i shall come back to, but we may note for now that it confutes the thesis that science was hindered.)

In answer to your question, then, i would say that science did evolve during this period; it was certainly not born out of nowhere in the sixteenth century. Science was not "held back" during this time; rather, the conditions that would lead to it were playing out. It isn't possible to make a case that science was effectively hindered over the intervening centuries unless you can show that it was ready to emerge back in the twelve hundreds and was somehow prevented from so doing. Moreover, we have nothing to compare it to in order to decide whether certain factors made the development faster or slower.

I do not agree either with your list of necessary conditions and i'll try to explain why.

A lack of overt mythological dogma.

In fact many theologians and natural philosophers (often the same thing) were able to make the latter a secular and separate area of study, the arts faculties of the universities gaining practical independence from their theological counterparts. With regard to considering alternatives as only theories, that is much the same as we find today in the philosophy of science.

Freedom.

I take issue with this point as i did with Mill when i was studying him. It simply isn't the case that the lack of "an atmosphere of freedom" sounds the death-knell for inquiry; Wittgenstein wrote the Tractatus while huddled in the trenches, after all. If the Condemnation was the latest in a long line of attempts to limit free thought and to preserve the dogma of the Church, how was it that science came about at all? Grant calls the Condemnation of 1277 "the last significant effort by theologians to inhibit arts masters in their pursuit of natural philosophy"; however, he and Lindberg explain that the effect was not what was hoped for by Tempier and it allowed myriad speculations on all manner of questions to take place "hypothetically speaking" that were previously off-limits. Hence (and in spite of your assertion), it did indeed "stimulate the discussion of new ideas".

A quorum.

Here you are quite mistaken. In order to achieve the status of theologian, a candidate first had to obtain a Master of Arts degree, hence familiarising himself with natural philosophy. Moreover, the same theologians considered the latter indispensable for the understanding of theology and supported thoroughly secular curricula for the arts. In order to qualify a candidate had to be able to expound all manner of contrary positions, refute them, offer counterarguments and refute them again. The level of intimacy thus obtained of natural philosophy meant that no theologian could fail to be acquainted with the supposed dangers of it and yet they still supported it; had they not, science would not have gotten off the ground. Unfortunately, you are emphatically in error here.

Moving onto Bede's comments and your criticisms:

The preservation of literacy and learning.

Here i leave your questions to Bede, since he is better informed than i.

The doctrine of the lawfulness of nature.

No. The Christians believed that God had ordained the world to run in a law-like fashion and that such laws and regularities could be discovered by men. Men like Burridan and (later) Boyle explained how the possibility of God's intervention in the world did not and should not render such investigations worthless. Moreover, they considered that in investigating these they were partaking in a sacred duty whereby their results further testified to God's glory. It would be wrong to dismiss this conception anachronistically from an atheist perspective. In addition, we make much the same assumptions today, but from differing foundations, if we take a realist approach to science. Furthermore, it isn't accurate to say that the Bible was the ultimate authority (although on some occasions that appears to have been the case), as Lindberg notes:

Your conclusions.

I shall offer some thoughts on your difficulties in a moment. We may conservatively conclude (and you appear to agree) that certain methodological ideas provided by Christianity accompanied by certain historical factors and the influence of the universities gave rise to science. I want to investigate the former aspect more thoroughly.

I have already answered these objections above. Why restrict your query to the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries? What no-good hindering were the Christians up to in the eighth? The basic point is that science did not spring up overnight but evolved over the course of this period as a result of circumstances specific to the Church. We cannot say on the basis of the historical investigations whether it would have been quicker or slower in a secular environment (although - again - the natural philosophy studied in the universities was very much secular) because we have no means of comparison, so i shall now offer some thoughts more related to the philosophy of science on this question.

The influence of theology and realism on the rise of science.

(The following remarks are very much speculative and i have no definitive opinion on the matter.)

As i have made clear elsewhere in these fora, i am not overly impressed with scientific realism. Nevertheless, many of the assumptions that formed the basis of the Christian approach are seen in the realist account; that is, the Christian approach was a realist one. I want to consider whether - in spite of the problems many philosophers of science identify - some form of realist assumptions are necessary for the rise of science and if so whether a theistic worldview would make them more likely to be held and investigated. This is an area that does not appear to have been studied much in the literature, probably because i am talking through my hat.

There are many types of realism but it is apparent that the more complex and convoluted forms are not relevant here. Is it possible that science could originate in an instrumentalist form via anti-realism or irrealism? On the face of it, it doesn't seem likely. I suggest instead that science had to come about in a realist fashion. If this is so, the question is then one of how likely realist assumptions are to arise in a given context; this would go some way to explaining why the Christian one was ultimately more fruitful than the Muslim, Chinese or Greek. Whether the same (essentially faith-based) assumptions could be found in a secular culture is an interesting question, but it doesn't seem as though they could come about any quicker than the Christian origins we have discussed.

As i said, these are just some ideas i'm considering.

Over to you, BioBeing.

livius drusus

This thread was split from Is Christianity a hindrance to science or intellectual accomplishment?. As you were, gentlemen.

Thank you,
livius drusus
Moderator - GRD

BioBeing

Wow - my very own shiny new thread, with lots of posts already! Its amazing how that happens - just like magic

Thanks liv!

Vorkosigan

Conditions necessary for science to develop: (The list you have been waiting for, Hugo

Peace

talents

organization

A lack of overt mythological dogma

Freedom to pursue the data wherever it leads

A quorum of scientists

With respect, none of these are on point.

Peace -- Science arose in the 16th and 17th century, which, like all other centuries, were filled with warfare.

Talents -- exist in all centuries.

Organization -- too vague. What is meant by this?

Intellectual freedom -- didn't exist until modern times. Scientific knowledge was not suppressed.

a quorom of scientists -- ??

Look, with respect to Hugo and Bede, the issue of science is not related to Christianity in any important way. All arguments presented on this score ignore the massive counterexample of orthodox Christianity. Science arose in western, not eastern, Europe. And it arose for reasons that had little or nothing to do with Christianity. Christianity was important in preserving the knowledge of the Roman Empire, and also in the spread of universities in Europe, but these were largely in the transmissal role. The crucial steps were taken when scholars began thinking of machines as metaphors for nature, using math to model the world, organizing themselves in formal and informal networks for exchanges of information, obtaining state sponsorship, experienced demand-pull from nascent capitalism, discovered the new world, inherited tons of imported tech and ideas from China and Arabia (printing, compasses, paper, etc), and so on. Each was probably necessary but not sufficient to the rise of science.

The other thing this thesis does not consider is the negative hypothesis. Christianity was necessary as a foil -- for example, Europeans were quite shocked by Asia and especially the New World, because the latter was not mentioned in the Bible, while the former was more advanced that Europe, yet was not Christian. Christianity also ensured a long anti-Christian line of thinkers, alchemists, heretics, and so on, who would contribute as well.

In short, the Christian thesis is strongly biased in three ways (1) it pays no attention to the centuries of Christianity without science (2) it ignores the large swathes of the Earth that were Christian with no science (orthodox Christianity, for example) (3) it creates a false view of only positive contributions, and ignores negative ones.

As I said to Boro Nut a while back:

I wouldn't worry about it too much, Boro. This sort of thing goes in cycles. Sooner or later it will occur to scholars that Christian theology is too incoherent, contradictory and delusional to have served as the stimulus for science, and someone will recall that the idea of lawfulness comes from Roman law, and then the historians will notice that there was no science for the first 15 centuries of Christianity in Europe, and someone will note that Orthodoxy failed to produce science, and then they'll re-examine the histories of Spain, Austria, and other nations, and then "oh yeah!" rationality will re-assert itself, and the idea will be relegated to the dustbin.

Vorkosigan

Hugo Holbling

Thanks for pointing this out, Michael. I had intended to include some comments on that score yesterday but ran out of steam (having just returned from Sickbay where i was held for observation with suspected meningitis, i think i can be excused). As you are no doubt aware, Grant explores this point towards the end of his The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages, as does Lindberg in The Beginnings of Western Science. I guess Bede will be able to offer you a more substantive response (along with further references) because he knows some Byzantinists (i think), but Grant notes the following:

• 1. The Byzantines are sometimes refered to as "the world's librarians" for their role in the transmission of the Greek tradition.
  
  2. The Byzantines never "institutionalized the study of natural philosophy and science".
  
  3. There was a renaissance in scholarship towards the end of the Byzantine Empire, but "[m]ost of the significant names [...] are unknown to historians of science and philosophy."

It seems that the most important factor which was missing was the second, but the first was indispensable in the rise of science.

I'd guess you've been reading Shapin. Do you agree with his claim that "there was no such thing as the Scientific Revolution"? You are quite right that the machine metaphor was important but i do not believe it arrived out of nowhere: it was present in Aristotle and other Greek work, the study of which was of course institutionalized by the Western Christians and very much known to (and transmitted by) the Byzantines. Similarly, the mathematization of the world was an idea born a long time before the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. You are quite correct also to note the importance of myriad other factors, but the significant premise underlying them all was that the world was created by God to run on the basis of laws and in an orderly fashion that could be discovered and understood by men. This (or so i suggest) was the factor missing elsewhere. Without such a conception it's hard to see how modeling via mathematics or the machine metaphor could have taken place. A possible rejoinder would be that the mechanisation in technology was what led to the use of the metaphor in the intellectual context, but that seems to put the cart before the horse. Of course, i may be mistaken, but that's what i was asking in the last part of my post.

Agreed, but what of the point i made above and - more importantly - the need for some kind of realist approach? I don't know the answer to this question yet.

Not only did i pay attention to (1) in my previous post, but we have not been arguing (3). The original point was whether or not Christianity had hindered science, which clearly is a simplistic question that cannot be answered, other than to note the complex interaction between the two. Now we are looking at to what extent Christian assumptions about the nature of the world contributed in the positive sense. More importantly from my perspective, i would appreciate your thoughts on the necessity or otherwise of a realist conception in the rise of science.

N.B. I'm still not feeling too good so i hope i've made sense.

Vorkosigan

• 1. The Byzantines are sometimes refered to as "the world's librarians" for their role in the transmission of the Greek tradition.
  
  2. The Byzantines never "institutionalized the study of natural philosophy and science".
  
  3. There was a renaissance in scholarship towards the end of the Byzantine Empire, but "[m]ost of the significant names [...] are unknown to historians of science and philosophy."

Hmm...this isn't quite what I was talking about. I was thinking of Russia and Eastern Europe, and other Christianities -- Indian, Syrian, etc. None of these gave rise to science. The indispensible thing was not Christianity, but it being in the West.

I'd guess you've been reading Shapin. Do you agree with his claim that "there was no such thing as the Scientific Revolution"?

He's just bein' provocative.

You are quite right that the machine metaphor was important but i do not believe it arrived out of nowhere: it was present in Aristotle and other Greek work, the study of which was of course institutionalized by the Western Christians and very much known to (and transmitted by) the Byzantines.

No, it was never known to the Greeks. It was an important difference between the two cultures; especially the clock. It would be hard to overestimate the impact of the clock on western thinking.

Similarly, the mathematization of the world was an idea born a long time before the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Not quite. Westerners began modeling the behavior of machines with math, and then extending that out to the world of nature. Nobody else took either of those steps.

You are quite correct also to note the importance of myriad other factors, but the significant premise underlying them all was that the world was created by God to run on the basis of laws and in an orderly fashion that could be discovered and understood by men.

I utterly reject this. This is Christian ideological recolonization of history, and reading modern beliefs backward into the past. The idea of nature's laws Christian concepts of law were Roman in origin, and Aristotle made this very distinction in his formulation of dikaion nomikon and dikaion physicon.

• Some people think that all rules of justice are merely conventional, because whereas (a law of ) nature is immutable and has the same validity everywhere....

In other words, the Greeks were already working on the idea of natural law. Christianity was responsible for nothing except transmission. And no belief that argues that god suspends laws at will can really claim to stand for a rational universe. In the Christian worldview the world is at heart irrational and arbitrary; it reflects the will of god.

This (or so i suggest) was the factor missing elsewhere. Without such a conception it's hard to see how modeling via mathematics or the machine metaphor could have taken place.

Through the influence of numerology and alchemy, of course. Those selfsame "lawful" Christian dudes were all closet heretics and alchemists. See people like Yates and Pagel for the locus classicus. Nature's laws were mystical and numerical. When Kepler and others speak of using math to understand God, this is what they are talking about.....so in fact, another root was present. Who knows whether, in the absense of Christianity, it would have been enough?

Agreed, but what of the point i made above and - more importantly - the need for some kind of realist approach? I don't know the answer to this question yet.

What do you mean by realist approach? I think all that can really be done is list all the things that made the West special in this particular area. There are so many, it is sort of pointless to try and assess their particular weight. I tried to find an old post where Bede and I discussed this....but I can't find it. So I'll re-iterate

1) printing
2) European discovery of the new world, and Asia
3) European realization it was behind everywhere else
4) discovery of progress
5) tech and idea imports from China, India and Islamic world
6) Europe was split into competing principalities that demanded latest knowledge, not great empires
7) European princes did not look down on technology and worldly learning, and were often themselves learned.
8) rising capitalism demanded reliable knowledge about the world, from Copernicus to Newton, everybody worked on money and its problems
9) imports of greek knowledge through Byz and other contacts with East
10) rejection of supernatural explanations
11) rise of knowledge worker (scientist) as specific discipline and social role
12) importation of scientific method from islam
13) double entry bookkeeping and the invention of corporations
14) development of universities and centers of learning
15) the fall of the Church from temporal power

and so many others....feelin' like Boris Hessen here...many scholars have paid attention to the eclectic nature of the SR, not merely on the social level, but on the individual. Newton is the quintessential example.

Not only did i pay attention to (1) in my previous post, but we have not been arguing (3). The original point was whether or not Christianity had hindered science, which clearly is a simplistic question that cannot be answered,

Of course yes. Any time a scientist had to curb his or her intellectual exploration because of some Christian nitwit belief, that's hindering. In addition to the crude effects on intellectual freedom, there is the more subtle problem of the Christian matrix for framing problems.....look at the way much early thinking on natural history was colored by attempts to make things fit Genesis. Naturally, that worldview was a hindrance.

The issue to me is how important that hindrance was -- was it mere annoyance, or was there a substantive effect?

In any case, if you are speaking of the rise of science, my view is that during the hindering period -- early to middle medieval period, science as such did not exist. So question is moot. If you asked whether Christianity hindered the West's intellectual growth, the answer is of course yes. That was not its only effect, though.

Another way to think about the question is to annul its hidden assumption. The question presupposes that there was a certain direction, never really explicated, in which intellectual growth should go -- sort of progress, and then it asks to what extent Christianity diverted science from that path. Is that really a valid way of looking at the problem? I think it is, but the assumption is there, nevertheless, and should be brought to light. Others might not agree.

Vorkosigan

lpetrich

Vorkosigan:
I was thinking of Russia and Eastern Europe, and other Christianities -- Indian, Syrian, etc. None of these gave rise to science. The indispensible thing was not Christianity, but it being in the West.

Including, of course, Byzantine Xtianity -- the Roman Empire's eastern half outlived its western half by a thousand years.

(the "machine metaphor"...)
No, it was never known to the Greeks. It was an important difference between the two cultures; especially the clock. It would be hard to overestimate the impact of the clock on western thinking.

The clock in Antikythera may be a counterexample, but the surviving documents do not mention mechanical clocks very much -- the closest they came was the sundial and the clepsydra ("water thief" -- a container with a hole in it that water would slowly drip through).

There are other technological achievents in the Middle Ages that helped, such as transparent glass. This was absolutely necessary for constructing the lenses of telescopes and microscopes.

(someone else...)
but the significant premise underlying them all was that the world was created by God to run on the basis of laws and in an orderly fashion that could be discovered and understood by men.

I utterly reject this. This is Christian ideological recolonization of history, and reading modern beliefs backward into the past.

I'm inclined to agree also. One common theological premise is something like "God's will is inscrutable to man", meaning that we cannot really understand why god decides this or that.

In other words, the Greeks were already working on the idea of natural law.

Interestingly, Hellenic paganism had had the idea that the Gods were subject to an impersonal Fate. Yes, even Zeus himself, ruler of the Universe, was subject to Fate.

Christianity was responsible for nothing except transmission. And no belief that argues that god suspends laws at will can really claim to stand for a rational universe. In the Christian worldview the world is at heart irrational and arbitrary; it reflects the will of god.

One counterargument is that the Xian God rarely does that, but that seems to be a modern position. People become saints not for understanding and utilizing the lawfulness of nature, but for working miracles. And medieval saints had allegedly worked LOTS of miracles.

Consider how Benjamin Franklin conquered lightning; he had concluded that it was a giant static-electricity discharge, and he decided to use the known properties of electricity to keep lightning from striking houses, ships, and other cherished structures. Thus, his lightning rod.

And if Andrew Dickson White had given a fair picture, then the theologians had a baker's dozen of egg on their face. I wonder if anyone has critically evaluated it; it seems almost too good to be true.

But I agree that this bit about god decreeing natural laws is a backdoor form of the conception of Fate.

Through the influence of numerology and alchemy, of course. Those selfsame "lawful" Christian dudes were all closet heretics and alchemists. ...

And Neoplatonists.