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05-17-2002, 12:42 PM | #31 | |||
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Alonzo Fyfe:
I’m puzzled by this exchange: Quote:
Quote:
As for “intersubjectivity” vs. “objectivity”, it’s not clear how this distinction can be maintained even theoretically. The reason that we call something “objective” is that it is perceived independently, by a number of people. Thus a body of water is “real” if a number of people see it, feel it, etc. Its perception is an “intersubjective” phenomenon, but whenever we come across such an “intersubjective” perception we assume that there must be something that “objectively exists” that accounts for it. Of course, the “thing” that “objectively exists” may not be what it appears to be at first sight. For example, under certain circumstances most people “see” a rainbow, yet there isn’t a “thing” in the real world corresponding to this perception. But all of these people are not hallucinating; there really is a pattern of photons reaching their retinas which their brains interpret as an “object”. This pattern of photons forms on the great majority of people’s retinas and is interpreted in this way because of the laws of optics, the structure of the eye, and the way the brain interprets optical signals. All of these things are real, and the latter two are based on the way a normal human eye and brain work. It is objectively true that human eyes and brains that are functioning normally work this way. Thus even this “intersubjective perception” has an objective basis. In fact, it is difficult to imagine how any “intersubjective” phenomenon could exist that did not have an objective basis, especially if it persisted over a long period and involved a really large number of people. Now this is not to say that certain things have an “intrinsic property” of “goodness” or that some acts have an “intrinsic property” of “rightness”. But the fact, for example, that some things (such as happiness) are more or less universally regarded as “good” must surely be based on some objective facts (presumably relating to the way a normal human brain functions). Thus the “intersubjective perception” that happiness is good would seem to have an objective basis. Since this is almost certainly the sort of thing that would produce “fundamental values which are shared by all rational people” if such things exist at all, I don’t see why you insist that this is an example of intersubjectivity as opposed to objectivity. If there are such values, they would both be intersubjective and have an objective basis. In attempting to clarify this point, you said: Quote:
So it seems to me that the basic question here is whether there are in fact “fundamental values which are shared by all rational people”. If so, it makes sense to speak of a (non-theistic) objective morality; otherwise it doesn’t. [Note: Actually I’m not sure that thinking in terms of “values” is the most fruitful way to think about this. I prefer to think in terms of “principles of action”. But that’s a story for another post.] |
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05-17-2002, 01:56 PM | #32 |
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AntiChris:
So, taking your type 2, a defining feature of an objective morality would be: Moral propositions are capable of being true or false independent of belief in those facts. Why do you use the words "capable of being" and not "are." Actually, it's not me. This is the definition most typically used in the professional literature. And, honestly, I never thought to ask this question. The most likely answer that comes to my mind is this: In some theories, moral terms are ambiguous or vague. Within such a theory, there may be some interpretations that allow for true and false value claims, and others that do not. In which case, if we are capable of giving a definition that allows moral propositions to be objectively true or false, then the theory is objective. Also, I am intrigued by your use of "and some of them are true". Could you explain what you mean here? This is used in the professional literature to distinguish realist theories from error theories. An error theory states that, within a theory, all of the propositions are capable of being true or false, but that none of them are true. For example, assume someone were to say, "What I mean when I say something is right is that God approves; and what I mean when I say that it is wrong is that God disapproves." In this case, if there is no God, then all statements that something is right or wrong within such a theory would be false, because it is always false that "X is approved of by God" or "God disapproves of Y." A moral theory has no real-world relevance unless at least one of the statements within that theory might actually be true. How do you test the soundness of your theory? The same way that one tests the soundness of any theory. I look for evidence that any of the propositions within the theory are false or inconsistent. If somebody can identify a proposition within the theory and offer evidence that the proposition is false, this is a reason to reject the theory. If somebody identifies a proposition A within the theory and points out A implies B and provides reason to reject B, then this provides reason to reject A -- which may require modifying or rejecting the theory. The dominant type of criticism I have received goes as follows: (1) You say that I ought to do X iff X is the best all things considered. (2) To say that I ought to do the best all things considered means that I must have some reason to do the best all things considered. (3) But it is quite conceivable that it is false that I have a reason to do the best all things considered. (4) Therefore, you claim that I ought to do the best all things considered is false. I answer this objection by saying that the objection commits the fallacy of equivocation. The objection blurs the distinction between moral ought (premise 1) and practical ought (premise 2). Premise 2 is true within the context of practical reasoning, but not within the context of moral reasoning. Practical ought looks only at the reasons that you have for doing or not doing an action. You practical-ought to do an action if you have more of a reason to do it than not do it. In contrast, moral ought looks at all the reasons that exist for your doing or not doing an action, regardless of who has them. Thus, it also looks at the effect of the action on others (e.g., your victims) and asks if they can offer any reason why you should or should not perform the action. Because practical ought and moral ought both look at two different sets of reasons, it is not unreasonable to expect that they yield two different answers. Thus, there are clearly cases in which a person practical-ought to do something that they moral-ought not to do. For example, it is easy to imagine circumstances in which a person who commits date-rape practical-ought to kill his victim, because if he lets her live he is almost certainly going to be identified. But that does not imply that he moral-ought to do so. The judgment of moral-ought adds to the reasons that the rapist has for killing the victim the reasons that the victim has for not being killed (plus the reasons that society has for discouraging rape and murder). Now, the rapist might not care about these reasons. They are not reasons that he has not to kill her. But these reasons exist nonetheless. Because of this equivocation, the objection above provides no sound reason to reject my theory. This equivocation between moral-ought and practical-ought is the primary defense offered for rationalist, subjectivist, and other internalist moral theories, and the primary reason why I reject those theories. This illustrates how I test the soundness of my theory. [ May 17, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p> |
05-17-2002, 04:22 PM | #33 | |
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[ May 18, 2002: Message edited by: dk ]</p> |
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05-17-2002, 07:36 PM | #34 |
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[First, a warning: the following may just be the result of a drug induced rambling, as my allegies are kicking my ass this month and I've been walking around like a zombie on strong allergy medication; please bear with... ]
Well, I've read all the previous posts and am still not convinced I have a full understanding of the term "objective morality." I have been operating on a working hypothesis that there is an objective morality that can be discerned by reasoning & logic. However, I am not so sure anymore. Koy's response was interesting because that is where I begin my initial analysis, the "sympathy" and "empathy" factors. However, I part ways with his conclusion that there is no objective morality. I recently saw a program discussing how children learn to "read minds." (bear with me, this will become relevant) They showed about 20 babies, less than 1 yr. old, all laying in a room in close proximity to each other. Once one baby started to cry, pretty soon all the babies were crying. The psychological explanation was that the babies could not distinguish themselves as being disparate individuals, so they cried because they could not distinguish their feelings from the other babies. From the psychological prospective, this showed that the babies had the capacity to be sympathetic and/or empathetic. When the babies get older, they use their memory & observations of other human behaviors to determine what is right & wrong in any given situation. This was my methodology in determining the "objective morality" in any given situation. 1. you must have the capacity to empathize with others, 2. the memory of how it feels to experience suffering, and 3. opportunity to observe, analyze and remember actions and their consequences (i.e., be able to figure out that actions cause predictable consequences). So, to go back to our slavery example: If I lived prior to the civil war, I could still determine that suffering was wrong if I: 1) Experienced & remembered what suffering was, observed the slaves suffering, and empathized with them. It occurs to me that the problem with most people living prior to the civil war is that they did not empathize with the slaves because they were considered to be inferior and not derserving of empathy, or of even being able to experience suffering. I would argue that it does not matter that slavery was stopped by brute force or even by majority consensus. Even if slavery wasn't stopped, it was, is and will always be morally wrong, based on the reasoning stated above. As I said, I'm not completely sure about this, so further comments are welcome. ciao, M. |
05-17-2002, 08:28 PM | #35 | |
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05-17-2002, 08:31 PM | #36 |
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Mochaloca: So, to go back to our slavery example: If I lived prior to the civil war, I could still determine that suffering was wrong if I: 1) Experienced & remembered what suffering was, observed the slaves suffering, and empathized with them. It occurs to me that the problem with most people living prior to the civil war is that they did not empathize with the slaves because they were considered to be inferior and not derserving of empathy, or of even being able to experience suffering.
Empathy and suffering are entirely subjective and therefore have nothing to do with objective morality. |
05-17-2002, 10:32 PM | #37 | |
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Chris |
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05-17-2002, 11:46 PM | #38 | |
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earth is a part of reality life exists on earth survival is innate with life's existance societal life exists societal life is dependent on societies societies are dependent on their well being life's actions in the interest of or are of no harm to society's well being are moral, actions contrary to the society's well being are immoral therefore morals are objective [ May 18, 2002: Message edited by: 0n0w1c ]</p> |
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05-18-2002, 12:12 AM | #39 | ||
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Alonzo Fyfe
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Moving on to your theory: Quote:
What does interest me is your "all things considered". Isn't this where the difficulty lies for the moral objectivist? What things should be considered? What weight should be given to the different things? Chris |
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05-18-2002, 01:22 AM | #40 |
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Objectivism/Subjectivism
Objectivist: Moral propositions are either true or false independent of belief. Subectivist: Moral propositions are merely statements of opinion or taste. The above is probably a gross simplification (or just plain wrong), but it does appear to be an aspect of this debate which seems to polarise opinions. Neither of the two statements fits well with my view of morality. For me, at one end of the spectrum, moral pronouncements can be nothing more than declarations of preference, whilst at the other it is quite possible that the truth or falsity of a moral proposition would be quite evident to all possible moral agents. Is it possible that some elements of morality are subjective and others objective? Chris |
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