capnkirk

Silly me, I did not suspect that your straightforward question was really to open a discussion about the relaibility of the senses. But, rising to the bait, I have entertained that discussion at length in my preceding response.

Your paraphrase of the actual quote is fraught with subtle implications. I can offer several anecdotes that demonstrate that the senses are not (perfectly) reliable. Take any optical illusion for example. While looking at the illusion, the senses are fooled. By the same token, when the illusion is revealed, those same senses see and understand HOW they were fooled. (The process of discovering the fact of an illusion and thereby dispelling it is the force majeure of scientific inquiry.). Truly, a credibility factor must be assigned to every sensory observation. I addressed this concept and how scientific inquiry deals with it in an earlier posting. Can you similarly explain how theism addresses this shortcoming?

But back to the quote you paraphrased above. Actually, you asked:
In a DIRECT response, I listed several examples as "evidence" of the value of Theli's statement as a default conclusion. Do you have a more truthful model relative to the sun rising in the east that is LESS consistent with observations? The same challenge applies to the other examples.

Kenny

K,

And just exactly what might that evidence be?

It is also consistent with a world where memory is unreliable, where induction fails, and where we are all victims of the Cartesians demon.

Assuming the reliability of inductive reasoning and the reliability of memory.

The evidence we receive from the senses is just as consistent with our being brains in vats as it is with the hypothesis that reality is as it seems to us, as well as with a number of other bizarre possibilities. Without holding certain prior presuppositions about the nature of reality, I do not see how information of the senses counts any more toward the hypothesis that reality is as seems to us than toward any other of these possibilities.

God Bless,
Kenny

Kenny

capnkirk,

Well, there are certain types of sensory beliefs which may be infallible, such as “I seem to be seeing red right now,” (it is hard to see how one could be mistaken in such a belief) but true enough. The point I was making, however, is that without holding the pre-scientific beliefs I mentioned, reasoning based on sensory input can’t even get off the ground.

That’s quite an interesting philosophical claim. Do you have any evidence to support it? How do you know that we have no alternative?

I agree that we have no alternative but to believe in the “assumptions” I mentioned. That’s the point! The beliefs I mentioned are necessarily prior to evidence based reasoning. If it is irrational to hold those beliefs then it is irrational to hold the almost any other belief. The conclusion, therefore, is not that one should give up on empirical or evidence based reasoning; the conclusion is that there is something wrong with the assertion that only those beliefs based on evidence are rational. It seems that you have conceded my point in this matter.

Note that I am not suggesting an anything goes approach here. I’m not saying that just any belief not based on evidence is automatically rational. Determining what sort of beliefs do not have to be based on evidence to be rational and what sort of beliefs do have to be based on evidence to be rational is a complex matter that calls for much more analysis, but it seems clear to me that there are some beliefs which are rational that are not (in fact, cannot be) held on the basis of evidence. Thus, the thesis that only those beliefs which are based on evidence are rational is a thesis which must be abandoned.

How has it been demonstrated to be such? Can you give me an argument for this conclusion which does not presuppose the reliability of memory, the reliability of the senses, or the reliability of inductive reasoning? Keep in mind what the point of this discussion is. I’m not questioning the reliability of the scientific method. I have a degree in physics. Philosophically, I would refer to myself as a scientific realist. I believe that scientific reasoning brings genuine advances in our knowledge of the world. The point of the discussion is to challenge the notion that only those beliefs which are based in evidence are rational. There are many basic beliefs we hold about reality for which we have absolutely no evidence whatsoever, but without which, reasoning itself would be impossible.

That’s true only if you start with the premise that there are no properly basic beliefs (i.e. beliefs which are rational without having been inferred from evidence), which is precisely why such a premise ought to be abandoned.

It shows that there’s something wrong with the notion that only beliefs based in evidence are rational.

It matters to me whether or not the world is as it appears to be. It matters very much to me, for example, whether or not my wife, whom I love deeply, is a real thinking feeling person rather than just some set of illusions placed in my mind by the Cartesian demon. It also matters to me because I’m interested in pursuing truth and knowledge, not just getting by successfully. Furthermore, without presupposing induction or the reliability of memory, we could never even have any knowledge as to whether or not we have learned to manipulate the symbols successfully.

Regardless, it is philosophy that we are doing right now.

Actually, Zeno’s paradox is easily resolved via differential calculus. From a physics standpoint, however, the man and the woman never do really touch because ultimately the apparent contact between them is nothing more than electron repulsion between atoms mediated through electromagnetic fields acting at a distance. But, I agree, it is possible to get close enough “for all practical purposes.”

One of the purposes of philosophy, in my opinion, is to analyze our basic beliefs and methodologies at a conceptual level and expose those assumptions taken for granted and any possibile difficulties therein. Often the concerns of philosophy are not subject to empirical testing because what is being analyzed are the conceptual apparatuses behind empirical testing itself. As such, philosophy is a great tool for helping us to think carefully and critically about many of the underlying assumptions we usually just take for granted in our daily reasoning and therein lies much of its value. It also helps us modify bad concepts and bad assumptions – such as the assumption that only beliefs based in evidence are rational.

God Bless,
Kenny

K

Kenny:

The evidence is that our sensory data allow us to consitently make preditions about future sensory data as if there were an actual physical world acting on our senses (eg. we eat to alleviate the feeling of hunger and the hunger goes away).

That's fine. I never said our senses were perfect. Some kind of god would have had to have designed us for our senses to be perfect .


These aren't assumed. There is a great deal of evidence to show that they tend to work fairly well in many domains.

It is consistent with the vat, but there is no evidence for the vat. If the vat exists, it is providing sensory data consistent with an actual physical world. in order to reach goals, we are forced to play by the rules of a physical world. That is why belief in an actual physical world is rational and belief in the vat (while it is still possible and consistent) is irrational - there isn't a shred of evidence to suggest that it might be the case.

long winded fool

Can anyone give an example of a rational belief without evidence of some kind? How about an example of ANY belief, rational or otherwise, without evidence? (Evidence, of course, is not the same as truth) Belief, in the true sense of the word, is not some "club" that one chooses to belong to. There may be varying degrees of belief, but even the most casual belief is based on evidence. Belief can't exist without evidence; therefore all beliefs must have evidence as a prerequisite. So not only is it impossible to have a rational belief without evidence, it is impossible to believe without evidence.

Of course, it's possible to have a rational belief without agreed upon evidence, as I think any logical atheist will admit. Creationists don't agree with the evidence evolutionists put forth and vice versa, yet both believe their own respective theories based on evidence, and both feel they are being rational. I have heard this argument before. You can play with definitions until you're blue in the face, but everyone has enough evidence for their beliefs to warrant their belief in their own opinion. Anything not based on evidence is not "belief."

Dr. Retard

Not every truth is true by definition. Murdering my mother is wrong. But if you look up "wrong" in the dictionary, you won't find anything about murdering my mother. Who cares what the dictionary doesn't say about rational belief? It's not like we expect an epistemological theory from a dictionary.

capnkirk

Kenny,

At first I considered replying to you point-by-point, but that seems to be simply taking us backwards rather than forward, so let me attempt to focus on what has me hung up.

You said in your last posting: "Note that I am not suggesting an anything goes approach here. I’m not saying that just any belief not based on evidence is automatically rational..." If you are not taking universal license, please specify the limits and constraints of the license you are proposing/defending.

In my postings, I have attempted at length to specify the limits and constraints I enforce, both in terms of boundaries and methodology, which I would summarize axiomatically, "I will accept no unsupported presumption that can be made subject to evidence." To expand briefly: I accept the presumptions concerning the fact of existence unconditionally. I accept the presumptions concerning reliability only conditionally. To the extent that I can use one of those presumptions to validate another on a case-by-case basis, I do. (Ex: I regularly write things down because the reliability of memory IS suspect). The intent is to pare the initial presumptions to an absolute minimum in my functional model of the process of discovery. I do not explicitly refute your premise but, lest it run amok, it must remain shackled.

Philosophy IS a powerful tool. It is precisely that property of it that makes it so dangerous (its potential for misapplication). Most of us on this forum are more skeptical of purely philosophical arguments than of any other kind because they have so often been used to take unwarranted license for other irrational beliefs. It appears to me that those of us who are arguing against you are really arguing against where we think you may be heading with this, so let's cut to the chase.

I think it is time for you to tell us what license you do take with your premise that not all beliefs require evidential support, then we can refocus our debate on expllicit issues rather than laying in defenses for the arguments anticipated and implied by the application of your premise to the thread title.

P.S. I would like to respond to some of the other points in your last posting, but they are increasingly off-subject...so I will explore some other conduit for that dialogue.

Kuyper

Since I'm the one who got the ball rolling on this thread, I thought I should at least drop in with a couple of comments. First of all, I appreciate the level of discussion taking place. So often on lists of this sort, discussion degenerates rapidly into exchanges of non-sense. Such is not the case here.

Second, after getting this started I purposely stayed away to allow adequate time for several to post replies and comments. I had intended to post earlier, however, a power outage where I live prevented that. It appears I now have my computer systems back up and running.

Now I need to read and digest the various responses and comments and then formulate some responses and further questions to keep this discussion moving forward. I'll spend some time on that later today.

A cursory read through of the various comments made leads me to want to perhaps re-phrase the original question. There seems to be two issues running here: 1)what makes a belief rational? and 2) what constitutes evidence (that is to say, what do we mean by the term 'evidence')? (based on the response that for a belief to be rational it must have evidence).

My contention has been that a belief may be rationally held without evidence. I've argued that we hold many of our beliefs in just that way. I gave the example of the belief that "I exist" as one such belief. There's no way to claim that I hold that belief based on any evidence. Yet that belief in my own existence is completely rational. This gives a response to Long Winded Fool's (interesting handle!) question:
Can anyone give an example of a rational belief without evidence of some kind? How about an example of ANY belief, rational or otherwise, without evidence?


I'll make some specific replies a bit later.

Thanks everyone for participating and I hope we can keep the dialogue going!

K

Kuyper

Why not? That would only seem to pre-suppose that no evidence exists to support theistic belief. I think many theists would contend that pre-supposition.

Quote:

Keith: If, however, you ask someone who defines 'rational' or 'theistic' differently than I, you'll get a different answer. This is why I am far more interested in concepts, than in which words we use to refer to those concepts. If we don't understand what we each mean by the words we use, the words themselves are meaningless. Keith.

I'm not sure what you're getting at here. What else besides words do we have to convey concepts?

K

Kuyper

True. However, if one responds to an argument by saying that "by definition" such and such, then we may at least examine those definitions to see how they hold up. Granted, the dictionary definitions of terms and the actual usage in philosophical arguments of those very same terms might vary widely, but we have to start somewhere.

K