Freethought & Rationalism Archive

Metaxy · 07-03-2003, 04:00 PM

Note in this argument that consciousness is a unique quality that isn't a facet of being able to make some judgement or state some conviction - a Turing-complete machine could make synthesized statements about "I feel" and "I am" and such, without necessarily being considered conscious under this definition.

1. Consciousness, defined very loosely as the hard to describe, somewhat abstract difference that presumably distinguishes a human from a machine made to emulate one, is an existent and distinct phenomenon.
2. A physical phenomenon is defined here as "something that - even theoretically - can be observed as matter or energy"
3. The only way to determine whether an entity is conscious is to personally be that entity, since a perfectly accurate simulation has no perceptable differences unless you are it. For example, there would be no way to know if you'd succeeded at removing consciousness from a brain (short of rendering it inoperative), because there are no outside differences.
4. Consciousness exists, yet is not a physical phenomenon.

jon1 · 07-03-2003, 05:19 PM

The problem with this is that your answer to the condition question (what is it for something to be physical?) is obviously going to exclude a phenomenon like consciousness (and when I say consciousness I mean subjective experience which of course is private and not publically observable). We could also conclude that subjective experience is not physical if the only things we let fall under the category of physical are those that are explained by physical theory. But by that definition the entities dealt with by the higher sciences would be non-physical too and I'm sure you don't want to go that far.

Metaxy · 07-03-2003, 05:38 PM

What definition of "higher science" are we using here? Do you mean abstract things like, say, sociology, or things like string theory?

jon1 · 07-03-2003, 05:40 PM

"What definition of "higher science" are we using here?"

The higher sciences are the ones that are less basic than physics such as chemistry, biology, etc...

Metaxy · 07-03-2003, 05:45 PM

Ah, I see. I'm just a lowly 15-year-old here, so don't get too disappointed

Anyway, chemistry and all the other sciences all can be reduced to studying patterns in the matter of things. However, the phenomenon of consciousness isn't a level of abstraction, it's a fundamental (or so I argue, at least).

jon1 · 07-03-2003, 06:04 PM

"Ah, I see. I'm just a lowly 15-year-old here, so don't get too disappointed"

Haha, don't worry, I'm only two years older than you although I've been studying philosophy for a while.

"Anyway, chemistry and all the other sciences all can be reduced to studying patterns in the matter of things. However, the phenomenon of consciousness isn't a level of abstraction, it's a fundamental (or so I argue, at least)."

The point of my bringing up the higher sciences is to show that even though the entities dealt with by them are not dealt with by physics, they can still be physical in a sense (probably in the supervenience sense).

jon1 · 07-03-2003, 06:08 PM

Given the non-public nature of consciousness this leads me to believe that consciousness might just simply be "what it's like to be a brain".

Dominus Paradoxum · 07-03-2003, 06:24 PM

But that, unless I am mistaken, is just the problem; isn't it? Why should there be "anything it is like" to be the brain? Why not nothing? As far as we can see this seems to be nothing in any physical theory which would determine that there be anything like conscious experience.

jon1 · 07-03-2003, 06:29 PM

"But that, unless I am mistaken, is just the problem; isn't it? Why should there be "anything it is like" to be the brain? Why not nothing? As far as we can see this seems to be nothing in any physical theory which would determine that there be anything like conscious experience."

Yes, you are quite right, that is what is known as the "hard problem" of consciousness. I didn't mean to sound like I was demeaning the problematic nature of consciousness when I said that it is what it's like to be something. I was only trying to say that consciousness is not an object.

Metaxy · 07-03-2003, 08:14 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by jon1
"But that, unless I am mistaken, is just the problem; isn't it? Why should there be "anything it is like" to be the brain? Why not nothing? As far as we can see this seems to be nothing in any physical theory which would determine that there be anything like conscious experience."

Yes, you are quite right, that is what is known as the "hard problem" of consciousness. I didn't mean to sound like I was demeaning the problematic nature of consciousness when I said that it is what it's like to be something. I was only trying to say that consciousness is not an object.

And that's just the point I'm making. I'm saying not only is consciousness a subjective, personal experience, you still couldn't perceive it from the outside if you were omniscient to the physical world.

07-03-2003, 04:00 PM	#1
Metaxy Junior Member Join Date: Apr 2003 Location: Williamsburg, MA Posts: 18	My argument against Materialism (based off of few possibly questionable assumptions) Note in this argument that consciousness is a unique quality that isn't a facet of being able to make some judgement or state some conviction - a Turing-complete machine could make synthesized statements about "I feel" and "I am" and such, without necessarily being considered conscious under this definition. 1. Consciousness, defined very loosely as the hard to describe, somewhat abstract difference that presumably distinguishes a human from a machine made to emulate one, is an existent and distinct phenomenon. 2. A physical phenomenon is defined here as "something that - even theoretically - can be observed as matter or energy" 3. The only way to determine whether an entity is conscious is to personally be that entity, since a perfectly accurate simulation has no perceptable differences unless you are it. For example, there would be no way to know if you'd succeeded at removing consciousness from a brain (short of rendering it inoperative), because there are no outside differences. 4. Consciousness exists, yet is not a physical phenomenon.

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07-03-2003, 05:19 PM	#2
jon1 Junior Member Join Date: Feb 2003 Location: md Posts: 58	The problem with this is that your answer to the condition question (what is it for something to be physical?) is obviously going to exclude a phenomenon like consciousness (and when I say consciousness I mean subjective experience which of course is private and not publically observable). We could also conclude that subjective experience is not physical if the only things we let fall under the category of physical are those that are explained by physical theory. But by that definition the entities dealt with by the higher sciences would be non-physical too and I'm sure you don't want to go that far.

07-03-2003, 05:38 PM	#3
Metaxy Junior Member Join Date: Apr 2003 Location: Williamsburg, MA Posts: 18	What definition of "higher science" are we using here? Do you mean abstract things like, say, sociology, or things like string theory?

07-03-2003, 05:40 PM	#4
jon1 Junior Member Join Date: Feb 2003 Location: md Posts: 58	"What definition of "higher science" are we using here?" The higher sciences are the ones that are less basic than physics such as chemistry, biology, etc...

07-03-2003, 05:45 PM	#5
Metaxy Junior Member Join Date: Apr 2003 Location: Williamsburg, MA Posts: 18	Ah, I see. I'm just a lowly 15-year-old here, so don't get too disappointed Anyway, chemistry and all the other sciences all can be reduced to studying patterns in the matter of things. However, the phenomenon of consciousness isn't a level of abstraction, it's a fundamental (or so I argue, at least).

07-03-2003, 06:04 PM	#6
jon1 Junior Member Join Date: Feb 2003 Location: md Posts: 58	"Ah, I see. I'm just a lowly 15-year-old here, so don't get too disappointed" Haha, don't worry, I'm only two years older than you although I've been studying philosophy for a while. "Anyway, chemistry and all the other sciences all can be reduced to studying patterns in the matter of things. However, the phenomenon of consciousness isn't a level of abstraction, it's a fundamental (or so I argue, at least)." The point of my bringing up the higher sciences is to show that even though the entities dealt with by them are not dealt with by physics, they can still be physical in a sense (probably in the supervenience sense).

07-03-2003, 06:08 PM	#7
jon1 Junior Member Join Date: Feb 2003 Location: md Posts: 58	Given the non-public nature of consciousness this leads me to believe that consciousness might just simply be "what it's like to be a brain".

07-03-2003, 06:24 PM	#8
Dominus Paradoxum Veteran Member Join Date: Nov 2002 Location: California Posts: 1,000	But that, unless I am mistaken, is just the problem; isn't it? Why should there be "anything it is like" to be the brain? Why not nothing? As far as we can see this seems to be nothing in any physical theory which would determine that there be anything like conscious experience.

07-03-2003, 06:29 PM	#9
jon1 Junior Member Join Date: Feb 2003 Location: md Posts: 58	"But that, unless I am mistaken, is just the problem; isn't it? Why should there be "anything it is like" to be the brain? Why not nothing? As far as we can see this seems to be nothing in any physical theory which would determine that there be anything like conscious experience." Yes, you are quite right, that is what is known as the "hard problem" of consciousness. I didn't mean to sound like I was demeaning the problematic nature of consciousness when I said that it is what it's like to be something. I was only trying to say that consciousness is not an object.

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