Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Bill Snedden :

I think McHugh would say that to be evil, insane, and etc., are deficiencies.

This strikes me as a major weakness in McHugh's position, although I don't see how "mystical God" is explicitly incoherent. But it does detract significantly from his rhetorical force when he has to retreat into this sort of God. The sentences "God is not powerful" and "God is not good" are true, under McHugh's brand of theism, and that should sufficiently remove it from anything resembling the apologists' theism.

I agree with other posters as well that the notion of "negative properties" is screwy. "Non-talked-about-more-than-ten-times" seems to be a negative property, as do "non-talked-about-ten-times" and "not-talked-about-less-than-ten-times." But then it looks like with the "McHugh Deduction" we can conclude that a self-contradictory being exists, because everything must have been talked about more, the same as, or fewer than ten times.

Thomas Metcalf

Family Man and Llyricist,

McHugh has defined his god to be non-contingent. Therefore, if it is possible, it is necessary. And if it's not necessary, it's not possible. So if God is indeed non-contingent, then he must be necessary or impossible.

I don't think it's legitimate to put alethic modal status into the definition of some entity, and when you do, you get weirdness like we've been observing as far as strange consequences of McHugh's argument form. Better, in my opinion, to say that alethic modal status isn't a determining predicate.

Bill Snedden

I'm sure that he would, but by what standard?

A thing is only "deficient" to the extent that it fails to conform to a standard; how it fails to meet a particular definition. I can speak of a "deficiency" only when I have an idea of what "non-deficiency" would be like.

McHugh may argue that evil, insanity, etc. are deficiencies, but having explicitly eschewed positive attribution for his deity, how is he to demonstrate that any attributes alleged of his deity are, in fact, deficient?

It seems to me that the only way to make sense of an entity that is "generally non-deficient" is to suppose that it is positively maximized in all possible attributes. But that would mean that this entity would have to be "tallest" AND "shortest" simultaneously. This poses an obvious contradiction; perhaps "non-deficient" without a positive standard of measurement is incoherent on its face.

"Mystical" isn't what does it, but the overall tendency of mystics to deny the possibility of positive attribution and yet neverthless maintain that they can speak positively about their god. How can one speak meaningfully about "something" without being able to say what that "something" is. Even the shabbiest framework needs a foundation in order for the construction to hold together. And isn't that the essence of coherence? Well, it seems to me that the apophatic "god" just doesn't hold together: there just isn't any there there...

I agree. Like I said, if you add "not conscious" and "not self-aware" as negative properties, you would seem to get "the universe" as a possible output. Do you suppose McHugh is a closet pantheist?

Hyuk!

Still and all, it is an interesting take on the OA. I think he presented it very skillfully as well. I wonder if it will appear in a future issue of PHILO?

Regards,

Bill Snedden

P.S. By "alethic modal status", are you referring to the alleged "non-contingent across all possible worlds" attribute or possibly the "reality of existing in all possible worlds"? I confess to being a neophyte when it comes to modal logic.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Bill Snedden :

I agree. The position itself is incoherent. You can't consistently assert that no true assertions can be made about an entity.

It looks that way. And I'm still not sure why "not unconscious", for example, wouldn't be a negative property.

I suspect it will, and I hope it will. It'll give me an opportunity to publish a response.

I've never read a book or taken a class in modal logic, so I'm a neophyte, too. By "alethic modal status" I just mean the (alleged) attribute of being possible, necessary, contingent, or impossible. My alethic modal status is, alas, contingent, and the alethic modal status of the law "A = A" is necessary.

Ernest Sparks

HRG: Why so timid ? I would at least index over the countable ordinals!

me: The suspect the intention where this construction was lifted from wanted a guarantee that all model relations used would have finite order type.

ÜHH! That came out pretty bad!

I suspect that the intention of this (lifted) construction is to provide a guarantee that all model set-relations used have finite order type.

That's better, I hope.

ernie

fishbulb

That sounds like bunk to me. The argument just begs the question. Premise 1 is part of his definition of Godlike. He just defines god as existing by necessity and then goes on to conclude that god exists. That is nonsense. You can't just define something into existence.

I often get the sneaking suspicion that almost all metaphysics is little more than an attempt to confuse people into accepting completely unsupported premises. But there is no getting around the fact that defining something as existing doesn't mean that it actually does.

Ernest Sparks

fishbulb,

you: He just defines god as existing by necessity and then goes on to conclude that god exists
He actually defines godlike to include non-contingent (must exist OR can't exist). This leaves the alternative available that godlike might be an impossibility.

you: You can't just define something into existence
He doesn't try. The rub comes when he asserts that this godlike being might actually exist.

you: I often get the sneaking suspicion that almost all metaphysics is little more than an attempt to confuse people into accepting completely unsupported premises
It should be the job of the critical metaphysician to put things right. In fact, this one needs a cleanup by the critical logician.

you: That sounds like bunk to me
Bertrand Russell is supposed to have said something along this line:
It is easier to waive an ontological argument off than it is to discover what is actually wrong with it.

fishbulb

I understand how he is going about it, but I think that he is fundamentally just trying to define something as existing, which is useless. We can paraphrase his argument like this: "godlike being" is defined as a being which either must exist or cannot exist. In other words, if it can exist it must exist. Or, if it doesn't exist, it is because it can't. (Although that phrasing strikes me as a weird way of looking at the existence of things.) He then assumes that such a being can exist and draws the conclusion that such a being therefore does exist. I find it hard to see how that really isn't begging the question.

So what? In real terms, there is no difference between saying something must exist and something does exist. If it exists, it is not possible that it doesn't exist. And if it must exist, then there it is. You can talk about "possible worlds" but there is only one actual world (if, by world, we mean everything that is real), and either god (or Santa Claus, or Charlie Sheen) exist in the real world (in which case, they are real) or they don't (in which case, they are imaginary). It is not really useful to talk about things that might exist in some hypothetical world, even if they don't exist in this one.

I am suggesting that, regardless of the logical soundness (or lack thereof) of this argument, this sort of argument is nothng more than an intellectual exercise and it is a mistake to draw any conclusions about the real world based on a syllogism that is not based on premises drawn from the real world.

If Russell said this, he was certainly correct. It is much easier to dismiss something than it is to analyze it. But there is limited time in which to analyze things and not everything is equally worthy of this valuable time. I say it is more appropriate to dismiss arguments which are both suspicious and dense than it is to invest the time in trying to evaluate and debunk them, unless the person making the argument can justify the argument's density. I find it more likely that this sort of argument is complex because it is trying to hide the fact that it is unsound than I do that it is complex because it is an inherently difficult concept that the author has been unable to simplify further.

Perhaps that's a bias that I carry, but we must all make value judgements as to what is worth a closer look. The whole line of argumentation that one can somehow prove something real without reference to any empirical evidence simply fails to impress me. Perhaps it is because no one has successfully used thist method to prove anything interesting that can be independently verified in over two millenia of trying.

I'm not opposed to thinking hard, and working through these sorts of things can be an enjoyable mental challenge. But in a world where we have limited amounts of mental energy to spend on thinking about things, we need to focus our efforts on areas that are more likely to bear actual fruit.

Llyricist

Amen Fishbulb
:notworthy

Ernest Sparks

fishbulb,

...he is fundamentally just trying to define something as existing

You and I disagree.

The whole line of argumentation that one can somehow prove something real without reference to any empirical evidence simply fails to impress me.

Fair enough, (for you)! This doesn't mean someone who is interested in pursuing it shouldn't do so. The whole world of mathematics looms without necessitation of empirical evidence. My take on '2 + 2 = 4' is probably different from yours. The value I see in tackling a argument like this is to help improve the understanding of modal logic and work toward a good formulation of its boundaries. If you would rather do something else, then go ahead and do something else.

A similar case: I (a total-non-fisherman) should tell my good friend (an-avid-fisherman) to stop wasting time on fish, since it has nothing to do with meat and potatoes?

ernie