Silent Acorns

I grabbed that layout from the web-site I quoted and I left everything as I found it. Personally, I have no idea what "pre-inertial physics" means and so I ignore it w.r.t. my critique.
I agree that this would be inapproriate here.
I'm not saying that science can answer the "why of the universe". I'm just pointing out that Thomas was making unsupported assumptions that science has shown may well be false. Thomas' five ways can only be true proofs if the premises are true. Because each of his "proofs" includes a dubious premise, they don't prove anything about the universe. And just to be clear, there is no such thing as "faith in science".
Thomas can talk about beings all he wants but his "proofs" don't prove anything about beings. Now that I think about it, I'm not even sure what Thomas means by a "being". Does he mean something that exists (i.e. "be"s), or some kind of intelligent "life"? Both? Neither?

You are suggesting that only beings can cause events to occur (or things to move) since you say that The Big Bang cannot be the uncaused cause of the universe (assuming you still believe that the Prime Mover = the uncaused cause). Why? Because the Prime Mover has to be a being? Why does the Prime Mover have to be a being? Is it supposed to be obvious? Is it because Thomas wanted it to be a being and thus assumed it had to be? Is the concept of the universe being the result of an uncaused event self-contradictory? How is the concept of the universe being the result of an uncaused being any less of a problem?

Christopher13

Silent Acorns, thanks for the head's-up. Maybe I shouldn't be allowed to make arguments since I'm oblivious to D, colon, etc.
I mentioned above that difficulties are bound to arise when not everyone is agreed on some notions, as Aquinas understands them, such as act/potency, nature/existence, and so on. I hate to do this because it will become a new nightmare for me, but:things are said to be in act to the degree that they are, or have being. Act and potency are metaphysical notions that were formed when philosophy began to consider how things change. It is as a result of these deliberations on the becoming in the world that things are said not to "move" to a new state unless something that has that state (read act or actuality) transmits it. This, too, is probably beyond the scope of this thread (and, like this whole discussion, beyond my personal forte as I'm not a trained philosopher). Diana, this is the meaning of my allusion to realist epistemology. It is not some elaborate end-run.
Silent Acorns, all this means to get at your idee fixe that using "being" in the proof is crazy-talk. Only things that are in act, that is simply "are," can cause an act in others. Events, to get a little technical, are not beings, which are individual existents. Events, much like rivers and chairs, are not things with their own intrinsic forms, but artificial arrangements of parts which have their own forms . . . . See what I mean? Things would be so much clearer over a pint.

Diana, quickly for now, perhaps you too, with Theli, should get past that Everything . . . mover business by detouring around it. Also, the minor premise stuff, ignore for now (it doesn't have anything to do with "everybody's doing it";it's more like, since this proof is about God, don't pretend the notion of God is totally empty for you--even if you were to worship God in the nearest fire hydrant, the content of your idea is not so much at issue . . . but forget it) . As for matter and energy and so on, you, and Silent Acorns, are really awaiting Aquinas' subsequent arguments, but the notion of a transfinite cause is embedded in his first proofs . . . Also, the essence of God, as I keep insisting, is not at issue here. Aquinas only claims for these proofs that certain things exist in nature (Prime Mover, Cause, Being, etc.) and that they correspond to ideas of God. The proofs are somewhat cumulative in effect (though each is valid), and are fleshed out in the Summa immediately afterwards. Feel free to unburden me by reading Aquinas.

diana

I'm so pleased you recognize this problem. Now please take a moment to address my first requests for clarification from you:

1. You say faith is "rational acceptance on the authority of another." ... Rational acceptance of what on the authority of another what? And what makes the next person an authority, so he can be believed? Please provide examples.

2. I'm also unclear on--but intrigued with--the idea that faith "is a matter of respecting boundaries." What boundaries? How do you know the boundary is there, to respect it?

3. [When you concluded that "faith is at least reasonable," I said], Please take a couple of extra moments and tell me what does and doesn't qualify as "reasonable." I'll add And why?

4. After your comment that faith makes room for "reason's special competence, I asked you to explain what you meant by makes room and reason's special competence.

Again, thank you in advance for clarifying what you're talking about.

You got that "nightmare" part right. That didn't even make a shred of grammatical sense to me.



I must say, this is a first. My opponent has never suggested to me that I simply overlook the obvious inconsistencies to help me see how his argument makes sense.

Of course, "detouring around" the paradox and the inherent problems of your "proof" doesn't make them go away. Why ignore them now if they're still going to be there when we get back from whereever it is you are planning to take us on your detour? If you can't solve these big glaring problems, you're wasting your time fiddling with any "proof" that will ultimately require that you deal with them if you cannot.

I really don't know how to make this any plainer.

Of course, my point about "everybody's doing it" was important because of your implied use of the Appeal to Popularity to "prove" that everyone believes in a god of some sort, which we were, and still are, arguing.

Hm. You don't seem to be catching onto almost everything I say. I believe, in my last post, I asked you to define what you mean by God. Instead, you respond with, "Don't pretend the notion of God is totally empty for you."

Your reticence at supplying a simple enough definition suggests to me that you, also, are incapable of defining God in a meaningful way.

I'll stop "pretending" that the notion of God is totally empty for me as soon as you stop pretending the notion of God is in any way meaningful for me. Deal?

Judging from your track record on this thread so far, though, I assume what I just said will go flying miles over your head, so let me put it another way. Please listen closely: You are not me. You are not in my head. You don't know what I think or know or what I don't. You have no way to know or prove I think "God" means squat. You have to take me at my word.

There. That should do it. Not a two-syllable word in the bunch.

You've yet to provide a single reason we should. Does he find some way around the problems we've outlined? Or does he do a little dance, toss some fairy dust, and tell us to just forget for a minute they're there--like you're doing?

d

Theli

"Everything requires a cause (or mover to be put into motion), god does not require a cause"
Here is the contradiction.
And how will seeing things change prove the existence of any creator being (god)?

Theli

I couldn't add to the last post, so I'll start a new one.
And what claims or beliefs are you trying to prove now that is not based on the "mover business"?

Silent Acorns

No, I don't see what you mean. What do you mean by "intrinsic form"? Do you mean a "characteristic shape"? Chairs and rivers certainly have characteristic shapes. And how is a river an "artificial" arrangement of parts? I'm sorry but it appears to me that everytime Thomas (assuming you're still following his argument) comes up to a fundamental problem he just throws out some vague obfuscating terminology to cover it up.

I don't see how any of this supports the claim "events cannot cause an act in others" when in the 800 years after-Tom science has shown quite conclusively that the occurance of a Big Bang is a sufficent cause to explain the universe we see around us.

Obviously, many people (including Thomists and atheistic scientists) aren't satisfied with this. We still want to know how and/or why the Big Bang (or whatever the initial event was) came into being. Clearly, Thomas wasn't satisfied with "the event was uncaused" and so he posed that only a being can cause things and therefore a being caused the first event. People like me want to know "what caused the being?" Thomas' reply? "Don't be silly, the being is sufficient cause for itself!" How? "It just is, isn't it obvious? Trust me. I'm smart. Have faith in my authority!"

I'm not surprised that a state of intoxication makes it much easier to accept Thomas' proofs.

Christopher13

I had a more sarcastic post started (Diana), but thought better of it. I'll leave the wisecracking to you. But, being new here, should we start a new thread for faith/reason? I know I made a post that briefly addressed most of your points except the first regarding authority. I await your decision. Look what happened last time you gave me permission to discuss the proof;voila, a new thread.
What can I say about your post otherwise? Wow, if you think you're talking past me, how do you think I feel? Realize that it is more or less me vs. several locutors, and that it is easier, as my Aquinas mentor told me too, to criticize than be constructive, and tough to do both. But I know that I am one of the few (only?) Thomist fans here, so . . . . I don't want special treatment, and it is time-consuming to rebut every little point. But here I go again. I have some patience.
This is a causal proof that argues from effects to the existence of a cause. Starting with the natural observation (God, I wish I had jumped earlier to the second proof! As I said above, the notion of moving doesn't mean for us what it did for Aristotle or Aquinas, but, if you're curious for historical reasons, see my other posts. Again, as far as the proof goes, "mover" means "cause.") that things are seen to move under the influence of a mover. Consider this an induction, just like we learn from boiling this amount of water, and a different amount, etc. causes us to say that "all water boils at 212 degrees Fahrenheit." This is just the starting point in the work of building up the major premise of our syllogism. From here we invoke the "infinite regression of causes" business (which I'm not explaining for the fifth time because it was Diana, I think, who has been mentioning it most and Silent Acorns, I think, is okay with it (Theli, I know you're there).
Next, with the Prime Mover established (everyone, be still here), the minor premise associates the Prime Mover (this is how syllogisms work--I feel Diana getting ready to start a new thread here by questioning the nature of syllogisms) with what Aquinas calls the "meaning of the name" and what others would call the "definition of the name." Here, I think, is the other sticking point. As I have stressed before, there is no a priori notion of God involved here necessarily. The causal proof demands that the exact essence not be known. Remember that only the existence of the cause is what is being shown here. Just as if you inquire into the nature of a dog, you have the name dog already in mind, and then proceed to determine that it is an animal of such-and-such qualities, so in this proof. We have a notion of God, not an essence (this is what my statements about everyone knowing what the word God is referring to, VERY generally, meant) when we create the minor premise of the syllogism.
I know everyone wants to talk Prime Mover and the first premise. I'm just outlining the proof again. So:There is a Prime Mover. The Prime Mover is what we call God (again Aquinas' phrasing). There is a God. AGAIN, for all practical purposes, this concept is empty of every notion you have ever heard about God. This proof only shows that a Prime Mover exists in nature, and, to put it poorly, most men who believe in God would claim this Prime Mover in nature as a property of their God. With the other Thomistic proofs and arguments, a definition of the actual essence of God is only merely glimpsed. And then the reaches of natural reason come to an end. But what an end. Aquinas eventually identifies God as Pure Form, Supreme Perfection, the being whose essence is to exist, the being who is Pure Act, the being who does not have being, but simply IS. Do you begin to appreciate why I cannot argue everything in this space? I will try to address the other points in your posts later.
Thanks, all.

diana

Greetings, Christopher.

Had you simply answered my questions and directly addressed my objections instead of brushing them aside, I suspect my patience wouldn't be so thin.

Anyhow.

Let's get back to your "proof," shall we?

I've been told, as you might imagine, that it's easier to criticize than be constructive. This is true, but it manages to imply that criticism serves no purpose. I beg to differ. In the realm of argumentation, this is how we determine the strength of proofs. Criticism--the possibility for disproof--is how we test theories. Turn off the criticism (or refuse to address it), and you have dogma, which is immune to reason.

I've been thinking about the paradox your proof represents. It bothers me, probably because I just don't, deep down, believe in paradoxes. I think any apparent paradox is a sign there's a false assumption somewhere that needs ferreting out.

That about sums up your/Aquinas' position, does it not?

As we've already acknowledged, however, this proof presents a paradox. If "everything" requires a mover, then nothing--even God himself--is logically exempt. You're tired of hearing this, I gather, but the conundrum is still there, nonetheless.

However, I agree that is makes no sense either to postulate that anything could have started from "infinite regression."

So I'm figuring there's a problem with the "everything that moves is moved by another" premise.

I've gathered thus far that Aquinas rested this premise upon "what we see," or observation. In using the term "everything," though, he implies that because we have never witnessed anything moving without being moved by another, then necessarily, everything that moves is moved by another. You agree?

He appears to be Arguing from Ignorance: Aquinas claims that "everything that moves is moved by another" is true simply because it hasn't been proved false.

Right? OK.

I don't always reject Argument from Ignorance forthwith. I mean, inductive thinking is based upon it: I think X will Y because nobody's ever seen X do Z. It is through such reasoning that I'm fairly confident that pigs don't really fly.

However, when the conclusion to such inductive thinking so obviously contradicts something else we are accepting as a truth, then either the conclusion of the Argument from Ignorance or the opposing hypothesis must be wrong. My cognitive dissonance sensitivity prevents me from accepting both as simultaneously true.

So the question here is, which one? "Everything that moves is moved by another" or "infinite regression isn't possible"?

If you yank the rug out from under the first, you end up with "Most things that move are moved by another," which implicitly does not require a Prime Mover, at all.

If you change your stance on the second and decide that infinite regression is possible after all, then once again, you don't need a Prime Mover.

To change either or both negates your proof. So, for the desired conclusion to be reached, we must, perforce, accept both premises as true. It would appear that your/Aquinas' "proof" is resting squarely upon the shoulders of this paradox, yes? (The pig of time has but a little way to fly/And Lo! The pig is on the wing!)

To accept a paradox is to reject consistency, upon which logic is based. If you wish to accept both theories that constitute your paradox as true, you have already departed from reason, and thus relegated yourself to the ranks of irrational theists.

Your other choice is to find the incorrect premise and correct it, but...then you have to give up your "proof."

(If you continue to argue that both are true, you've proven my original point, the one which dragged you into this discourse in the first place: There is no such thing as a rational theist. That is why faith is so indispensible.)

So far as I can tell, your only hope to maintain a "rational theist" position is to somehow convince me that paradoxes are somehow logical.

Good luck.

d

HRG

However, neither Aristoteles nor Aquinas ever naturally observed quantum phenomena. But we have.
But this induction argument is destroyed by quantum phenomena, e.g. pion decay. A pion decay event (including the decay channel and the momentum and spin of the decay products) is AFAWCT spontaneous, causeless and does not need a mover.

Physics has proceeded since the times of Aquinas and Aristoteles, which makes the Prime Mover proof only of historical interest: like an old legal code which has since been repealed. Seen from a current perspective, their "error" was an unwarranted extrapolation of observations under very restricted situations to all situations.

Regards,
HRG.

HRG

Actually, as far as we can tell, uncaused events happen every nanosecond - by the gazillions. It is only their statistical average that makes the macroscopic world look (approximately) causal.

Thus Thomas was right - except for uniqueness, of course!

Personal s(n)ide remark: physics has progressed since the days of Aristoteles and Thomas. Shouldn't philosophy try to catch up ?

Regards,
HRG.