The_Ist

At the bottom:

While I think it would be absurd to claim that I can know all of God's purposes and how exactly he goes about accomplishing all of them, I will not be using this defense. I don't consider it a solid theistic argument at all.

Yes, but my point is that the latter C necessarily must not fulfill God's purposes more than this C, because if it did he would have chosen it.

Below, I will discuss in more detail this supposed world C in which no one denies God. I will posit that it may be the empty set.

I think this analogy is faulty. Consider a logically possible C1 in which no suffering/hell exists, and this actual world, C2. It's not like God could have chosen C1, because it wouldn't have fulfilled his purposes as much as C2. If he had chosen C1, he wouldn't have made the perfect decision, and thus would not be a perfect OmniGod at all. However, in the example you give, your nature does not bind you to allow the man to have the gun and kill himself, so yes, you would share in the responsibility.

Yes, I understand what you're saying; however, I fail to see the logical problem.

But that's the point: the two scenarios aren't equally viable. If they were, and it just came down to which had less evil, God would choose the one that did. So since he chose this one, it follows that the C in which no one chose evil or hell must not have fulfilled his purposes as completely as this one (below, I'll argue that this may be because there is no set of individuals such that the former is possible).

The reason I didn't discuss the specifics of these goals is because that, IMO, is a completely different argument. The only thing that matters for the discussion at hand is that God presumably had reasons and purposes for creating the universe, and that, due to his perfection and status as an OmniGod, he must have chosen the one that fulfilled these reasons and purposes to the max.

If you want to discuss some of these exact goals, then I guess we can, though I don't exactly see how it is relevant.

Agreed.

No. You cannot separate a single facet within a certain C and claim that, since it exists, it must be a goal of the Creator. Take the Holocaust, for example. Some people may say, "Why wouldn't an OmniGod have stopped the Holocaust from happening, or at least not let as many people die? How did that serve his purposes?". The problem with this is that one is thinking about some world C' that is exactly the same as this world C, except for the fact that C' does not include the Holocaust. But C' is not a logically possible world: if God were to remove the Holocaust, it would necessarily have other effects on the "new world" that would also be different from certain aspects of C, thus making it not fit the definition of C'. (Think about the famous example about the butterfly flapping its wings on one side of the world, causing such and such to happen on the other side. I forget how it goes.) If you change one particular point, the new world will be drastically different than the one from which you changed. Therefore, you cannot isolate one specific point or aspect of this world C and say that it is necessarily a goal of God, because it may be the case (and, in fact, it MUST be, if an OmniGod created the universe) that its non-existence or alteration would have a ripple effect that would cause the world to not fulfill God's purposes to the max.

Sorry if I misled you, but I do not claim that God could have chosen anything. My example of C', a world that is exactly the same as this world except for its removal of the Holocaust, gives a case of something God could not have chosen, because C' cannot logically exist.

I guess at this point I want to introduce a new argument: theoretically speaking, there may have been NO possible world C in which all the individuals therein would have chosen to be saved. In the words of Craig, responding to a similar argument:

"There may not be a compossible set of individuals such that if you put all of them together in a world, all of them freely receive God's salvation and are saved."

IOW, we have no way of knowing that the set of all individuals who exist in a world C, all of whom freely accept God, is not, in fact, the EMPTY set. Therefore, you cannot definitively claim that God could have created a world in which all people always choose good over evil, because it may fall into the same category as C', as a world which would have been infeasible for God to create.

Another point regarding this quote: you talk about God creating this universe as opposed to "a corresponding free-will universe WITHOUT hell or evil." But, as I've already somewhat explained, the latter would not correspond to the former at all. Take away suffering and hell from this world, and you have a world that is probably in no way similar to this one, and that necessarily, since God didn't choose it, does not fulfill his purposes as well as this one. The point is that you cannot isolate certain negative attributes of this C and claim that God could have created some C' that was identical to this C, except for the fact that it did not include this or that attribute. Applications of Chaos Theory prove this idea.

But how is one without evil and hell "equivalent" to this one at all? For all we know, there may be NO such universe with no evil and hell in which some set of individuals could exist. I don't see how that hypothetical universe is in any way equivalent to what we have now.

No. If God chose them because they were necessary by-products of the universe that fulfilled his goals and desires, which is what I'm arguing, then they aren't unncessary in the least.

Absolutely not. What if there is no compossible set of individuals who all freely choose to accept God? If this is the case, then any universe in which free-willed individuals exist must necessarily have some evil.

I am sorry if you were misled by that quote to which you repsonded here, but that was directed at Jamie_L. In my premised argument against the problem of evil, I am employing the Expectations Defense, which, though I don't necessarily agree with it, IMO, is a good refutation of the PoE. Do not be confused; in my argument with you I am not claiming that God allowed unnecessary evil to exist, but that the evil we see is the necessary by-product of this world C that fulfills God's purposes to the max.

Sometimes I take different sides of the coin theologically when dealing with different arguments, just for the heck of it. I should have been more clear that I was doing so in this case. My apologies.

mike_decock

This assumes that God is benevolent and has a purpose. If there is a God, it is entirely possible that this is an experiment in arbitrary cruelty.

When speaking of God's "goals and desires" it implies that God is lacking something. Beyond the speculation about whether this universe is necessarily the way it is still doesn't address two other issues:

1) Creation wasn't necessary. A benevolent God would have chosen NOT to create a world in which suffering outweighed joy.

2) The concept of a "will, goal or plan" implies a specific end result. An OmniGod could just as easily create the end result and avoid this process. Again, that means that this universe is unnecessary.

-Mike...

Angrillori

Just for emphasis. The set of universes in which no one goes to hell is guaranteed not only to NOT be the empty set, but to, in fact, contain an infinite number of elements.

If there are always a finite number of decisions and an infinite number of scenarios, ANY and EVERY combination of decisions made is guaranteed.

Your infinity just isn't large enough.

Next, consider this:
If I know a restaurant that serves ice cream sundaes, and offers peanuts on top at no extra charge or hassle. Then, when I later see you eating a sundae with peanuts on top, I know you chose peanuts. You didn't have to have them, it wasn't easier or harder for you to order with or without peanuts. I know when the clerk asked "Do you want peanuts on that?" you said YES.

Replace you with God, sundae with universe, and peanuts with going to hell.

Earlier we mathematically showed thatthere IS in fact a universe with free will in which no one goes to hell. And, with infinite possibilities and finite choices made in each, there are infinite universes where no one goes to hell. As long as infinity>any finite number this is true. The rest just follows.


Doesn't this seem begging the question a bit? God must want to minimize suffering, so this must be the minimum amount of suffering?

This seems to be what your argument boils down to. But I think, as I've pointed out above, mathematically, and logically (definition of omnipotence) then a universe without ANY human-caused evil and suffering and hell-going-to IS viable for ANY possible goal a foreknowing omnipotent God may have. In someone elses words, for an omnigod, since the idea of a 'means to an end' is irrelevant, then every means must be its own end as well. This includes suffering and evil and hell.

The_Ist

I'm only defending the traditional conception of the Christian God here. Of course, it is always possible that this is just a cruel experiment; that's a non-falsifiable proposition. I am only talking about creation with respect to Christian theology, though.

No. If a being needs something, a lack is implied. Goals and desires, or wants, only signify some state of events a being would prefer, in the absence of which the being is no less great or powerful than if this state of events would have obtained. Some lack would only be implied if God had certain wants he could not fulfill.

This seems to beg the question as to whether the suffering outweighs the joy in this world.

This is false if the will, goal, or plan involves the process itself.

But all of the universes in this set could be devoid of free-willed beings.

No. Let me try to explain this again. Consider this world that we live in, C. Now think about a world C' that is defined as following: a world exactly the same as C, except for the fact that the decision of Adolf Hitler to attempt to exterminate the Jews is reversed. According to your statement above, since this C' is a different combination of decisions than C, it is guaranteed to be possible. But it is obviously not. The ramifications of the reversal of such a free-willed choice on other free-willed choices would be enormous. There would be free-will choices down the line that couldn't even be made, because certain events wouldn't have even come to pass. This C' could never obtain, because it represents a non-compossible set of free-will decisions; therefore, it represents an example of a combination of decisions that could not be instantiated, and thus invalidates this argument of yours.

I don't know what this means.

This analogy fails for the same reason as the one you gave in your last post, so I see no reason to rehash my arguments.

I wouldn’t mind seeing this alleged mathematical proof. I think you may be referring to this, in your second post on the thread:

“As long as there are always a finite number of decisions made, then it is a statistical certainty that in infinite tries, a set of conditions will lead to the result 'no evil choices chosen.'”

But this statement is false. If there is no compossible set of individuals who all freely choose to accept God, i.e., if such a case is the empty set, then you have a situation in which there are an infinite number of possible starting conditions, and NONE that include free-willed beings and lead to the result of “no evil chosen.” It’s like saying “given infinite starting conditions for the universe, it is a statistical certainty that one of them will lead to the result of C’ (described above) obtaining.” The problem is, there is NO compossible set of circumstances that fit the definition of C’.

No, I don’t think it does. Here’s the argument more formally:

1) If an OmniGod created the universe, he would have created the one that fulfilled his purposes as much as possible.

2) One of an OmniGod’s purposes is to minimize suffering.

3) Therefore, all else being equal, an OmniGod would choose world W over W’, if W fulfilled his other purposes equally as well or better than W’, and contained less suffering.

4) Therefore, if an OmniGod created this world, then this world contains the minimum suffering of any possible world that could have fulfilled his other purposes as well as this one.

See above.

No. If God has some purpose that includes the process that brings about that purpose’s total fulfillment, then the means are certainly relevant, though not ends in and of themselves.

mike_decock

When you want something, it implies you do not have it. It doesn not imply you cannot fulfill it: "If I want a cookie (desire), I bake one (create), and eat it (desire fulfilled)."

An omnipotent being would not need to go through the process of baking the cookie (creation), it can instantaneously materialise the cookie or go straight to the sensation of eating the cookie (desire fulfilled).

Granted. If we include Heaven/Hell into "this world", then the majority of humanity is suffering in Hell. That doesn't include the suffering of humanity on earth.

It is an unnecessary process for an unnecessary result, one which contains much suffering.

It is obviously posible.

In an infinite number of possible universes, it is equally possible that a C' could have been chosen which did not include the free-will decision of Hitler to exterminate the Jews. It is not a reversal of a free-willed choice, nor is it a violation of any other free will choices. The argument remains valid.

-Mike...

Tabula_rasa

Interesting thread.

Could somebody point me to a particular Bible chapter/verse which shows where humans were given free will by God? I'm having difficulty finding it on my own.

I did a search for "free will" and got no results. I did a search for "freewill" and got 17 results, 16 of which were "freewill offerings" and one which was in relation to people choosing to move about the countryside in a letter from king Artaxerxes. But I didn't see anything in Genesis.

Tabula_rasa

Biff the unclean

Sure, it's in Genesis 3
3:4 And the serpent said unto the woman, Ye shall not surely die:
3:5 For God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.

Oops! That wasn't God giving man free will at all. That was the other team giving man the ability to choose for themselves.
God forbid man to have free will in Genesis. Maybe it's some later book he changes his mind.

Tabula_rasa

Knowing the difference between good and evil is not the same as having free will. Free will is a wide array of choices beyond the plain old vanilla and chocolate of good and evil.

Anyway, we see in Gen.2 17 that God says to Adam: But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die. So God does tell Adam that he shouldn't eat from the tree. Problem is, according to the story, God didn't bother getting around to tell Eve. Even then, it's not clear that Adam knew he was eating fruit from that particular tree. Tried and convicted of unknowingly purchasing hot goods. Looks to me like God made a complete bollocks of the whole affair.

Apologists?

Tabula_rasa

Biff the unclean

Ahh, but knowing the difference between good and evil is exactly what free will is. Free will is not the opportunity to make a choice but the ability to make choices. It is the freedom to use ones "will." And you cannot have a will without the ability to discern. There are a wide range of choices between good and evil…but not if you who haven't the concept of what they are. There are many shades of pink between white and red, all of which are meaningless to a blind man.

The_Ist

I can agree with this. But there is no prima facie problem with God not having something. If God does not have something trivial, like a toaster, I guess that, technically speaking, you could say God "lacks" a toaster, but this is not the sort of lack that takes away from a being's greatness, power, etc.

But this is not the case if God has some desire that includes the process by which this desire is fulfilled in its totality, in which case the means (e.g., creating the cookie) are not ends in and of themselves, but are relevant to the desired end.

Well if you want to attempt to quantify suffering and joy with the inclusion of heaven and hell, you have to take into effect the angels in heaven, demons in hell, etc.

And anyway, I don't see the relevance of such quantifications. Even if it is the case that there is a greater numerical amount of suffering than joy in this world, what does this prove? Such a state must have been necessary for God to fulfill his purposes to the max; otherwise, we would see less suffering and more joy.

I don't really know what "things" you're referring to here, but regardless this seems to be mere argument by assertion.

This is a simple application of chaos theory.

Define world C as this world.

Define world C' as a world that is EXACTLY the same as C, except that in C' Hitler did not decide to attempt to exterminate the Jews.

C' is not a possible world. It is not a possible combination of free will choices. The fact that Hitler, in C', does not make the free will decision to attempt to exterminate the Jews obviously has huge ramifications and consequences for millions upon millions of people. Think about all the lives that would have changed (Hitler himself, those people who would have worked in the concentration camps, the Jews who would have been victimized during the Holocaust, etc., etc.) drastically because of this ONE different decision. These people would go through completely different circumstances in their lives - they would be presented with free will decisions they wouldn't have encountered in world C;also, they would not have free will decisions in world C' that they would have had in C. This is obviously the case because they would be in completely different circumstances in C' as opposed to C, and circumstances clearly have a large effect on WHAT choices one can make. But since this is the case, C' FAILS to be a possible world, because it is defines as EXACTLY the same as C except for Hitler's aforementioned decision, and it obviously does not fit this definition, because of the already-described changes that would occur in C' that would make it distinct from C.

No. This free will choice by Hitler would create free will choices down the line that would not have even existed in C, and it would have caused some free will choices that would have occured in the future in C to never come into existence. See above; C' is not a possible world, because it does not represent a compossible set of free-willed choices.