Koyaanisqatsi

The evasion to a question follows from the pointless word games employed by the actor in order to avoid addressing the question.

And fear.

Subjective qualification number one.

Subjective qualification number two.

Subjective qualification number three. You're out!

Ok.



<ol type="1">[*] I wasn't accusing you, I was pointing out that you were proving subjectivity[*] That the earth is round is not a "subjective" thought[*] Judging the earth to be round is a nonsensical phrase that does not serve as anything other than gibberish, so if you were thinking it was pithy or illustrative of bd's analogy, you are incorrect.[/list=a]

Then we are not in agreement.

Please stop personifying words, not to mention bringing up worthless comments such as this.

A proposition does not and cannot "act" nor does it "view" nor would such a tautology have any bearing on anything we've been discussing.

Is this Principle a logical construct and if so, please direct me to a website/source so that I can read the actual principle? I have never heard of it and cannot find it.

As far as I can decipher, you appear to be using the constructs of "being" and "agent" in a technical manner, yet applying them in a non-technical way, so that the result is cryptic gibberish.

Does anyone else know what he/she is talking about re: the Principle of Finality?

Also, can anyone else kindly explain how this "principle" has any relevance to what we've been discussing?

Will you ever move beyond pointless tautologies and get to either a point or a counter-point?

No, actually, you did not (YOU:I mean objective knowledge is produced by discursive thinking), but even if you were what relevance would that have?

Please stop trying to emulate a college primer textbook in your writing style and directly answer my questions as it is abundantly clear that you do not fully comprehend the terms you are using.

For example, your previous comment would be translated into the following tautology: I said analytical reasoning [is] terminated by a fact or statement (a proposition, axiom, postulate, or notion taken for granted) that is evident without proof or reasoning.

Of course analytical reasoning will be "terminated" if one simply assumes something to be true without proof or reasoning!

You have a marvelous grasp of the obvious, but beyond that, nothing relevant to say to the points.

?

How is that "irrational vs. rational?" What the hell are you talking about?

Please don't mistake my confusion for inability to follow your thought processes, because it is abundantly clear that it is your sophistry that is causing the confusion and that's giving you the benefit of the doubt.

False. Gravity is objective because it "exists" independently of human perception.

The phrase "it has been rendered" implies that it is only considered to be objective as a result of human cognition, which is ass backwards and contrary to the intended purpose of the qualifier "objective." It necessarily means that the "objective existence" of Gravity is dependent upon human cognition.

That is a contradiction in terms.

Not nearly as absurd as this latest tautology.

Not to mention the fact that you are contradicting yourself. You just went to bizzarre (erroneous) lengths to establish that Gravity was not a "self evident assumption."

Non-sequitur. The proper inferrence to draw from P1 and P2 would be your favorite default, a tautology: String theory explains the objectivity of Gravity.

String theory is not a material object or force of nature that can be said to "exist" in the same manner that either a material object or force of nature can be said to "exist."

A theory is an abstraction of cognitive processes (discursive thinking) and therefore cannot be said to "objectively exist" in any relevant way.

Speaking of relevance, what has any of this to do with objective morality? So far, you've only regurgitated terms you clearly do not comprehend in order to establish little more than a series of tautologies.

Why? Please directly apply any of this nonsense to either the topic or my points.

<ol type="1">[*] IMO: In My Opinion.[*] The phrase you don't know what everyone "reasons" about morality betrays subjectivity[/list=a]

Non-sequitur.

String theory! String theory!

<ol type="a">[*] There is no "it" to "inherit" anything[*] String theory describes elements of Gravity, that's it![/list=a]

THERE IS NO "IT" TO BE ACTIVE. DISCURSIVE THINKING IS A COGNITIVE PROCESS, NOT A BEING.

To make false, unprovable, unsupportable, childishly dismissive declarations of this kind is worse than absurd; it is a pointless waste of everyone's time.

As with just about everything you have posted, you have not addressed or answered my question.

How does one "participate" in something that is predetermined (aka, the concept of "destiny")?

It was not ad hominem; it was and is demonstrable, IMO, as this post and your last non-sequitur regarding "destiny," especially, readily shows.

Again, I will ask, how is this relevant, other than to further establish subjectivity and what do you mean by "creates intellect?"

Then, you mean they are congenitally deffective in some manner; a product of something that went wrong with their brain chemistry in vitro?

Whose "virtue and morality?" Yours (subjective)? The society's (subjective)? The universe's (objective, but invalid)?

NO IT IS NOT! The topic is non-theistic objective morality; an oxymoron.

To posit a person "ruled by passion" is itself absurd! No such beings exist, other than in your exploded hyperbole and nineteenth century novels.

According to whom? You (subjective)? Society (subjective)? The universe (objective, and invalid)?

All of which are subjective.

Please stay on point.

What has that got to do with an objective morality? Safety has to do with survival, not morality and "loving parents" is a product of human bonding, but by no means an absolute or objective "given."



Survival, survival and entitlement borne from social reform.

NONE of those have anything to do with an "objective morality," other than to subjectively qualify matters of survival, i.e., "It is morally reprehensible to not provide clean drinking water."

The actual argument is, "By not providing clean drinking water, you shoot your own power structure in the foot by killing off the very people who can continue to maintain your power structure through their votes."

It gets translated subjectively into "morally reprehensible," but that does not mean it is "objectively immoral" to not provide clean drinking water!

You and I go camping at my instigation. Because it was at my instigation, is it therefore morally reprehensible that I did not provide you with clean drinking water?

No. In that scenario, it would be incumbant upon you to provide your own clean drinking water, since it is a matter of your own continued survival that you drink clean drinking water.

The action of my not providing you with clean drinking water in this scenario cannot be considered "morally reprehensible."

However, if you are an employee of mine in a necessarily remote section of land, for example, wherein it would not be possible for you to provide your own water at your own expense and I deliberately provided you with infested drinking water, then in that scenario it can be said that my actions are morally reprehensible.

We now have two scenarios involving the action of my not providing clean drinking water.

IF IT WERE OBJECTIVELY IMMORAL TO NOT PROVIDE CLEAN DRINKING WATER, THEN IT WOULD BE OBJECTIVELY IMMORAL IN BOTH SCENARIOS.

It is not, thereby demonstrating the inherent, necessarily subjective quality of morality.

Determining what is or is not to be considered "immoral" is a product of subjective application and dependent upon many different factors, all of which prove that there is no such thing and can be no such thing as "objective morality."

<ol type="1">[*] Nobody cares about the porposition of non objective non-theistic morality[*] You have once again demonstrated the necessarily subjective parameters of morality[/list=a]

Subjective.

Non sequitur. You have not and cannot demonstrate an "objective morality" derived from anything, much less "human nature." As such, you can not support your claim that human rationality or intelligence "benefits" from it.

AKA, SUBJECTIVITY! <img src="graemlins/banghead.gif" border="0" alt="[Bang Head]" />

I did neither so your "point" escapes me.

Gibberish.

? Do you mean, when lovers engage in a sexual position colloquially termed "The Doggy Position," they are engaging in an "objectively immoral" act, or do you mean when humans engage in bestiality, they are engaging in an "objectively immoral" act?

Again, I would respectfully suggest that you do not either fully comprehend the terms you so casually (and erroneously) throw around or that English is simply not your primary language and you are therefore suffering from a confusion of syntax and the proper application of terms.

WHAT THE HELL ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT?

Does anyone else understand what dk is referring to as I am having a nearly impossible time deciphering his/her comments. Please chime in at will.

Thank you.

You've stated this before and still not clarified it. Is that what you were trying to do with the "absurdity" nonsense previously?

If so, again, I would ask you, what is the relevance to the topic?

Nor does it need to, since it can be shown mathematically that for any unknown "N" the law
"works."

Are you trying to make an analogy between a mathematical equation and the assumption of objectivity? That because for any number "N" in a given mathematical equation the equation can be shown to be solvent, that therefore the assumption of objectivity is equivalent to an actual objectivity??

If you would only lead, I would...

Ok...

BIGGER HINT: ANSWER THE GODDAMNED QUESTIONS IN ORDER TO HAVE A DISCUSSION!

BIGGER HINT: DON'T PRETEND YOU KNEW WHAT YOU WERE TALKING ABOUT ONCE SOMEONE DEMONSTRATES YOUR INCOHERENCE.

See if you can follow this: You are not making any sense. Your posts provide nothing relevant or coherent and serve no usefull purpose to explain your position.

F*ckin hell...

I thought I'd just slice up your sophisms for all to see. The previous one is so far my favorite.

I like this one too, since it demonstrates, once again, subjectivity.

That one's just fun because of the grammar.

Is this a relevant rhetorical question or just more pointless tautological ramblings?

For the twentieth time, how is this at all relevant to the topic of objective morality?

OBJECTIVE non-theistic morality is the topic and the point I was making was in regard to what everyone else was arguing in regard to what is or is not "morally necessary" and how it is necessarily subjective.

You had claimed that masturbation could not be considered either "objectively moral" or "immoral" because it did not fit with your subjectively applied construct of "regulatory control."

I was demonstrating that you were incorrect according to the very next sentence you had originally posted and included in your last response to me that I am now addressing:

I am now convinced that you simply do not understand English and, accordingly, apologize for anything I have posted. You simply do not know what you're talking about as a function of English not being your primary language.

No, my argument hinges upon the fact that no one has been able to establish either a single objectively immoral act or the mechanism that mandates such objectivity.

Here we go....

You mean, you submit nothing but tautologies!

NON SEQUITUR.

Therefore, the "essence of a thing" is a necessarily subjective process of the individual mind and irrelevant to our discussion.

Non sequitur.

<img src="graemlins/banghead.gif" border="0" alt="[Bang Head]" />

(edited for formatting - Koy)

[ June 10, 2002: Message edited by: Koyaanisqatsi ]</p>

bd-from-kg

Alonzo Fyfe:

This is a response to your June 7, 5:31 AM post.

1. I’m not sure exactly what the point of this argument is. You say:

But of course no desires are entailed by such an increase; indeed, no desires are entailed by any knowledge or beliefs. The only kind of thing that can be logically entailed by anything is a proposition, and desires are not propositions. How does this trivial tautology imply anything about what desires it is appropriate to include in any definition of “ought” ?

2. A parallel argument can be made regarding beliefs. For example, consider the claim made by many scientists that the evidence that some species descended from others is overwhelming. [To avoid any misunderstanding, I agree entirely with this.] It seems clear (based on their further explanations) that they mean that any reasonable person familiar with the evidence will believe it. But this statement has two serious problems, as anyone familiar with your argument can plainly see.

First, no one can possibly be familiar with all of the relevant evidence, or even with any large fraction of it. So it makes no sense to talk about the beliefs that would be caused by acquisition of all that K&U - since nothing would be caused by it - since the acquisition of all that K&U will never happen, and can never happen, in order to cause anything in fact. In which case, even a perfectly rational person’s beliefs on this subject will be dependent on which pieces of knowledge he decides to acquire.

The second objection is even more serious. No one has ever observed, for example, birds evolving from dinosaurs, or squirrels and rats evolving from a common ancestor. The belief that these things occurred depends on a long chain of inferences. And for virtually every step in the chain the conclusion is not logically entailed by the premises. In other words, the belief that squirrels and rats evolved from a common ancestor is not logically entailed by the evidence; all that one can say is that it was caused by knowledge and understanding of the evidence.

Now causation is a funny thing; causal changes can be just about anything. The acquisition of K&U effects the structure of the brain. New neural connections are formed, unused connections (presumably those associated with previous false beliefs) atrophy. Beliefs also depend on brain structure. Therefore, it is quite possible that the acquisition of knowledge and understanding could generate a change in brain structure that also alters a person's beliefs. But those alterations are causally contingent and, like the pressing of a button, can lead to just about anything.

While learning about the performance of stock XYZ over the past five years, certain new connections form and then . . . poof . . . a dendrite and an axion come into contact and, as a result, the person now has a belief in creationism. Another person, reading a book on the history of postage stamps, unaccountably develops a belief that frogs are descended from water lilies. It certainly does not follow that the first agent should believe in creationism or the second agent should believe that frogs are descended from water lilies.

That is to say, if such a person were to ask, "why should I believe in creationism?" how would we answer? "Because a neural connection would be formed causing you to believe in creationism if you learned about the performance of stock XYZ." When he looks at us questioningly and asks, "So?" Then what?

As you put it so eloquently:

Thus, the statement that a reasonable person familiar with the evidence will believe that some species descended from others is meaningless and irrelevant. Meaningless because it is impossible that anyone could be familiar with all of the relevant evidence. Irrelevant because the mere fact that a belief might be (contingently) caused by the acquisition of certain new K&U tells us nothing about whether the belief is rationally justifiable. Such causal changes can be just about anything. Given the random, unpredictable nature of causation, in all likelihood the acquisition of the very same K&U in a different order, or under different circumstances, would result in a completely different, unrelated set of beliefs.

Now what does this do to your theory? For all practical purposes it demolishes it, because (as Hume demonstrated) no knowledge that we have entails anything whatsoever about what will happen in the future. Thus, in the case of Jones you say:

But actually any increase in K&U will not “increase his awareness” of the most efficient means, but will only change his beliefs about the most efficient means. Given the random, unpredictable nature of causality, there is no reason to suppose that these new beliefs would be “better” than his old ones.

In the end, whether one takes an all-things-considered view or a some-things-considered one, your logic implies that any beliefs that one might have about what action will best satisfy the relevant desires are fundamentally unjustifiable. These beliefs may change with the acquisition of new K&U, but in a way that is essentially random; regardless of the amount of K&U one has, there is no good reason to believe that these beliefs will have any relationship to what will actually happen.

So if this is your reason for ignoring desires that result from increased K&U, then your theory, perhaps, is something that we would be better off without - all things considered.

Alonzo Fyfe

But of course no desires are entailed by such an increase [in knowledge and understanding]; indeed, no desires are entailed by any knowledge or beliefs. The only kind of thing that can be logically entailed by anything is a proposition, and desires are not propositions....A parallel argument can be made regarding beliefs.

No, beliefs and desires have a significant and relevant difference.

However, one thing they have in common is that propositions are actually an essential part of what beliefs and desires are.

Desires and beliefs are both called propositional attitudes -- mental attitudes towards a proposition. A "belief that P" is a mental attitude that the proposition P is true. A "desire that P" is a mental attitude that the proposition P is to be made or made to remain true.

And, so, it is possible to speak of what is entailed by the propositions that are the object of a belief as follows:

A believes that P
A believes that P implies Q
A rationally-ought to believe that Q

Not that the agent must actually believe that Q, but believing that not-Q under these circumstances would be irrational.

Also, a belief that P is a mental attitude that the proposition "P" is true. And "P" is true if and only if P. Thus, any evidence that P is evidence that "P" is true and, consequently, a reason to believe that "P" as opposed to "not-P"

All of the knowledge and understanding in the world about any state of affairs cannot generate a conclusion that is anything other than just another belief-state. If the conclusion is a desire-state, then that desire itself must be entailed by desire-states included among the premises.

There are no set of facts that are true of Jones murdering Smith that entails a desire for Jones not to murder Smith.

The bulk of your posting takes my argument that causal implication that there is no reason to seriously consider whatever desires may be caused by an increase in knowledge and understanding and argue that they fail to justify beliefs that may be caused by an increase in knowledge and understanding as well.

I accept the argument. The criticism I levied against whatever desires may be caused by an increase in knowledge and understanding are just as valid against the beliefs that may be caused by an increase in knowledge and understanding. Causal implication just does not work.

So, why do I reject the desires that are "brought about" as a result of improved knowledge and understanding?

I would accept any desires entailed by an improvement in knowledge and understanding, but there are none to include. And I would include any desires caused by an increase in knowledge and understanding the same way that I include any future desires however they are caused (those that will come into existence are relevant; those that will not come into existence are not; and those that might come into existence are relevant in proportion to the probability that they will come into existence). The desires "caused" by a "sufficient knowledge and understanding" (if any -- and there is some reason to believe that there are none) are irrelevant because they will never exist.

[ June 12, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

dk

I’ve broken the response into two parts. You might as well skip to the last quote, the rest of the thread is pointless.
dk: - You asked a very general question, I gave a very general explanation.
dk: - Sometimes fear is a reasonable response. I’m surprised you didn’t bring up the feeling of guilt.
dk: - There’s nothing subjective about a court’s docket, the judges order or an injunction. Immoral people are unable to resolve their problems informally, therefore are compelled to appeal their grievance to a formal authoritative body.
dk: - There’s nothing subjective about the cost of litigation. When immoral people screw others the court costs burden the entire society. One need only look at the cost of health care insurance, and liability insurance premiums for health care providers.
dk: - New proposition. A nation or civilization grows and prospers until it encounters an insoluble problem. Nations dependent upon huge bureaucracies for social justice institutionalize personal discretion.
dk:: When is it correct or incorrect to judge?
dk: - Hey? This bullet illustrates an objective necessity.
dk: Why are you so contrary to the notion that “ideas, forms and concepts” are intelligible items, as opposed to real items?
dk: - The Principle of Finality dates back to Aristotle. Here’s Kant’s take: <a href="http://www.vt.edu/vt98/academics/books/kant/judgemnt" target="_blank"> THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT: by Immanuel Kant </a>
dk: - When you ask a question, I answer it. I’m not presenting an argument. My point is that concepts, ideas,,, etc. originate in the intellect (are not real) to explain sensible things, as opposed to reason that distinguishes between sensible things. .
dk: - I said, “Nonetheless self-evident assumptions are unassailable and necessary to terminate regressive testing of uncountable (infinite) premises.” (posted June 07, 2002 06:13 PM ). We seem to be in agreement, so why do I suspect we don’t agree at all. Discursive thinking is an infinitely regressive exercise. This isn’t an “of course” statement but a necessary statement. Knowledge simply can’t proceed in any sense: material, efficient, formal or final without self-evident assumptions.
dk: - Irrational in the sense gravity is non-divisible. For example the basic units of hard science are mass, length and time; all other units are derived.
dk: What people know (or don’t know) about gravity is completely dependent upon human perception and judgment. Science is unable to distinguish the appearance from the essence of gravity, though can ascertain the two are distinct.
dk: - No, I’ve gone to great lengths to demonstrate that the intellect is predisposed to know, hence justifies self-evident assumptions to perfect itself by rendering nonsense INTO intelligible by imposing concepts, ideas and structure. Clearly concepts, ideas and structures don’t exist in the real world, but are authored by the intellect to explain reality.
dk: - I’m making a distinction between reason and intellect such that: reason distinguishes sensual things; Intellect renders sensible things intelligible by imposing concepts, ideas and structure.

Definition: cognitive science : the scientific study of knowledge and how it is acquired, combining elements of philosophy, psychology, linguistics, anthropology, and artificial intelligence (Encarta® World English Dictionary [North American Edition] ©). How does an abstraction differ from a cognitive processes?

If cognition is a science then abstraction is a necessary object of the inquiry. I believe this falls under the category of the Hard Questions that give rise to circular arguments. Any exposition of relevancy must overcome the difficulties raised by the proposition of cognitive science. For example: “What is Strong AI?”, “What are the elementals of Strong AI?”, “What is human Intelligence”, “How does Strong AI differ from human intelligence?”, “How is machine intelligence analogous to human intelligence”, and “In what sense is Strong AI perfected?” “

None of the questions are an obstacle to cognitive sciences, Why? Whatever assumptions are necessary to a coherent explanation are simply asserted. If a new and better paradigm comes along, then a completely new set of assumptions are constructed. Science like the human intellect is predisposed to know, and knowledge follows from judgments of the active intellect that renders intelligibles from nonsense. If intelligence is denied access to self-evident assumptions then the philosophy of science is an obstacle to intelligence; which is an absurdity. Self evident assumptions can’t be proven true or false, but when denied they render knowledge absurd.
dk: - You’re certainly entitled to your opinion. Statements that appeal to popular opinion like, “since the only reason anyone thinks there can be such a thing as "objective morality …” demonstrate the fallacy of Ad populum. Your appeal to popular opinion makes you the kettle calling the pot black.
dk: Gravity, electromagnetism, the strong, and the weak forces underlie the science of physics, and are objective and universal. To deny the existence or validity of the necessary underlying axioms, propositions and mathematics is an absurdity. The basis for non-theistic morality is human nature. People are rational social creatures that share a common lineage. Individuals of the species are complex and unique but share the same strengths and weaknesses across a wide spectrum. Your non-sequitur comment is absurd.
quote:
dk: - If you can’t define “it”, then why bring it up. This is absurd.
dk: - I just explained your destiny doesn’t preclude one’s participation. I didn’t imply anything. You asked, “How does one participate in their destiny?” I answered, “By working with volition towards some goal”. I said nothing about existence independent of life. People work. People have self-will (volition). People have reason. People have intellect. People have life. People can direct their actions (work) towards a self-determined goal, and in doing so participate in their destiny. It’s a matter of prerogative.
dk: To deny a self-evident assumption poses an absurdity. Does music play the musician? Does a statue carve the sculptor? Does a cabinet build a carpenter? In a philosophical sense I mean..
---
In modern philosophy (as in modern usage in general) the notion of cause is associated with the idea of something's producing or bringing about something else (its effect); a relation sometimes called 'efficient causation'. Historically, the term 'cause' has a broader sense, equivalent to 'explanatory feature'. This usage survives in the description of Aristotle as holding 'the doctrine of the four causes'. The members of Aristotle's quartet, the material, formal, efficient, and final cause, correspond to four kinds of explanation. But only the efficient cause is unproblematically a candidate for a cause that produces something distinct from itself.
--- <a href="http://www.xrefer.com/entry/551556" target="_blank">Causality: The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, © </a>
dk: You asked, ‘How does one "participate" in their "destiny"?’ You also asked a second and third question but they were incoherent. I answered your first question, and you snipped my answer.
dk: - If you’ve demonstrated anything it is incoherence. For example, you seem unable to distinguish between destiny & predestination or cause & effect.
dk: - The relevancy follows from the topic “non-theistic morality”. People are rational social creatures unsuited by nature to immoral conduct.
dk: - I mean what I said. For example Hitler, Stalin, Mao, etc… were degenerates, though as far as I know they didn’t suffer any congenital defects.
dk: - Morality regulates conduct, hence is fundamentally coercive, while virtue and vice are consonant with a person’s character. They are interdependent because morality informs the conscience about virtue and vice. The objectivity of morality follows from human nature, and virtue follows suit.
dk: Aren’t we the sensitive one.
dk: - Definition 4. PHILOSOPHY act of will: an act of will distinguished from the intended physical movement it causes: (Encarta® World English Dictionary [North American Edition] ©).

I’m not sure what you mean by association, I suspect you’re quoting from Hume’s doctrine, “reason is a slave to passion.” My position is that Hume was wrong in every sense. Martin Luther King said, I paraphrase, “civil unrest is cause by social injustice not protesters”. The cause of social injustice in this instance was de jure racial segregation ordered by the Supreme Court (Plessy v. Ferguson) under the policy of “Separate but Equal”. Jim Crow laws were immoral because by fiat they denied the human nature of black people.
dk: - Really, history offers several very passionate examples of mob violence. By all accounts people have been trampled and crushed to death because somebody yelled, “fire”, in a crowed theatre. People’s passions can overwhelm their reason. Reasonable people would have calmly and safely walked out, precisely because they understood the greatest threat to their life wasn’t the fire but a mob mentality.
dk: - According to human nature.
dk: - Survival and social justice are matters of the gravest moral concern. One need only examine the unbridled passions that carried people into harms way in the riots, wars, and peacetime carnage of the 20th Century. Clearly nationalism and idealism pose an eminent threat to people. Hitler set the entire world afire fanning the passions of the German people.
dk: - If survival is subjective then nothing else makes any sense.
dk: - I’m not sure what votes have to do with objective morality, except that people with an informed conscience tend to elect reasonable people to represent them. On this line utilitarianism and pragmatism have their merits but fail to address issues of dignity essential to objective morality. The danger of democracy follows from corrupt demagogues and charismatic leaders that harness the passions of constituents with escalatory rhetoric to overwhelm reason with conviction. Clearly the primary means employed by corrupt leaders are indoctrination, propaganda and deceit. Even reasonable constituents offended by fallacious arguments can loose all confidence in reason, and give into unbridled passions. After a brutal defeat in WW II the German people almost universally recognized the true folly of fascism and Arian Superiority. The German people were happy to condemn NAZISM for the light of reason that makes charity, hope and faith possible.
dk: – Reprehension is a reaction to shocking behavior, shocking behavior isn’t necessarily moral. I know several people that displayed reprehension at a pig roasted in a pit, yet love to eat bacon.
dk: - I’m not sure it is reasonable or necessary to present such warped circumstances. I'd be in camp about 15 minutes without a source of clean drinking water. For example MPBE gasoline additives are mandated by the EPA to clean the air by polluting the water table. Their are plenty of other examples to demonstrate how people’s passions are turned unreasonable against them.
When people are subjugated by their passions then reason becomes a worthless slave. It’s objectively immoral for a corporation or outdoor camping expedition to expose their members to foul water or dehydration. Whether the goal is industrial or recreational a healthy productive membership requires adequate shelter, water and clothing. Morality regulates conduct to perfect the rational nature of people. There is no conflict because people are by nature rational creatures. To isolate a willful act from context is pretext. You’ve essentially defined willful actions solely upon pretext to deny the individual their personal goals and purposes. The scheme is fallacious because actions communicate a person’s intentions, the pretext of an “innate [im]moral act” deprives the individual of intent and purpose, hence denigrates the actor to an automaton. This might be efficient for filling in truth tables but is an offense to rational creatures.
dk: - The number of posts in this thread would indicate otherwise. A baby is born with potential and act, but in any rational sense is completely selfish, dependent and helpless. As the infant matures they perfect their rational nature to become a moral agent (principle of finality) with the capacity to materialize their goals i.e. to participate in their destiny by materializing their potential. I haven’t mentioned emotions, appetites or instincts because they are harnessed by reason to actualize potential to make life good. Naturally there are limits to reason that account for the many moral dilemmas and gray areas. Still people are rational creatures ill suited to unbridled emotions, appetites and instincts.
dk: - About as subjective as carcinogens, slow acting poisons, yelling fire in a crowed movie theatre and social injustice.
dk: - A person with a passion might hurl themselves naked off the top of the Sears Tower to protest some social injustice. To actually jump off the Sears Tower the individual must overcome their rational nature. Afterwards egg heads might argue the moral and ethical merits of the 7 second solo flight after the splatter corpse was scrapped off Wacker Drive. A triumph of passion over reason? I’m sure Hume would make the case as the media glorified the triumph of passion over reason. While this scenario may seem absurd, after September 11 the reality surely hits home. Was it a passion for justice that drove commercial airliners into the Twin Towers and Pentagon? No, it was people that employed reason to serve their passions as a “means to an ends”. The ideological deployment of people as a “means to an ends” appeals to one’s passions. The terrorists of 9-11 make the point that people aren’t a “means to an ends”, and that jurisdiction of morality reaches out beyond all geographic borders to impact all people.
dk: On June 03, 2002 09:20 AM Koyaanisqatsi posted “Once again, the only possible way in which an action can be considered "objectively moral or immoral" is if there can be established an innate quality of "wrong" or "rightness" within the action "itself," independent of human perceptions/existence.” To state the argument in the form modes tollens form:
P: objective morality is valid
Q: objective morality is independent of perception/existence

• If P then Q
• ~Q
• therefore not ~P.

The proposition: “objective morality is independent of perception/existence” poses an absurdity, an absurdity you interject as a straw man (having nothing to do with anything I’ve said ). Descartes began the rational modern philosophical inquiry with the undoubtable premise, “I think therefore I am”.
---
Can I be wrong about my existence?
Is my existence reasonable?
-
Ans: I’m right about my existence because reason demands it.
----
By golly I just made a moral judgment that justified my existence from reason. Undoubtedly morality is dependent upon a rational human nature that rightfully exists. My existence and rational nature are objectively drawn from the tree of human lineage; and therefore is the basis of non-theistic objective morality that regulates the conduct of all human beings.
dk: - I can’t imagine a situation or circumstance where human knowledge doesn’t comment on human nature. Please offer some support for the comment “gibberish”. For example even the gibberish of an infant reflects upon human nature, and as such has become a matter of intense scientific study in the field of human development. Why? To perfect people’s rational nature. Makes sense to me.
dk: - I mean that the rational nature of human beings evokes moral constraints, and that dogs are naturally unfettered by moral constraints.
dk: - “confusion of syntax”? as in “bad syntax”. You crack me up. Please frame your comments to specify a technical reference, for example are you technically speaking about traditional logic, propositional calculus, higher order logic, predicate calculus, natural deduction,,, etc.? Otherwise I have no idea what you’re talking about. Throughout this thread I have tried to structure my comments conversationally with traditional logic, and to draw conclusions from a single premise wherever possible.
dk: - I just explained.
dk: - I endeavored to explain why self-evident assumptions (axioms) are a logical necessity. Can you tell me why self-evident assumptions are non-sequiturs?
The term “absurdity” describes a premise that renders knowledge unintelligible. For example the premise, “Women are irrational creatures”, is an absurdity i.e. all the insights by women about women are rendered unintelligible.
dk: - You can’t test or even sample an uncountable number of “unknowns”, so without axioms you can’t demonstrate anything. Think man, your explanation is an absurdity!!!!
Mechanics and Mathematics are two distinct sciences that work from different data sets with different instruments. I was referencing (not analogizing) the method of logic, not the application of logic.
dk: - Yeh, Yeh, Yeh, Sherlock Holmes concluded from the evidence it was the “butler”, but only in the fallacious universe of Kaya does a logical necessity infer “all butlers are murders”. Objective morality concludes murder to be wrong, but only in the fallacious universe of Kaya does a logical necessity require all homicides be murder.
dk: I never mentioned anything about a moral necessity, the objectivity of non-theistic morality is a logical necessity drawn from the rational nature of people.
dk: - You’re like a spoiled kid asking mommy a question, if mommy doesn’t give the right answer you throw a tantrum.
[quote]Koyaanisqatsi: - ME: All you're talking about is establishing moral principles based upon what should or should not be considered necessary conduct to regulate.
That is unquestionably a subjectively applied morality, dependent entirely upon group consensus.
dk: - No that’s not what I’m not talking about at all. I’m talking about the rational nature of people, and perfecting human nature by regulating conduct with reason. Clearly all societies regulate human conduct, but not all regulations are reasonable (moral); nor does every action carry a moral or immoral judgment.
dk: - Institutions founded on principles of genocide, racial purity, slavery, eugenics, and fascism were condemned at the Nuremberg Trials as universal crimes against humanity. That’s as good a place as any to establish the existence of objective morality. Today in the post modernist world these moral truths are being challenged again, as they were challenged in ethnic wars, religious wars, national wars, and ideological wars. The new reality in year 2002 sinks with the technology of mutually assured destruction. Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons give despots the power to destroy 100s of millions of people. Political terrorists are justified even glorified to use commercial technology and suicide bombers to randomly murder thousands of working people. The threat of global warming threatens and challenges every person on the planet. The population rate of Western civilization has fallen below replacement levels (Western Europe, USA, Australia and Canada). Less than 1% of the earths population consumes 95% of the wealth. I think a person has to be blind, deaf and dumb not to recognize the eminent threat posed by the normalization, nominalization and nihilizatoin of objective morals truths. Everybody on the planet is threatened by demagogues, rogue nations, international terrorists, disenfranchised communities, environmental degradation and opportunistic opinion makers. Not only does every person on the planet share a rational nature, they also suffer uniformly under a global threat of mass destruction.

Moral and ethical coherence and clarity haven’t kept pace with new paradigms technology presents. It is quite evident that post modernist democracies have been working overtime to subjugate moral and ethical concerns to service technology for political capital. This is pure and simple demagoguery. In the:

• 1960s LSD, marijuana and a war to win the peace was going to fix everybody
• 1970s sexual equality, peaceful protest and de jure integration was going to fix everybody
• 1980s social responsibility, supply side economics and military power was going to fix everybody
• 1990s computers, government spending and the Internet were going to fix everybody
• 2000 standardized tests, compassionate conservatism, and the war on terrorism will fix everybody.

Its all bunk, people are rational creatures and the only reasonable way to fix people is to perfect their rational nature. Non-theistic morality regulates conduct to perfect human nature. Only a moral person is capable of acting or reacting to the “uncreated truth” the future presents to each new generation.
dk: - Well you pegged me with, “here we go…”
Koyaanisqatsi: NON SEQUITUR.
dk: I’m going to criticize your “non sequitur” response as anything but self evident. Let me begin the argument.
Tautology as an explanation of reality is unsatisfactory to science. The drug LSD makes a person hallucinate, hence is given a hallucinatory-inducing property, this forms a tautology. The new form really doesn’t explain anything, hence dooms science to a mundane exercise of creating endless forms and words without any real meaning. The proposed cure arose from two competing theories: 1) dynamism (material things are active with internal forces) and 2) mechanism (material things are passive only acted upon by external forces). Life presented a problem for dynamism and mechanism because living organism presents “vital” properties that don’t exist in lifeless matter, hence are governed by unknowns. For example the mind-body problem and the identity theory of mind. To overcome the difficulty, abracadabra, vitalism presupposes that “vital” phenomena can’t be explained by the laws that govern lifeless matter. So what we have is psychology and sociology deriving their basis from biology, biology deriving its basis from chemistry and physics, and chemistry and physics deriving a basis from a conundrum of materialism, dynamism, and vitalism.

A fair criticism of the non-sequitur tautology.
The Scientific method systematically reduces the complex (final reality) to the simple (antecedent reality). The antecedent thing (reality) serves to explain the final thing (reality).

What of lifeless things, or the nature of a Lifeless Things (LT)

<ol type="1">[*]Does the antecedent LT serves to explain the final LT? The explanation alludes that the nature of a final LT rests solely upon terms of the antecedent LT. The nature of the explanation puts the final LT in terms of the antecedent LT to describe an ends unto itself. The end of a final LT is merely the ends to which it tends. Therefore the antecedent LT merely states a new form of the final LT which is of course a tautology, not an explanation.[*]Does the development of a LT explain the final LT by reduction? The developmental antecedent of a final LT doesn’t reveal anything about the internal structures or functions by which the final LT operates, nor does it explain how the final LT acts towards its end. The developmental antecedent LT therefore merely presents a new from of tautology, not an explanation.[*]To overcome the tautology evident in 1 and 2 requires science to banish the ends and the development of a final LT from systemization because they simply pose new tautologies, not an explanation.[*]So what is left for science to proceed upon? An unknown can only be explained by reduction of what is known, to explain the complex in simple terms. Science must continue to reduce each new complexity to the simple until it reduces the final LT to quantum’s of motion and mass (length, time, mass). Only then can science finally explain a LT.[/list=a]

What of Life Sciences, or the study of Vital Phenomena (VP) necessary to govern life


<ol type="1">[*]Life sciences require an explanation of life in terms of LT by the method of reduction i.e. such that complex unknowns (VP) are rendered intelligible by an explanation of what is known (LT).[*]The Life Sciences require an explanation that avoids the fruitless tautology presented by unknown VPs, on the probability that the unknown(VP) reduces to a known(LT).[*]Final problem. The science of LT (the known) explains matter as motion and mass with mathematical formulas. Mathematics is a science detached from reality, hence can only yield an idea of quantity, absent the reality of quantity.[/list=a]
Conclusion: your non-sequitur rejoinder is provisional and tautological, and therefore misleading.

[ June 13, 2002: Message edited by: dk ]</p>

bd-from-kg

99percent:

[Sorry for the late reply; life has gotten extremely hectic lately.]

I was wrong. I have no idea where you’re coming from. So this reply is necessarily disconnected. I can’t “connect the dots” to infer a coherent moral philosophy from the things you’ve said. Maybe you can help.

It seems from this answer that what you mean by “objective” morality is what is generally called absolute morality, and that you subscribe to a deontological view. But this isn’t entirely clear. For example:

Here it seems that you want to have it both ways. You want to say that the “rightness” of an act depends on its intrinsic nature (e.g., telling the truth vs. lying), but that it also depends on its consequences (whether it produces “true” happiness). Unfortunately this only seems tenable if one invents polite fictions like distinguishing between “true” happiness (the kind of happiness produced by “virtuous” acts) and other happiness, which isn’t “really” happiness no matter how much it may feel like it to the person experiencing it.

This doesn’t work. In the real world there is no special “flavor” of happiness that can only be obtained by being a moral person. (For example, when I read to my three-year-old granddaughter, she enjoys it immensely in spite of the fact that she didn’t “earn” this happiness by being “virtuous”. In general, it is simply not true that being virtuous always leads to more happiness than being “wicked”. If this were so, there would be no need for morality; such a miraculous correspondence between “moral-ought” and “practical-ought” would be noticed by everyone, and almost everyone would draw the obvious lesson that it’s always in one’s interest to be virtuous.

But even if it were true that being virtuous always leads to more “true” happiness than any alternative, you would still have a dilemma: is an act morally right because of its intrinsic nature (and it’s just a happy coincidence that in our world “virtuous” acts always happen to be in the agent’s best interest), or is it morally right because of its consequences (and it’s just a happy coincidence that in our world the choice with the best consequences is always the most “virtuous” one)? The only other possibility is that there is some mysterious metaphysical principle that makes it logically necessary that these two senses of “morally right” must always coincide (i.e., have the same extension).

By the way, it makes no sense to say that the intrinsic nature of an act can depend on the happiness or unhappiness it causes. Consequences depend on causal laws, which (as Alonzo is fond of pointing out) are contingent. A contingent relationship with something else is not an intrinsic property of a thing.

I have no idea what you’re trying to say here.

First, I’m not so sure that this is the fundamental reason for your rejection of consequentialist theories. It appears to me that the basic reason is that such theories make it practically impossible to formulate universally valid moral principles. They imply that on rare occasions it may be “right” even to murder your grandmother to collect an inheritance.

Second, as you point out, it is indeed impossible to know in advance with certainty what the consequences of an act will be, so consequentialist theories imply that one cannot know in advance which choice is “morally right”. Two comments about this:

A. It does not follow from the fact that it is impossible in principle to know whether X is true that there is no objective truth regarding X. For example, it may be impossible in principle for us to know whether there is life on the tenth planet circling Betelgeuse. (Even if scientists from this planet sent a signal telling of their existence which was reaching Earth right now, it would tell us only that there was [probably] life there when the signal was sent – about 310 years ago - not whether there is life there now.) But it is either objectively true or false that there is life on this planet.

B. Some philosophers have argued that it is the consequences that are most probable or which a reasonably person could be expected to anticipate or foresee which determine the “rightness” of an act. But I think that this confuses two distinct issues: whether an act is right, and whether the agent should be praised or blamed for doing it. If there is every reason to think that the consequences of a given choice will be “better” than those of any alternative, but actually turn out to be catastrophic, it seems to me to be more natural to say that he made the wrong choice, but that he is not to blame (and often should be praised) for making it. But this has always seemed to me to be an argument about language, not about morality per se.

I’m still mystified as to why you think so. Are you saying that the psychological effects that our actions will have on children are irrelevant to whether they’re right or wrong? If so, what exactly is wrong with statutory rape? Is a priest who seduces an altar boy doing anything wrong? Is it more wrong than having an affair with a woman from another town? If so, why?

Are you serious?

You don’t. Like most decisions in real life, you guess and hope you’re right. But as I pointed out above, the fact of uncertainty doesn’t mean that there’s no “objectively right” decision. What if the patient really is in agonizing pain? Are you saying that it would not be objectively right to relieve the pain? I’m truly bewildered.

It would be nice if we could always know for certain what we morally-ought to do, just as it would be nice if we could always know for certain what we practical-ought to do, or for that matter what is really the case, or what will happen tomorrow. But the real world was not designed for our convenience. We just have to muddle through as best we can.

From the general tone of your replies here, I take it that your answer is that there is no way to determine this, even roughly, and that therefore the infliction any amount of pain is morally irrelevant. since the question here is how much pain is morally acceptable, not how much is occurring this would seem to apply to anyone, not just to a patient unable to communicate. (After all, what communication would have any bearing on whether a given amount of pain is morally acceptable?)

If you really believe that the infliction of pain, no matter how great, is of no moral consequence, your thinking in this area is so alien to mine that we probably have little of interest to say to one another.

Why ever not? If a person who is flat-out insane should be permitted to make life-and-death decisions on his own behalf [see below], why not an eight-year-old?

As I said, it seems obvious to me that neither children nor the insane should be able to make such decisions, but your position looks to me to be clearly inconsistent.

Huh? The well-being of a madman is certainly not going to come from his rational desire to be well. Does that mean that it is objectively right to ignore his well-being? Once again your thinking here is beyond my comprehension.

I can only assume that you are young and have very little experience of real life. My aunt tried to kill herself. Fortunately the people who dealt with the situation did not share your moral philosophy. Instead, what happened was that usually happens in this situation. She was hospitalized for a short time and counseled during that time. Also, her many friends and relatives visited here and made it clear how important she was to them and how upset they would be if she were to die. (In fact, in many cases I’m sure they overdid it.) After being released she didn’t try to kill herself again. Of course, this sort of thing doesn’t always work, but it often does. In any case it’s worth a try. If the desire is really transient it usually works; otherwise it generally doesn’t. Suppose the folks at the hospital had said “Too bad you failed. Here’s how to do it right next time” and then released her immediately. Or suppose they had refused to treat her in the first place on the grounds that this would be interfering with her clear desire and intent? Would that have been more “humane”?

I’m baffled. Do you mean that there are objective moral judgments and non-objective moral judgments? In what sense is a non-objective moral judgment a moral judgment as opposed to a personal, subjective preference? Do these sometimes apply to the same act?

I’m also perplexed about why you call such judgments non-objective. For example, suppose that a father beats his one-year-old daughter to within an inch of her life because she got sick and vomited on the sofa. Are you saying that such an act is not objectively wrong?

And everything else is unimportant? It doesn’t matter if you inflict psychological torment on your family, deliberately destroy friendships by means of lies and deceit, or otherwise cause misery and hatred by means that can’t practically be regulated by laws?

Once again I’m baffled. Empathy is quite frequently used both as the basis for laws and in deciding how to apply it in particular cases. Why is this wrong?

Now as to your new argument regarding slavery:

I thought that your moral philosophy was based entirely on survival. You devoted a good bit of verbiage to trying to show that survival is objectively good. I have yet to see a single line even purporting to show (purely from facts about the real world) that happiness is objectively good.

Besides, treating happiness as an intrinsic good seems inconsistent with your rejection of empathy as a basis for objective morality. What do you think empathy is all about?

No, it’s not at all self-evident. Nor is it self-evident that it undermines reason.

Besides, this whole argument hinges on the claim that slavery undermines the slave’s happiness. According to it, the reason that slavery’s effect on volition is “bad” is solely that this effect in turn affects the slave’s ability to reason. And that this effect is “bad” is solely because of its effect on the slave’s happiness.

But earlier we had the following exchange:

It appears that you’ve done a 180 here. Originally the “wrongness” of slavery had nothing to do with the happiness or unhappiness of the slaves; now it has everything to do with it.

If you want to continue this discussion, please (at a minimum):

(1) Define what you mean by “objective morality”.
(2) Explain whether you think that the “rightness” of an action depends ultimately on its consequences, or on its intrinsic nature, or on something else.
(3) Explain what you mean by saying that happiness is a self-evident moral premise, but that objective morality cannot be based on empathy.

[ June 13, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]</p>

bd-from-kg

Alonzo Fyfe:

In this post I want to reply to two of your shorter posts: the second one from June 9 and the one from June 10. (I’ll get to your longer June 9 post soon.)

Reply to June 9 post:

This comment illustrates the profound difference between our positions as well as anything. I do not consider that morality is ultimately about facts. Moral theories can agree completely about the facts, yet still differ radically.

But as it happens, our theories do “posit” very significant differences regarding factual questions. Among other things, I hold that there is a natural interpretation of moral language such that the most majority of what ordinary people say when they discuss moral questions is meaningful, and a great deal of it is true.

But this is a pretty important distinction, isn’t it? I say that a fully rational agent with sufficient K&U would “do the right thing”; you say that he would do the right thing if he happens to be so inclined. It’s like the difference between saying that Bill Gates will give me a million dollars if I ask him to, and saying that Bill Gates will give me a million dollars if I ask him to and he happens to want to.

And you don’t. This is a huge difference. In my theory the definition of “should” and other moral terms is natural and non-arbitrary in a very important sense; in yours it’s completely arbitrary.

I think that what you’re saying is that the property of being “morally right” has approximately the same extension in our two theories. Whether this is true depends in large part on your answers to the four questions I posed at the end of my June 4 post. So far you’ve answered only the fourth, and that answer does not bode well for how well we agree on the question of what actions are “morally right”. But in any case, we disagree profoundly on what it means to say that an action is morally right, so any agreement is entirely superficial.

Let’s say that Charles uses the term “public school” to refer to any public building used primarily for the purposes of education, while Donald uses it to refer to any public building with the word “school” in its official name. It may well be true that in the great majority of cases Charles and Donald will “agree” as to whether a given building is a “public school”, but the agreement is purely superficial because they mean entirely different things by the term.

Reply to June 10 post:

This is a misunderstanding. The question I actually described as “key” was this:

The reason that I consider this question key is that it goes to the central question that I intended to address in the “interview” post, namely whether your moral theory could reasonably be described as “objective”.

As I made clear above, I do not regard “What shall I do[/i]?” as the key question addressed by moral philosophy. But I do think that this question has a vital relationship to moral philosophy. To say that calling an act “morally right” means simply that it corresponds to some relationship between desires and consequences, and that what relationship of this kind it shall be used to describe is simply a question of how to facilitate communication most efficiently, is not a “moral theory”; it is a repudiation of the whole concept of morality. In fact, you have said so yourself many times. You have concluded that the very concept of morality, as it is commonly understood, is basically meaningless, in the same way that a discussion of which Greek god is really the tallest is meaningless, and have therefore chosen to use moral terminology in a completely different way from the way it is normally used - one which is completely divorced from the question “What shall I do?”

I suspect that most of those who have been reading your posts still do not fully understand how you use terms such as “morally right”. Many moralists (such as classical utilitarians) have argued that actions are “morally right” if they satisfy a criterion more or less like yours (i.e., an “all-things-considered” criterion of one kind or another), but they have meant that as a matter of fact acts that have the property of being “morally right” (and only such acts) satisfy this criterion. By contrast, you do not claim that your criterion is an attempt to “point to” some moral property – i.e., some property that has some actual relationship to the question “what shall I do?” - by defining the acts that have it; the only property that you assert that acts satisfying your criterion have in common is that they satisfy the criterion. As G.E. Moore pointed out, this makes the question “Is it really true that all actions, and only those actions, which satisfy this criterion are morally right?” meaningless in the same way that the question “Do all triangles really have three sides?” is meaningless.

But this makes your criterion completely arbitrary – i.e., completely divorced from the question of “What shall I do?” That is, there is no objective reason to regard the fact that an action is “morally right” under your criterion as a reason for doing it, any more than there is an objective reason to regard the fact that it is “morally right” under some other criterion, such as the fact that it will make members of the KKK very happy, as a reason for doing it. You might consider it a reason for you to do something, just as a member of the KKK might consider the latter fact to be a reason for him to do something. But the one reason is not “objectively better” than the other, except in the sense that you can define “better” in terms of either definition of “morally right”, in which case each reason is “objectively better” than the other in terms of the corresponding definition.

But this is exactly what most people mean by “subjective morality”. Lots of subjective moral theories define “morally right” in such a way that it can be objectively determined (in principle) whether a given act is “morally right”. The question is whether there is an objective way to choose between all of these definitions of “morally right” which is not itself derived from one of those definitions (thus making that definition judge and jury in its own favor). If you can’t show that there is such a way to choose between definitions of “morally right” which does not beg the question, you must admit that your theory is just another subjective moral theory.

This is not a “refutation” of your theory; it may well be the case that there is no objective morality. My point is rather that you’re flying under false colors: representing a subjective moral theory as an objective one.

[ June 14, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]</p>

Alonzo Fyfe

BD:

I think I'll try a slight change of strategy, taken from the mock interview. Instead of answering the question I think you are asking, I will answer more than one interpretation of the question in the hopes that one of them will be correct.

I think that what you're saying is that the property of being "morally right" has approximately the same extension in our two theories.


This depends on whether you take the word "extension" to be the same as "reference." Your example of the "public school" suggests it does.

In the example you provide, both meanings have a reference which happens to be very similar. Yet, one of my criticisms I have of your theory is that your moral terms either do not have a reference at all or do not have the reference you think it does.

Perhaps a better example to illustrate what I was trying to say is this:

Let's say that Charles uses the term "UFO" to mean "flying saucer (a.k.a. alien spaceship)." The idea that such a meaning is possible can be illustrated by the person who thinks a skeptic may answer the question "Do you believe in UFOs" by saying "No." When Donald uses the term "UFO", he means "unidentified flying objects". Donald happens to believe that all UFOs can be explained as mundane events.

Both of them create a filing cabinet called "UFOs", and both of them fill their filing cabinets with folders of examples. Both filing cabinets end up having almost identical contents.

Is it correct to say that both "UFO" terms have the same "extension"? Well, if we mean that they refer to nearly the same real world objects, the answer is "no." Alien spaceships are not phenomena that can be as mundane events,

But, if by "extension" we mean the set of objects that each person would identify as fulfilling his requirements (in this example, the set of folders that one would put in a file cabinet), then the answer would be "yes, both terms have the same extension."


Whether this is true depends in large part on your answers to the four questions I posed at the end of my June 4 post.

Not really. In answering your 4 questions I will not be saying anything about the cases you will put into your file cabinet or the cases I would put in mine. Instead, I am describing the cases I would put in your file cabinet.

But, if it would make you happy...


(1) In the case of an irrational person, does you theory "count" the desires that he would have if he were rational as opposed to the ones he does have?

No real-world reference. Rationality has to do with beliefs, not desires. The desires that a person would end up with are the same desires he would start with. Of course, the desires he starts with do count.

Note: Whatever phenomena causes the improvement in rationality may cause a change in desires. In which case, those desires that will exist count, those desires that will not exist do not count, and those desires that might exist count according to the probability that they will exist.


(2) Does it count only desires for "final" ends?

Yes


(3) Does it count future desires whose existence is contingent on the choice in question?

Those desires that will exist count, those desires that will not exist do not count, and those desires that might exist count according to the probability that they will exist.


(4) Does it count desires that would exist if someone had more knowledge and understanding?

No real-world reference. Knowledge and understanding have to do with beliefs, not desires; no change of desires is entailed by an increase in knowledge and understanding.

[Same caveats about desires caused to come into being apply.]


...That is, there is no objective reason to regard the fact that an action is "morally right" under your criterion as a reason for doing it,

This has 146,212.6 possible meanings. For many of those meanings, I think this is true. Yet, there is one meaning for which this is false.


First, I need to take care of an ambiguity. "Morally right" could mean either "morally permissible" (as in "not immoral"), or "morally obligatory". If it means "morally permissible," then it is clearly false that the fact that something is "morally right" is not a reason to do it. I have no reason to go to the store right now, but it is morally permissible for me to do so.

So, the concern is whether "the fact that an action is morally obligatory is a reason for doing it."


Second, there is an additional amibuity over the phrase "objective reason." The only reasons that exist for or against doing an action is that it fulfills a desire - directly or indirectly. Desires are mental states. If, by "objective reason" you mean "mind-independent reason" then there are no objective reasons for doing anything. In this sense of the term, I am a complete subjectivist.

But even though value (including moral value) depends in an essential way on mental states, different mental states are treated differently.

If X believes that P, then X believes that "P" is true. And "P" is true if and only if P. P, itself, is independent of the belief that P. An objective belief is one where "P" is true is independent of whether X believes that P.

We can try to look at desires the same way -- that a desire that P is justified in terms of P having a desire-independent goodness in the same way that a belief that P is justified in terms of "P" having a belief-independent truth.

Yet, even here, a type of desire-independent value exists. If we constrain desire-dependence too narrowly we get agent-desire-dependence, where no value exists independent of a particular agent's desire. This is too narrow; other agents exists and those agents have desires. Most (almost all) desire-dependent value is not agent-desire-dependent value, because the agent's own desires are not the only desires that exist.

However, there is a second type of objectivity, this being the belief-objectivity that I discussed at the start of this part. Values, though they are desire-dependent (and, thus, desire-subjective), are belief-independent (thus belief-objective). This means that value claims (X is good) are capable of being objectively true or false.

Given this wide range of possibilities, what are you looking for in your quest for an "objective reason." If you are looking for a belief-objective reason, these exist. If you are looking for an agent-desire-independent reason, these exist. But if you are looking for a desire-independent reason (broadly defined), they do not exist.


Third, I need to apply the same analysis above for "objective reason" to "a reason for doing it."

If we want to limit our discussion to things that are true in the real world, then there is only one family of entities in the real world which can count as a "reason for doing it," and that is desires. Desires are the only entities that exist that are tied to actions in the right way. All human intentional action is aimed ultimately at a particular end that has value for the agent, and desires are the sole real-world entity that assigns values to ends and controls human action towards those ends.

Given that the only reasons that exist are desire-dependent, in asking about "a reason for doing it" one must be asking about "a desire that is fulfilled by doing it". If you are talking about something else, then your "reason for doing it" is a fiction and you are not talking about anything of real-world importance.

But this then leads to the question, whose desire?

This leads to a second ambiguity. Are you asking whether the agent has a reason for doing the action? This is true if there is some proposition P true of the action where the agent desires that P (or some consequent of P). Or are you asking if the action will fulfill a desire without specifying whose desires we are interested in. This is true if P is true of the action where somebody (not necessarily the agent) desires that P (or some consequent of P).

So, now, let's look at your statement: "...there is no objective reason to regard the fact that an action is "morally [obligatory]" under your criterion as a reason for doing it,"

There is one plausible interpretation in which this is false. To say that an action is "morally obligatory" is to say that all of the reasons that exist for performing the action outweigh all of the reasons that exist against performing the action. So, there is a strong and necessary connection between what is morally obligatory and what there exists a reason to do. Furthermore, the proposition that "The reasons for doing action X far outweigh the reasons against doing action X" is objectively true independent of whether anybody believes it to be true or not. And is objectively true regardless of whether any specific person desires it to be true or not.

Does "a reason for doing it" mean a desire-independent reason? No such reasons exist. I am a subjectivist.

Does "a reason for doing it" mean a belief-independent reason? Then, sure, such a reason exists. I am an objectivist.

Does "a reason for doing it" mean an agent-desire-independent reason? These exist. I am an objectivist.


Now...


That is, there is no objective reason to regard the fact that an action is "morally [obligatory]" under your criterion as a reason for doing it, any more than there is an objective reason to regard the fact that it is "morally right" under some other criterion, such as the fact that it will make members of the KKK very happy, as a reason for doing it.

Again, the translation.

An action is morally obligatory under my criterion if the reasons that exist for performing an action far outweigh the reasons that exist for not performing the action.

The existence of these reasons is belief-objective.

There are, indeed, belief-objective reasons that exist recommending the actions that I call "morally obligatory" over what the KKK call "morally obligatory", these being the desires of the KKKs victims. They exist regardless of whether you or I or any KKK member believe that they exist. They even exist regardless of whether you or I desire that they exist. They exist as reasons to oppose the KKKs actions regardless.


The question is whether there is an objective way to choose between all of these definitions of "morally right" which is not itself derived from one of those definitions (thus making that definition judge and jury in its own favor). If you can’t show that there is such a way to choose between definitions of "morally right" which does not beg the question, you must admit that your theory is just another subjective moral theory.

Once again, there is no objective way to choose between definitions in any field. You can't objectively choose between definitions of "atom". You cannot objectively choose between definitions of "objective". You cannot objectively choose between definitions of "=". If this is your criterion for objectivity, everything from chemistry to logic to math is subjective.

In which case, it is true that my theory is just another subjective moral theory, just like every theory in chemistry, physics, astronomy, logic, and math is just another subjective theory. Because they, too, cannot answer the challenge to provide an objective way to choose among definitions.

Try to put this objection into terms that does not end up implying that every proposition within a language is subjective. To do this, it is not sufficient to argue that the terms are arbitrary. It requires that some substantive conclusion depends on the terms used such that, using a different term yields different conclusions (as opposed to the same conclusions stated using different words).

You may want to call my theory subjective because the motivational force for doing the right thing must come from the agent's own desires. The motivational force for doing any action must come from the agent's own desires. That is because only his desires reside in his brain and only his brain is connected to his muscles in the right way. So there is no such thing as an objective morality is by this you mean a morality capable of motivating a person independent of his own desires.

You may want to call my theory subjective because it allows for no desire-independent value. All value depends on the existence of mental states; without mental states, there is no value. So, all value is desire-subjective. And I see no hope for an objective morality under this definition.

I have freely admitted that there are definitions of "subjective" where it is true that my theory is subjective.

Yet, there remains one very important way in which this theory is objective, and this is the sense that I have in mind when I say it is objective. None of the propositions contained within the theory are a matter of opinion -- the truth of falsity of every proposition P within the theory is independent of any belief that P.

And nothing in the theory depends on what anything is called. If you can actually find anything in the theory where it is the case that "If _____ is called 'X', then P, but if ______ is called Y, then not-P", please bring it to my attention. It would be a flaw.

Ultimately, this is the same type of objectivity that every scientific theory aims for. If my theory ends up being no more objective than, say, the theory that atoms have parts, I can live with that.

[ June 14, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

The AntiChris

bd-from-kg

Apologies for taking these quotes out of context but I wanted to be sure I understand what you're saying.

In the first quote, are you saying that you believe the act is objectively wrong?

If so, is it possible to say that an act is objectively wrong in the absence of an objective morality?

Chris

Alonzo Fyfe

Of all of the things written in my last post, I would like to extract one issue that I think is core and give it special treatment. It is reflected in BD's statement:

But this makes your criterion completely arbitrary -- i.e., completely divorced from the question of "What shall I do?" There is no objective reason to regard the fact that an action is "morally right" under your criterion as a reason for doing it, any more than there is an objective reason to regard the fact that it is "morally right" under some other criterion, such as the fact that it will make members of the KKK very happy, as a reason for doing it.

If the KKK supporter is willing to constrain "morally right" to being logically equivalent to "that which will make members of the KKK very happy," then I have no problem with this statement. Whatever is not true of "that which will make members of the KKK very happy" is also not true of "morally right".

But if in calling "that which will make members of the KKK very happy" morally right, one is saying that there is some additional fact about "that which will make members of the KKK very happy", we have problems. I need to know what that alledged fact is and how the claim that it is true of "that which will make members of the KKK very happy" is justified.

The same thing is true of the theory that I advance here. I use the term 'morally right' to mean 'that action which a person with good desires would perform, where 'good desires' are those desires that are compatible with the maximum fulfillment of other desires directly or indirectly.'

If I limit 'morally right' to this meaning, then nobody else should have any problem with it. However, if in calling this 'morally right' I mean something more than this, then one is justified in asking, "What is this 'something more' and how do you justify your claim that it is true of that action done by a person with good desires?

It is not unreasonable to think that both the KKK supporter and I are asserting "something more". Most of the history of philosophy has been concerned with the search for "something moreness" with different theorists shouting "over here, over here" and others shouting "no, over here, over here." With subjectivists insisting, "'Something moreness' is a projection of your own desires on that where you claim to have found it -- there is no objective justification for any claim of something moreness; these claims are always subjective."

Consequently, it is reasonable to ask if I can find an objective reason for the 'something moreness' that I say is true of 'that act which a good person would perform.'

My answer is that 'something moreness' is a fiction. It does not exist. It has never existed. It never will exist. There is no justification for a claim of 'something moreness' -- and in their attempts to justify "something moreness' as a property of that which is morally right both the objectivists and the subjectivists fail.

I am neither an objectivist nor a subjectivist about 'something moreness', I am an eliminativist.

In short, if I am being asked for an objective reason to use one definition over another, the question is irrelevant. There is no objective reason to prefer any definition over another, and thus this creates no special problem for any moral claim. And if I am being asked for an objective reason to attribute "something moreness" to that which I call morally right, the question commits a fallacy of "complex question". It presupposes a "something moreness" that does not exist.

If I am being asked whether the propositions contained within the theory are objectively true, then that is a question that I can answer. As long as I can include among the objectively true propositions that no morally right action has "something moreness" and that what something is is a distinct question from what it is called.

If there is a fourth possible interpretation to this question, then I do not know off hand what it could be.

[BD: I know you have denied the existence of intrinsic values. However, ultimately I see no reasonable interpretation of your question other than as a challenge to provide proof of the existence of intrinsic values -- a challenge to show that my 'morally right' has a 'something moreness' that the KKK supporter's 'morally right' lacks.]

One could then raise the objection that in rejecting "something moreness" I am throwing all of moral philosophy out the window.

Again, if one is willing to constrain their definition of 'moral philosophy" to "the quest for this 'something moreness'" then the statement is true. I see no reason to believe that moral philosophy -- defined in this way -- has anything relevant to say about the real world.

Accordingly, if the charge that this thesis then contains no answer to the question "what shall I do," then I answer that moral philosophy, in its quest for things that are not real, has nothing to say that is relevant to real-world actions. I call 'morally right' that action which is recommended by all of the reasons that exist. This is far more relevant than assertion of 'morally right' that suggests a 'something moreness' that does not exist.

Indeed, nothing can be more relevant to answering real-world questions about "what shall I do."

[ June 14, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

bd-from-kg

The AntiChris:

Glad to see you’re still with us.

No. But 99percent seems to be very concerned to “establish” an objective morality. If acts like this are “morally neutral” according to his “objective” system, I frankly don’t see the point.

However, I believe that there is a sense (quite different from Alonzo’s) in which there is an objective morality. But I doubt that 99% would consider it objective, and I’m quite sure that Koyaanisqatsi wouldn’t. (Koy apparently wouldn’t consider anything that could exist in any possible world to be an “objective morality”, so the latter goes without saying.)

In the second quote I was simply acknowledging that I could be wrong, and that even if I’m right not everyone would agree that what I call “objective morality” is objective.

No.