Calvan

Michael C. J. Bradford in The Universality of Presupposition writes:
“In the continuing debate between self-declared "Christians" and "skeptics," of which The Skeptical Review is but a small (but relevant) part, accusations are regularly levied from both parties regarding the objective reason (or lack thereof) in the presentation of arguments. Is there a clear distinction between Christians and skeptics regarding the application of faith and reason in these debates? It is submitted herein that the underlying cognitive processes used by most Christians and skeptics are effectively identical.” (My underlining.)

This may be true unless it is not! I would like to think that the cognitive processes used by skeptics is essentially different than that used by theists when these processes are employed in the determination of what is real.

“ Ultimately, it is postulated that all parties involved are heavily influenced by inherent presuppositions (independent of whether or not the debater perceives that they exist).”

Yes, I would agree with this statement but that does not deny the employment of assumption by the skeptic or non-theist in his pursuit of “reality”. The theist already has determine what reality is. The skeptic is only seeking reality.

“Regarding the concept of inquiry, a self-declared "free-thinker" recognizes and accepts as a fundamental presupposition the free will of man to question everything, and ultimately to decide for himself what to (or not to) believe.”

I do not accept this statement to be valid. I suggest that a free-thinker does not require “ultimately to decide for himself what to (or not to) believe.” I suggest such a statement is inconsistent with the concept of “free-thinker”.

“A self-declared Christian also accepts the free will of man to question everything. Christians are clearly encouraged to "test everything" (1 Thess. 5:21), and are thus personally responsible for what they do (or do not) believe.”

I don’t consider what is written in (1 Thess. 5:21) to be relevant. What I assume to be real is that the Christian questions not at all when it comes to believing.

“Regarding the concept of proselytizing, many "free-thinkers" believe that "it is wrong, always, everywhere, and for everyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence" (W. K. Clifford).”

I suggest that the terms "it is wrong, always, everywhere, and for everyone, to believe.” are prejudicial and misleading. They carry a connotation of rigidity which I assume is inconsistent with free-thinkers.

“As a consequence, "free-thinkers" regularly engage in discussions with individuals whose paradigm they would like to convert. Christians, likewise compelled to be involved in apologetics, must "sanctify the Lord God in (their) hearts, and always be ready to give a defense to everyone who asks (them) a reason for the hope that is in (them)"(1 Peter 3:15).”

I suggest this may be a valid accusation. I assume that such practices by free-thinkers are not so much based upon the principles of free-thinking as they are upon the stroking of ego. Assuming that my statement is valid does not take away from one essence of free-thinking which I assume to be the pursuit of rather than the certitude of reality.

“Regarding the concept of truth, a "free-thinker" typically accepts the scientific method and the corresponding results of empirical and theoretical science.”

Agreed.

“This belief, however, requires the acceptance of two fundamental presuppositions. First, it must be accepted that truth is absolute. Second, it must be accepted that the human mind is capable of discerning between what is and what is not truth.”

I see no reason for these requirements. I perceive no need for a free-thinker to accept any truth as absolute. Regarding the discernment of truth, I suggest that there are measurements which the human mind is perfectly capable of making as to what is truth without the requirement of certitude. For example, one can assume that stimuli that provide the same significance consistently may be a measure of something that may be true.

“Note that the scientific method is not purely objective. That is, deciding which question to ask, how to ask the question, and thereafter how to interpret the answer are all partly subjective processes. The scientist must ultimately accept on faith his ability to apply the scientific method toward discernment of truth. Without acceptance of the two aforementioned presuppositions, honest application of the scientific method is useless.”

At the same time, there is an assumption that I make which is that a perception that is positive in nature, meaning that it functions in some way to support life, may be assumed to be true or real until otherwise determined by additional evidence. Conversely, that which is negative in nature may be assumed to be false. I suggest that the scientist indeed will develop faith in his ability to perceive what is as real as he can determine. This faith is another word for the repeated evidence that a given principle is unchanging.

“ In addition, without absolute immutable, truth, the scientific method will ultimately always fail.”

I suggest that the scientific method does not and never has depended upon absolute immutable truth. I suggest that if it did, there would likely be very little advancement employing the scientific method.

“Clearly, it is the human understanding of truth, not truth itself, which is subject to revision and change.”

I fail to see how one can equate the understanding of truth with truth. One is tentative. The other is absolute. And it is obvious that one is subject to revision and the other is not. They are two different animals.

“A Christian also adheres to the presuppositions of absolute truth and human capacity to discern truth. However, the Christian fundamentally accepts Jesus Christ as the Logos (John 1:1), i.e., as the ultimate embodiment of absolute truth (John 14:6).”

Agreed.

“Therefore, both skeptics ("free-thinkers") and Christians share fundamental beliefs and presuppositions regarding the necessities of inquiry and proselytizing, as well as the existence and human ability to discern absolute truth.”

I think this is a fallacious conclusion. I do not accept as valid that Christians and skeptics share fundamental beliefs. I will acknowledge that there is overlapping by some. But that does not mean that this sharing of beliefs is the essential character of both. Christians believe. Skeptics, by my understanding of the meaning of skeptic, do not. Again, that does not mean that all skeptics are free of presuppositions just as it does not mean that all christians do not participate in scientific method. The same argument applies to the process of proselytizing. Because both may do it, that does not equate the essential behaviors of the Christian and the Skeptic.
And the idea that both Christians and Skeptics are able to discern absolute truth is similarly invalid. Absolute truth is reserved for Christians to discern. I would assume that Skeptics may acquire knowledge, perhaps. But I doubt that any skeptic would claim to be infallible in their understanding of reality.

Keith Russell

Greetings:

The processes used by both theists (why limit the discussion to 'Christians'?) and 'skeptics' are identical in their application, but I believe that theists begin with unsupported, arbitrary premises.

They may reason validly from those premises, but if the premise isn't logically sound, what results isn't going to correspond to reality--not matter how accurate the internal logic of a given theological system.

Keith.

Calvan

Thank you Keith for your thoughts. You write:

"The processes used by both theists (why limit the discussion to 'Christians'?) and 'skeptics' are identical in their application, but I believe that theists begin with unsupported, arbitrary premises."

I agree with not limiting the discussion to 'Christians'.

I would challenge the assertion that 'The processes used by both theists and skeptics are identical in their application.'
May not the processes be essentially different rather than identical? Is not one based upon the belief process and the other upon the evaluation of evidence? And if this were real, would that not make the execution of the process different?

I feel confused by the use of the word application. Does it refer to the actual process being employed? Or does it refer to the effects of the process? Or perhaps it refers to the behaviors that result?

"They may reason validly from those premises, but if the premise isn't logically sound, what results isn't going to correspond to reality--not matter how accurate the internal logic of a given theological system."

I to wonder about the value of reason, valid or otherwise, being the basis for drawing a conclusion when the premises of the reasoning are unreality-based.

Thank you again for your thoughts. Ross

Hugo Holbling

Calvan wrote:

Have you read any Feyerabend, Calvan? If not, may i suggest that he will be of considerable interest to you with regard to your OP? I am currently working through his <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0226467759/qid=1033240849/sr=1-4/ref=sr_1_4/104-9101024-0145559?v=glance" target="_blank">correspondence</a> with Imre Lakatos and his <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0860916464/qid=1033240849/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/104-9101024-0145559?v=glance" target="_blank">Against Method</a>, as well as looking at Lakatos' counter-arguments. <a href="http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/feyerabe.htm" target="_blank">This link</a> gives an overview of PKF's arguments, but if you are prepared to make a study of his work you will find that he was concerned with many of the points you raise. When i have finished my reading i shall be happy to discuss him here, if you like.

Feyerabend severely criticized rationalists and claimed they were no less irrational than the pre- or unscientific methodologies they castigated; whether or not his case was convincing is another thing. Lakatos said no but considered his friend to have a very strong argument which (as their correspondence makes clear) he spent a good deal of time trying to defeat. Again, i suggest you look at what he had to say since i think you will find it relevant to the question of the universality or otherwise of presuppositions.

Calvan

THANK YOU HUGO. YOUR SUGGESTIONS SOUND FASCINATING.
Calvan

Bluenose

ditto

<img src="graemlins/notworthy.gif" border="0" alt="[Not Worthy]" />

hinduwoman

Throwing in my two cents:
Some kind of presuppositions are indespensible because otherwise we cannot function. But the difference is that sceptics/freethinkers accept only the barest minimum --- that the world is real and perception is the only valid proof; any other kind of proofs must have perception as its basis. The theists on the other hand has the extra presuppostions that a God exists, He is the God of their sect, He has said this and done that. Thus they have more presuppositions to muddle their thinking. What is more, they refuse to ever examine their presuppostions while you can lead a freethinker into admitting that we do not know anything with absolute certainty and we might be living in a Matrix world.

So I would say there are two features that distinguish sceptics from theists:
Less presuppostions
Readiness to examine their own presuppostions.

Bluenose

Great point.

IIRC Telemachus [the model agnostic] made a similar point about a year ago when he talked about being skeptical of skepticism.
I tend toward radical empiricism [qv William James essay] and feel re-examined methodology and terminology improves all axioms, postulates et cet.

Calvan

I thank all contributors to this discussion. If it is not obvious, I am withdrawing from this discussion. I enter this post in the interests of courtesy to whom it may concern. Thanks again to all who have made their contribution.
Calvan

Synaesthesia

I think the most salient thing that distigushes my own philosophy from faith is the doctrine of naturalism.

Naturalism: The denial that there is a first philosophy.