Keith Russell

Skepticos said:
"It is clear that the subject of perception, by definition, cannot be an object of perception. So, in what sense can we say that we have an experience of the SELF?"

Well, saying it is clear, in no way makes it clear. I disagree. Yes, 'the self' constantly changes; new memories are added, new conclusions are reached, and new opinions can be formed.

But, if these things become part of the self, then why believe that, at least, part of the self cannot be accessed via introspection?

And, if the self cannot be accessed via introspection, then what evidence supports your belief that solipsism is, at least, possible?

Keith.

Skepticos

Keith Russell writes:

"Well, saying it is clear, in no way makes it clear."

I think that it is clear, and that it is derived from the law of identity. The subject of perception is not an object of perception, since the two are distinct. Thus, the subject cannot be an object (that's my *a priori* analysis of the issue <grin&gt .

"But, if these things become part of the self, then why believe that, at least, part of the self cannot be accessed via introspection?"

Yet the question is how far these things are truly part of the SELF. Our belief concerning the self is that it is a constant and immutable *something* underlying perceptions, emotions, etc. So, do we say that "I am anger"? No, we say that "I am experiencing anger", so that there is a subject/object distinction implied - there is the experiencer ("I") and the experienced ("anger").

"And, if the self cannot be accessed via introspection, then what evidence supports your belief that solipsism is, at least, possible?"

Good question. And one which leads me back to my earlier post. The self is a tricky subject, but I also believe it is an inescapable belief that we all hold. The belief in the self is presupposed in the most basic functionings of thought, and this applies to the solipsist as well. The solipsist will simply believe that there is a self, even though the self is never an object of perception. The same holds for the realist.

- Skepticos

P.S. - If we accept empiricism as our epistemological paradigm, then there seems to be no empirical basis for our belief in the self. But we believe it nonetheless. Is that not enough?

John Page

Skepti:

Very interesting that your argumentation refers to "we" or multiple selves and "our belief" or collective belief.

What do you think is doing the believing? Surely your statements themselves reference the empirical basis on which we believe there is a 'self' within all of us.

That we currently have a poor understanding of how the phenomenon of self comes about is far from concluding that the 'self' is an illusion that is empirically unprovable! (not that you actually said this).

Each of us would seem to contain an identity that is empirically experienced by others, the summary of these experiences being the subjective "you" in someone else's mind. This ability to individuate gives rise to the concept that each of us has a unique "self". I would agree the self seems to be merely an abstraction of our physical and mental existence - the "timeless I" - but exist it surely does.

Empirically tenable? We can test this on ourselves.

Cheers, John

[ October 27, 2002: Message edited by: John Page ]</p>

Skepticos

John,

Your statement reminds me of the tale of the professor and the student.

In a philosophy class, a student raises his hand and says, "Professor, how can I know that I exist?" And the professor replies, "To whom do I address the answer?"

- Skepticos

Keith Russell

Skepticos:

Exactly!

(LOL!)

Keith.