Freethought & Rationalism Archive

Kenny · 01-21-2003, 11:05 AM

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Originally posted by SRB
[B]One reason why belief in God is not properly basic is that God's existence is disconfirmed by the evidence (e.g. the evidence that gratuitous suffering exists).

That, off course, assumes that the argument from evil succeeds. I do not believe that it does, but that is a discussion for another thread. In addition, it is not necessarily the case that evidence against a proposition automatically discredits it. Whether or not evidence against a proposition provides a sufficient defeater for one�s belief in said proposition depends on the initial warrant one has for that proposition to begin with. For example, consider the case of a man on trial for murder in which there is massive amounts of evidence against him such that any fair and rational jury would convict him. His DNA is present at the crime scene, his finger prints are on the murder weapon, several credible witnesses testify that they saw him do it, he has no alibi, etc. Except for one thing, the man clearly and distinctly remembers that he did not commit the crime. He cannot refute or explain the evidence against him, but he still knows that he is innocent. The notion of defeaters in Plantinga�s system preserves the possibility of critical reflection and rational dialog, but there are still times when individuals find themselves in epistemicly privileged positions such that even strong evidence against a proposition does not defeat their warrant for that proposition. Such is not a defect in Plantinga�s system � it is realistic. Such are the ambiguities of life.

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That God exists is not self-evident, not something that everyone automatically believes and is not something that we cannot get by without believing. It is a very poor candidate.

It seems to me that there are several candidates for properly basic beliefs which are such that not everyone believes them and are such that we can get by without believing them. I believe I had hot chocolate and toast for breakfast this morning in a properly basic manner via memory. Very few people likely believe the proposition �Kenny had hot chocolate and toast for breakfast this morning� (because they have formed no beliefs whatsoever on the matter). Furthermore, I could easily get by without believing that I had hot chocolate and toast for breakfast this morning. I don�t see how that makes my belief not properly basic or a poor candidate for being a properly basic belief.

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If belief in the existence of God is properly basic, then so is belief in the paranormal, voodoo, ghosts, fairies, and the Great Pumpkin. Since that is ridiculous, we must deny that belief in the existence of God is properly basic. Plantinga has no effective response to this objection.

I disagree. As I pointed out in my essay, not just any belief is plausibly subject to a properly basic defense and the notion of defeaters and epistemic overrides also have a role to play in destroying the warrant for some plausibly proper basic beliefs. Here is some more from my essay on the subject:

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There are some metaphysical beliefs which may, in fact, be rationally regarded as properly basic in some other logically possible world, but nevertheless, have too many defeaters in the world in which we actually live such that they cannot be regarded as properly basic by anyone in this world. This can be illustrated by developing a response to what Plantinga calls the *Great Pumpkin Objection* and the *Son of the Great Pumpkin Objection.* The original version of the Great Pumpkin Objection (which is Plantinga*s own invention) is both easily stated and easily dealt with. Plantinga sets it forward and answers it as follows:

According to the Great Pumpkin Objection, if belief in God can be properly basic so can any other belief, no matter how bizarre: if belief in God can be properly basic, then all bets are off, and anything goes. You might as well claim that belief in the Great Pumpkin (who returns every Halloween to the most sincere pumpkin patch) is properly basic with respect to warrant. You might as well make the same claim for atheism, voodoo, astrology, witchcraft, and anything else you can think of. This objection is, of course, plainly false. To recognize that some kinds of belief are properly basic with respect to warrant doesn*t for a moment commit one to thinking all other kinds are.

On Plantinga*s externalist characterization of knowledge, it is obviously not the case that all plausible candidates for properly basic beliefs are actually properly basic beliefs with respect to warrant. We have already noted that if Christian belief itself is false, it is likely not warranted. The Great Pumpkin Objection, therefore, carries no weight, but perhaps the Great Pumpkin Objection is merely a straw man. Perhaps the real force behind an objection of this sort lies in what Plantinga calls the *Son of the Great Pumpkin Objection* which is the name Plantinga gives to the following objection from Michael Martin.

Although reformed epistemologists would not have to accept voodoo beliefs as rational, voodoo followers would be able to claim that insofar as they are basic in the voodoo community they are rational and, moreover, that reformed thought was irrational in this community. Indeed, Plantinga*s proposal would generate many different communities that could legitimately claim that their basic beliefs are rational... Among the communities generated might be devil worshipers, flat earthers, and believers in fairies, just so long as belief in the devil, the flatness of the earth, and fairies were basic in the respective communities.75

Plantinga dismisses this objection by focusing in on what sense one might construe the term legitimately. He argues that if legitimately is taken as warrantedly, then the answer turns along the same lines as the answer to the Great Pumpkin Objection; the premises behind the argument which would allow the voodooists to conclude their beliefs are properly basic would simply not have warrant if they were false. On the other hand, if legitimately is taken as justifiably, then, perhaps the voodoo community would be justified in its beliefs, but that this, according to Plantinga, is trivial. The reason being that Plantinga conceives of the concept of traditional justification as being deontological in character --as not violating any sort of epistemic duties76 -- but to Plantinga, such justification is a trivial matter. Of course, from Plantinga*s point of view, the voodooists are within their epistemic rights in believing as they do if the voodooists find their beliefs to be compelling and seemingly truthful to them -- what could they possibly be doing wrong by believing what seems true to them?77

I am inclined, however, to agree with the assessment of Keith DeRose, at this point, that here Plantinga is *making things too easy on himself by construing the objection in some needlessly weak ways.*78 Specifically, I think Plantinga dismisses the question of rational justification too easily. As DeRose points out, the real spirit behind the objection seems to be that there are some beliefs which nearly everyone, including Plantinga, would consider bizarre or irrational that could conceivably be defended against the charge of irrationality just as effectively with a Plantinga style defense as Plantinga does for Christianity, and this calls into question whether or not Plantinga*s defense of the rationality of Christianity is really successful.79 A better response, in my opinion, is along the lines of the following developed by Gregory J. Patton:

If it is assumed that there could exist a logically possible world in which the Great Pumpkin is worshipped as God due to the fact that the inhabitants interpret the signs and indications that they receive as being from such an entity, then their belief in Great Pumpkin is properly basic! Plantinga can say that without embarrassment, since in this world, the one human beings live in, belief in the Great Pumpkin is not a living option. There are too many "defeaters" in operation for anyone to claim proper basicality for such a belief. Belief in God, however, has a long tradition of acceptance in this world, with a great number of adherents claiming religious experiences. It is thus a "livable option" for individuals in this world.80

In other words, belief in the Great Pumpkin does not bare the label of *irrational* arbitrarily. Although a community of Great Pumpkin adherents in another possible world might be capable of using a Plantinga style defense for the rationality of their beliefs, no such defense can be made in our world because, in our world, such a belief immediately finds itself in the face of numerous defeaters. Given that our cognitive design plan seems to include within it an element of social interaction (recall our discussion of testimony above), not the least of these defeaters would be the fact that belief in the Great Pumpkin is almost universally regarded as irrational. Such is not the case with either theism or Christianity. Belief in God or in some sort of divine reality is wide spread and adhered to by numerous people, many of whom are rational, intelligent, and sophisticated adults. The same is true of Christianity. Consequently, belief in God and belief in Christianity are living options in the world in which we find ourselves whereas belief in the Great Pumpkin is not.

Might this response raise another difficulty for my thesis, however? Has not the my thesis, up to this point, been that Christian belief is properly basic such that it is warranted for the believer even without being held on the basis of evidence? Furthermore, would not the existence of a sizable community of sophisticated adults who believe themselves to be recipients of the testimony of the Holy Spirit to the truth of Christian beliefs, itself constitute positive evidence for the truth of Christian belief, and that without such evidence Christian belief would no longer be rational? Does this then refute the thesis that Christian beliefs are properly basic?

I think not. First, as we have seen, in order to for a properly basic belief to retain its warrant, it must exist in the absence of sufficient defeaters. Among such potential defeaters are possible sources of undermining evidence. In turn, Bayesian Confirmation Theory shows us that if a certain set of evidence were to count as undermining evidence for a hypothesis, then lack of such evidence actually serves to raise the probability of that hypothesis.81 Thus, in a certain sense, the very lack of sufficient undermining defeaters is itself a form of positive evidence without which a belief could not be rational. The key issue as to whether or not a belief is properly basic, then, is not whether or not it can be warranted in the absence of certain forms of evidence, but whether the belief is warranted without being held on the basis of evidence. Typically, we do not regard the absence of sufficient undermining defeaters to be a reason we hold a certain belief, nor do we infer that belief from such a lack, even though such a lack does, in a certain sense, constitute positive evidence for our beliefs. Likewise, to be rational in holding her belief in Christianity, the Christian believer need not infer that belief or hold it on the basis of the fact that the Christian community exists, even though the absence of such a community might, itself, constitute a sort of undermining defeater for the truth of Christian belief.

God Bless,
Kenny

capnkirk · 01-21-2003, 12:46 PM

Kenny,

I have read through all your philosophical arguments and while they superficially seem sound, it is because it takes a studied reading (and re-reading) to begin to see the flaws. I will offer only one example here, because I have not the inclination to provide a thoroughly rigorous critique to post on this thread, nor would I deluge the thread with the volume of dissertation required.

In your epistle to me (that starts with: That's not an easy question...) for the entireity of the first two excerpts, you characterize "warrant" as being purely objective, then in the third excerpt, where you attempt to apply your previously developed criteria to belief in God, you completely change the character of warrant to subjective. In the very next excerpt, where you reapply this criteria to other beliefs, the character of warrant again becomes objective.

This but one example of critical flaws I found. If I work up the energy, I may copy that document to MSWord where I can mark it up, then send it to you via email, but it is too difficult to do on-line.

SRB · 01-21-2003, 01:30 PM

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Originally posted by Kenny
...it is not necessarily the case that evidence against a proposition automatically discredits it. Whether or not evidence against a proposition provides a sufficient defeater for one�s belief in said proposition depends on the initial warrant one has for that proposition to begin with.

This is true, but not relevant because theists have no way of using publicly available evidence to defend their beliefs or show that their beliefs are warranted. So an appeal to the basicity of theistic belief in the face of disconfirming evidence is unavailing.

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For example, consider the case of a man on trial for murder in which there is massive amounts of evidence against him such that any fair and rational jury would convict him. His DNA is present at the crime scene, his finger prints are on the murder weapon, several credible witnesses testify that they saw him do it, he has no alibi, etc. Except for one thing, the man clearly and distinctly remembers that he did not commit the crime. He cannot refute or explain the evidence against him, but he still knows that he is innocent.

It seems to me that in the face of such evidence, the man could have some reason to doubt the reliability of his memory, but let's suppose that he can take his memory as reliable. So what? The only reasonable position of anyone who has access only to the publicly available evidence is to suppose that the man is guilty and that he is plain mistaken that he has a warranted belief in his own innocence. That's my view of (many) theists. It is certainly within the bounds of logical possibility that they have warranted beliefs, but it is not reasonable for outsiders like me to believe that they have such warrant.

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It seems to me that there are several candidates for properly basic beliefs which are such that not everyone believes them and are such that we can get by without believing them. I believe I had hot chocolate and toast for breakfast this morning in a properly basic manner via memory.

People universally and automatically form a belief that their memories are generally reliable. Since your beliefs about what you had for breakfast are of this kind, they are not bad candidates for being properly basic.

Your response to the Great Pumpkin Objection seems to boil down to the fact that not many intelligent people believe in the Great Pumpkin, while lots of intelligent people believe that God exists. This is problematic because through the ages intelligent people have held all manner of irrational beliefs. Through the ages, sizeable numbers of otherwise rational people have believed in ghosts, the reliability of horoscopes, the paranormal, witches, etc. It seems ridiculous to say that these beliefs were all warranted.

The heredity of religious beliefs may play a part here. It is doubtful that I can have a warranted belief concerning what I know to be a highly controversial topic if the principal explanation of my beliefs is that I inherited them from my parents in some form of indoctrination. The only reasonable explanation of the apparent heredity of religious beliefs and demography of believers, however, involves precisely this sort of inheritance.

SRB

K · 01-21-2003, 05:04 PM

Kenny:

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No, that is not evidence for the reliability of inductive reasoning, the reliability of memory, or the reliability of the senses, because to argue for a probabilistic conclusion about reality on the basis of reliable past experience or to have confidence that any future predictions one might make will likely come to pass requires that all of these things already be presupposed. With respect to the reliability of inductive reasoning (the process of making probabilistic inferences based on past experience regarding future experience), one cannot successfully argue that since inductive reasoning has proven reliable in the past one can expect it to be reliable in the future because in doing so one would be assuming what one is trying to prove (namely that past experience is a reliable guide to future expectations). With respect to the reliability of memory, in order to say memory has demonstrated itself reliable in the past, one must appeal to one�s recollection of the past, thereby making an appeal to the reliability of memory. With respect to the reliability of the senses, the problems of memory and induction still loom, but even if it is known that one can successfully navigate through the sensory world and make predictions about future sensations, that does not mean that the world is as it seems to be or even that it is likely that the world is as it seems to be.

What exactly do you call evidence? When there is a great number of examples of using past events to successfully predict future events, I'd say there is a great body of evidence suggesting that future events can be predicted from past events. If you are arguing that when we first use this method (as babies) we are holding an irrational belief since we don't yet have the evidence, I can't argue with that except to say that I wouldn't call the completely programmed actions of a baby "beliefs". The same argument holds for inductive reasoning and the reliability of our memories.

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I agree that the senses are fallible in that in most instances they are only capable of yielding probabilistic conclusions, but that�s not what I�m talking about here. If the beliefs I mentioned above are not presupposed, then the senses cannot be held to be of any value at all in making any sort of truthful conclusions about the external world, probabilistic or otherwise.

If you are trying to PROVE absolutely that the senses provide valuable information, then the presuppositions must be made. I'm not talking about proving their reliability. I'm only saying that there is good evidence for it.

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As I pointed out, the beliefs I mentioned above cannot be inferred from sense experience in a non-circular manner.

In a formal proof.

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Actually, even assuming induction and the reliability of memory, I do not see why the vat hypothesis gets any less confirmation on the evidence that the external world hypothesis. Both seem to have equal explanatory power in terms of accounting for sensory experience. The only way that one could get more confirmation than the other, then, is if the antecedent probabilities are unequal, but I am skeptical that a good argument for assigning the external world hypothesis a greater antecedent probability, without assuming the reliability of the senses, could be made without some form of special pleading.

There is absolutely no evidence for the vat. The vat hypothesis doesn't allow you to make any predictions about future events correctly. Only the physical world hypothesis allows you to do it. It is the only hypothesis with any evidence supporting it.

Biff the unclean · 01-21-2003, 05:28 PM

When I was a teen I found myself going through these same mental gymnastics trying to prove that God existed. I even tried this same ' we can't know reality is real BS'
One day it struck me that there was no other subject you had to act like this about.
"Do you believe that there are rhinoceros?" would never elicit such squirming. I would say yes and I would give proof. Never would I not give proof and then play with the definition of what proof was. Never would I do a verbal tap dance along the lines of the old you can't really prove that you are really real so how can you say that rhinos aren't really real either.
Never, just doesn't happen.
Do you believe there is a tuna salad sandwich isn't a question that requires a convoluted philosophic reply. You just produce the sandwich.

There is only one reason you can't get a straight answer about this God thing...

Oxymoron · 01-22-2003, 02:44 AM

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Kenny said:
No, that is not evidence for the reliability of inductive reasoning, the reliability of memory, or the reliability of the senses, because to argue for a probabilistic conclusion about reality on the basis of reliable past experience or to have confidence that any future predictions one might make will likely come to pass requires that all of these things already be presupposed. With respect to the reliability of inductive reasoning (the process of making probabilistic inferences based on past experience regarding future experience), one cannot successfully argue that since inductive reasoning has proven reliable in the past one can expect it to be reliable in the future because in doing so one would be assuming what one is trying to prove (namely that past experience is a reliable guide to future expectations). With respect to the reliability of memory, in order to say memory has demonstrated itself reliable in the past, one must appeal to one�s recollection of the past, thereby making an appeal to the reliability of memory. With respect to the reliability of the senses, the problems of memory and induction still loom, but even if it is known that one can successfully navigate through the sensory world and make predictions about future sensations, that does not mean that the world is as it seems to be or even that it is likely that the world is as it seems to be.

Kenny, that's how humans work. Sorry, but you really need to get over it. All the philosophical argument in the world won't change that. There is no perfect knowledge system out there (unless you claim to have it?

)

We don't know the future. We have limited, interpreted knowledge of the past. That knowledge builds into a dynamically evolving model of How The World Works. We make predictions based on that model. If the predictions are right, one point to us. If not, we ought to change the model.

It's the best we've got given our hardware. Bear in mind that science is but a refinement of this process, and has proven to be the most powerful tool for altering our world to our needs ever created. So we should have confidence that as long as we are nurturing our inductive model of the world, we are being true to our physical nature and creating an optimal predictive system to help us through our lives.

bd-from-kg · 01-22-2003, 10:00 AM

Oxymoron:

You�re missing the point entirely. Kenny is not arguing for skepticism.

K:

Kenny is absolutely right in saying that some beliefs are properly basic with respect to warrant, which is a fancy way of saying that it is rational to believe them even though there is no evidence for them. And he�s identified some of them, such as the belief that memory is in general a reasonably reliable guide to one�s own past experiences. There is clearly no way to justify this belief (in terms of evidence) which does not depend on the assumption that memory is a reasonably reliable guide to one�s past experiences. The general reliability of induction is another. There are a good many others. The question is whether theistic belief is in this category. And here I think Kenny�s argument fails.

Kenny:

1. The argument toward the end of your long post, to the effect that naturalism is self-defeating in that it implies that there is no reason to trust one�s reason and therefore (among other things) to believe in naturalism, was discussed at mind-numbing length a while back in the thread Why Should A Metaphysical Naturalist Trust Her Reason?

2. Your argument is based largely on Plantinga�s criterion for warranted belief:

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A belief is warranted if and only if it is formed through the proper functioning of one�s cognitive faculties which are part of a well designed plan aimed at the production of true beliefs in the type of environment in which those cognitive faculties were designed to function in the absence of sufficient defeaters for said belief.

Here�s what seems to me to be the fatal objection to this criterion.

Imagine an advanced race capable of creating beings with any properties it pleases. In fact it creates a number of different beings for a wide variety of purposes. Each of them is designed to be strongly predisposed to form certain beliefs, which are chosen to make it as likely as possible that they will complete their missions successfully. They will, of course, form other beliefs as well. Whether these are likely to be true depends on how their cognitive faculties are designed to work.

Now in the vast majority of cases these beings are designed in such a way that some of the beliefs they are predisposed to are false, or their cognitive faculties are designed in such a way that other beliefs that they form are likely to be false (or at least will not be reliably true), or both. Let�s call the beings in this category Type U (for �unreliable�). Some of the other beings are designed so that the beliefs they are predisposed to are true, and their cognitive faculties are so designed that other beliefs they form are reliably true, but not because these beliefs are formed by making rational inferences from the evidence. Rather, they are formed through processes that the creators know in advance (from their knowledge of how the world �really is�) will just happen in this world to produce true beliefs a high percentage of the time, although they would fail miserably to do so in most other worlds that do not share the idiosyncrasies of this one. Let�s call the beings in this category Type RN (for �reliable but nonrational�). Finally, a few of these beings are designed so that all of the beliefs they are predisposed to are true, and other beliefs that they form are likely to be true because they arrive at them rationally. Call the beings in this category Type RR (for �reliable and rational�).

Now we can all agree that the beliefs of the Type U beings (even the occasional true ones) do not have warrant. But what about those of Type RN? Their beliefs are formed through the proper functioning of their cognitive faculties which are part of a well designed plan aimed at the production of true beliefs in the type of environment in which those cognitive faculties were designed to function, etc. Yet it seems clear that their beliefs are not warranted, because they were formed in a nonrational manner. The justifications they would give for their beliefs might well be completely absurd, and would certainly (from a rational point of view) be wholly inadequate. In fact, we�d be inclined to say that their beliefs are true only by virtue of the lucky chance that, in their case, true beliefs happened to be more useful (to the designers) than false ones.

What about the Type RR beings? Surely their beliefs are warranted? Well, even that�s not clear. It�s arguable that they also have true beliefs only by virtue of the lucky chance that true beliefs were more useful to their designers than false ones, not because the designers valued true beliefs per se. And they have no way of telling that they are of Type RR. After all, so far as the Type U and RN beings can tell, they�re of Type RR too. On the other hand, it can be argued that, whatever the reasons behind the designers� decision to give them rational (and therefore reliable) cognitive faculties, the fact is that they did so, and by doing so gave them the capability of forming warranted beliefs. But this applies only to the beliefs formed through these rational processes; it would still seem that the beliefs they have merely because they have been designed to be predisposed to them are not warranted, even though (because it happens to be in their creators� interests) they are all true. I would therefore incline to the view that those of their beliefs that are formed via rational processes are warranted, but those that they have merely because they were designed to be predisposed to form them are not.

But regardless of the status of the beliefs of the Type RR beings, it seems clear that the beliefs of the Type RN beings do not have warrant, even though they meet Plantinga�s criterion. This would seem to smash his criterion for warranted beliefs to smithereens.

Biff the unclean · 01-22-2003, 12:36 PM

This is turning into the same sort of flimflam that is used when the contradictory definitions of the word "faith" are ignored.
The belief that memory is in general a reasonably reliable guide to one�s own past experiences is based on evidence. The "Ah Yes, I remember It Well" song that Maurice Chevalier sings in Gigi comes to mind. The time may well come in your life (it's coming in mine) when the evidence will show that you will have to disregard this belief.
The only way to know if something actually exists is through evidence. But let's cut to the chase. After all this really has to do with believing in God despite the fact that there is no evidence for any gods. But this isn't as simple as just believing that God exists. You also believe that God has this attribute and that attribute, he did these things, he will do those things, he has this plan, he dislikes that behavior, on and on and on. It could fill volumes�in fact it does fill volumes.
There is a reason to believe this story. The reason being that it's been crammed down your throat since you were an infant. Along with it has come the idea that only evil people who will be punished in this world and for eternity don't believe it. So it is rational to believe it because it is rational to try to avoid pain & suffering.
That is the only rational behind it.
If you had never heard that there was such a thing as a god you would never have thought of the idea yourself.
If the fear of god had never been put in you, then you wouldn't be trying to turn logic upside down to fit this god in. You don't go through these contortions for any other god because you aren't afraid of any other god.
Stop torturing logic already, and logic will show you that you have nothing more to fear from Yahweh than you do from Zeus. "Screw your courage to the sticking place."

Kuyper · 01-22-2003, 04:53 PM

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Originally posted by capnkirk
OK then, tell me if any of these observations mitigates against a rational, much less perfect, theistic god:

1. Xtianity tells us that we have one life, and that at the end of it we will be judged. Based on that judgement, we will spend the REST OF ETERNITY in either heaven or hell. Compared to eternity, our lifespan is like the snap of your fingers. Any human father that subjected his children to that standard would be imprisoned, not worshipped. So either the scripture is fundamentally wrong, or god is a tyrant.

Whether or not that particular understanding of the Christian theology is correct is a matter of considerable debate among theologians. Further, the Christianity makes clear that the choice for heaven or hell is clearly in OUR hands. That's what free will is all about. Scripture makes clear that it is NOT God's will that any should experience hell. The message of all of scripture is God's great love for human beings. Why should we label God a tyrant if we reap what we sow? He makes clear what the choices are, what the consequences are and then leaves it up to us.

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2. The xtian god is omnipresent. If so, then where is hell? Logic dictates that god is present in hell (0r that hell is itself part of god).

The characteristic of omnipresence simply means God is not bound by the limits of space. That does not entail that he necessarily has to be 'everywhere' at once all the time. He can be wherever he chooses to be. Further, there's no reason why he couldn't choose to not be in a particular place--hell being one example. Part of Christian doctrine teaches that when Christ died on the cross he did, in fact, descend into hell. If that's true, then it would seam to indicate that God can indeed pick and choose his spaces. His omniscience means he can pick his choose his time as well.

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3. In WWII, some 30,000,000 civilians were killed, many of them while begging to god for their lives. He didn't save them. Having ignored the ardent pleas of millions of innocents, how can one possibly expect that his prayer for some personal blessing for himself or a loved one answered?

This is little more than a re-statement of the age old "why doesn't God answer all prayers" concern. It might be that our understanding of prayer is misguided. It might also be that God does answer our prayers, just not in accordance with our expectations. I sometimes think that on this point people confuse magic with mystery. They're two very different things. Nowhere does Christian doctrine teach that God is going to magically remove us from all dangers and threats. What Christianity does teach is that in all circumstances we face on this earth God will be with us. And ultimately, God will prevail, and thus so will those who believe.

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4. Knowing what we now do about the size of the universe, to believe that humanity is the creme de la creme of god's creation and he placed us on one single mote in all that vastness and didn't create life elsewhere strains credulity in that it seems an unprecedented waste to let the rest of the universe lie fallow. On the other hand, if we are not the lone sentients in the universe, then we are faced with whether our preferred status in god's creation is valid.

Well, the one obvious point to be made here is that we have not one shred of proof or evidence of life existing anywhere else in the universe (the Raelians notwithstanding!). But even if it did, so what? Christian doctrine, based on scripture, teaches only how God revealed himself to us on this planet. How he might choose to reveal himself to other beings of His creation is not our concern.

As a side point, scientists, especially physicists, seem to be coming more and more to thinking that the universe and the physical laws that govern it seem just a bit too convenient, as if they were constructed to allow life to exist on earth. Lots of the work being done on the anthropic principal and the questions surrounding that seem to point in that direction. That is not conclusive 'proof' or anything of the sort, but it does give one pause.

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5. Either you believe the genesis version of creation (that has much evidence to the contrary) or you concede that evolution is a fact rather than a theory. But evolution also precludes our being the crown of his creation in that evolution hasn't stopped. Homo Sapiens sapians is just the current year model in a long evolutionary line. Humanity WILL be replaced by a more evolved species.

First to your comment that one must concede that evolution is a "fact rather than a theory", you seem to be confusing on the meaning of these terms in science. No evolutionary biologist I know of would ever say that evolution or any other theory of science is a fact. That is not a scientific way of putting it. Rather they might say that the evidence supporting this or that conclusion is strong, or over-whelming, or something along those lines. Science is ever in the business of refuting theories and hypotheses. Theories once thought iron clad give way to new explanations as new data comes to light. You might read Thomas Khun's "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" to gain better insight into that. I would also recommend "Conjectures and Refutations" by Sir Karl Popper.

Second, you use the term theory here in its popular, rather than scientific understanding. The term 'theory' in science simply means a well supported explanation of some observation or phenomenon.

Third, your entire comment sets up a false dilemma. There's no particular reason that a Christian can not accept that evolution might have been the means by which God brought forth life on earth. For the non-thiest, however, evolution is the only game in town. You might see Ken Miller's "Finding Darwin's God" for some understanding on this point. I'm not saying I'm in 100% agreement with Miller (I'm probably more like 35%), but since he's a theist who accepts evolutionary explanations for the origin of all life on earth, I use him as an example.

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6. While on the subject of evolution, the fact that 99% of all species that ever existed are now extinct hardly speaks of a perfect creator.

Why? For this argument to hold you need to define what you mean by "perfect". Perfect in what sense? And why is that notion of perfection the correct one and not some other notion?
And finally, in order for that argument to hold, you'd have to know fully what God's intentions were so as to guage whether or not the creation exhibits the intended perfection. It's odd that you would use what is essentially a theological argument (albeit it a negative one) to try and disprove God's existence.

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So either god's revelation to man has gotten so contorted as to be unrecognizable, or there was no revelation, hence no theist god.

I don't see how that logic even follows. In order for that contention to be true, you'd have to show an understanding of what a God would have intended to reveal and how he would have to reveal it. How would you come by that knowledge in order to pass the judgment that it hasn't taken place?

[/QUOTE]
You may not consider that evidence, but I sure do! And to wish all these objections away in order to maintain theistic belief is patently IRRATIONAL. [/QUOTE]

Well, as you can see, one does not need to "wish" these objections away. There are prefectly sound responses to all of them. You seem to think these objections are all self-evident, slam dunk arguments, but I hope you can now see that they are not.

Thanks for your comments, Kirk. I enjoyed responding.

K

Kuyper · 01-22-2003, 05:10 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Biff the unclean
This is turning into the same sort of flimflam that is used when the contradictory definitions of the word "faith" are ignored.
The belief that memory is in general a reasonably reliable guide to one�s own past experiences is based on evidence. The "Ah Yes, I remember It Well" song that Maurice Chevalier sings in Gigi comes to mind. The time may well come in your life (it's coming in mine) when the evidence will show that you will have to disregard this belief.

Could someone please remind what we were discussing? :boohoo:

Quote:

The only way to know if something actually exists is through evidence. But let's cut to the chase. After all this really has to do with believing in God despite the fact that there is no evidence for any gods. But this isn't as simple as just believing that God exists. You also believe that God has this attribute and that attribute, he did these things, he will do those things, he has this plan, he dislikes that behavior, on and on and on. It could fill volumes�in fact it does fill volumes.
There is a reason to believe this story. The reason being that it's been crammed down your throat since you were an infant.

Perhaps there are some who have had religion "crammed down their throats", but that doesn't explain how adult non-theists, with little or no religious backbround, many of high education also come to believe. C.S. Lewis comes to mind. Just because some claim belief because of childhood circumstances does not entail that all, or even most, do. There's clearly more going here than the simple pat response you give here.

Quote:

Along with it has come the idea that only evil people who will be punished in this world and for eternity don't believe it. So it is rational to believe it because it is rational to try to avoid pain & suffering.
That is the only rational behind it.

This comment grossly mis-characterizes what theistic belief is all about, especially from the Judeo-Christian point of view. It strikes me as more of a characature than anything else...and a false one at that.

Quote:

If you had never heard that there was such a thing as a god you would never have thought of the idea yourself.

This runs counter to the fundamental intuition of most human beings on the face of the planet. If anthropologists have noted anything in their study of humans it's that there is an almost universal belief among all humans in something other than the merely physical. Whence that intuition? It's not easily explained in evolutionary terms, and those who have tried have, in my opinion, done a poor job of it. Daniel Dennett comes to mind in that regard. (see his book Darwin's Dangerous Idea)

K

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01-21-2003, 12:46 PM	#42
capnkirk Senior Member Join Date: Dec 2002 Location: where no one has gone before Posts: 735	Kenny, I have read through all your philosophical arguments and while they superficially seem sound, it is because it takes a studied reading (and re-reading) to begin to see the flaws. I will offer only one example here, because I have not the inclination to provide a thoroughly rigorous critique to post on this thread, nor would I deluge the thread with the volume of dissertation required. In your epistle to me (that starts with: That's not an easy question...) for the entireity of the first two excerpts, you characterize "warrant" as being purely objective, then in the third excerpt, where you attempt to apply your previously developed criteria to belief in God, you completely change the character of warrant to subjective. In the very next excerpt, where you reapply this criteria to other beliefs, the character of warrant again becomes objective. This but one example of critical flaws I found. If I work up the energy, I may copy that document to MSWord where I can mark it up, then send it to you via email, but it is too difficult to do on-line.

01-21-2003, 05:28 PM	#45
Biff the unclean Banned Join Date: Oct 2002 Location: an inaccessible island fortress Posts: 10,638	When I was a teen I found myself going through these same mental gymnastics trying to prove that God existed. I even tried this same ' we can't know reality is real BS' One day it struck me that there was no other subject you had to act like this about. "Do you believe that there are rhinoceros?" would never elicit such squirming. I would say yes and I would give proof. Never would I not give proof and then play with the definition of what proof was. Never would I do a verbal tap dance along the lines of the old you can't really prove that you are really real so how can you say that rhinos aren't really real either. Never, just doesn't happen. Do you believe there is a tuna salad sandwich isn't a question that requires a convoluted philosophic reply. You just produce the sandwich. There is only one reason you can't get a straight answer about this God thing...

01-22-2003, 12:36 PM	#48
Biff the unclean Banned Join Date: Oct 2002 Location: an inaccessible island fortress Posts: 10,638	This is turning into the same sort of flimflam that is used when the contradictory definitions of the word "faith" are ignored. The belief that memory is in general a reasonably reliable guide to one�s own past experiences is based on evidence. The "Ah Yes, I remember It Well" song that Maurice Chevalier sings in Gigi comes to mind. The time may well come in your life (it's coming in mine) when the evidence will show that you will have to disregard this belief. The only way to know if something actually exists is through evidence. But let's cut to the chase. After all this really has to do with believing in God despite the fact that there is no evidence for any gods. But this isn't as simple as just believing that God exists. You also believe that God has this attribute and that attribute, he did these things, he will do those things, he has this plan, he dislikes that behavior, on and on and on. It could fill volumes�in fact it does fill volumes. There is a reason to believe this story. The reason being that it's been crammed down your throat since you were an infant. Along with it has come the idea that only evil people who will be punished in this world and for eternity don't believe it. So it is rational to believe it because it is rational to try to avoid pain & suffering. That is the only rational behind it. If you had never heard that there was such a thing as a god you would never have thought of the idea yourself. If the fear of god had never been put in you, then you wouldn't be trying to turn logic upside down to fit this god in. You don't go through these contortions for any other god because you aren't afraid of any other god. Stop torturing logic already, and logic will show you that you have nothing more to fear from Yahweh than you do from Zeus. "Screw your courage to the sticking place."

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