mnkbdky

This thread will demonstrate that if something exists, then, it has an essence or a nature (I will be using nature and essence as synonyms). That is, if something X exists then X has, at least, one property P that could not fail to obtain just in case X obtained. Furthermore, if X has an essence E, then, it could not be the case that X could lack E. That is, it is impossible that there is a world W in which X lacks E. Now, when it is impossible that something not obtain or impossible that some thing lack another thing it is called necessary, therefore, an essence will defined as, a necessary property. It will then be argued that morality does indeed exist, and, therefore, has its nature or essence necessarily. That is, morality has necessary properties. This position will be called, metaphysical moral realism (MMR).

p.s. This task is long and involved, so please excuse the length and preserver to the end. Also, I will be posting this on both the Philosophy and Moral Foundations forums. It is posted on the former because of its metaphysical claims about essences and on the latter because of its axiological assertions. Now on with the argument.

It has been argued by some throughout the history of philosophy that good and evil are cultural conventions. They are concepts that have been arbitrarily attributed to thing only by the will of mankind (or divinity). This thread will make clear that this opinion is apodictally false. To this task I will now turn.

It should not be controversial to state that things are what they are by nature and not by somebody’s will. Whether we have access to that nature or not, an object must exist as it is and does become what it is because of what persons say about it. A person may use that object however they please (perhaps even according to its nature) but in doing so they do not change the ontological make up of that object. The object is what it is ontologically by nature.

Now by nature I mean, something has a nature N if for any object X and property P it is impossible that X exist and not P or P exist and not X. Another way to state this is, X has a nature, if X has a property P that could not fail to obtain just in case X obtain or X could not fail to obtain just in case P obtained. If it is impossible that X and P exist apart from one another, then, it is necessarily false that there is a possible world W in which X could exist apart P. An object’s nature, then, is a necessary property of that object. How, though, do we tell if things have natures?

An easy way to see that things do indeed have natures is to think in terms of its contradictories. For example, in trying to ascertain whether I have an essence or not I can attempt to think of myself as distinct or numerically different than myself. (It makes no difference whether we define the self materially or immaterially; either way, we can ask whether it is possible that that person be numerically distinct from the substance that constitutes them.) It soon becomes clear that this is impossible and is a broad contradiction. That is, it logically necessarily false that there is a possible world W in which X has the property P of being me and Y have P and X /=Y. Positively, it is logically necessarily true that, X=Y if and only if for every P, X has P if and only if Y has P. Therefore, I have the property of having the property of being self identical. Therefore, the property of being identical to myself could not fail to obtain just in case I obtain and if I obtain then the property of being self identical could not fail to obtain. If the property of being self identical could not fail to obtain just in case I obtain, then, I have the necessary property of being self identical, which is to say that being self identical is part of my essence.

After performing this test on myself it appears that we may apply it to all existent things and come to the same conclusion. It must be the case, then, that every existent thing has the property of being self identical. To be exact, it is logically necessary that if object X exists, then, X has the property of having the property of being numerically identical to itself. Now, if every existent thing has the necessary property of being self identical, then, every existent thing has a nature or an essence. While this observation only give us generally insight into a things nature and is by no means a profound find, it is enough to demonstrate that things do indeed have a nature. It will take a lot more work to discover a things specific nature, but that is a life long project not suitable for this thread.

Now, from all of the above it should be sufficiently clear that thing have their nature’s necessarily and, hence, natures are not the result of human convention. That is,

1) If object X exists, then, X has an nature N

2) If X has N, then, N could not fail to obtain if X obtains.

3) If N could not fail to obtain if X obtains, then, N is a necessary property P to X.

4) If N is a necessary property P to X, then, N is not arbitrarily attributed to X.

5) If N is not arbitrarily attributed to X, then, N does not depend on anyone’s will toward or conventions about X.

6) Therefore, if object X exist, then, N does not depend on anyone’s will toward or conventions about X.

(At this point, I will forgo discussing objections to this argument and will wait to do this when the discussion begins.)

From the argument above, it should be abundantly clear that if Good and Evil do exist, then, they have their nature’s necessarily and not because of human convention or will. However, from the above we could only say that Good is identical to itself and Evil is identical to itself--hardly something to get excited about. As I said above, it will take some more work to get to its specific nature. While I do not intend to discover all of the necessary properties of Good and Evil, or exhaust their nature’s, I will attempt to discover at least one. Now, let’s take a closer look.

In the section above, we though in terms of something's contradictories in order to discover its essence. This process of metaphysical via negativa seems to be a good way to proceed for discovering some specifics about the nature of Good and Evil. For instance, try to image the contradictory of the statements, “It is morally right or Good not to torture infants for pleasure” and/or “it is morally wrong or Evil to torture infants for pleasure.” I suggest that just as it was impossible to imagine something being numerically distinct from itself, so too, is it impossible to imagine that the statements, “It is morally right or Good to torture infants for pleasure” and/or “It s morally wrong or Evil not to torture infants for pleasure.” Of course, it is possible to state these contradictory propositions. However, it is impossible to see how they could possibly be true. Therefore, it must be part of Good’s essence that it is morally right not to torture infants for pleasure and Evil’s essence that it is morally wrong to torture infants for pleasure.

The strongest and easiest argument against this position is to simply say that Good and Evil do not exist. I will call this position metaphysical moral nihilism. By denying the existence of moral good and evil the metaphysical moral nihilist asserts that all moral declaration are neither true nor false. I believe and will demonstrate that this position is self-refuting and, hence, necessarily false. The argument is as follows:

It is true that

(A) either,

(1) It is true that it is good to torture infants for pleasure

or

(2) It is false that it is good to torture infants for pleasure

or

(3) It is morally neutral to torture infants for pleasure.

Now, (A) is only true if its components (i.e., (1), (2) and (3)) are true or false.

The metaphysical moral nihilist might object that (1), (2) and (3) are not an exhaustive set of contraries and there is another option,

(4) Good and evil do not exist, therefore, (1), (2) and (3) are neither true nor false and, hence, (A) has no truth value.

The metaphysical moral nihilist’s object, however, will not work. For if (4) is true, the, (2) is true as well. That is, f it is the case that it is neither good nor evil to torture infants for pleasure, then, it is false that it is good to torture infants of pleasure. Therefore, the metaphysical moral nihilist’s claim that (1), (2), and (3) are neither true not false is itself false--since it assures the truth of (2). (4) is, therefore, self-refuting. It appears, then, that (A) is valid and exhaustive set of contrary propositions. Now, no set of contraries can be all false, one must be true. And if (1), (2) and (3) are either true or false, then, good and evil must exist. So again, (4) is false. Good and Evil do exist.

It might be object that we could swap good for evil in (1) and (2) and arrive at the opposite conclusion--that is, that it is false that it is evil to torture infants for pleasure. This is true. However, it does not hurt the argument. For even if they are swapped good and evil must exist in order for them to be true or false. The only thing swapping does is to place us in a epistemological moral quandary.


In conclusion, the argument in the first section demonstrated that if something exists it has a nature and that necessarily. In the second section we saw that if Good and Evil exist, then, it is part of Good’s essence that it is morally right not to torture infants for pleasure and Evil’s essence that it is morally wrong to torture infants for pleasure. In the third section we saw that the denial of Good and Evil was self-refuting. The metaphysical reality of Good and Evil has been vindicated. Therefore, the position I have called metaphysical moral realism is true and metaphysical moral nihilism is false. As a consequent, it should also be recognized that moral relativism is false as well.

QED

--mnkbdky

Bilbo

among other interesting things, mnkbdky argues:

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The strongest and easiest argument against this position is to simply say that Good and Evil do not exist. I will call this position metaphysical moral nihilism. By denying the existence of moral good and evil the metaphysical moral nihilist asserts that all moral declaration are neither true nor false. I believe and will demonstrate that this position is self-refuting and, hence, necessarily false. The argument is as follows:

It is true that

Either

(1) It is true that it is good to torture infants for pleasure,


(2) It is false that it is good to torture infants for pleasure

or

(3) It is morally neutral to torture infants for pleasure.
--------------------------------------------


This argument seems to confuse use and mention. Truth and falsity are properties of statements (or propositions), not constituents of statements. Locutions of the form “It is true that p” (where “p” is a propositional variable) have little sense. “Is true” is not a connective like “it is the case that”, but rather is a predicate that follows the name of a statement.

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Now, (A) is only true if its components (i.e., (1), (2) and (3)) are true or false.

The metaphysical moral nihilist might object that (1), (2) and (3) are not an exhaustive set of contraries and there is another option,

(4) Good and evil do not exist, therefore, (1), (2) and (3) are neither true nor false and, hence, (A) has no truth value.

The metaphysical moral nihilist’s object, however, will not work. For if (4) is true, the, (2) is true as well. That is, f it is the case that it is neither good nor evil to torture infants for pleasure, then, it is false that it is good to torture infants of pleasure.
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Even given a de dicto reading of (4), your (2) is in need of serious repair (as per my earlier remarks). In any case, its doubtful that a reformulation of the disjuncts of (A) will yield the conclusion you want.

One plausible analysis of statements containing non-denoting terms is that such statements lack (classical) truth-value, and that the negation of such statements is likewise without classical truth-value.


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…Now, no set of contraries can be all false, one must be true. And if (1), (2) and (3) are either true or false, then, good and evil must exist. So again, (4) is false. Good and Evil do exist.
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Given that the relativist presumably denies, in some strong sense, the existence of the Good, the term “Good” will (according to him) fail to denote. But logical rules (of the sort you allude to above), require that terms denote, and that quantifiers range over non-empty domains. As such, the relativist is ideally positioned to deny the implication you’re trying to saddle him with.


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In conclusion, the argument in the first section demonstrated that if something exists it has a nature and that necessarily. In the second section we saw that if Good and Evil exist, then, it is part of Good’s essence that it is morally right not to torture infants for pleasure and Evil’s essence that it is morally wrong to torture infants for pleasure. In the third section we saw that the denial of Good and Evil was self-refuting. The metaphysical reality of Good and Evil has been vindicated. Therefore, the position I have called metaphysical moral realism is true and metaphysical moral nihilism is false. As a consequent, it should also be recognized that moral relativism is false as well.
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I think there are problems with your first two sections; particularily the propriety of analogizing from identity relations involving individuals (of the sort that can be counted), to identities between properties such as Good, if such it be, but I suppose there is enough to chew on for the moment.

Your general thesis is interesting, but I think there are some kinks to iron out.


Regards,

Bilbo.

Scorpion

Good to hear from you, mnkbdky...

Some serious problems of this argument were discussed in this thread a couple of weeks ago - I assume you overlooked them since you considered them as objections against the actual argument (instead of discussion about the fallacy you had planted there on purpose) and didn't want to go to them until the full version is out...

I can not avoid repeating what me and others have said in the other thread and Bilbo has said in this one, but anyway:

First, the argument has some slack that could be cut out of it. (1) and (2) are exhaustive alone. If "morally neutral" is considered to mean something that is not good nor evil, (3) is a subcase of (2).

I suppose you mean (A) is only true of only one of its components is true? This is wrong since if (3) is true, (2) is also true, but so far the argument loses nothing if you just dump (3) altogether (alternatively you may modify (2) to say "it's evil to torture etc." if you want to have all three - good, neutral, evil - represented in the argument but it is not essential IMO)

Anyway, the real itch is in the application of (4). The statement in itself doesn't have anything wrong, but this is utterly mind-boggling:

First of all (4) is a metalogical statement that denies the validity and relevance of the whole construct so far and using it together with the very statements it denounces is very, very illegal and bound to produce completely arbitrary and meaningless results (note, not false results but meaningless results).

Even without the fatal problem of mixing metalogic with logic the above is a clear contradiction: you're saying that if (4) is true, then (2) is true as well.

Ahem.


I will truncate this to "(1), (2) and (3) are neither true nor false" for clarity (if you have a problem with this, just ask me)... now, the above quote says:

"If (1), (2) and (3) are neither true nor false, then (2) is true as well."

There is something deeply disturbing in that sentence, don't you agree?

You seem to interpret (4) as...

...but this is not what is said in (4) - this is said in (3) and (2). To say that it is neither true or false that doing X is good is a completely different from saying that doing X is neither good or evil. The former requires that Good/Evil does not denote, the latter requires that Good/Evil denotes. The whole argument against moral nihilism rests on this confusion.

-S-

mnkbdky

.

I am not exactly sure what Bilbo means by use and mention. However, he is certainly mistaken about his claim that, "Locutions of the form 'It is true that p (where "p" is a propositional variable) have little sense.'" "It is true that p" is a statement in and of itself and, therefore, necessarily has truth value. Concider this, "It is true that (ADT) either (1) all dogs have tails or (2) all dogs don't have tails." (DT) is a statement and, thus, has truth value, it may either be true or false. In fact (ADT) is false, for it is possible that only some dogs have tails and other don't. However, the statement, "It is true that, (SDT) either (1) some dogs have tails or (2) some dogs don't," is true. The truth and falsity of (ADT) depends on the truth and falsity of it constituents.



Tease this out for me a bit, I am not sure what you are claiming. My initial reading is that you are saying that the relativist will say that the term "Good" does not refer to anything, such as the term "apple" does.

Is this correct?

If so, then, how does this put him in an ideal position to deny the implications of (4).?

John Page

Hi mnkbdky:

I am a relativist. . No. The term "good" refers to the thinker's valuation of the object/action, i.e. whether its is of positive benefit to them (using their own subjective criteria) or a group. e.g. "This wine is good for me" "He will be a good leader for the people", even "An apple a day keeps the doctor away, therefore the apple is good."

Good is not an essence external to the human mind, like a material apple is. Perhaps confusions arise because the mind holds the concept apple and the concept good. "Good" is not a universal.

This being the case, the implications of (4) go away.

Cheers, John

mnkbdky

I agree, JP. The moral relativist MR must admit the existence of good and evil, for they are terms that refer to objects/actions. Therefore, the MR cannot be a metaphysical moral nihilist--for MMNs say good and evil have no meaning or referent. Rather, for them, good and evil--like all terms--are only part of a system of language formed by the human psyche, which has no correspondence with reality. However, relativism suffers from its own problems, see my reply to Dr. Retard on this topic in the moral foundations forum.

John Page

I understand the first bit but I'm confused why you say:
Does the term "them" refer to MRs or MMNs? (For I see no reason for an MR to deny that language has no correspondence with reality.

Cheers, john

mnkbdky

MMNs

John Page

Ah! In that case yes, its feelgood only!

mnkbdky

I agree.



Yes, meaningless does result. But with that result comes the fact that my defintion of good, that good is an existant thing with an essence, is false. So, if we retain that meaning throughout, then, (4) is self-refuting.

In fact, even if we have good mean MR, and retain that meaning, then (4) is self-refuting.

Anytime we give good a meaning or referrent (4) is self-refuting.

Now, if we don't give good a referent or meaning, then, (4) has no truth value and, hence is neither true nor false. So, (4) without a referrent or meaning for good is irrelevant and, hence, should not be in the equation.



This is the point. (4) results in a contradiction any time good refers to something. Furthermore, (4) itself is utter non-sense if it doesn't have good refer to anything. So, the MMN is stuck, either his or her objection is utter non-sense, doesn't mean anything and, therefore, does not belong in the equation; or it results in a contradiction and, hence, is false



The whole objection requires that good/evil denote. If it does not then the statment it self is meaningless. If good/evil have no referrent or meaning the objection might as well be,

(4'') Since ratava and bogo gobo do not exist, (1) and (2) are neither true nor false.

But, of course, this objection has no bearing on the argument or any argument for that fact. It is meaning-less.

Thanks

--mnkbdky