Freethought & Rationalism Archive

hedonologist · 01-07-2002, 05:28 PM

This is how I think it would. In a sense this is the only way to reach a meaning about materialism that regards physical reality (ie behavior) instead of having nebulous conversations that seem unimportant if you don't realize these implications.

The primary practical questions regard how we treat each other and what is our ultimate purpose/intention in our actions, but I want to start with a less realistic hypothetical that most clearly distinguishes between how the "mind-body dualists" and "mind-body monist" (eg materialists), behave.

Imagine an exact physical copy could be made of your brain, as it is at this moment, and if you had an accident that gave you severe enough brain damage, it was a common practice to replace the brain from info stored in a "back up" copy that you might make at the end of each day with some sort of brain scanning device. If you had one of these inexpensive devices and the complimentary insurance, a new brain could be made and hooked up like the old brain was.

What would your experience be like if you died from the brain damage and this new brain was put in your head? Would you awake as the new brain or would someone else wake up in that brain? I would say that since the new brain could have been made when I was still alive, and that new brain would have a different experience from me, that the new brain could not be me after I died either.

This theory I'm presenting creates the only paradox I know of, and I am not certain of what I say, I just say so to hear how people will react.

I also would like to hear how anyone else thinks a materialist or dualist philosophy, leads people to act differently, but with the emphasis on the materialist behavior, rather than talking about how dualism might lead to a mind-over-matter belief that might inspire some to try and bend a spoon or contact dead spirits. I might get into the more practical questions after I hear how people respond to this.

tronvillain · 01-07-2002, 06:50 PM

I see no paradox.

I would simply awake, seemingly immediately after having made the recording. Obviously I would not be the person who died - we would differ by the experiences of a day. Still, if you consider yourself in the past to be "you" asserting that such a copy is not "you" seems unjustified.

Think of it this way: imagine that every five minutes you are abducted by aliens who make nintey-nine copies of you, then randomly destroy all but one and transport that one back to your original position in an instant. Does this lack of physical continuity matter to "you"? No. All that seems to matter is the information.

excreationist · 01-07-2002, 06:58 PM

Well I think that it is possible, assuming that the mind isn't a supernatural entity... in movies like the Sixth Day they show how this could work.

tronvillain · 01-07-2002, 07:31 PM

Of course, even though "I" would live on I wouldn't go around risking my life since death sounds unpleasant. That the information will subsequently be lost is irrelevant to the brain having the experience at the time - I wouldn't volunteer to be tortured for hours then given a drug to forget it all either.

d'naturalist · 01-07-2002, 08:18 PM

If I had my brain copied, and my current brain was damaged ("hurt to death", as someone once wrote) a day later? I would have a new brain grown from the "backup copy" and installed into my head. I would then awake as myself with a day's worth of amnesia.

Keep in mind that you're talking about an "exact physical copy", meaning same DNA, same chemical composition, same neural pathways. As a M-B Monist, I see the mind as simply a "projection" created by the electro-chemical processes of the brain and sensory organs. Consequently, as long as the physical brain is reconstructed as an exact duplicate of the original and connected properly to the body, it'll provide the same conscious & subconscious mind.

The M-B Dualist, basically sees the mind or soul as a independent entity that inhabits the brain or body. By that way of thinking, any damage that results in the loss of that "occupant" would be irreversible by physical means. The new brain may have all the same memories and thought processes, but it would also have a new tenant.

Jamie_L · 01-08-2002, 05:11 AM

I'm not up on my definitions, so I'm not clear on the distinction between "mind-body dualists" and "mind-body monists". However, I've inferred that my basic worldview defines me as some type of materialist. Here's my view:

Suppose you could create a whole new me, physically identical, and you made it conscious while I was still alive. Let's call him me2. Now both "me's" are functioning, thinking, aware, etc. Each one is "me" to the rest of the world, and interprets itself as "me" internally. However, we are two beings. I am still the first me, and if you separate us, I have no idea what me2 is experiencing. If you kill me (the original), I'll be dead regardless of the experiences of me2. Me2 would keep on living, acting and thinking like me, being "me" to the rest of the world. But I'd be dead as far as I'm concerned. I would never experience another thing again.

So, in the original scenario, if you replaced my brain, the original me would be dead. Though my old body would be around, me2's brain would carry on in my place. I wouldn't be the one experiencing it, me2 would.

Either way, I'm dead, dead, dead.

Another scenario (from a cool story I read). Suppose a teleporter exists. But what actually happens is your body is scanned and recorded, then completely destroyed. Somewhere else, another machine rebuilds your body to the original specs from atoms at the remote site. Assuming no glitches in the process, are you still alive? Or have you been killed, and some new entity exactly like you has taken your place? Me, I say I'm dead, even though the copy is me as far as it is concerned, and the rest of the world will see it as the same. I'm still blown to bits at the first site.

Jamie

tronvillain · 01-08-2002, 09:50 PM

Am I right in thinking that you take the "matter matters" view, rather than the "information matters" view that I take?

When you die and your copy lives on, the "you" that existed at the moment of death obviously does not live on. All of the experiences "you" have had since divergence - including the one of dying - are lost, but the "you" that existed at the moment of divergence lives on in your copy.

That was the case of a diverged copy, but in the case of an identical copy it's not at all clear that anything is lost. When "you" step into the teleporter, in what sense do "you" not step out the other end? Really.

Jamie_L · 01-09-2002, 04:32 AM

tronvillain:

I guess I do take the "matter matters" view as you put it. In the sense of the system outside of me, there is no net loss when I get teleported in my example. But to me, it seems that I am dead, and some other creature that is exactly like me and is convinced it is me keeps on going. But I won't experience anything. The me that used to experience things is vaporized goo at the first teleport site.

True that diverged copies become different people, but at the instant they are created, they are TWO separate entities, even though they are identical. It is of no comfort to me that the other one may go on living if someone decides to put a gun to my head and shoot me before we start having divergent experiences. Whether or not we have diverged yet seems irrelevant. I will still be dead.

Jamie

tronvillain · 01-09-2002, 03:18 PM

Quote:

I guess I do take the "matter matters" view as you put it. In the sense of the system outside of me, there is no net loss when I get teleported in my example. But to me, it seems that I am dead, and some other creature that is exactly like me and is convinced it is me keeps on going. But I won't experience anything. The me that used to experience things is vaporized goo at the first teleport site.

Ah, but what are "you" but a brain in a certain state? If after a given process there is an identical brain in an identical state, in what sense have "you" not been preserved by the process?

Quote:

True that diverged copies become different people, but at the instant they are created, they are TWO separate entities, even though they are identical. It is of no comfort to me that the other one may go on living if someone decides to put a gun to my head and shoot me before we start having divergent experiences. Whether or not we have diverged yet seems irrelevant. I will still be dead.

So, you would be totally indifferent between being killed and being copied and then killed? Besides, if the death occurs before divergence there will be no loss - there will be no real sense in which "you" will be dead.

Christopher Lord · 01-09-2002, 04:01 PM

The transporter (which breaks you down and reconstructs you at another location) is a good way of thinking of this.

Would the reconstruction still be you? The 'real' you was deconstructed moments ago, but it doesnt matter how long, really.

Which way would you rather be transported to a distant star?
On a rocket with a 50% chance of making it, or on as a stored pattern on a harddisk carried on a low speed inertial vehicle which will take much longer, but with a 99% chance of making the trip, with perfect deconstruction and reconstruction at either end.

Materialists will be happy with the slow trip on a disk, but dualists will take the chance on the high speed rocket.

01-07-2002, 05:28 PM	#1
hedonologist Banned Join Date: Jul 2001 Location: South CA Posts: 222	How does a materialist philosophy affect behavior? This is how I think it would. In a sense this is the only way to reach a meaning about materialism that regards physical reality (ie behavior) instead of having nebulous conversations that seem unimportant if you don't realize these implications. The primary practical questions regard how we treat each other and what is our ultimate purpose/intention in our actions, but I want to start with a less realistic hypothetical that most clearly distinguishes between how the "mind-body dualists" and "mind-body monist" (eg materialists), behave. Imagine an exact physical copy could be made of your brain, as it is at this moment, and if you had an accident that gave you severe enough brain damage, it was a common practice to replace the brain from info stored in a "back up" copy that you might make at the end of each day with some sort of brain scanning device. If you had one of these inexpensive devices and the complimentary insurance, a new brain could be made and hooked up like the old brain was. What would your experience be like if you died from the brain damage and this new brain was put in your head? Would you awake as the new brain or would someone else wake up in that brain? I would say that since the new brain could have been made when I was still alive, and that new brain would have a different experience from me, that the new brain could not be me after I died either. This theory I'm presenting creates the only paradox I know of, and I am not certain of what I say, I just say so to hear how people will react. I also would like to hear how anyone else thinks a materialist or dualist philosophy, leads people to act differently, but with the emphasis on the materialist behavior, rather than talking about how dualism might lead to a mind-over-matter belief that might inspire some to try and bend a spoon or contact dead spirits. I might get into the more practical questions after I hear how people respond to this.

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01-07-2002, 06:50 PM	#2
tronvillain Veteran Member Join Date: Oct 2000 Location: Alberta, Canada Posts: 5,658	I see no paradox. I would simply awake, seemingly immediately after having made the recording. Obviously I would not be the person who died - we would differ by the experiences of a day. Still, if you consider yourself in the past to be "you" asserting that such a copy is not "you" seems unjustified. Think of it this way: imagine that every five minutes you are abducted by aliens who make nintey-nine copies of you, then randomly destroy all but one and transport that one back to your original position in an instant. Does this lack of physical continuity matter to "you"? No. All that seems to matter is the information.

01-07-2002, 06:58 PM	#3
excreationist Veteran Member Join Date: Aug 2000 Location: Australia Posts: 4,886	Well I think that it is possible, assuming that the mind isn't a supernatural entity... in movies like the Sixth Day they show how this could work.

01-07-2002, 07:31 PM	#4
tronvillain Veteran Member Join Date: Oct 2000 Location: Alberta, Canada Posts: 5,658	Of course, even though "I" would live on I wouldn't go around risking my life since death sounds unpleasant. That the information will subsequently be lost is irrelevant to the brain having the experience at the time - I wouldn't volunteer to be tortured for hours then given a drug to forget it all either.

01-07-2002, 08:18 PM	#5
d'naturalist Regular Member Join Date: Nov 2001 Location: USA Posts: 245	If I had my brain copied, and my current brain was damaged ("hurt to death", as someone once wrote) a day later? I would have a new brain grown from the "backup copy" and installed into my head. I would then awake as myself with a day's worth of amnesia. Keep in mind that you're talking about an "exact physical copy", meaning same DNA, same chemical composition, same neural pathways. As a M-B Monist, I see the mind as simply a "projection" created by the electro-chemical processes of the brain and sensory organs. Consequently, as long as the physical brain is reconstructed as an exact duplicate of the original and connected properly to the body, it'll provide the same conscious & subconscious mind. The M-B Dualist, basically sees the mind or soul as a independent entity that inhabits the brain or body. By that way of thinking, any damage that results in the loss of that "occupant" would be irreversible by physical means. The new brain may have all the same memories and thought processes, but it would also have a new tenant.

01-08-2002, 05:11 AM	#6
Jamie_L Veteran Member Join Date: Oct 2001 Location: U.S. Posts: 2,565	I'm not up on my definitions, so I'm not clear on the distinction between "mind-body dualists" and "mind-body monists". However, I've inferred that my basic worldview defines me as some type of materialist. Here's my view: Suppose you could create a whole new me, physically identical, and you made it conscious while I was still alive. Let's call him me2. Now both "me's" are functioning, thinking, aware, etc. Each one is "me" to the rest of the world, and interprets itself as "me" internally. However, we are two beings. I am still the first me, and if you separate us, I have no idea what me2 is experiencing. If you kill me (the original), I'll be dead regardless of the experiences of me2. Me2 would keep on living, acting and thinking like me, being "me" to the rest of the world. But I'd be dead as far as I'm concerned. I would never experience another thing again. So, in the original scenario, if you replaced my brain, the original me would be dead. Though my old body would be around, me2's brain would carry on in my place. I wouldn't be the one experiencing it, me2 would. Either way, I'm dead, dead, dead. Another scenario (from a cool story I read). Suppose a teleporter exists. But what actually happens is your body is scanned and recorded, then completely destroyed. Somewhere else, another machine rebuilds your body to the original specs from atoms at the remote site. Assuming no glitches in the process, are you still alive? Or have you been killed, and some new entity exactly like you has taken your place? Me, I say I'm dead, even though the copy is me as far as it is concerned, and the rest of the world will see it as the same. I'm still blown to bits at the first site. Jamie

01-08-2002, 09:50 PM	#7
tronvillain Veteran Member Join Date: Oct 2000 Location: Alberta, Canada Posts: 5,658	Am I right in thinking that you take the "matter matters" view, rather than the "information matters" view that I take? When you die and your copy lives on, the "you" that existed at the moment of death obviously does not live on. All of the experiences "you" have had since divergence - including the one of dying - are lost, but the "you" that existed at the moment of divergence lives on in your copy. That was the case of a diverged copy, but in the case of an identical copy it's not at all clear that anything is lost. When "you" step into the teleporter, in what sense do "you" not step out the other end? Really.

01-09-2002, 04:32 AM	#8
Jamie_L Veteran Member Join Date: Oct 2001 Location: U.S. Posts: 2,565	tronvillain: I guess I do take the "matter matters" view as you put it. In the sense of the system outside of me, there is no net loss when I get teleported in my example. But to me, it seems that I am dead, and some other creature that is exactly like me and is convinced it is me keeps on going. But I won't experience anything. The me that used to experience things is vaporized goo at the first teleport site. True that diverged copies become different people, but at the instant they are created, they are TWO separate entities, even though they are identical. It is of no comfort to me that the other one may go on living if someone decides to put a gun to my head and shoot me before we start having divergent experiences. Whether or not we have diverged yet seems irrelevant. I will still be dead. Jamie

01-09-2002, 04:01 PM	#10
Christopher Lord Senior Member Join Date: Feb 2001 Location: Toronto Posts: 808	The transporter (which breaks you down and reconstructs you at another location) is a good way of thinking of this. Would the reconstruction still be you? The 'real' you was deconstructed moments ago, but it doesnt matter how long, really. Which way would you rather be transported to a distant star? On a rocket with a 50% chance of making it, or on as a stored pattern on a harddisk carried on a low speed inertial vehicle which will take much longer, but with a 99% chance of making the trip, with perfect deconstruction and reconstruction at either end. Materialists will be happy with the slow trip on a disk, but dualists will take the chance on the high speed rocket.

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