Alonzo Fyfe

First, this is a question-begging assertion. I do not think these are "judgments" in the sense that you have in mind here. Rather, values state relationships between states of affairs and desires. I do not think that the "judgment" theory holds up to critical scrutiny as well as the "relational value" theory, and there is no legitmacy in assuming the superiority of the "judgment" theory in a debate over which model is best.

Second, in describing values as "relationships between states of affairs and desires", different values describe different relationships between different states of affairs and different desires. "Cute" describes a relationship between things (like kittens) and the desires of the beholder -- so a different beholder means a different relationship. Moral value, on the other hand, describes relationships between desires and all other desires, and thus does not change from one "beholder" to the next. There is no mystery to the fact that different types of value are treated differently.

In other words, cuteness is, indeed, a subjective(2) value. But the fact that cuteness is subjective(2) does not imply that all values are subjective(2). This is like saying that because John Smith is male all humans are male.

Third, even if there is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions for something to classify as "cute", there is also no set of necessary and sufficient conditions for something to count as "tree" or "planet". And, yet, botony and astronomy are objective sciences.

twisted brother

Only one person came close to the correct answer - that is, the one which will avoid prison time.

Sr. Zonules wrote:
Even more important than how much money is in it or whose purse it was, is the status of the purse (stolen, evidence) and the disposition of the victim (robbed, lost, kidnapped, murdered).

If you retain the purse or the money for any length of time, and it is evidence in a criminal case, you most likely will be charged with several crimes depending upon the jurisdiction in which you found the purse and where you took it when you found it (if you live in East St. Louis, and take it home to St. Louis, i.e. across state lines, then the felonies start to multiply).

Philosophical conjecture is pretty and nice, but meaningless when the premise does not exclude certain possibilities.

Philosophy cannot exist in a vacuum. Reality always makes philosophy (and religion) face the true test of our existence. Regardless of what Jesus, Buddha, Kant, Hume, Calvin or Hobbes said, you would be in prison (where you would learn a whole new philosophy, guaranteed).

DRFseven

The one that will avoid prison time is not necessarily the correct one. The question was "what should I do?" and pertained to morals, so I would expect that the scenario did not include a likelihood of being caught. Even if it did, avoiding prison time is not a universal consideration, nor is it necessarily much of a threat.

DRFseven

Alonzo, every value judgement involves a relationship, but they are still value judgements because they describe the process of assigning negative or positive value. Labeling something as "good" IS a value judgement, just as labeling something as "pretty" or "tasty" or "scary" are value judgments.



No, they all describe the evaluator's opinion of what constitutes the value of something. What constitutes cuteness and how much of it do kittens have? What constitutes justice and how much of it does the death penalty have? It will all depend upon the evaluator's historical circumstances pertaining to kittens and the death penalty.

Quote:

In other words, cuteness is, indeed, a subjective(2) value. But the fact that cuteness is subjective(2) does not imply that all values are subjective(2). This is like saying that because John Smith is male all humans are male.

The above quote demonstrates your confusion with intrinsic value. The kittens are not cute as John Smith is male. Objectively speaking, the kittens are CATS as John Smith is male (perceived facts). Subjectively speaking, the kittens are cute, as John Smith is nice (judgements).

Yes, yes, we understand that our facts are only perceptions and that we are often wrong. However, we cannot be wrong about a value judgement. Peter Faulk is handsome and sexy to me, no matter what my daughters think! We can value something some way, change, and then value it another way, while the object we are evaluating just sits there remaining the same. It is OUR OPINION that changes.

Alonzo Fyfe

I would like to know what criteria you use to identify a desire to avoid prison time as "correct", and a desire to return money to the person who lost it as "incorrect."

Just curious.

Okay, I admit it. I am more than just curious. I think that there are ways to determine which desires are more valuable than others (by whether they fulfill or thwart other desires). However, I am wondering if you have a system for evaluating desires as correct and incorrect, or simply pick them.

Buddrow_Wilson

When I was a teenager, I once found a wallet on the floor of a supermarket. I picked it up and pocketed it. Searching the wallet I discovered $120, multiple credit cards, ID cards, and assorted sentimental items. I took the cash and deposited the remainder in the closest Postal deposit box. I never felt any guilt over this. In fact, I felt good about not charging up his credit cards and just throwing away his ID, etc. I imagine he was very relieved to find the damage done was minimal.

Every time that a similar opportunity has presented itself since then, however, I have brought the purse, wallet, backpack, etc. to the attention of a store manager or appropriate person depending on the situation. Perhaps its maturity that I no longer desire to snoop and take the cash, but I still feel no guilt over that time as a teenager.

Alonzo Fyfe

You are now merely repeating yourself rather than providing arguments, when the evidence against you can be found as close as one or two threads away from this one.

All value claims describe relationships between states of affairs and desires, but different families of value claims describe different types of states of affairs and different sets of desires.

One family (e.g., pretty, cute, tasty) describe relationships between that which is being evaluated and the desires (preferences) of the person making the claim.

Another family (e.g., harm, injury, fitness) relate the object of evaluation to the desires of the person whose state is being evaluated.

A third family (e.g., dangerous) relates the object of evaluation to the desires of the average person.

And a fourth family (e.g., wrong, right, permissible, obligatory) relates the object of evaluation to the sum of all desires.

Of these, some families (e.g., pretty, obnoxious, comfortable, tasty) describe the object of evaluation as fulfilling or thwarting the relevant desires directly. Others (e.g., useful, dangerous) describe the object of evaluation as fulfilling or thwarting the relevant desires indirectly. Still others (e.g., harm, injury, evil) can fulfill or thwart the relevant desires either directly or indirectly.

[Note: This is very rough and, for the sake of brevity, not entirely accurate. I give a much fuller account in Parts XIII and XIV in Ethics Without God.

The proof that different value terms describe different types of relationships between different sets of desires is to be found in the way that people use these terms -- what one person understands another person to mean, in the types of evidence that is considered relevant in supporting a claim, and the types of inferences considered relevant.

That evidence simply does not support your thesis that "moral good" belongs in the same family as "tasty" and "cute".

DRFseven

Whether this is the case or not does not alter the fact that moral opinions are value judgements. People form opinions for all sorts of reasons; no matter what the reasons are for making any given evaluation, the fact is that in the case of moral questions, an evaluation is made. It is this evaluation that makes it a value judgement.

You know as well as I that "in the same family" is user-definable. "Good" and "chipmunk" are both nouns, so they are in the family of nouns. They are NOT both value judgments, so they are not BOTH in the family of value judgments. "Good" and "cute" are both in the family of value judgments.

Alonzo Fyfe

True. Whether to measure distance in terms of "yards" or "meters" is arbitrary. But the choice does not in any way influence the distance from the Earth to the Sun.

An argument that you can change the measure of a thing by simply changing the unit of measure makes no sense. One has to distinguish between the subjectivity of selecting a unit of measure, and the objectivity of the thing measured.

DRFseven

Of course not, but that's not what we're talking about. We're talking about the fact that the thing IS measured; not about how we arrived upon a measurement or whether the measurement can be perceived to be correct.

All we need to do to figure out whether something is a measurement or not is to see if it was measured. If it WAS, it's a measurement, no matter how accurate or inaccurate we think that measurement was. It's the same with moral opinions; someone's moral opinion IS a moral opinion, even if it differs from our own.