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Old 06-30-2002, 06:40 AM   #211
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fwh
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1) That philosophical realism-the idea that "rock bottom reality is a result of the universe being revealed by the senses-is illogical. I don't think that logical, moral, and esthetic truth can be attained by following certain rules of thought. Following realism to its final conclusion leads to a behaviorist theory which is untenable to me.
I’m not sure where this myth came from, but behaviorism is by no means a consequence of realism. I doubt you can find a single living realist who actually thinks our mind should be excluded from attempts at developing our knowledge.

Behaviorism was important as movement that emphasized the scientific study of man. It was an important move in spite of the fact that it prematurely ruled out the scientific study of our internal state, not because of it.

I don’t think it is realistic to characterize the way we find moral, esthetic and logical perspectives using some specified rules of thought. The fact that there are no hard and fast rules of thinking or knowing does not in any way conflict with realism.

Your senses, through which these words are being apprehended, are suggesting to you that you have mischaracterized most realist’s positions. Since you do not believe that the actual “rock bottom” reality is revealed to you by your senses, should you disbelieve me and stick to your mistaken preconceptions about it?

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4) That mind is no late-come epiphenomenon; that the whole universe is, in the last resort, mental; and that our logic is a result of participation in a cosmic "Logos". That matter is a product of mind and not the other way around.
I see absolutely no justification for the belief that the very biological phenomenon of mind extends past the pale of our biological evolution, past the short duration of our lives. Other than animals, what possible reason have we to believe that anything can have any sort of belief? I can see no reason but the appeal of chauvinism.

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Old 06-30-2002, 06:58 AM   #212
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About Julian Jaynes' "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind":
I haven't got the book yet but I've been wanting to for a while. It seems like that main idea behind the book is that ancient peoples just obeyed the voices in their heads without really questioning them... then Greek philosophers questioned them and had philosopher-level consciousness (well that's what I call it). Before this high level of introspection those people would still be "aware" though (e.g. be able to feel pleasure and pain)... it is confusing how some people talk about consciousness/sentience as being what animals have - I call that "awareness"... I think educated people learn to be "conscious" though.
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Old 06-30-2002, 10:40 AM   #213
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excreationist...

"I'm saying we can "see" the moon and this is probably real (assuming that we aren't shizophrenic)."

What purpose did you have in mind for putting quotations marks (sometimes called "scare quotes") around 'see'? Without these quote marks, I would assume it is an acknowledgement that when we report that we saw the moon we would be reporting an event which could be real. That is, the moon on which the report was based could have been the object of sight. Seeing is a mental event. It is a transitive act, having an object. The object seen may or may not be a real object, but in the sense in which it is reported, it is reported as real -- i.e., existing independently of the mind. The object becomes an object publically referred to. Thus, if there is doubt about what was seen, it would not dispute the existence of what was referred to -- rather it would dispute the perception. (This assumes that it is publically acknowledged that the moon is real. There are other scenarios worth considering as well.)

"We can detect the mass which we call the moon with our naked eyes - which we see in fairly low resolution."

It doesn't seem plausible that we "detect the mass." Perhaps what you mean is that our senses pick up information about the moon "en masse." Information is collected "en masse" and is used in the presentation (or representation) of the objects of vision experiences. When we see frames of information given to us at 50 Hertz, for example, we fill in the gaps between frames with information picked up in several frames and mush them together. Were a real event not detected by such a 50 Hertz presentation, we would not see it. Though I think this moving picture analogy does not adequately characterize human vision, I think it may help some in formulating a model of "reality capture." I suspect vision is oriented to maximize the amount of data available to the extent constrained by the amount of time it takes to process that data. I've heard that our visual representation lags about 1/2 second behind the time of data arrival.

"We detect the surface of this "moon" structure that is facing towards us."

The use of "scare quotes" again. The existence of the moon would seem to be in doubt by their use.

"The particles that make up with moon structure are real. We don't detect them directly (through telepathy or something) - we detect them through the photons that are reflected by the atoms in the moon's structure."

This may be an adequate description of physical events (though I doubt it), but I certainly would not doubt that the light medium by which objects are seen convey information about the objects.

"My position is that there is a big group of atoms out in space and humans who have detected this large structure with their eyes have named it "the Moon" (or Luna or something)."

The moon was known (or at least thought) to be real long before we knew what it was composed of. Of course, what it meant to us has changed over the course of centuries. And, of course, we have named it (much as we name the collection of planets, their satellites, and the sun, 'the solar system') The question remains whether or not it makes sense to say the moon is real over and above what it is composed of. Note the same thing could be said of atoms, sub-atomic particles, and sub-sub-atomic particles. What makes something real?

The lie detector test is not different in kind than how I understand your intent. What you are maintaining is that neurons don't lie. However, as a theory of mind, it tells me nothing.

"I'm saying that the pain signal basically is used by the motivational system to mean "avoid this" and the pleasure signal means "repeat this".

This is a theory, I suppose. Do you think I could rewire the brain so that I was motivated in exactly the opposite way? If it were rewired would I experience pain in exactly the same way?


"Robots don't have all of those things programmed in. We react to pain signals in a very rapid way - assuming that the signal is intense. This is necessary because it might mean the difference between life and death when we were hunters and gatherers. Robots are very slow at moving."

The question really was about being motivated by pain, not by pain signals. I suspect your theory would be that we are not motivated by pain. We only experience pain and we experience that we are being motivated in a certain way. For example, when we hold our hand over a hot flame, we don't respond by pulling our hand away until it feels hot (and we can control this to some degree by willing ourselves to hold it there despite the pain). Your theory, I gather, is that we don't pull our hand away until the pain signal causes it to move away. Thus, there is no pain experienced until our hand moves away.

"What do you mean by that? I think different people have different beliefs and experiences. Are you talking about checking to see if people are lying, etc?"

All I had in mind was that if there were no independent account of mental activity, this would be tantamount to there being no theory which would explain (or predict) experience. One has to be able to separate the two. Without such a separation, all I would be able to accomplish are correlations. However, I see now this is all you had in mind. You are not really intending to develop a theory of mind, but instead developing a neuro-physical model which is able to represent with some degree of confidence that this is how the brain works and that it might prove of some use to us. However, your ideas appear to be premised on the theory that the mind's relationship to the electro-chemical activity of the brain and its system of nerves (possibly coupled with other systems) is one of correspondence. Since this is what philosophers are in dispute about, what makes you think otherwise? (One reason for thinking otherwise is that there an infinite number of mental states possible, but only a finite number of physical states.)

"So do you mean you don't like how this is focused on a first-person point of view? Well the ideas I've had on this have been about materialist explanations for consciousness so I've made it as first-person as possible."

I know this is what you've been saying. But there can no explanation of consciousness without at the same time it being an explanation of a first-person account.

"What about this:

2. Aware Systems
...receive input and respond according to its goals/desires and beliefs learnt through experience about how the world works
(self-motivated, acting on self-learnt beliefs)."

This is reasonable I think. Any system that responds to input in accordance with goals/desires/beliefs, etc., might be said to be aware (though I suspect much more would be needed than that, at least if being aware is used in its ordinary sense -- i.e., perceptually aware of a world that exists independently of it). The question might remain whether or not the system really did have goals or desires or beliefs, etc. How could you tell?

"Basically "consciousness" would involve learning enough about how the world works to be at the later stages of cognitive development."

It may involve this, but I suspect it hasn't captured what consciousness is. Piaget's interest was in the origin of cognitive development and (possibly) a behavioral interpretation of the cognitive categories of Immanual Kant. As such, his views are studied in Psychology, along with other views, such as those of the Gestaltists.

"Basically there is an aware system involved (see previous definitions) and during its desire-seeking it processes some of the "green" patterns."

This doesn't sound very Piagetian. In Piaget's view, seeing green requires the prior ability to categorize objects in accordance with colors, something, according to Piaget (and Kant), would be learned. But perhaps you are assuming that as well.

"From its point of view, it is processing a certain kind of data. In humans, we can associate this with words like "green" and images like grass and leaves and that hue that comes from our eyes whenever we look at certain objects - like frogs, etc."

If I understand it correctly, this is the view that Locke had and was criticized by Piaget.

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Old 06-30-2002, 10:58 AM   #214
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excreationist...

"That's what sight is about though - photons are used to detect things. And I think electron microscopes use electrons to detect things."

I grant that light is a medium through which we see objects. Photons are detected by our senses. However, this hardly explains perception.

"And then you'd probably wonder how we can "perceive" or be conscious of what is hitting our retinas..."

Actually you'd have to explain dream consciousness as well by your theory of photons.

"It detects the sub-atomic particles *indirectly*, and it could be said to "see" them."

Given this admission, I think you are abusing the use of 'perception'. As such I will probably find myself having little or no interest in your project.

"Yeah, a brain is involved too. But it initially involves photons hitting our retinas."

So you say.

"And does that mean that what we hear isn't real either? What do you mean by "what appears to us by sight" and "real"?

I was only trying to help. But since you have your own private definition of perception, I doubt whether I have many more responses in me.

"That may be true, but I think it is pointless wasting too much time talking about that."

It rather is pointless to go into philosophical discussions with you. I took this to be a philosophical forum and since this is my interest, I make the kinds of inquiries I do. Your interest appears to be otherwise.

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Old 06-30-2002, 04:09 PM   #215
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Quote:
Originally posted by excreationist:
<strong>About Julian Jaynes' "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind": I haven't got the book yet but I've been wanting to for a while. It seems like that main idea behind the book is that ancient peoples just obeyed the voices in their heads without really questioning them...</strong>
About the voices, I think the suggestion is that verbal law needed to be remembered and reinforced to be effective so societies that developed the "playback" of voices in their head were better able to cohere. This would have given rise to an authority that outlasted any physical ruler so the laws took on a "life of their own". I don't think Jaynes suggested the voices mysteriously emanated by magic, although to the subject experiencing them it might have seemed a miracle that someone could speak from beyond the grave etc.

Cheers, John
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Old 06-30-2002, 09:58 PM   #216
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John...

"I do not subscribe to a theory that the brain works in the same manner as a (conventional?) computer."

Nor do I. I used the hardware/software analogy of the brain/mind as a way to move the question about the "border" along. I gather this is not to your taste. As such, I'll drop that line of inquiry, as valuable as I think it is.

"However, the software analogy seems to have use. Clearly the human brain is organized and operates in a particular way. Perhaps like architects using blueprints to show the essential features of a building, we use the notion of software to help map the brain's processing of reality. "

This is vague. Or at least I'm not sure what software you are speaking about. As an example of the hardware/software analogy other than computers, we can look at the genetic code. The genetic code can be considered software, while the hardware represents how the code is instantiated within the structure of DNA.

"I don't pretend that my theory alone breaks the loop of subjective experience. Perhaps, when we can build a (reasonably complete) simulation of a brain and play with its subjective thoughts your objection will disappear."

Could be. I'll not hold my breath. I don't expect this to occur any time soon nor indeed in what's left of my lifetime.


"You can take this as pure speculation but I think there is empirical evidence in this direction through the alteration of brain chemistry and individal behavior/though patterns using drugs."

I have no difficulty understanding that the mind is a product of brain activity. In order to develop a theory (or model) of the brain such that a mind is one of its products, one will have to incorporate within that theory a theory of mind that can be checked by some observation. One would have to be able to observe the first hand experiences of others, something which is at present not possible, nor do I anticipate this possibility in your ideas.

"What I'm wishing to drive home is that it is the mind/brain that categorizes the sense data - the identification of a "snake" is one that occurs in the brain."

Drive it home all you like. The story does not get any better by repeating it. This is how I would tell the story. The mind categorizes sense data. 'Snake' is one of the categories that objects can be perceived as. Perception is a mental activity. Some part of the brain somehow produces all these mental activities. How it does it is a mystery, and so is what it is that is produced.

"I think part of the confusion here is your insistence on calling something real without making an accurate definition of what is "real"."

I'd written, probably more than once, that what's real is what exists apart from the mind. Apparently you don't think this is accurate enough, at least with respect to your being able to respond to my questioning about what's real. I've mentioned that I'm an empirical realist. I take this to mean that reality is that which our perceptions deal with. This does not mean, however, that all perceptions are veridical. All it means is that veridical perception represents what is real. When we report that we've seen the moon, we can report this as a veridical perception if the moon we perceive is the moon that exists (i.e., is the real moon).

"You can imagine things, this is a provable exitential statement and thus an instance of reality."

The imagining of things is a mental activity which in some to be determined sense is undoubtedly real. (I take note that it violates the above empirical realism that I have adhered to. I would have to add that it would be known through reflection -- another feature our mind has. However, this does not imply that the things which are imagined are real.

"Imaginary things thus participate in reality - what you call real in your response above I term as physical to avoid the confusion."

Participate?? Whatever do you mean by that?

"Would you say that an object must be conscious in order to count?"

This is a good question to which I'm not sure I can give an adequate answer. I think counting is an exercise in quantificatonal logic and begins by assuming a few basic principles (also called axioms). Unlike you (and excreationist) I don't believe counting requires objects to be counted (though I might agree that counting would not have any significance until there exists something to count, as well as the ability to discern the necessary homogenity of the objects being counted, which in turn requires certain categories of experience be satisfied, among them what Piaget calls "invariance"). Since we can impart logic into computers or calculators sufficient to regard them as capable of counting, I would conclude that it is not necessary that consciousness is required for counting. Consciousness would be required, however, in order for the agent to know (or be aware) it was counting.

"I don't think my definition and usage of the words violate dictionary definitions. I'm trying to relate them to reality. What about subjects observing themselves?"

This is certainly a possibility. The use of "I" in language generally represents the subject whereas the use of "me" in language generally represents the object, presumably indicating the same reference as that which "I" refers. Do you think "I" and "me" are identical? That is, would I be able to exactly translate every correct use of "I" in English, to a language in which "me" was correctly used?


"The reality is we're talking about two objects about which you, the observer, have a subjective view. If you remove yourself from this scenarion you have three objects and you the observer ad nauseum."

I'm afraid this is gibberish to me.

"It's physical reality excluding the physical entities that comprise the mind."

It is not a great leap to suggest this means that the physical entities that comprise the mind are not externally real. Would they be externally real to the physical entities of someone else's mind? If so, this is very interesting. We have something externally real to all minds but one. For that one mind, it is not externally real, but, I gather, internally real. What is external to others is internally real to the one. How is this possible? Are you thinking that the inner workings of the brain (considered here as one of the physical entities comprising the mind) are able to be observed by others, but not by the one mind whose brain is being observed? Does this mean we cannot probe our own brain? This seems a rather odd restriction. I saw a show last night where brain surgeons were working on a language impediment of a patient and needed to locate the exact spot where a suspected tumor was located that caused the impediment. In order to accomplish this feat, the patient had to read aloud passages given to him by nurses all the while the surgeon probed various parts of the brain until they located the exact spot where speech was produced. Would this be an example of what you had in mind? If so, would it be inconceivable that both the patient and surgeons would regard the same sort of activity as part of external reality? After all, it could be rigged so that the patient could observe the activity, if not (at least in principle) perform the probing himself.

"I said that object and subject were essentially synonymous (see above), not objective and subjective viewpoints."

This is even more absurd. How could there be a distinction between an objective view and a subjective view without a distinction between an object and a subject? I'm not confusing viewpoints with information. I completely fail to understand how you could conclude this from my pressing you on your bald statements. If it becomes necessary to pin you down I will go back to the original statements you make to which I found criticism. Not wishing to do this, however, I would like you to consider that I've given my criticisms much thought. When I first began responding to you, I assumed that your statements were imprecise or misstatements of what you had in mind. I had hoped you would correct them. Unfortunately you did not do this and instead fell back on what I believe is your own private definitions. This is a sad way of avoiding criticism, imho, and I'm not happy about my having wasted a great deal of time discussing it with you.

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Old 07-01-2002, 03:28 AM   #217
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owleye:
(in mostly reverse order)

An early post of yours: "I should think you would argue that what is real is hidden from us in some way that we cannot determine."

My reply: "That may be true, but I think it is pointless wasting too much time talking about that."

Your reply: "It rather is pointless to go into philosophical discussions with you. I took this to be a philosophical forum and since this is my interest, I make the kinds of inquiries I do. Your interest appears to be otherwise."

Well it seemed like you were saying that we can't be certain about the true nature of reality or something. Well I just said I agreed and that I don't think this is the time for me to discuss that tangent. You see this discussion is already about many things and it makes me harder to keep track of what's being discussed. It seemed to me that uncertainty could be discussed in another thread, or perhaps with someone else since I don't want to talk about it here.

"And does that mean that what we hear isn't real either? What do you mean by "what appears to us by sight" and "real"?"

I was only trying to help. But since you have your own private definition of perception, I doubt whether I have many more responses in me.

I asked you two genuine questions. I'm trying to understand what you're talking about since I don't understand what you mean by "real". If you want to help, why not answer those questions?

"Yeah, a brain is involved too. But it initially involves photons hitting our retinas."

So you say.

I was trying to point out that photons hitting our retinas are involved in sight.

"It [our brain] detects the sub-atomic particles *indirectly*, and it could be said to "see" them."

Given this admission, I think you are abusing the use of 'perception'. As such I will probably find myself having little or no interest in your project.

What is wrong with me saying that our brain processing visual information in order to follow goals and learn, etc, and becomes aware of it? I guess it sounds too materialistic to you.

Actually you'd have to explain dream consciousness as well by your theory of photons.
This is a *simplified* diagram of how I think animal brains work.

Basically photons are detected by the senses at the top left, then the major features are extracted (see <a href="http://www2b.abc.net.au/aftershock/posts/topic12497.shtm" target="_blank">New Scientist article</a>) and this is what the main areas of the main (thalamus, etc?) process (are aware of). In the case of LSD use, the data types can be mixed up - so you can see music (as colours), etc, and data can be corrupted so features extracted from the senses are distorted. In the case of dreaming, I think the brain tries to find large-scale patterns and these can be in the forms of narratives (dreams) that are partly visual. I think we also do non-narrative pattern-finding during sleep because people can wake up and suddenly have the solution to a problem. So anyway, during dreaming, the same kind of data would be processed within the brain as it is while you are awake looking at things. But that doesn't mean that this data had to come from photons while you were dreaming.

"That's what sight is about though - photons are used to detect things. And I think electron microscopes use electrons to detect things."

I grant that light is a medium through which we see objects. Photons are detected by our senses. However, this hardly explains perception.

Ok, so I forgot to mention the brain's involvement in sight....

As far as Piaget goes, I haven't read any of his books and they may be very outdated. I'm mostly just interested in his framework about cognitive development (the stages involved).

This is reasonable I think. Any system that responds to input in accordance with goals/desires/beliefs, etc., might be said to be aware (though I suspect much more would be needed than that, at least if being aware is used in its ordinary sense -- i.e., perceptually aware of a world that exists independently of it).
Apparently babies don't know the world exists independently of it...

The question might remain whether or not the system really did have goals or desires or beliefs, etc. How could you tell?
The main thing is that the goals and beliefs would be learnt through *experience* (rather than being genetically preprogrammed in). So say you wanted to test whether dogs were aware... you could watch to see if they develop their own goals and beliefs. You could consistently ring a bell and then several seconds later, open up a door and bring out some food. (And then wait a day after each time) You could take notice if the dog runs up to the door after the bell is rung through a secret window. If it does that, then the dog has the belief or expectation that food will soon follow. There are lots of experiments about beliefs... another one, which I think is mainly done on babies is to put them on a glass floor. When they are young they don't mind, but if they are older, they are terrified because they expect (believe) that they will fall and hurt themselves. I think this can also be done with animals although they might be scared of heights instinctively rather than have to learn it. So basically I would be looking for evidence that they *learn* the beliefs - and that would involve studying the system/animal for quite some time. Also, they would develop their own goals. e.g. a cat might feel hunger and so search for food. Then it might spot a mouse - which went under a hole in a fence. Its goal would be to eat the mouse and it would have to jump the fence or go around the fence to get to the mouse. So there is some intelligent planning involved. Jumping a fence isn't an automatic response to hunger. Robots can be programmed to be intelligent at planning but they usually don't learn beliefs about the world - their "knowledge" is preprogrammed in. And even if they can learn for themselves, this is different from being able to learn how the world *works*. I mean "machine learning" usually involves specialized fields while proper learning involves being very versatile. (That's what intelligence is about IMO)

...there can no explanation of consciousness without at the same time it being an explanation of a first-person account.
A brain has its own beliefs/expectations, goals, problem-solving strategies, sensory data, etc. Anyway, to be capable of expressing a first-person account, the brain needs to summarize its "train of thought" - probably using language. And this becomes sensory data for itself (it can detect its own commentary - the "voice in its head"). The brain is generating that commentary and that brain forms explicit beliefs that it is continuously generating thoughts and solving problems. So that individual brain has explicit beliefs that it is "conscious" (i.e. it possesses self-consciousness).

...However, your ideas appear to be premised on the theory that the mind's relationship to the electro-chemical activity of the brain and its system of nerves (possibly coupled with other systems) is one of correspondence. Since this is what philosophers are in dispute about, what makes you think otherwise? (One reason for thinking otherwise is that there an infinite number of mental states possible, but only a finite number of physical states.)
Just about how many physical states the brain can be in... there are about 100 billion neurons in the brain. I'll just assume that each neuron can be configured to be one of 2 possible options. (But in my "Rule of 78" applet each applet had 8 weightings which each had 1000+ possibilities, which is about 1000^8 = 1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 combinations.)
So getting back to the brain, there are 2 to the power of 100 billion (2^100 billion) combinations = about 10^33 billion combinations. So if each neuron had two combinations, in total, the entire brain would have a 1 with 33 billion zeroes combinations. And there are apparently about 10^80 atoms in the universe. (1 with 80 zeroes)
I don't think there is a literally *infinite* number of mental states - I think our creativity is based on experiences interacting with the physical world and partly on instinct - and there would be a limited amount of variation in that since there is a limited amount of matter in the universe. I'm aware that many philosophers reject the idea of materialism - that only the physical world exists.

The question really was about being motivated by pain, not by pain signals. I suspect your theory would be that we are not motivated by pain. We only experience pain and we experience that we are being motivated in a certain way. For example, when we hold our hand over a hot flame, we don't respond by pulling our hand away until it feels hot (and we can control this to some degree by willing ourselves to hold it there despite the pain). Your theory, I gather, is that we don't pull our hand away until the pain signal causes it to move away. Thus, there is no pain experienced until our hand moves away.
I disagree with your last sentence... the pain signal would be experienced while the hand is being moved away and also probably just before it moves. My original theory has the "central executive" as being the decision maker for everything (though it just blindly uses problem-solving strategies from other parts of the brain)... now I think that sometimes the main processor of "working memory" just inhibits behaviours sometimes. So reflexes are a result of it not taking any action. But it can inhibit those reflexes. I have some good textbooks to read about it but I just haven't got around to it... I reply to stuff here far, far more than I thoroughly research what I'm talking about (as far as neuroscience goes).

This is a theory, I suppose. Do you think I could rewire the brain so that I was motivated in exactly the opposite way? If it were rewired would I experience pain in exactly the same way?
If that happened then you would seek/repeat the pain signal, so you would "desire" it. There would be no hint of wanting to avoid it so it would be about pleasure... pain would still exist although it would use the former pleasure signal to be transmitted.

The moon was known (or at least thought) to be real long before we knew what it was composed of. Of course, what it meant to us has changed over the course of centuries. And, of course, we have named it (much as we name the collection of planets, their satellites, and the sun, 'the solar system') The question remains whether or not it makes sense to say the moon is real over and above what it is composed of. Note the same thing could be said of atoms, sub-atomic particles, and sub-sub-atomic particles. What makes something real?
This really should be in a new thread since it sounds like a big topic. I don't really have a definite opinion on it at the moment - but maybe I'd say that real objects - and processes(?) - exist within the physical world. Even if we live in the Matrix, our world has a physical basis although we would be mistaken about its true nature. I just assume that we live at the lowest level of reality. (i.e. not inside VR or God's mind, etc)

"We detect the surface of this "moon" structure that is facing towards us."

The use of "scare quotes" again. The existence of the moon would seem to be in doubt by their use.

I'm talking about a particular structure which has an arbitrary name - in this case the name is "the Moon". I'm emphasizing how arbitrary the label for that structure is.

"We can detect the mass which we call the moon with our naked eyes - which we see in fairly low resolution."

It doesn't seem plausible that we "detect the mass." Perhaps what you mean is that our senses pick up information about the moon "en masse."

By "the mass" I mean "the large group of atoms".

...I suspect vision is oriented to maximize the amount of data available to the extent constrained by the amount of time it takes to process that data. I've heard that our visual representation lags about 1/2 second behind the time of data arrival.
I think that's about the quickest it takes to react to visual stimuli (I could probably make an applet to test this to the millisecond)... some of that time would involve evaluation and then getting the muscles to respond.

What purpose did you have in mind for putting quotations marks (sometimes called "scare quotes") around 'see'?...
Probably because I was thinking that "see" was somehow a synonym for "having knowledge of"... I was probably confused...
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Old 07-01-2002, 01:17 PM   #218
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Quote:
Originally posted by owleye:
<strong>..I'm not sure what software you are speaking about. As an example of the hardware/software analogy other than computers, we can look at the genetic code. The genetic code can be considered software, while the hardware represents how the code is instantiated within the structure of DNA.
</strong>
I'm saying it should not be considered software in the sense that there is no proof someone/thing authored it.
Quote:
Originally posted by owleye:
<strong>I have no difficulty understanding that the mind is a product of brain activity.
</strong>
Hooray - now, would you describe it as concrete or abstract or what?
Quote:
Originally posted by owleye:
<strong>...This is how I would tell the story. The mind categorizes sense data. 'Snake' is one of the categories that objects can be perceived as. Perception is a mental activity. Some part of the brain somehow produces all these mental activities. How it does it is a mystery, and so is what it is that is produced.
</strong>
I don't see anything here that forces a conclusion that some of the speculations/definitions in this thread are wrong. Just because its a mystery to you shouldn't stop the rest of us trying.
Quote:
Originally posted by owleye:
<strong>I'd written, probably more than once, that what's real is what exists apart from the mind. Apparently you don't think this is accurate enough, at least with respect to your being able to respond to my questioning about what's real. I've mentioned that I'm an empirical realist. I take this to mean that reality is that which our perceptions deal with.
</strong>
No, its not accurate enough. e.g. I perceive a penguin. I perceive that the penguin I was perceiving is not a real penguin. This is as far as empirical realism goes.

But when you say that an imagined thing is not "real" there is a contradiction in you philosophy - you have perceived the instance of a penguin in question - whatever form it may actually take.

Consider the following argument: If imaginations exist within the mind and they can be perceived then they must be real therefore the mind must be real! The accuracy I seek to inject is merely recognition that our organs of perception to not directly experience all objects in reality (we went through the sun example) and, as a result, we must admit that there are real things that are external to our perception and real things that are internal to it.
Quote:
Originally posted by owleye:
<strong>The imagining of things is a mental activity which in some to be determined sense is undoubtedly real.
</strong>
See method of determination above.
Quote:
Originally posted by owleye:
<strong>"Imaginary things thus participate in reality - what you call real in your response above I term as physical to avoid the confusion."

Participate?? Whatever do you mean by that?
</strong>
Part of (reality).
Quote:
Originally posted by owleye:
<strong>I would conclude that it is not necessary that consciousness is required for counting.
</strong>
We agree on this. All we need is a mechanical process that identifies the objects to be counted counts them. It is such a mechanical process that I refered to earlier on in this thread.
Quote:
Originally posted by owleye:
<strong>Do you think "I" and "me" are identical? That is, would I be able to exactly translate every correct use of "I" in English, to a language in which "me" was correctly used?
</strong>
The words "I" and "me" just refer to a different viewpoint of "you". The use of a word doesn't change the object, only the context in which it is to be seen.
Quote:
Originally posted by owleye:
<strong>"The reality is we're talking about two objects about which you, the observer, have a subjective view. If you remove yourself from this scenarion you have three objects and you the observer ad nauseum."

I'm afraid this is gibberish to me.
</strong>
Your inability to recognize the underlying reason that views are subjective is very confusing. You started talking about object and subject always being different. How about when you stand alone in a room and talk about yourself. Are there two "yous"? No. Any difference if you look in a mirror. No, but you might be able to see yourself a little more objectively.
Quote:
Originally posted by owleye:
<strong>It is not a great leap to suggest this means that the physical entities that comprise the mind are not externally real. Would they be externally real to the physical entities of someone else's mind? If so, this is very interesting. </strong>
Of course they would. As you have mentioned before, we lack the ability to experience the actual contents (or perhaps "state" would be better) of someone elses mind. We can draw an analogy with the unobserved tree falling in the forest - just because you don't perceive it does not mean that it was not imagined.
Quote:
Originally posted by owleye:
<strong>This is even more absurd. How could there be a distinction between an objective view and a subjective view without a distinction between an object and a subject?
</strong>
See above but one post.
Quote:
Originally posted by owleye:
<strong>Not wishing to do this, however, I would like you to consider that I've given my criticisms much thought. When I first began responding to you, I assumed that your statements were imprecise or misstatements of what you had in mind. I had hoped you would correct them. </strong>
Are you hereby saying you are infallible and truth is ruled by your own definitions? Have you considered that empirical realism may be flawed requiring new interpretation in the light of new understandings of how the brain/mind might work?

Cheers, John

[ July 01, 2002: Message edited by: John Page ]</p>
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Old 07-01-2002, 10:44 PM   #219
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excreationist...

"Well it seemed like you were saying that we can't be certain about the true nature of reality or something. Well I just said I agreed and that I don't think this is the time for me to discuss that tangent."

The advocacy of the realist position that I was offering was based on how you seemed to characterize things (e.g., putting quotation marks around "seeing" and the "moon"), despite that in other instances you explicitly allowed that the moon is real (later indicating that the moon is a collection of sub-atomic particles). I thought you went astray when you advocated seeing sub-atomic particles. As such I sensed that your ontology would be better served if you would advocate a descriptivist or possibly a superrealist position, rather than a realist. Here is what I mean. I provide below how various theorists answer the following questions (taken from an introductory text in the Philosophy of Science).

Q1. Do unobservables exist? -- i.e., What is the ontological status of the class of so-called theoretical entities that comprise the standard model used in contemporary physics and chemistry?

Q2. Are theoretical statements true? -- i.e., is what scientists say of the world really true of the world (or is it only what can be known of the world, or is it only the best explanation to date we have of the world)?

Q3. Are observation statements true? -- i.e., Is the moon that is allegedly seen real, or merely a conventional construction?

The superrealist (Arthur Eddington holds this view) responds as follows: Q1 Yes, Q2 Yes, Q3 No. (Eddington writes: "I have settled down to the task of writing these lectures and have drawn up my chairs to my two tables. Two tables! Yes; there are duplicates of every object about me -- two tables, two chairs, two pens." He goes on to note that the first table "is the table of common sense, is extended, permanent, colored, and substantial." The second table "is the table of physics, is mostly emptiness. It is a vast number of electric charges speeding about." He then goes on to deny that the first table exists.

The realist affirms all three questions, while the instrumentalist denies the first two, and affirms only the third. The descriptivist denies the first and affirms the second and third.

My guess is that you hold Q1 and Q2 to be true but I'm not sure about Q3, though it seems there is an inextricable link between Q1 and Q3, making you a realist. Moreover, this link seems to be such that you are what is called a direct realist. What is perceived is the totality (or that part which is facing us) of sub atomic particles comprising the object seen. Since objects have the properties of color, taste, pitch, odor, etc., it must be the case that the totality (or part thereof) of sub-atomic particles have these properties as well. However, as far as I'm aware, no sub-atomic particle (or collection of them) has the property of color. They may radiate certain wave-lengths of light that we perceive as color, but, from the standpoint of the photon, or the sub-atomic particle which radiated it, it has no color to it.

"I asked you two genuine questions. I'm trying to understand what you're talking about since I don't understand what you mean by "real". If you want to help, why not answer those questions?"

I think I've given what I believe being real means several times. However, if I haven't, I'll give it here. Reality is what exists apart from minds. Thus, unicorns are not real. They exist only as products of the mind.

"What is wrong with me saying that our brain processing visual information in order to follow goals and learn, etc, and becomes aware of it? I guess it sounds too materialistic to you."

I have no difficulty with this. You should pay attention to what I'm objecting to.

With respect to your diagram about which I would have many objections, let me merely consider the box called Perception. According to the diagram it has two inputs and one output. What it is described as doing is providing "perceived experience," further defined as providing for "object location, shape, sensory data at various resolutions."

Obviously this is terribly oversimplied, and fails to tell me how it is able to accomplish this feat given sensory input and what short term memory provides. The main difficulty has to do with any process that has two inputs to it. How are these inputs synchronized (if they are clock driven, or matched, if they are are data driven). Does Perception itself fetch the data from its two sources, or does it merely respond to the flow of data provided by one or the other input? Since it is called Short Term Memory, one way of making this work is to call it the data store (or the holding register) so that the other input becomes the data flow. It is then the responsibility of Perception to retrieve what it needs so as to provide its output (presumably in near-real time).

The second problem is that the model only describes the data it provides as output in a language that assumes we already know the form it takes in humans. Whereas you began with photons as input to "Sensory Inputs" presumably they being the carriers of information, the diagram doesn't provide any clue as to how information is carried beyond that. If you decide that the information is somehow embedded in our neural network, it will remain unclear how this gets translated to our experience (of color, location, etc.)

"That's what sight is about though - photons are used to detect things. And I think electron microscopes use electrons to detect things."

"Apparently babies don't know the world exists independently of it..."

This is part of Piaget's theory, which in some sense follows a Kantian model. In order to be aware of a world independent of it, babies first have to learn object invariance. In any case, it is possible that babies aren't really aware of anything until this point. At what point would your theory of mind say that babies are aware?

"The main thing is that the goals and beliefs would be learnt through *experience* (rather than being genetically preprogrammed in)."

Do you mean specific goals and specific beliefs? Surely some goals (such as those associated with reproduction) are genetically programmed.

"So say you wanted to test whether dogs were aware... you could watch to see if they develop their own goals and beliefs."

This is a behavioral model of desires and beliefs. A goal is determined by observing what purpose a behavior has. Beliefs are determined from the dispositions (i.e., the tendencies) related to behavior. This may be sufficient to say that an animal is aware, but it would be insufficient if we were speaking about the kind of awareness that is the subject of debate. In humans (at least beyond a certain age), being aware (or being conscious) means, being self-aware (or self-conscious). That is, in order for a goal to count as a conscious goal (in the human sense) the agent has to be aware that it has that goal. If it has a belief, it has to be aware that it has that belief. It has been argued that only humans (and possibly some of the higher primates) have this level of consciousness.

"A brain has its own beliefs/expectations, goals, problem-solving strategies, sensory data, etc. Anyway, to be capable of expressing a first-person account, the brain needs to summarize its "train of thought" - probably using language. And this becomes sensory data for itself (it can detect its own commentary - the "voice in its head"). The brain is generating that commentary and that brain forms explicit beliefs that it is continuously generating thoughts and solving problems. So that individual brain has explicit beliefs that it is "conscious" (i.e. it possesses self-consciousness)."

I take this to be your theory (or thesis). Do you have any support for it at all?

"I'm aware that many philosophers reject the idea of materialism - that only the physical world exists."

Actually, I think this would refer to what is called "physicalism," and not "materialism." In any case, I suspect you haven't really given it much thought. Based on my interactions with you I had originally assumed you were familiar with David Chalmers' analysis of what he calls the hard problem of consciousness and that you were taking the position held by Paul Churchland called "Eliminative Materialism" which essentially denies the existence of the mind altogether. I'm no longer convinced that you are aware of their work.

"I disagree with your last sentence... the pain signal would be experienced while the hand is being moved away and also probably just before it moves."

What do you mean by the experience of "the pain signal?" This seems a distortion of language. We may be experiencing pain or we may be experiencing heat, the heat of the flame. Undoubtedly there are several lines of neural connections leading to a pain generation center in the brain and a center which generates the feeling of heat in the brain, among other things. Signals radiating from these centers might possibly trigger the experience we have, but it is a distortion to say that we experience the signals.

"If that happened then you would seek/repeat the pain signal, so you would "desire" it. There would be no hint of wanting to avoid it so it would be about pleasure... pain would still exist although it would use the former pleasure signal to be transmitted."

More distortions. (Under the rewiring scenario) -- I would not seek/repeat the pain signal. Rather, I would expect to seek/repeat what the pain refers me to. Thus, I would seek the pain from the hot flame. Or I would seek the hot flame. According to your theory, then, the hot flame would be a pleasurable experience, not a painful one. (Interestingly, we sometimes do see seek painful experiences. I've even done this, with respect to toothaches. I would not say doing so makes it a pleasurable experience, however. In addition I would grant that some of our most painful experiences are highly pleasurable. I think certain sexual experiences are of this kind. So it appears that the wiring of pain and pleasure is complex. Your theory (which speaks about seeking pleasures and avoiding pains) is undoubtedly too simple-minded.

"I'm talking about a particular structure which has an arbitrary name - in this case the name is "the Moon". I'm emphasizing how arbitrary the label for that structure is."

When I talked about seeing the moon, I'm not referring to the name I give to what the moon refers to. It boggles my mind that you would even think this is a consideration. Despite this, however, it is possible you are a nominalist about the moon (i.e., the moon exists in name only). Then it would confirm that you do not take a realist position about the moon. However, you've danced around this.

"I think that's about the quickest it takes to react to visual stimuli (I could probably make an applet to test this to the millisecond)... some of that time would involve evaluation and then getting the muscles to respond."

What I was saying was that the world we _see_ is already 1/2 second behind the actual state of the world. It is not the delay between stimuli and response. The Lebec experiments have confirmed this, though in the world of real-time piloted simulations (one of the areas I worked in during my stint at NASA), the researchers were already familiar with the time lag of conscious experience (of about .4 seconds) that has to be accounted for when a pilot flies the aircraft (as opposed to a robot, for example, which does not need consciousness).

owleye
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Old 07-02-2002, 05:56 AM   #220
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Does anyone think it is possible to know you are dreaming when you are dreaming. After you wake from a dream you can probably think, "I was dreaming". While you are dreaming, can you reflect within the dream? Does this have to be developed or do we have to wait on evolution?

Where do dreams fit in the border of the mind and brain? Are we ready to move on and try to take dreams into account?
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