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05-20-2002, 05:39 PM | #61 | ||
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It would be irrational to truthfully tell an enemy how to build a weapon of mass destruction. If your goals are altruist in nature, it would be irrational to behave in a way that is counter productive to your goals. It is irrational to act in a way that is counter productive to you goals, no mater what you goals are. Once an individual has a particular set of moral goals, whether they came through a decision or or instinct, there are rational objective ways of supporting those goals. But there is no objective law stating what moral goals we SHOULD hold and SHOULDN'T hold. There is no law stating one should not have the goal of deriving pleasure from the pain of others, or pleasure from the pleasure of others. Morality can be objectively right or wrong in regards to supporting goals, but goals aren't objectively right or wrong. Goals are subjective |
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05-20-2002, 08:55 PM | #62 |
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bd-from-kg: I have no idea how you got from “X is subjective” to “X has nothing to do with objective morality”. You might as well say that a doctor should ignore the fact that I feel severe pain in my shoulder whenever I move my arm on the grounds that pain is “subjective” and therefore has nothing to do with my objective medical condition. And if the medical condition is that I have frequent headaches, the condition itself is subjective, yet it is objectively true that it exists.
I am talking about suffering and empathy. I do not see what doctors, pain or medical conditions have to do with objective morality. And a rock has to survive in order for it to continue to be a rock. A rock cannot choose to survive or not. It doesn't have an ought. One meaning could be simply that we have to do what’s necessary to stay alive in order to stay alive. This can hardly be denied, but it doesn’t follow that we ought to do what’s necessary to stay alive unless you start with the premise that would be “good” for us to stay alive. It is good to stay alive or else you can no longer live. Its an all or nothing proposition. You cannot cease to live and then decide to live again. Another meaning could be that all living things have an innate tendency to act in ways that tend to keep them alive. But that isn’t true of all living things; occasionally an individual with no such tendency will be produced. And such individual naturally dies. Its function of living ceases. The only reason that there are few such individuals is that they normally fail to stay alive. This is called “natural selection”. This has no moral implications unless you start with the premise that we “ought” to cooperate with natural selection. Since human beings can alter nature to suit they no longer fall into rules of natural selection and therefore must become moral beings (because they can go against nature). So the rest of your argument in this paragraph is no longer relevant. On the other hand, if you mean that survival is important to us in the sense that we desire it strongly, Survival is not something you "desire" it is simply fundamental to everything else including desire itself. But we desire many other things besides survival; are all of them “good” simply by virtue of the fact that we desire them? And anyway, this contradicts your statement that subjective things like empathy and suffering (and presumably desires) have nothing to do with objective morality. It doesn't. I can desire to kill my neighbor but if that neighbor has a gun and is ready to defend himself my desire is no longer relevant. I cannot kill my neighbor for I will die. My life is fundamental and precedes any desires in any decision. Empathy and suffering cannot be relevant in objective morality because there subjective in nature, there is no way you can measure the level of suffering and determine it objectively. There are several problems with this. First, slavery does not deprive one of free will; in fact, it has nothing to do with free will. What it does is to prevent one from doing what one wants, which is quite a different matter. No. Slavery is person X preventing with force and at his whim from person Y of doing things person X and Z can freely do. Besides, slavery is not only passive restraint. It is also the forcing others to do things at the threat of force. Almost every law prevents someone from doing what he wants. Are all laws therefore morally wrong? Laws are applied equally to everyone, they are supposed to anyway. Second, surely you’re not saying that what’s wrong with slavery is that it lowers productivity? That slavery would be fine if it increased the GNP? If so, I see no point in considering your “moral philosophy” any further. Of course not, but slavery does affect the productivity of men (obviously). No, that is not what’s immoral about it. When a policeman arrests a criminal by tackling him and putting handcuffs on him, he is forcefully subjugating the perp’s will to his own, but few of us would say that he is acting immorally. What’s wrong with slavery is that one man is unjustly subjugating another man’s will to his own; the slave (ordinarily) has done nothing to deserve being enslaved. But of course, “unjust” and “deserve” are moral terms. In the absence of any moral principles on the basis of which you can say that the slave owner acted unjustly or that the slave did not deserve to be deprived of his freedom, there is no way to reach the conclusion that slavery is objectively immoral. The difference (and objectively so) between the policeman arresting a criminal and a slave owner is that the policeman is responding to an initiation of violence from the criminal. The slave never initiated violence, in fact it is the slave owner who is the initiator. Oh, please. Dying for one’s country is not especially good for one’s well being, but how does it follow that it isn’t good for one’s society? The heroes who died trying to save people in the WTC on 9/11 surely knew that running up the stairs of a burning building was not especially good for their well being. So were they acting antisocially? Or again, should we put everyone who works in the criminal justice system in the same category as slave owners because what they do is contrary to the well being of those who are punished? There is, again, a difference (and objectively so) between the slaves and those heroes who died trying to save people. The slaves are in that state against their will. The heroes died trying to save people on their own free will to do so. [ May 20, 2002: Message edited by: 99Percent ]</p> |
05-21-2002, 01:18 AM | #63 | |
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Alonzo Fyfe
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What I'm getting at is, what difference does calling it an objective theory make? You have argued, and I agree, that absolute certainty of the truth or falsity of a moral proposition is not required. However, for all but the most trivially simple propositions, truth or falsity is often far from certain. It seems to me that most moral statements are in reality comments on strategies for achieving aims based on underlying moral values. At its simplest, the statement "murder is wrong", is really saying that murder is a bad strategy if you believe harming others is wrong. Harming others is a bad strategy if you want to avoid harm to yourself and so on... Whilst I have considerable sympathy with the notion that at their most basic level these moral values are probably universal or "objective" in nature, strategies are surely subjective? Are you saying that by acknowledging the objective basis of morality, we can develop better strategies? Chris |
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05-21-2002, 02:40 AM | #64 | |
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05-21-2002, 04:40 AM | #65 | |
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Another reason why I am not in a rush to answer your posts is the fact that you and I do not disagree in substantive conclusions. As far as I can tell, on any specific moral issue, if you apply your system and I apply my system we will get exactly the same results. Which means that our dispute is purely academic. What would it take for such an entity that exists? (A) It has to be an entity, the knowledge of which alters our behavior. (B) It must alter our behavior for the better. Which means we still need a separate conception of better so that we can see if the change is an improvement or a degradation. (C) It must necessarily lead to better behavior -- the link cannot just happen to be a happy coincidence. If the relationship is merely contingent, we can still ask which route to take if the contingency were to break down. (D) Our capacity to recognize and properly respond to this mysterious objective morality has to be a capacity that has survived evolutionary pressures, which select such capacities on the basis of survival of the fittest, not on the basis of reacting appropriately to strange entity. There is no such thing. Now, common-sense morality (or folk-morality; the morality that is practiced by the lay population) contains two incompatible concentrations. (1) A concentration on the reasons that the reasons has; what the agent would do if fully informed. (2) A concentration on minimizing harm to others. What a person will actually do if fully informed is maximize fulfillment of his own desires, whatever those desires may be. (They may be altruistic desires, they may be self-centered.) Whereas "harm to others" is best understood as the thwarting of the strong and stable desires of others (Joel Feinberg, HARM TO OTHERS, Oxford University Press). There is no necessarily link between the two -- between what maximizes the fulfillment of an agent's desires and what minimizes harm to others. So, when these two elements part company (when the fulfillment of an agent's desires is harmful to others), we must ask which of the two roads we should take. If we take Route 1 where these elements part company, we risk calling moral the harshest forms possible of selfishness, cruelty, exploitation and harm -- because we have left 'harm to others' behind. If we take Route 2 where the elements part company, we travel down a road where the morally right thing to do is divorced from what a particular agent has a reason to do -- a road where it is possible for an agent to know that an action is wrong in an objective sense (in that the agent knows as an objective fact that the action is harmful to others) and simply not care. I argue that practical-ought and moral-ought split precisely along these lines. Practical-ought takes Route 1; moral-ought takes Route 2. Those who hold that the reasons of the agent are a necessary component of moral ought are confusing this distinction. Or, to put the point another way, on this board people have often used the example of Jones killing Smith to take his money. The view under debate tends to be whether Jones can expect to profit or benefit from the murder/theft -- whether it is rational for Jones to take the money, or whether the reasons that Jones has for taking the the money outweigh the reasons that Jones has for not taking it. My view is that the morality of Jones killing Smith for his money has nothing to do with what is rational for Jones or with Jones' reasons for taking or not taking the money. It has to do with whether Smith and everybody else, all things considered, have a reason to stop him. Jones' reasons for killing Smith for the money are not relevant except insofar as these are reasons that everybody else has a reason to encourage or discourage. In other words, those who follow Route 1 look at the murder/theft from Jones' perspective. Those who take Route 2 look at the murder/theft from the perspective of Smith and everybody else. My take on the "very purpose and function of morality" is to minimize harm to others. (And since we are 'others' to everybody else on the planet, we have a reason to do so.) And doing so means creating a situation where each agent's Route 1 runs parallel to Route 2 -- where a person pursuing the maximum fulfillment of his own desires does not harm others. But we can't do by imagining or inventing some mysterious metaphysical link between the two so that they are, in the theorist's mind at least, the same road. We do so through moral education and through sanctions. Moral education involves helping children in particular acquire those desires and aversions for which maximum fulfillment is incompatible with harm to others. Sanctions involve a crude but effective announcement that "if you do not have a sufficient reason to not murder Smith for his money; one will be provided for you." Or "We will give you a reason to travel a personal Route 1 that is as close as possible to Route 2 in the form of what we will do to you if you deviate too significantly from Route 2." Here, I am talking about social ostracisim, fines, imprisonment, and possibly death. But the point is, we must use techniques like this to force Route 1 and Route 2 to run parallel to each other. There is no magical, metaphysical link between them. The only link that exists is one that we construct -- sometimes, admittedly, through the use of some fairly crude tools. We must recognize that where the two routes diverge, morality travels Route 2 (minimizing harm to others), not Route 1 (maximizing fulfillment of the agent's own desires), and this is what justifies forcing others to take a personal Route 1 closer to Route 2, rather than further away. [ May 21, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p> |
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05-21-2002, 06:56 AM | #66 |
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So, would a subjectivist "all-things-considered" theory produce the same results as the objectivist version? Yes. Many people are under the mistaken impression that objective and subjective are mutually exclusive. They are not. You and I are both objects in the world, and yet we are objects with minds, beliefs, and desires. We are both, at the same time, object and subject. Moral truths are also, at the same time, both objective and subjective. Objective in the sense that the truth or falsity of moral propositions is substantially independent of the beliefs and desires of any one individual -- there is an objective right answer that is true for everybody. Subjective in that the right answer is an answer about how states of affairs relate to desires. What I'm getting at is, what difference does calling it an objective theory make? Well, calling it an objective theory has the advantage of being true. Of course, it is not objective in the sense of proving that values exist independent of the mind. Desire-independent values do not exist. But it is true in the sense of there being one correct answer to moral questions that is true for everybody independent of their individual beliefs and desires (because it is dependent on the desires of others as well). You have argued, and I agree, that absolute certainty of the truth or falsity of a moral proposition is not required. However, for all but the most trivially simple propositions, truth or falsity is often far from certain. Well, the amount of certainty is also far from certain. I maintain that if we clear out of the errors (subjectivism, rationalism, internalism) we can be more certain about a lot of these propositions than we are today with these errors cluttering our view. About some issues, reasonable people will continue to disagree -- just as with any scientific endeavor. But with an objective truth there are also objective ways to test various theories and, through this, to come closer to the truth over time -- just as with any scientific endeavor. It seems to me that most moral statements are in reality comments on strategies for achieving aims based on underlying moral values. Well, I would substitute '(strong and stable) desires' for 'underlying moral values' -- but, ultimately, not some random or arbitrary subset of desires, but all desires (all things considered). I am not sure, but with this change your characterization seems to be saying the same thing I have been saying. |
05-21-2002, 09:02 AM | #67 | ||||||||||||
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You've just contradicted yourself by saying that one person can believe (an inherently subjective action) one thing while another believes something else, but that doesn't mean there isn't an "objective" truth. What would the objective truth be and what's more, how would it be established? If you say "God" you've immediately disqualified yourself from this conversation. Quote:
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Nevermind, you're apparenlty not trustworthy enough to do so (a subjective judgment call on my behalf borne out of your actions, thereby demonstrating that consensus does indeed establish a semblance of "objectivity," a point I argued repeatedly): Quote:
Address my arguments as I wrote them, if you please. The following is a perfect example of what I'm talking about: Quote:
You had argued (with your analogy) that the earth's age is objectively true independent of what somebody believes and I was demonstrating that the analogy was not valid and not applicable to the argument of objective morality, because objvective morality cannot be demonstrated to exist independently of "somebody" in the manner that the Earth's age can be. One is a fact. The Earth is X years old. It is not Y years old, so for anybody to say, "I believe the Earth is Y years old," they are simply and irrefutably objectively incorrect in their belief. The Earth is X years old no matter what somebody else believes. The morality of masturbation, on the other hand (sorry, couldn't resist ) is not analogous in the same manner, since there is no objective "X" that can be demonstrated to exist to the question of whether or not masturbation is immoral in the same manner that the Earth is "X" years old. The only way you could demonstrate such an "objective X" for masturbation is to prove that a god exists who in turn has simply subjectively mandated that masturbation is immoral, in which case you would have simply shifted the exact same subjectivity onto the god. No matter how you slice it, it is not possible to ever state that masturbation is objectively immoral, even with the proof that a god exists. Quote:
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If god states, "Masturbation is immoral," it is still a subjective declaration, since it would be impossible for that god to explain the objective justification behind such a declaration. Quote:
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You will find it is impossible to do so, even with the childish assertion of Goddidit. |
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05-21-2002, 09:31 AM | #68 | |||
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It’s annoying when seemingly meaningful statements, on being challenged, are explained away as mere platitudes and tautologies. This does not make for a fruitful discussion. |
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05-21-2002, 09:35 AM | #69 | |||||||||||
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My understanding is that you are trying to show that there are objective moral facts by deducing them from certain physical facts. It’s well known that the sort of thing you’re attempting here can’t be done. What I’ve been doing is to try to help you see that your arguments involve implicit moral premises. In other words, you’re deriving “oughts” from other “oughts”. This is perfectly legitimate, but it doesn’t show that the “oughts” that appear in the conclusions are “objective”. Now let’s look at your specific comments. Quote:
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Thus: (1) The “goodness” of staying alive is a moral premise. It can’t be deduced from the nature of life. (2) This premise isn’t even true: it is not always good to stay alive. Whether it is in a given case depends on the subjective state (and potential future subjective states) of the living thing in question. Quote:
Besides, we all die despite our best efforts; it’s in the nature of life to die. In fact, it appears from recent discoveries in molecular biology that we’re programmed to die. In other words, there are features of our molecular structure that seem designed to bring about death after a certain point. Does this imply that we “ought” to hasten the process, or at least not try to resist it by following “life extension” strategies? And it’s interesting that you have said nothing about reproduction. It’s just as true that a given species will disappear if its members fail to reproduce as it is that it will disappear if they fail to stay alive (at least long enough to reproduce). Does it follow reproducing is “morally good” by the same reasoning that you used to conclude that staying alive is “morally good”? Quote:
Buddhism is a perfect illustration of this. Buddhists believe in reincarnation, so what they mean be “staying alive” is continuing to be reincarnated. And they regard this as something that emphatically is not desirable, because life is suffering. What they regard as the “ultimate good” is to cease to exist. You may not agree with this philosophy, but it isn’t obviously irrational. Quote:
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In your discussion of slavery I’m again proceeding on the understanding that you think that it can be shown that slavery is objectively wrong simply by pointing to various facts about slavery. One again this attempt is doomed to failure. Your conclusion is once again based on certain implicit moral premises in addition to the facts you mention. this is so obvious that it should hardly need pointing out. Quote:
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It sure looks to me as though you’re appealing implicitly to some moral principle here. What is it exactly and where did it come from? Quote:
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P1: The well being of society is “good”. P2: The well being of society depends on the well being of the individuals in it. P3: Slavery is not conducive to the well-being of the slaves. C1 Therefore slavery is not conducive to the well being of society. (from P2 and P3) C2 Therefore slavery is immoral. (from P1 and C1) My point was that C1 does not follow from P2 and P3, unless P2 is interpreted as meaning that the well being of society depends on the well being of every one of its members, in which case it is obviously false. It’s not clear how the fact that slaves are acting under coercion can be used to save this argument or to construct a new, valid argument along these lines. In fact, this whole argument seems to me to be totally wrongheaded. What’s wrong with slavery is not that it is “not conducive to the well being of society”, at least in any straightforward sense. That’s what troubled me about your comment that what’s wrong with slavery is that it reduces the “productivity” of those enslaved (and therefore, presumably, the GNP of the society as a whole). The implication is that if slavery results in the slaves producing things of more value than they would have produced otherwise, it’s perfectly OK; in fact, it would seem to be morally obligatory according to your reasoning. Unless, of course, slavery damages the “well being” of society in some other, noneconomic sense. In short, all of your attempts to derive “objective moral truths” from facts about the “real world” fail, as must all such attempts. All of them appeal implicitly to moral principles that cannot be derived from any facts about the real world. |
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05-21-2002, 09:40 AM | #70 | |
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