Goober

In my opinion, we do have free will. We make our own decisions based on our circumstances. Of course your decisions are determined by your brain structure and your past experience. But your brain structure and your past experiences are what makes you you, so you are still making your own decisions.

DoubleDutchy

Where does solvency lurk ? I fear that the question is rhetorical, as, clearly, it lurks only in the dimly lit recesses of the so-called minds of financial consultants.
The magnetical and electrical processes that give rise to the customer relation with my bank occur at speeds and a level of complexity that makes my awareness of those processes impossible. I am left with a fuzzy awareness of Swiss francs, stocks and accounts of which I suppose myself owner. The realities of solid state physics , which are already pretty well understood, will inevitably show otherwise. Mystical entities, like francs, will retreat before sword of reductionism an I will be left with magnetons and empty space, penniless just as anything else in this universe.

Something went wrong here, I do hope SoD can mend it before it is too late .

soulofdarwin

Cute! And I am particularly gratified to have your mention of reductionism. As it turns out, Nobel Laureate particle physicist Steven Weinberg has summed up the matter quite nicely, I think, in the following anecdote:

“For some years I have been wrangling about reductionism with a good friend, the evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr, who among other things gave us our best working definition of a biological species. It started when, in a 1985 article, he pounced on a line in a ‘Scientific American’ article (on other matters) that I had written in 1974. In this article I had mentioned that in physics we hope to find a few simple general laws that would explain why nature is the way it is and that at present the closest we can come to a unified view of nature is a description of elementary particles and their mutual interactions. Mayr in his article called this ‘a horrible example of the way physicists think’ and referred to me as ‘an uncompromising reductionist’. I responded in an article in ‘Nature’ that I am not an uncompromising reductionist; I am a compromising reductionist. . . .

As far as I can understand it, Mayr distinguishes three kinds of reductionism: constitutive reductionism (or ontological reductionism, or analysis), which is a method of studying objects by inquiring into their basic constituents; theory reductionism, which is the explanation of a whole theory in terms of a more inclusive theory; and explanatory reductionism, which is the view ‘that the mere knowledge of its ultimate components would be sufficient to explain a complex system’. The main reason I reject this categorization is that none of these categories has much to do with what I am talking about (though I suppose theory reductionism comes closest). Each of these three categories is defined by what scientists actually do or have done or could do; I am talking about nature itself. For instance, even though physicists cannot actually explain the properties of very complicated molecules like DNA in terms of the quantum mechanics of electrons, nuclei, and electric forces, and even though chemistry survives to deal with such problems with its own language and concepts, still there are no autonomous principles of chemistry that are simply independent truths, not resting on deeper principles of physics.� [pp. 53-54, ‘Dreams of a Final Theory’]

In other words, there are no autonomous laws of nature other than a relatively few fundamental laws. That is to say that nature is described by a hierarchy of explanations, each resting on a more fundamental explanation and ultimately converging on the fundamental laws of nature, for which there are no further explanations. Or, more simply put, the reality of everything is there. It remains only for us to see it.

Reductionism, therefore, relates to order in nature (as opposed to reductionism as a prescription for progress in science, i.e., the advancement of knowledge, a view to which Weinberg does not subscribe).

soulofdarwin

Not much with which to quibble there. And my silicon-based friend, assuming its endowment with heuristic algorithms equal to my own, also makes its decisions. Who makes decisions is not the point of discussion. The relevant questions are: (1) what motive forces (internal and external) drive decision-making processes, and (2) what logical algorithms are employed? My thesis is that, given the instantaneous set of circumstances (drivers and algorithms) under which a decision is made, that decision could not have been made otherwise. It is completely determinant and invariant. While you might wish to label decisions "choices", I can only consider your "choice" of that term unfortunate.

DoubleDutchy

Thanks, you're too kind really, but how about the point ? Are bankaccounts 'mystical entities' because they have to be implemented on a medium ? (Be it oak chests, parchment folio's or semiconductor storage).

Is 'free will' a mystical entity because it is certainly brain- and thus hardware-dependent ?

If free will is and bankaccounts are not, where lies the difference ?

Chemistry, meteorology, thermodynamics and a bunch of other sciences obtain very tangible results in the real world, relying on concepts that ,since they do not exist 'independently', are not as a matter of fact, part of 'reality'. Relying on 'reality' alone any real world results would be unnattainable. What kind of 'reality' are you trying to sell us ? It sounds pretty mystical to me.

pi_noir

Wow, it is so awesome to hear so many of you guys don't believe in free will. I've tried to broach the subject with family/friends and they act like determinism is unthinkable. What soulofdarwin said made so much sense. Unless the entire universe is completely nonsensical and the sun won't rise tomorrow, then we must be ruled by cause and effect. I thought an idea from "Godel, Escher, Bach" was useful in explaining how we come to feel that we have free will. Hofstader said that at the nueron level or lowest stratum of our minds we are completely determined, but that the neurons form larger systems, which are unaware of their mechanical underpinnings. I found rjak's reply interesting, to paraphrase "I think proposition x is untrue because I don't like the consequences if it were true". None too convincing.

rjak

Well, your paraphrase is a bit glib and I think that it does leave out some important aspects of my argument, but that's the basic nature of it. My point is that the results of proposition X are, in this case, entirely impossible for me to accept, not merely unpleasant. Also, I do not see accepting this proposition as leading anywhere at all in terms of positive, progressive action. Once again, I realize that, scientifically, free will is very difficult indeed to defend. Personally, I choose to believe in it because I do not see it as blocking my clear thought on other issues and I reject the idea that I am nothing but a sentient observer of pre-set events. If that makes me a mystic, fine.

leyline

One of the curious consequences of not believing in freewill is that emotions become insignificant. For those of us who believe in freewill, emotions are very significant indeed not just in ‘perceiving’ a situation, but also as a motivational force. ( Including a moral force.)

The determinist’s being ultra-rationalists not surprisingly filter out the relevance of emotion. They place conception way above subjective experience, to the point that if they think it is inconceivable, then it doesn’t exist except as an illusion. Some are intellectually strong enough to admit this, and so when I point out to them that the emotional feelings that go with say the death of a relative or falling in love, are according to their philosophy irrelevant to the course of the universe and their future lives, they will agree. Emotion becomes like an incidental inconsequential light going on and off at Christmas time, which itself comes round like clockwork every year.

This even applies to their feelings of confidence about determinism and rationality itself …. as well as the converse feelings about religion, freewill, emotionalism and so on.

If for example a determinist doesn’t like this particular argument and indeed finds a degree of emotion rising up, then I would quickly point out that according to them it is just an irrelevance. (Just like a smile or a disdainful look.) Their emotion is as insignificant as their argument by their own criteria. Which is a very curious philosophical position to take. Ie They think that their own philosophy ( and everyone else’s ) has no significance whatsoever, despite any feelings to the contrary. It has no effect upon the course of the universe at all because it is has no motivational possibility. Just like the discovery of a truth.

From the perspective of a non determinist, why would anyone try to do that? Because rationalism is a force and it is very strong in some people. It becomes a big part of their identity. Their motivation isn’t the elimination of freewill however, so much as an attempt to make the world well behaved. Concepts like chaos and freewill seem to unravel everything to them. Having said that it is only a part of their nature.

The best way to make a determinist angry therefore, is to point out how emotional they in actual fact are, just like the rest of us and how it appears to cloud and motivate their thinking at times. Like when they get excited about a new idea or when after taking great care in explaining something over the phone, the company subsequently denies all knowledge of it. All insignificant to the course of the universe? The same goes for any subsequent annoyance or laughter at having that pointed out. The only significance an emotion has is its inevitable place in the scheme of things. The feeling itself is useless.

A text for example may make you sit up and think. But sitting up and thinking does nothing according to the determinist, except fill in the links of an inevitable chain. A curious irony for those who enjoy what chains of thought can apparently discover.

Unlike themselves I believe that the ultra-rationalist’s own philosophies and emotions are very significant. That’s another thing that determinism renders insignificant. Respect. It’s a mark of freewill, emotion and imagination as much as necessity.

sodium

I think that our perception that we make our choices is real, as the direct cause of our choices is our own minds / brains. However, our choices are ultimately the result of processes that we do not actually control. Also, I see the mind as something the brain does, like a program that is performed by a computer.

If it seems troubling that the process of your mind is ultimately determined by physical processes beyond your control, look at it this way. If you are sane, then you really couldn't ask for a better process. It does what you want, after all, just as you do what it determines.

If your mind were shopping for physical processes that would do what it wants, it would choose your brain, and the physical processes behind it. So I don't think you can complain, or assume that something isn't your fault because your brain made you do it.

How so? Emotions are part of the chain of causality just like everything else.

I think we have to be careful about this pre-set business, because there are two ways in which things can be pre-set.

Some things are pre-set (at least for me) because I have no influence over them. Other things I can control, so they are not pre-set in that sense. But they are pre-set in the sense that my actions and the eventual result can be known ahead of time. Saying that things are "pre-set" in the first sense makes us powerless. This is not true for the second sense.

leyline

the point i would raise sodium is that there is a spectrum of belief open to us, not two opposing extremes. Your comments about the reliability of the body and brain and such are in my opinion relevant to sanity and spirituality and emotion. The key phrase you used however was

"If it seems troubling that the process of your mind is ultimately determined by physical processes beyond your control, ...."

ie 'ultimately determined' is extremist.

WRT the insignificance of emotions to the determinist

"Emotions are part of the chain of causality just like everything else."

As i pointed out in the first post this is the only significance for a determinist. It isn't that the determinist says that emotions are insignificant, but as i tried to point out, it is that the feelings lend no significance. We feel we can change things. The determinist says that it is an illusion.