Kuyper

You were doing find up to your last sentence. While you present a novel approach to Plantinga, it's a bit premature to speak of "smashing to smithereens". I've not doubt that Plantinga himself would have some good responses to your examples. But since he's not here (AFAIK "Al...are you here??), we'll have to muddle forward as best we can.

I want to cogitate a bit on your comments and formulate a response.

Thanks

K

Kuyper

Sorry, Phil, but I'm not seeing your logic here. If a belief is true, how is it irrational? That just doesn't make sense to me.

K

Kuyper

Ah, but that goes to what we mean by "evidence". Here, I think, things get a bit messy. It just isn't all that clear what is meant by evidence in this case. The objection seems to be that theistic belief isn't rational because there is no evidence for it. Now, a theist (such as myself) might take certain experiences I've had as evidence of God at work in my life. I might also see evidence in creation and in other ways. In claiming that I have no such evidence, the objector surely isn't claiming that I don't exist, or that the cosmos doesn't exist, or that I've had no such experiences. To me the objection doesn't seem to rest so much on lack of evidence as it does on non-acceptance of certain back ground principles that give evidentiary status to things. The whole "no evidence" objection, is, I think, really not about lack of evidence, but about staking out a philosophical position that won't allow a connection to be drawn between certain observations and belief in God.

If the dispute really were about evidence (or the lack thereof) then I might ask what 'evidence' you posses that a universe could exist independant of being created. Of course no one has any such evidence (speculative hypothesis about multi-verses, bubble universes and the like are NOT evidence of anything). But if you don't have evidence that the universe can exist independant of being created then the existence of the universe would be HUGH evidence for a creator. But of course, a non-thiest would reject that conclusion out of hand. Why? Because she has evidence to the contrary? No, because she doesn't. Rather, it's because she doesn't accept the background principles that would give evidentiary status to certain observations. That's a very different thing than saying simply "there is no evidence". Thus I don't think the "no evidence" objection has as much force as many people think.

K

K

bd-from-kg:

Memory that forms a consistent model of the past and allows future predictions is evidence of its reliability. If you believe that the reliability of memory must be assumed and that there is no evidence for its reliability, do you also believe that there is no evidence for faulty memory? Certainly if memory is ASSUMED reliable, there is nothing that should cause that to be questioned - it's axiomic.

Similarly with inductive reasoning. Do you believe there is no evidence to indicate that some forms of reasoning (random generation of conclusions for example) are not reliable? Inductive reasoning is used because it works (in many domains familiar to us). It's not just some random assumption that is continually made without any evidence supporting its use.

Kenny

Thank you for pointing that out.

Thanks once again. Though the dogma that all beliefs require evidence to be considered rational is cherished by many atheists, it is provably false.

An interesting and original objection – I have not seen any like it in any of the literature I’ve encountered. However, I think it fails. It all turns on whether or not the belief forming processes of RN type beings can genuinely be classified as non-rational. I would argue that if the belief forming processes of RN beings have a high objective probability of producing true beliefs in the cognitive environment in which they find themselves, then they are rational, at least with respect to that particular cognitive environment.

You did not exactly specify what you meant by the term ‘rational’ with respect to the belief forming processes of the RN beings. The one clue you did give was your statement to the effect that the belief forming processes of the RN beings “just happen in this world to produce true beliefs a high percentage of the time, although they would fail miserably to do so in most other worlds that do not share the idiosyncrasies of this one.” I take it from this comment that what you may have in mind when you apply the term ‘rational’ to belief forming processes, is to designate a set of processes that tend to produce true beliefs not only in the possible world in which these agents find themselves, but also across the vast majority of all possible worlds. By way of response, I would argue that, by this criterion, human beings themselves could be classified as RN beings, at least with respect to many of our belief forming processes, in which case our beliefs would also not be warranted if your analysis is correct.

Many of the belief forming processes of human beings would likely not produce a high percentage of true beliefs across all possible worlds. For instance, the philosopher Hilary Kornblith, in his essay, “Naturalist Epistemology and Its Critics,” cites a study which shows that “human beings have a natural tendency to draw conclusions about a population of objects on the basis of extremely small samples, indeed, often on the basis of a single case.” This tendency violates the statistical rule of making inferences from appropriately large sample sizes and thus the authors of this study argue this means that human beings are naturally inclined to reason poorly. Kornblith, however, believes this conclusion to be mistaken. The natural environment in which human beings find themselves is such that it displays a great deal of repetitiveness. Consequently, according to Kornblith, “we ought to be asking, not whether [our tendency to make hasty generalizations] would work well in any possible environment, but whether it works well in the environments in which human beings tend to be found.” In this instance, Kornblith believes this inferential tendency on the part of human beings does work well in the type of environment in which humans find themselves such that there is nothing irrational in human beings forming their beliefs in this way in most instances.

This one of the great strengths of externalism, in my opinion. It draws attention, not to the processes by which some ideally rational agent might form its beliefs in all possible worlds, but to the manner in which beliefs are actually formed by human beings in this world and to the extent to which they can be trusted to yield reliable conclusions, not in any possible world, but in this world. Human cognitive processes were not adapted to suit all possible worlds; they were adapted to suit the world in which human beings find themselves. One need not even cite any studies concerning a human tendency of violating basic statistical rules of inference to make this point. Human reliance on inductive reasoning, our rejection of grue-like predicates, our tendency to believe in the existence of other minds – all of these belief forming mechanisms are likely to produce false beliefs most of the time in vast numbers of possible worlds. That is irrelevant to whether or not our beliefs are rational and warranted, however, because the question we are concerned with is whether or not our belief forming processes tend to form true beliefs in this world. If they do, then we can rely upon them, regardless of whether or not they would work well in other possible worlds.

Well, if our cognitive processes were conditioned by an unconscious evolutionary process (as metaphysical naturalists believe), then if our belief forming processes are reliable it is due solely to the lucky chance that holding true beliefs happened to be more conducive to our survival than holding false ones. But, regardless, as long as the cognitive processes of the RR beings are genuinely aimed at the production of true beliefs and are reliable, then I think that the motives of the designers are irrelevant.

If the RR beings were to become aware that their designers had a tendency to produce numerous beings with unreliable cognitive faculties, then that might furnish these beings with a sufficient defeater for the proposition that their belief forming mechanisms are reliable which in turn would destroy the initial warrant they might otherwise enjoy for their beliefs (likewise, if it could be successfully argued that unguided evolution has a high probability of producing beings with unreliable cognitive faculties, that might destroy the warrant that a metaphysical naturalist might otherwise enjoy for her beliefs). Otherwise, these beings are warranted in trusting their cognitive faculties in a properly basic manner just as we are.

As long as these belief forming mechanisms are reliable, aimed at the production of true beliefs, and there are no sufficient defeaters for them, then it does not matter whether their beliefs were inferentially obtained or the result of a basic predisposition to believe in them – they are still warranted. Our belief in other minds is a likely candidate for a belief which we have a basic predisposition towards but one which we can not properly infer via evidential reasoning.

Since we, by your criteria, are likely RN type beings, if your analysis smashes Plantinga’s criterion for warranted beliefs, it also smashes our claim to be rational beings. Give those options, I prefer to leave Plantinga intact.

God Bless,
Kenny

P.S. SRB, I have not forgotten you. I will try to get to your post soon.

K

Kenny:

If that's the case, why don't you just post your proof and be done with it? Why are we going back and forth with arguments when a proof exists?

Supporting evidence and lack of contradicting evidence can obviously make a belief rational (any objections?). I'd still like to know what else can make a belief rational. You seemed to imply that being correct makes a belief rational.

Let me give you a hypothetical.

Let's say that a person believes beyond the shadow of a doubt that Oakland is going to win on Sunday because Oakland and Raiders each have the same number of letters (and vowels). Now this person bets everything on Oakland knowing it's a guaranteed win. If Oakland does win, does that make the belief rational? If so, we're working with entirely different definitions of rational. If not, what separates this example from any other belief for which there is absolutely no supporting evidence?

capnkirk

You DID NOT even address the stated argument! Free will is not at issue here. GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE reward/punishment is! And SINCE WHEN are having a single life to live, and the reward of heaven and the punishment of hell "matters of considerable debate among the xtian faithful?
omnipresent

\Om`ni*pres"ent\, a. [Omni- + present: cf.F. omnipr['e]sent.] Present in all places at the same time; ubiquitous; as, the omnipresent Jehovah. --Prior.

Webster refutes your artful dodge. You can't wish this argument away by redefining words!
...not so! It is an argument against the expectation that god answers ANY prayers!! ...but your (non)response IS just the old "God works in mysterious ways" apology. A god that has ignored the desperate prayers of tens of millions of innocents for their very lives isn't worthy of worship! Nor does realization of such a failure engender a reasonable, much less rational expectation that ANY prayer will be answered. Again, I find nothing but theistic apologies in your words.
Another evasion! My argument clearly considered BOTH possibilities (either there IS other sentient life in the universe, or there isn't) and the objections subsequent to each one. If we are alone, god went to a lot of unnecessary work just to create life on earth. On the other, if there is sentient life out there, it is virtually certain that some are millions (or billions) of years more evolved than humans (Being only 1% out of phase with earth evloution = 45 million years of evolution), beings that humans would probably consider as gods themselves. At the very least, the net result of direct contact with such beings, theologically speaking, would be a near universal abandonment of the gods of earth's religions in favor of these beings or of their gods (presuming they had any). Why? because such an event would destroy in the minds of most of the faithful the "special" (superior) position in creation granted us by our professed gods. (See response to next point for an expansion of this point.)

But I digress. You simply evaded the whole issue.

Quote:

First to your comment that one must concede that evolution is a "fact rather than a theory", you seem to be confusing on the meaning of these terms in science. No evolutionary biologist I know of would ever say that evolution or any other theory of science is a fact. That is not a scientific way of putting it. Rather they might say that the evidence supporting this or that conclusion is strong, or over-whelming, or something along those lines. Science is ever in the business of refuting theories and hypotheses. Theories once thought iron clad give way to new explanations as new data comes to light. You might read Thomas Khun's "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" to gain better insight into that. I would also recommend "Conjectures and Refutations" by Sir Karl Popper.

Evolution IS a fact!!! The only arguments that remain are over DETAILS of the process! The only xtian group still denying the FACT of evolution is the fundies (who are still clinging to the Genesis creation). Your digression evades the point of the argument.

AGAIN, I offered BOTH choices (either evolution happened or it didn't). and argued that EITHER choice brings with it a set of conflicts with the dominant xtian doctrines. (I presumed that you weren't a creationist, so I didn't see the need to specify the counterevidence to that myth.). I focused on the threats evolution in any form brings to xtain theology. The most fundamental of these is the "specialness" of humanity in creation (i.e. only humans have souls), rationalized by the recognition that our sentience has given us dominion over the animals (though theists credit god with this gift of dominion). I pointed to the threat that THIS concept is what actually puts evolution permanently at odds with theology. What was that argument? It was: Implicit in acceptance of evolution is the inevitability that humanity will be replaced by a more evolved sentient species, successfully challenging man's claim to being the crown of god's creation. You totally failed to grasp this...or you chose not to address it. For that reason, your "second" and "third" responses are not germane to my point.
Why? One accepted method to disprove a postulation is to demonstrate how that postulation leads to an absurdity. Hence a 1% success ratio is not compatible with a "perfect" creator presumes (for argument sake) the validity of the xtian affirmation of the perfection of god (do you deny this affirmation?).
Let me turn the question around. In what way do you (as a xtian) perceive god to be imperfect? I cannot reconcile perfection (or anything close to it) from a "creation" standpoint for an omnipotent god to require over threee billion years of evolutionary progress to produce a sentient species, while along the way creating tens of millions of species that failed to endure (99% of them). If that truly DOES represent god's perfect creation, then xtians don't have a CLUE who god is or what he is about (i.e. you are deluding yourselves), or god didn't play any part in (the fact of or the process of) evolution (i.e. you are deluding yourselves).

Since you FAILED to respond to the SALIENT point in any of my evidences, I remain utterly unconvinced. You will have to do a lot better than that. One must presume that either you can't see the INHERENT threat to xtian theism present in each argument...or you WON'T.

To bring this back to the original arugment, here is the quote:
I think that the preceding dialog fully illustrates my argument that theistic belief IS of the kind that "holds in the face of disconfirming evidence". I think that it also demonstrates HOW theistic belief endeavors to accomplish this feat.

I rest my case.

Philosoft

I'm not making a logical argument. I'm just stating that, if a prior unevidenced belief (irrational) is later confirmed, it does not make the prior belief rational in hindsight. An extreme example: suppose I believe that at some point in the next 18 months, the earth will stop rotating for 38 seconds. I currently have no evidence for the truth of that belief, thus it is irrational. If, sometime within the next 18 months, the earth stops rotating for 38 seconds, that does not mean the prior belief was rational in hindsight.

Hawkingfan

Kuyper,
Is the belief in Allah over God rational? Is the belief in the truth of the Koran over the Bible rational? Is the belief in invisible pink unicorns who live in my backyard rational? Is the belief in Santa Claus rational?

capnkirk

First: As astronomers and physicists study ever-more-distant objects, they are observing them as they were long ago. Contemporary astronomy regularly observes objects as they were 10-12 billion years ago, so the nature of the universe from that point forward IS directly observable!

Second: From those observations, the extension of observed phenomena back towards the instant of "creation" (I use that word advisedly here because of all the baggage that it carries with it, but out of necessity, because we have no more descriptive word for it.) can be reasonably postulated. We don't have to observe the instant of creation to be able to predict major features of it, and to thereby predict (contemporarily) unobserved (but observable) residual evidences. Later observations of the predicted residual attribute would thereby be considered confirming "evidence" of the accuracy of the model. Such predictions and confirmations DO exist. In fact two scientists conducting tests having nothing to do with cosmology (hence, no vested interest in any particular outcome) were awarded a Nobel Prize for detecting just such a residue (in 1965). There are many more such examples since.

Third: The relativistic effect of mass on spacetime is well understood. The relativistic effect of same at the instant of creation was infinite. This is to say that there was no "before" the Big Bang (BB). Since causality is a time-dependent entity, cause/effect relationship also is meaningless. Ergo: All arguments arising out of either of these concepts are inapplicable on the far side of the BB event. The creator/creation relationship dissolves under the light of these "knowns", in that it declares any properties of any reality external to or not subsequent to the BB are unknowable, period.
The preceding analysis emphatically refutes your contention that non-thiests do not have any evidence as to the nature of the BB event that do not depend on an assumption of god. It also refutes your "out-of-hand" claim.

Your assertions here are a classic example of transferrance. The qualities you project on non-theists: "rejection out of hand", "not accepting the background principles that would give evidentiary status" are qualities absolutely necessary to the maintenance of theistic belief, as demonstrated in my immediately preceding post to you.