Jobar

Suaup, this thread is a good example of how so many of us have reached such high levels of philosophical/theological discourse; we attack and abrade each other's arguments, honing and refining our ideas by a sort of intellectual combat. (We atheists are better at sharing our weapons, I think, so we usually win.)

I want to come at theophilus in a direction from which no one has yet pressed a strong attack, and from whence I think he's extremely vulnurable. He said:
You haven't established a nontheistic, objective standard of morality, so you have no basis for describing anything as evil, amoral or otherwise.

Now let's examine this closely. You want an "objective standard"? Theo, consider what a "standard" is. A standard is a measure which has been agreed upon by those who do the measuring. It is 'objective' only in a limited sense; the group which has agreed to use any set standard may all agree on what the standard is, but that does not mean that a standard is universal. Other groups- nations, races, professions, whatever- may have agreed upon entirely different standards. We have miles, and we have kilometers; both are valid standards, but neither is universal.

I do not see how you can say there is any *universally* objective standard for anything at all.

We do not need universal standards for human morality; all we need are human standards. Just as we have refined our standards for measuring physical quantities over time, we also refine our moral standards; we learn to express our morality more exactly, and with less and less uncertainty.

NonContradiction

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Philosoft

If "evil" contains a component of maliciousness, or intent to harm, which I think is reasonable, then it appears one could avoid a contradiction, as it is possible to do an immoral act without intent to harm.


If one were to accidentally strike down an old lady crossing the street, I would say that something evil has occured. I don't think that evil must be intentional.

Hume's solution to the PoE is rather disagreeable to many Christians.

Yes, it would be, but I think that it's also equally disagreeable to many atheists that use the AfE to argue that the goodness of God cannot be reconciled with evil in the world. As Hume has argued, it's not a logical contradiction. If God exists, then he doesn't necessarily have to be malevolent, as many people are inclined to assert.


Yeah, I suppose if you redefine the concept Smith is attacking, that might happen. I don't think Smith had Hume's god in mind when he wrote that.

I am assuming that Smith is talking about a Tri-Omni God - the God of standard theism

Philosoft

It appears we're at different levels of abstraction. It's possible to consider the accidental killing of the old lady a metaphysical evil, but I wouldn't say, "That action by the accidental killer was an evil action."

Agreed. That's why the evidential PoE is much stronger.
Yes, but Hume's objection countermands omnibenevolence.

Wiploc

You're equating evil and sin. This is done a lot these days, and I'm not saying it's wrong, but traditionally they were distinct. Sin was the mistrust and disobedience of god. Evil was the causes of human unhappiness. Evil was the result of sin: When the kids rebelled in the garden, god punished them with evil.

Evil is traditionally divided into two types, "natural evil," and something else (the name of which I forget). Earthquakes are an example of natural evil. The other kind includes sloth and gluttony. Yes, sloth and gluttony are sins, but, since they cause unhappiness, they are also evils.

Natural evils like earthquakes don't involve sinning, and may therefore be fairly described as "amoral evils." The phase, "amoral evil," therefore, is not necessarily oxymoronic.
crc

NonContradiction

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Philosoft

It appears we're at different levels of abstraction. It's possible to consider the accidental killing of the old lady a metaphysical evil, but I wouldn't say, "That action by the accidental killer was an evil action."


An example of an amoral action is wearing a black tie rather than a checkered one, wearing a white shirt rather than a red one. It's an action devoid of moral preferences or consequences. To say "amoral evil" strikes me as being rather odd.

I think that it's probably better to speak in terms of pain and suffering, rather than evil, since we all know what pain and suffering is, but I am not so sure that there is universal agreement about what evil is.


Agreed. That's why the evidential PoE is much stronger.

And which means that we also have an evidential PoG.

Yes, but Hume's objection countermands omnibenevolence.

True, which means that the only reasonable conclusion is that God is indifferent to our pains and pleasures if we advocate an empirical argument for the existence of God. For that reason, I don't like empirical arguments for the existence of God.

Wiploc

The AfE doesn't prove that no gods exist. It does conclusively prove that one particular god doesn't exist: Since people suffer, there is no god who knows about the suffering, wants to prevent the suffering, and is able to prevent the suffering. Such a god does not exist.

That god is the traditional Christian god. A lot of Christians still believe in him, but because of the AfE, we know they are wrong.

Another effect of the AfE, at least I assume it is because of the AfE, is that a lot of other Christians no longer believe in a truly omnipotent or omnibenevolent god. They think he's pretty nice, and pretty strong; but they don't think he is always nice, and they don't believe he can do anything.

crc

Philosoft

It's just a way to metaphysically describe earthquakes and eruptions and tsunami that are not apparently the result of moral actions.

Fair enough.

PoG = Proof of God? No, that can't be it. "Evidential proof of God" makes no sense. Help me out.
I understand that, but I think the future of proofs for existence of God is bleak, indeed.

Wiploc

Well, for comparison, here's a paper I wrote on almost the same subject:

· Explain the second-order problem of evil that confronts traditional Christianity, once it has developed its interpretation of the Genesis fall story according to which moral and physical evil is the result of human sin, not divine design or impotence.

If god is perfect (omniscient (etc.)) then he knew when he created the garden that Adam and Eve would sin. He also knew how to avoid that sin by tweaking either the garden or Adam and Eve. Therefore, he knowingly elected to have sin. If the sin was his choice, then the resulting evils were also his choice, from the beginning of time. How can we say he is good if he willed the Fall, willed the guilt and the “weeds,” willed the hellfire? If that was god’s choice, his plan, which he executed, then isn’t he bad rather than good?

· And explain how traditional Christianity then seeks to meet the challenge to God's perfection that this version of the problem of evil poses. (What, that is, is the "second-order" theodicy that traditional Christian theology develops, and how does it affect the overall meaning of universal history.

The traditional perfect deity is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good. First- order theodicists sort of skip over the all-knowing part, and hope nobody notices.

Second-order theodicists own up to the all-knowingness of god – but they abandon the other two attributes. Again, they hope we don’t notice. In first-order theodicy, good referred to someone who, while he might stand and watch while a baby falls into boiling water, at least wouldn’t throw the baby in himself. Under second-order theodicy, the word “good” is changed to mean “preening glory-hound.” We aren’t supposed to notice this change, because they still use the same word: “good.”

As to god’s omnipotence, in second-order theodicy, god can’t achieve his glory without diverse painful entertainments including famine, pestilence, war, death, telephone solicitors, and Ashcrofts. This selectively impotent god is still supposed to be technically omnipotent as a result of two moves: first, even an omnipotent god can’t do things that are logically impossible; and second, any mysterious divine non-feasance is taken to be a result of logical impossibility.

With god thus surreptitiously redefined, second-order theodicists can arbitrarily claim that the most glory god can achieve is by, at great personal sacrifice, saving a few of the undeserving people whom he has put on the path toward eternal hellfire. Therefore, in order to have people he deems undeserving, god orchestrates the Fall. So that he can save some of them from it, he contrives hellfire as the fate of sinners. He requires a huge sacrifice before he’ll forgive people in order that he can make the sacrifice. He achieves that sacrifice by crucifying himself. He then arbitrarily grants grace to a few lucky souls, and sucks them up to Heaven, thereby achieving the best of all possible worlds – for a narcissistic god.

NonContradiction

[QUOTE]Originally posted by wiploc
The AfE doesn't prove that no gods exist.

Yes, I know. For that reason, I capitalized the word God.

It does conclusively prove that one particular god doesn't exist:

I don't agree. The AfE is a reductio ad absurdum, which means that it seeks to demonstrate a logical contradiction in order to prove that it's intial assumption of God being Omnibenevolent was false. As I have indicated, the evidential problem of evil doesn't prove that a 'necessary' logical contradiction exists between the goodness of God and the existence of evil in the world. Therefore, the AfE doesn't prove what it sets out to prove initially.

As Demea has pointed out in Humes' DNR, the existence of a better world in the hereafter, assuming God wants all people to enter it, solves the PoE. Of course, whether a better world exists or not remains to be seen, but if it does, then the PoE wasn't a problem at all.


Since people suffer, there is no god who knows about the suffering, wants to prevent the suffering, and is able to prevent the suffering. Such a god does not exist.

If you know that God, with a capital G, doesn't exist, I would be eager to know how you know that.

That god is the traditional Christian god. A lot of Christians still believe in him, but because of the AfE, we know they are wrong.

I don't think that the AfE proves anything, anymore than I believe that other empirical arguments prove the existence of God. In brief, I don't believe that empirical arguments can be made to prove the existence or nonexistence of a diety. You are welcome to try if you think otherwise.

Come to think of it, the AfE is an a priori argument. However, the evidential PoE, is an a posteriori argument. Go figure.

NonContradiction

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Philosoft

PoG = Proof of God? No, that can't be it. "Evidential proof of God" makes no sense. Help me out.

Sorry, I intended PoG to mean problem of good. We have an evidential problem of good, as well as evil.

I understand that, but I think the future of proofs for existence of God is bleak, indeed.

I think that the future of empirical proofs for the existence or non-existence of God is very bleak. However, I am not so quick to write off all non-empirical arguments.