Theli

As for metaphysical naturalism, I wasn't even aware that naturalism touched the topic of value.

Longbow

As long as it is just limited to metaphysics, then it doesn't necessarily speak on the subject. Personally, I think the only meaning and value in the universe is personal. As for "objective moral value", I do think that some objective construct of "moral value" is possible, but not very important. Objectvie morality, I would contend, is not really about value.

But, it is true that such a metaphysical doctrine usually involves also being a moral subjectivist, and empiricist, and so on -- all these other epistemological and moral positions.

I think there could be a universally consistent morality, according to a moral relativist. But, such a morality would be arbitrary on some level, according to them. Some might say that the problem isn't that there is no universal consistent morality, but that there are too many, and there is no way to choose one over the others.

I, personally, am not a relativist, though.

Not as long as you don't dipute any of it.

picklepuss

Hi all;

I believe(?) that "philosophical naturalism" is a term invented by W.V.O.Quine. Basically it is just another word for "Physicalism", which is another word for "Realism", which is the contrary of "Idealism". The two basic positions which date back to the Greeks.
Realism today is the basic assumption that "the world" exists independently of any observer or any observation. Therefore 'truth' is 'literal' not 'interpretive', 'objective', not 'subjective', 'absolute', not 'relative'.

I conceive of " metaphysical Naturalism" as being the ontology of Realism, expressed as Physicalism, combined with the aesthetic methodology of Naturalism. Physicalism being the assumption that all that exists is ultimately physical, and Naturalism being the 19th century art/literary movement which insisted upon a one-to-one correspondence between artistic representation and empirical observation. Art cloaked in the banality of the plain and simple everyday event.

I don't know which came first, art's "aesthetic naturalism", or science's "methodological naturalism". But Physicalism, that is, 'metaphysical Naturalism', is the root of both, and Materialism is the root of Physicalism, just as Realism is the root of Materialism.

Out of metaphysical Naturalism there can only arise an Instrumentalist concept of ideas, including those ideas related to 'Ethics'. The Instrumentalist concept being the belief that-'whatever problem-solving idea works, is good, true, and founded in ultimate reality'.

Unfortunately, that quickly becomes, 'whatever notion works for me/us, is good, true, and real'.

Which is, ethically speaking, pretty much the present-day state of affairs among individuals, groups, and states.

Isn't it?

Theli

Longbow...

How can morality be objective when it can't be refered to as an object?
It would be like trying to find out wich color is the best, as opposed to people having their own favorite colors.
As "best color" and "moral code" are both subjects, they should be refered to as such.
I find the idea of an objective morality really strange. Would an objective morality not be relative? Would it always be wrong to kill?

Plump-DJ

So it doesn't tell us we're *objectively* the result of a blind cosmic accident? You don't think that might have some implications?

I would guess he refers to an objective moral reality. Something is right or wrong regardless of how we feel about it or who hold's the judgement.

PDJ

[ October 28, 2002: Message edited by: Plump-DJ ]</p>

Plump-DJ

Hello Bill..

If i may comment, having just read this I got the distinct impression that Evolution was put forth by many as not merely a possible autonomous epistemic justification for the clam that we have knowledge but a successful one.

Of course the problem with this is that Evolutionary epistemology is just one big begged question and does not deal with the problems of the autonmous justification of knowledge raised by Hume, Descartes and many contempory atheist thinkers.

Just my 2cents...

[ October 28, 2002: Message edited by: Plump-DJ ]</p>

tronvillain

Chip:
Well, if metaphysical naturalism is true there is no ultimate meaning or value to the universe, but it is certainly not opposed to people finding their own meaning or value in the universe. I suppose you could sum it up with "Ultimately nothing matters, but a lot of things matter to me."

I go in for "subjective morality" rather than "moral relativism" myself, but in any case there does not appear to be any objective or universal moral system. Is that what you meant by "a universally consistent morality"?

Theli

Plump...

What sort of reference would you use to figure out what "right" is? As neither "right" or "wrong" are inherit in any objects, I don't see how.
For us to say that one choice is more right than another we first need to set a goal. That being for instance personal gain.

Plump-DJ

Let me say from the outset that i am a novice when it coems to this but i think i would respond in the following manner.

The issue of moral ontology or moral realism or moral objectivity is not the same as moral epistemology. I've just spent the last few posts getting this banged into me by Jeffery Jay Lowder who seems to be arguing for meta-ethical-moral-objectivity within a naturalistic framework.

In answer to your question then i'd say i honestly don't know.

Dr. Retard

No, metaphysical naturalism doesn't take any obvious stance on the existence or apprehensibility of meaning or value. Of course, if you conceive of 'meaning' or 'value' in some supernatural way, then they're obviously ruled out by metaphysical naturalism, in a most trivial fashion. But supernatural conceptions are not the only conceptions, or even the best conceptions. So the simplest accurate answer is that metaphysical naturalism has nothing to do with questions of meaning and value.

Now note this exchange:

Chip's reply seems nuts. After all:
(1) You can't get "MN has no utility" from "MN says nothing about the meaning of the universe". This is a pure non sequitur. Here's a parody: mathematics says nothing about the meaning of the universe, therefore mathematics has no utility. Why in the world would anyone doubt the utility of some theory or domain of knowledge, just because it says nothing about the meaning of the universe?

(2) I'd like to know what "MN has utility" means, since this is the proposition being doubted. How can a metaphysical thesis have utility? The most obvious way is that it successfully explains our observations, time and time again -- explanatory utility. Or perhaps it allows us to make successful predictions -- predictive utility. Perhaps it successfully synthesizes our other beliefs -- this would be something like utility of coherence. These are the classic ways in which theories have utility. But MN passes all these tests. So why doubt its utility? Maybe the sense of "utility" used is something like "X has utility iff X implies all sorts of interesting things about the meaning of the universe." But if that's the sense at issue, who cares whether MN has utility?

(3) The ultimate question is not "Does MN have utility?" but "Is MN true?" Now, in the first sense proposed above, a theory's utility does serve as (defeasible) justification for believing its truth. If a theory passes those tests, thereby besting all rival theories, then it seems we should believe it. But just because a theory lacks utility doesn't make it false. It just raises the question of why we should believe in it. Of course, this is irrelevant to metaphysical naturalism, since, as noted above, it passes the tests and consequently has utility. Of course, it lacks utility in the second proposed sense above, the 'meaning-of-the-universe-relevance' sense. But whether something has utility in this sense is a matter that has nothing to do with whether it is true or false, or even whether we should believe it.

The idea of moral relativism is that the only REAL moralities are those existing in cultural practices, personal affections, and the like. I'll focus on cultural relativism. Cultural relativism says that there's no sense in which one cultural practice is better than another, since "better" is necessarily indexed to cultural practices. What makes a behavior moral is just like what makes a behavior legal -- it all turns on how a culture's people tend to regard that behavior, or treat that behavior.

This is pure Time Cube fodder. And I am educated stupid.

"They" can and do imply no worth? What exactly are "they"? Metaphysical naturalism and moral relativism? Well, first, though metaphysical naturalism is obviously popular among we infidels, moral relativism isn't. Nor does moral relativism follow from metaphysical naturalism, which as noted above, says nothing about questions of value. And, moreover, the question is ambiguous between:

1. They do not imply that there is any worth ~[(MN&MR) -&gt; W]

and

2. They imply that there is no worth [(MN&MR) -&gt; ~W]

Both are false, because moral relativism implies that worth exists wherever cultural practices (or whatever) regard or treat things in a certain way. So, by cultural relativism, adult humans have worth in the US because that's how we feel, claim, believe, and behave here. So let's ignore the moral relativism conjunct.

1 is true, because metaphysical naturalism says nothing about whether worth exists. It certain't doesn't imply the existence of worth. But, as noted above, so what? 2 is false, for the exact same reason.

And suppose I consider myself a thinking representative of life. Why shouldn't I negate or deny the value of my own foundation? What if I, as a thinking representative of life, straightforwardly deny that value exists? Maybe I'm wrong. But you cannot hope to change my mind by employing the claim that I SHOULDN'T negate or deny the value of my own foundation. That's clearly question-begging. As a value nihilist (ex hypothesi only!), I deny that there's anything wrong with such a negation or denial, because I deny that there's anything wrong with anything, because I deny that value properties like "wrongness" can be truly ascribed to anything. Observe:

A: I think claims with "should" and "shouldn't" are nonsense.
B: You shouldn't think that.

This is a pointless dialogue. B's reply presupposes the very thing at issue. If B really wants to change A's mind, B should try to JUSTIFY "should" and "shouldn't," instead of just employing them.

Comparing us to Christians (by use of the loaded term "church") is hardly a good start.

[ November 09, 2002: Message edited by: Dr. Retard ]</p>