Scrutinizer

Bill,

I tend to think this is very nit-picky. May I suggest that something must have reality independent of the mind of finite beings in order to be objective rather than the very general word -- "mind"? If God provides the definition of objective, obviously there would be objective morals, even if those values are not independent of God's "mind".

Bin Laden and other people have subjective opinions of what is moral because our minds are what allow us to arrive at a decision of what is and isn't moral. But since God would be the defining reality on which all other things depend, his "values" aren't merely subjective like ours; they define the very nature of goodness. Of course, you could arbitrarily pick any human and claim that his/her values define the nature of goodness and work from there, but that would be missing the point that Joe Bloggs wasn't and isn't the creator and sustainer of the universe. Without God, we couldn't even discuss "goodness" and "badness" -- without Joe Bloggs we certainly could.

This treats God once again like his "opinion" is no more correct than anyone elses. God "is", and without him there would be no good, bad, right, wrong, etc., -- he defines what is right and good because he is the eternal and immutable creator of all that is! I'm unsure how to make it any clearer.

Couldn't you just say the same thing no matter how many "standards" you have though? If there were an external standard above God, you could ask "How did this standard come to decide that such-and-such is good and such-and-such is bad? Is what the standard decrees good because the standard decrees it, or does the standard decree the goodness of something because it is good?"

I'm not sure why being able to know the difference is important.

Why does it need to be falsifiable?

Regards,

- Scrutinizer

Ms. Siv

Excellent post ! (very precise and scientific)

I would approach it in a different way, though.

I think morality is just a set of ESS (as I said earlier) - Evolutionarily Stable Strategies. And going by that logic, exploiters can and do get away with it most times.
They get away with it when the cost of fighting against the exploitation exceeds the cost of exploitation itself.

Going by that logic, where everyone follows the "golden rule", that will be the ESS (not subjective).

Its game theory, plain and simple.

- Sivakami.

Bill Snedden

Why, thank you

Not to cast aspersions, but many people confuse the term "subjective" with "opinion". Subjective means, simply, "having existence dependent upon the mind." Any value or set of values (or strategies) that is dependent upon the mind for existence is therefore subjective by definition.

The substitution of "opinion" for "subjective" is also often used as a "poison the well" strategy by those arguing against subjective moral theories. "That's only your opinion!" is the common theme of such arguments. However, such an appeal to emotion does nothing to counter the fact that all value is subjective by definition. I'm not suggesting or implying that you're doing that, merely pointing out that the confusion of "subjective" with "opinion" seems rather common.

It would seem to me that the value upon which your ESS depends is, as in the example I gave, the value of one's own life (since it is survival and reproduction that are the driving forces behind evolution by natural selection). The choices that are made are those of each individual creature in accord with his/her subjective valuation of his/her own life.

The manner in which you describe this process as "objective" seems to me more to approach what we might call universal, in that all humans would agree upon it. Just as we would all agree that our own lives have value and make moral decisions based upon that value (as must be the case if ESS were to be true). I believe that the term used to describe this type of "universal" moral theory is inter-subjective. This reflects the necessarily subjective nature of value while emphasizing the universal nature of the value underlying the theory.

Interestingly, that also happens to be my own position on morality. That is, that the value of one's own life represents a proper inter-subjective standard upon which a system of morality can be based.

Regards,

Bill Snedden

Bill Snedden

I've always found it rather "nit-picky" that some people choose to define "pencil" as "an implement for writing, drawing, or marking consisting of or containing a slender cylinder or strip of a solid marking substance." I'd much prefer that it meant "an adhesive substance used to join two objects." Unfortunately, the former is the actual meaning of the word.

"Nit-picky" you may find it, but it is the definition of the word.

I believe that this is known as the fallacy of <a href="http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/special-pleading.html" target="_blank">"special pleading."</a> A mind is a mind is a mind. Why should we grant special privileges to an "infinite mind" (even assuming such a thing could exist) over a "finite mind"? How would such a mind be functionally different? Simply knowing more or being smarter are obviously not sufficient differences as we would not grant the same for humans either.

Well, any being's "values" are subjective by definition, but you raise an interesting point. What if God's "values" aren't a creation of His subjective mind (in other words, aren't "values" in our sense of the word at all) but rather of His very nature? In other words, they could not be other than they are because they are grounded in God's being (which cannot be other than it is). Therefore as God is the ground of all being, these "values" must necessarily exist, cannot therefore be subjective, and must be considered objective. Wouldn't this solve the problem?

In a word, no. Such an argument may demonstrate how God's "values" could be considered objective, but it does not demonstrate how we can know that they are or what they are. I'll come back to this, below.

This is special pleading once again. What gives any being the "right" to dictate what right and wrong are for any other being?

God's long life span, unchanging nature, infinite knowledge, and infinite power simply don't provide sufficient reason to grant this as we can see by replacing "God" with "Hitler" in any argument attempting to prove such.

Standards don't "decree" or "decide" anything. They just are. It is we who decide what to use as a standard.

In terms of a standard of morality, something is termed "good" when it matches that which has been determined to be the standard.

Well and good, we say, just set up "God" as the standard. Unfortunately, this doesn't get us off of Euthyphro's hook.

The result is, of course, that whatever God commands is good. Unfortunately, according to the Bible, God has commanded and committed many actions that we would have great difficulty calling "good": genocide, rape, incest, killing children, etc. While these things could conceivably be called "good", doing so renders any possible use of the word incoherent.

The answer to both of these questions is the same, and also my response to the first counter-argument I proposed, above.

Specifically, I asked if the subjective/objective problem could be solved if God's "values" must necessarily exist, cannot therefore be subjective, and must be considered objective.

My answer was "no," and the reason had to do with how we know or come to know what those values are. The answer also pertains to your other question, "why does it need to be falsifiable?"

How do we come to know what God's values are? It seems to me that there are two possibilities.

1) God could have made us in such a way that they are part of our nature as well; that we simply "know" what is right.

2) God could reveal them to us, either directly or in writing.

Objection to 1) Leaving aside the fact that this fails to comport with Christian doctrine, this would also seem to be falsified by the fact that humans often hold conflicting values. If 1 were to be true, we should expect that all humans simply "know" right from wrong and there would be no disagreements on moral issues. The Christian might reply that we do indeed have this moral knowledge, however the noetic effect of sin prevents our knowledge from being complete. While this might explain how innate moral knowledge does not rule out conflict, it does not put us in any better position to know right from wrong. All it does is show that innate moral knowledge, whether or not it exists, is insufficient to the task.

Objection to 2) Here we have the same problem that I laid out in my other post. Namely, how can we tell whether God's commands (as revealed directly or in writing) are "good"? Leaving aside the immediate problem of interpretation, we can simply assume that whatever God says or commands must be good, but how do we deal with situations where God's commands conflict with our subjective understanding of "good?" What if God commands us to kill our children? Is that "good?"

Of course, the Christian might reply, "Well, God would never command that." Leaving aside the obvious objection that His past behavior would certainly not support that contention, it begs the question. Why would God not command us to kill our children? Because it's evil? But that implies that killing children is evil of its own accord, regardless of God's values.

Now, why is it important that our hypotheses be falsifiable? Well, if we assume that whatever God commands or says is "good", we're put in the difficult position of being unable to differentiate between God and Satan!

Consider: While Satan is not as powerful as God, he's still a powerful being. He could appear to us as a messenger of God, or God Himself (in fact, the Bible explicitly says that he does this). Disguised as God, he might command us to take some action that conflicts with what we might normally call "good". However, as he is disguised as God, and whatever God commands is "good", we have no way to determine that it's actually Satan and thus will fall into his trap.

Without some kind of standard, a "test" if you will, we can't tell the difference between a very powerful being and the all-powerful Being. Both will appear as God, both will sound and act like God, and we without an external standard, we would be unable to differentiate their commands.

"But wait," the Christian might reply, "We have the Bible as an objective standard to which we can turn". But unfortunately, we've already determined that the Bible is insufficient to this task. There are many God-sanctioned or committed acts in the Bible that seem "evil" to us, and yet if God is the source of "good", they cannot really be evil. Thus any effort we put forth to avoid the traps of the Evil One would be futile indeed.

Regards,

Bill Snedden

Tom Piper

Bill Snedden,

I am new here-- I think I have gotten what has appeared in this thread, but if my points have already been answered, just point me to the answers and I'll read them there.

You offered this in defence of the view that morals are based on values. You make it sound as though the values are prior to the command 'do not kill', and that the command is based on the value. Why do you think that is so? A 'divine command' theorist would contend that the command generates the value?

In the case of 'divine command' theory, there is a relation between moral rules and values, but not of the sort that you envision. You make it sound as though the value undergirds the moral rule in the sense of being the ground on which the rule is based. On your view the rule would not be 'objective' since it is not based on something objective.

On the DC theory, this isn't so, and the moral value would be objective in the sense that legal value is objective. People have legal value in virtue of the laws that make it wrong to kill people. The law generates the value. The law is objective in the sense that it is independent of what any particular human thinks, even though it is not independent of all minds.

On the DC theory, the moral law is the result of the supreme law giver. People have moral value in virtue of these laws. These laws are objective in the sense that they don't depend on any human mind.

Tom

[ February 17, 2002: Message edited by: Tom Piper ]</p>

Daggah

IOW, the supposed "objective" morality was updated to account for changes in what was viewed as right and wrong. I.e., the supposed "objective" morality was actually subjective. Thanks.

Bill Snedden

My apologies for the delay in response.

Would they? I don't think so. They certainly would not agree that just any command generated moral value, yes? So it can't be just the command itself, it must have something to do with the authority of the command. Maybe a sort of "moral authority" or something like that.

Well, in order to hold that the commands of such an authority are, in fact, binding, they would have to agree that such an authority is valuable. In other words, that they care, or have reason to care, what such an authority might order. Otherwise, it could be just any old being issuing commands.

So-called "Divine Command" theorists hold that the commands have the compelling force of moral law because they are divine in origin, and it is this divine origin that renders the moral authority binding.

However, there doesn't seem to be any real reason to grant this claim and in fact, it appears to be nothing more than fallacious special pleading.

You're putting the cart before the horse here. Legal rules cannot generate value; their creation is indication of a value already held.

We have laws against murder because we believe it to be morally wrong to murder. The value is prior to the law, not after.

This is where the special pleading comes in.

By what authority does the "supreme law giver" hold that his laws are moral laws? By what authority are we bound by them?

I did already cover the definition of "objective", above. A mind is a mind is a mind is a mind (to paraphrase Gertrude Stein). By what reasoning can we possibly infer that value becomes objective if it exists in the mind of the "supreme law giver" when we know that values held in our minds are subjective?

Regards,

Bill Snedden

Tom Piper

Bill,

I said, in response to one of your earlier remarks To which you responded Of course! I thought that was clear when I said ‘Divine Command’ theory. I’ll try to be more careful.

You said I think we have a disagreement here, but maybe it is just the mode of expression. If the authority is legitimate, then the command is binding, whether or not the person to whom the command applies values the authority. Two quick counter-examples- the relationship between children and their parents in which the authority of the parents over the children holds whether the children value it or not. (This is one that some think relevant to the Divine Command situation-- perhaps we will get there). A second counter-example-- various separatist groups in the U.S. Clearly these groups/individuals do not value the authority that the government has over them, but that does not in itself, render that authority void. To think that it did would be to allow that many, many criminals have been convicted and punished by thpse without the authority to do so.


You said It is true that the authority of the ‘Divine Commander’ must be legitimate. That is merely special pleading remains to be seen-- perhaps we will get to a discussion of that.

I said, To which you responded Here we have a disagreement-- I think I have the horse and cart where they should be. I think you are leaving something out. It may be true that some laws that are in place, in some sense, reflect prior values. Whether or not it is true in general is a point that need not be decided here. However, when you say that legal laws cannot generate values, this seems obviously false. And false in a number of different ways. It is the fact that a law has the status of law that makes people ‘want’ to obey it. For ‘law-abiding’ citizens, the power that the law qua law exercises over them is independent of the motives or values of the law makers. It is true that the law-makers must be legitimate authorities, but if they are the law generates the valuing.
There is at least one other sense is which the law generates value, apart from any valuing whatsoever. Laws make this happen in the way that rules in certain games create values. Think of the value that a pawn has in a game of chess, compared to the (absence of) value the piece of wood has outside the game context. Think of the comparative value of the queen over a pawn, in the same context. This value is purely the result of the rules of the game; it has nothing to do with the prior values/motives/wants of the individuals playing or not playing the game. Something such as this is what generates ‘property’, as it is understood in our culture. (If memory serves me here, notions such as ‘property’, ‘rules’, ‘laws’ (and the associated values), obligations such as those we have to keep promises, along with others, are are referred to as ‘institutional facts’ (non-natural facts) and they, along with natural facts, form the matrix in which our human lives are embedded-- I first encountered the notion ‘institutional fact’ in discussions with Elizabeth Anscombe. There is a literature, for those who are interested.)

I said To which you responded This is an important question, but not the question being addressed now.

You then said There are at least two distinct senses of ‘objective’, one of which is, indeed, something like ‘having reality independent of the mind’. Another is ‘expressing or dealing with facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations’. You seem to focus on the first; in my definition, as I recall, I mentioned the second. When you ask a question such as ‘By what reasoning can we possibly infer that value becomes objective if it exists in the mind of the "supreme law giver" when we know that values held in our minds are subjective?’, and I think about this question in terms of the two senses of objective, and their respective opposite ‘subjective’s, and something such as the value of the queen in chess, and the value reflected in the law qua law, I don’t know what to say. Human beings create the traffic laws. They don’t exist ‘in nature’. There is a sense in which they are dependent on perception (in the mind), but they are clearly objective. There can be subjective interpretations of various laws, but most of the traffic laws, anyway, are straight-forward. Moreover, the fact that something is the deliverance/judegment of a particular mind does not necessarily make it distorted by personal feelings, etc. I am not sure that all of this is important to the main point of this post, but then I am not sure why you think soome of the things you do, so I am not sure what needs to be brought up to make my point. It may be important to refine some of these notions if this discussion moves forward, but I don’t think it is necessary here.

Laws/rules can generate values, in order for laws to be binding they don’t have to be valued by those they bind, if they are binding, they are binding whether or not they are the mere whim of the law-giver. The only question is, is there something/some being that stands in the proper authority relation to human beings to make it the source of moral law? Which is, of course, the question ‘Is there a God as He is understood by Divine Command theorists?’ I have only addressed those parts of your post that I understood to be arguing that there couldn’t be. More can said about whether or not there can be, and of course, even if that is answered in the affirmative, the question ‘Is there such a being?’ will remain.

Apologies in advance! I too, am often late in responding; students are always demanding, and more and more so as the semester progresses.

Tom

[ February 23, 2002: Message edited by: Tom Piper ]</p>