John Page

owleye:

The color vision link is valid in locating mental activity concerning colors. If you're talking specifically about "mental" as the seat of consciousness in the brain I can't tell you.

Why is mental activity producd? To better understand the present and forsee the future and thereby enhance survival.
Conscious appears to be an account of first hand experience of events in reality as interpreted within the brain.
The conscious mind is somewhere in the brain.
Yes, and experiences can be imaginary (soemthing that has no correlate in reality external to the mind) or real (there is a correlate that caused the conscious perception). This is the difference I'm trying to highlight. From here, we can suppose there is something in the mind that is not conscious that "created" the imaginary hotel. Hence, there is a subconscious as you are unaware in a dream (say, a nightmare) as to whether its real or imagined.
No, I'm not, I just don't want you to get the impression that I think the brain knows something separately from the mind. Hence the quotes in an attempt to avoid ambiguity in the meaning of "knows".
If you remove the widow's brain, yet kept the remainder of her body of life support, would the remainder of the widow's body be consciously aware? Experiments prove not. The issue is which part of the widow knows.
No it isn't. This is anthropomorphism. To know something the knower must contain information about the thing which it knows. No problem with the pillow here, but in the context of human knowledge some recognition or understanding is required.
So, when know is used in the passive voice it connotes the knower has information, used in the sense of a verb that knowledge is put to use in a process of recognition or understanding. If I am ambiguous to you in my use of this word, let me know and I'll clarify.

Note: I do know that some use knowledge and understanding interchangeably. IMO understanding can only arise by correlating items of knowledge to build causal or contextual relationships.
In conscious experience they are the same, see my comments above about the viewing from a distance issue.
If you mean consciously experienced, what's experienced is a brain state. It's experienced by the brain.
Yes, physically within and of abstract form.
Similar reality for a start. It is more difficult to me to have a concept of an elephant if I've never seen one.
The physiology has to support the kind of concepts being communicated and there needs to be a method of communication.
The answer will also depend upon the concept - there would be a lower physiological requirement for the concept of the quantity three than for calculus.
The topic is the mind/body border. I'm trying to communicate how the dividing line between the physical and abstract part of reality can be conceived as operating.

All the symbols are explained where not already in use from logic - but you only read the first page so you wouldn't know that.

Unless you read the document you won't understand what the symbols mean - I gave you specific references as to diagram and written explanation of the process. Kant's Critique was a long document, I wouldn't have though one para and a simple diagram would be too much to ask! Up to you.
This is your opinion of what mathematicians do. Numbers are real concepts, quantities exist. Your comment only makes sense in the context of numbers not directly participating in physical reality - this is only part of reality.

In the middle of page 12 there is a specific reference to mathematics as the study of relations between quantities which in turn are specialized entities that are deemed a priori to be homogenous.
I've answered the first question immediately above. You introduced the term formal science, what definition do you propose?
I'm saying you need to distinguish between the two observations and arrive at a conclusion based on the information provided. This sort of methodology was used by Heisenberg and others to come up with new and more accurate interpretations of what was happending in the sub-atomic world.

I am observing that you perceive that an object exists continuously in time. This is a function of your perception - it "creates" "objects" in your mind from raw sense data. As far as I understand it, mainstream physics does not support a continuous observation on your part - light is only transmitted in quanta. You might find it interesting to consider how cinematography works - basically the # frames per second has to be above the threshold of our eyesight's sampling rate - demonstrating that seeing is not a continuous process.

So, when you consciously perceive an object it is because you have detected a persistent effect. I don't care too much about how you interchange effect and object but the reason your interpretation is wrong is because objects do not last forever - they decay. That an effect persists over a large number of times is no guarantee that it will continue to do so. Thus, in order to understand reality you need to look at the data as it crosses the sensory boundary and match this up with the mind's interpretation. So, I'm asking you to consider what an object really is and how you come to know of its apparent existence.
Of course they are - otherwise how could a perceived object move or continue to exist? See lengthier post above, one needs to be careful about defining object.

Regarding Zeno and the arrow paradox, the arrow in mid-flight is different than the arrow at rest because it has the invisible (and abstract) properties of velocity and kinetic energy. If you stop the arrow and try to observe it, these properties will not be present, i.e. it can be considred a different object.
No you have assumed that the second object is identical. See Zeno's arrows above and lengthier post above that. I'm not saying that the same object cannot be seen to travel - just be careful how you define object, they move in spacetime and can transmogrify. On the other hand, my definition of identity is consistent with the uniqueness demanded for operation of the Law of Identity.
Please see my above observations regarding continuity and consideration of cinematography creating non-jerky perceptions. Again, I'm not saying its not the same object - you can tie a piece of string to it if you want - its just not identical.
Again, I believe this is your confusion about the nature of objects of the perception and the meaning of the word identity - in general usage this is "absolute sameness" and in identity theoiry in math it is "an element in a set unchanged by any operation on it".
How do you know what "belongs" to the object? All you have is the experimental data at the sensory layer. That is what we use to form our perceptions. The notion of the object is created in your mind.
We may be at cross purposes - the concept is not necessarily in a fixed location in the brain or all brains.
Concepts result from comparison operations, I didn't say they were comparisons per se.
There is a difference between the concept of a specific instance of a thing (say, the dog you just saw) and the idealised concept of the thing. Maybe "idealised concept" will make more sense in the Kantian context. As you know, I suppose that there is an abstract axiomatic concept that is used to test a particular instance of sense data against. Why do I call it an abstract axiomatic concept (I know you don't like this term)? Because of the dictionary definitions of the words:

Abstract = Of or existing in thought
Axiomatic = Self evident
Concept = An idea of a group or class of objects

An AAC, if I may call it that, would perhaps manifest itself as one or more neurons against which an "incoming experience" is examined.

To compare two objects, (as opposed to recognizing something unknown) simply regard the first object as an AAC and apply the comparison process.
Your question is not quite english. The answer to what I think your question is is 'A'. (This is going to be fun - now we have four instances of 'A' of which there are informational copies persisting over time.)
LOL. In the case where 'A' is representing itself, its an informational copy. In the case where 'A' is the thing that's being literally represented, the other 'A' is a literal copy!
The second paragraph of section 2.4 in the paper deals with (symbolic) abstractions of symbols. I recommend confusion can be avoided by using a different symbol for every natural language description. It is unclear from the above when you say "one or more of its representational forms" the "its" refers to the original thing or its subsequent representation. (In the case of the former, multiple layers of abstraction might be involved and ontologic can only represent two in any one statement.)
A logical comparison.
Could be. We need to define whther constructed included learned abilities.
Depends how you define the border between the mind and body. It certainly retains it in some form (otherwise how could we know it?). As I've said before, I don't think we'd find it in pictorial format. This is speculation - maybe its straightforward JPEG3 (joke).
Soemthing assumed to be well defined and not subject to change.
Math takes place in the mind, if all minds are the same then who am I to argue....(I'm not being dismissive, just making a point about the non-universality of the concept of universality).

Anyway, if the "universe of discourse" is the "context" I don;t see any big argument here.
Self fulfilling prophecy, I think. Define the set of universes as the totally of existence then off we go again, you just expanded the "real" universe which is what I said it was for starters - see my reality quadrants.
Information can be considered merely as data. The meaning of a piece of information can only be intelligible (to a person or process) if its context is known (two what? ducks, pigs etc.). However, the information itself could be merely "two".
Sure, a mistake occurs when a process is unreliable when compared with the expected result. If you ask what the expected result is, I would define this as the "standard". Example, I press the wrong button on the calculator - there may be many checks on the expected result such as tactile sensation associated with the button I think I've pressed, getting a large number on the screen when its money I have to pay someone.

If you talk about a methodological mistake, we may not know what to expect so we can't check to detect for mistakes. So we look for other methods or additional data for some kind of verification.
Lack of precision, lack of data, lack of analysis. Standards are assumed by man, not given.
Did I say say math was discovered?

Mathematical systems have been invented by mankind. Within those systems, various truths have been discovered.

Aside from the semantics here, I suggesting that repeatability of an information maniplation process is the key. A sum can be performed and yield a result. Again. Again etc. The mathematical priciples apply so the result is considered timeless. It is in a way, but the math is only applied when the sum is performed -i.e a finite number of times in specific locations. We're back to the perception of a continuously existing object example earlier in this thread - mathematical objects are subject to the same reality.

Cheers. John

excreationist

owleye:
I'll reply to your post soon, but I found a good link that has some information about materialistic explainations for consciousness.

What I'm saying is that I agree with Dennett's emphasis on "performance" and the Flight Simulator analogy. The rest of what I quoted is saying that a virtual serial machine isn't needed for many/most of the abilities that conscious humans have. I just included it as more examples that artificial neural networks have come a long way in mirroring aspects of our abilities.

owleye

John...

"Representations are things in themselves, they are used as representations (by us, for example) of other things that are not directly present."

Saying that a representation is a thing in itself doesn't say much unless you can tell me about things in themselves. Kant would deny any knowledge of things as they are in themselves. He accepts things only as they appear to us. If you have some understanding of what a thing is in itself, I assume it is because you have some other source of knowledge of a thing that doesn't come by way of our senses. What makes you think a thing in itself is knowable?

"Kant's transcendental idealist is unable to explain how the concept of representations comes about in the first place."

You don't have a good understanding of transcendental idealism. In any case, inquiring about origins is one in which he divides the task into a logical (formal) one and an empirical one. If you are seeking an empirically determined origin of a concept (or of anything else) you would be inviting a philosophical discussion of teaching and learning (or education, generally). If you are seeking a formal origin, he would regard certain concepts (those which he calls categories) as foundational from which others are constructed. Kant is not so much interested in any empirical determination of anything (i.e., he is not considering himself as a scientist, or a mathematician), but rather as a philosopher he is interested in their formal nature, about which he has written quite a bit.

"If representations do exits there is no need for a transcendental explanation and if representations don't exist then there is no medium for the transmission of information - to which your perception of this message is contrary."

This statement completely baffles me. I suspect you don't understand what a transcendental explanation is. Also, how am I to understand your use of representation? A sign, for example, represents something else. Signs exist. I should therefore conclude that no transcendental explanation is needed. But this is silly. What makes a sign possible in the first place. One would expect that that which the sign refers us to (or represents) is distinct from the sign itself. However, there is nothing physical about the sign which makes it represent anything at all. It is because of the way our mind works that a sign has any meaning at all. Kant's transcendental idealism includes many references to representations, just because he is describing how our mind works.

"Look at the end of the first sentence "The objects of experience, then, are never given in themselves, but only in experience, and have no existence outside it." It has been proven that conscious mental experiences (can) result from physical experiences."

What is a physical experience? Experiences, the way I understand them, are mental? What would count as a physical experience? Perhaps you can cite an example of one.

"Thus, the objects of experience do result from the action of physical objects and the statement at the end of the sentence is misleading if not downright wrong."

Kant does not deny that objects of experience can be physical. Indeed, outer experiences are about the physical (material) world. The experience itself, however, is mental. There is a major distinction between an experience and what it is an experience of. When Kant refers to appearances he is referring to the phenomena that comprise the material (physical) world. The material world includes the brain, which is part of what appears to us. Science, (on which any empirical advance is based) must confirm all its theories through observations. What Kant was up to, among other things, is to determine what makes science itself possible. This is the famous Kantian transcendental question. You would go along way in understanding Kant if you appreciated the difficulty Kant faced in answering this question (and others like it). You, on the other hand, apparently scoff at such a question, thinking that it can be answered by studying the brain.

"There is a connection between physical reality and conscious experience, we don't know how this happens."

You could start by telling me what sort of a connection it would have to be. Descartes assumed some physical connection, which, of course, begs the question of how a physical event can affect a mental one, one that is not-physical. It is because of problems physicalizing the "connection" that most folks rule out Cartesian dualism. Other thinkers have other ideas. I doubt whether you have given it much thought.

"If you're going to complain that one can only experience consciousness first hand, go ahead. We know roughly what happens inside the combustion chamber of a car engine but nobody's ever been there."

This assumes that consciousness is in your brain somewhere. (I'm aware that some part of the brain could be responsible for consciousness, but this is not the same thing as saying that consciousness is a part of the brain.) I await your response to a question along this line elsewhere posed.

"You'll have to wait for neurological science to advance for a full explanation, if experience is anything to go by, speculation will be required to develop the concepts required to fully interpret and explain brain activity."

We're not speaking about developing concepts. This is obviously something we do because we are the kind of creatures we are. Locating concepts in the brain, however, is not to be expected, principally because a concept is not a physical entity.

"Babbage's early machines and even the electric adding machine are good examples of how operations can be facilitated electromechanically. I'm trying to bring your attention to the need to be open minded about the components of a conscious organism - neuronal states should include physical vectors."

No machine has ever been capable of dealing with concepts (unless, of course, you think that the human brain is a machine). Your going to have to do better than that if you want to convince me that you are anywhere near to being on the right track.

"See above, I'm trying to expand your awareness of the brain's possible resources."

I have no doubt that the brain is sufficiently complex that consciousness is one of its products. There are some theorists who believe that consciousness is a separate physical state, separate from electronic, molecular, nuclear, neural, or other known physical states, having its own powers. The question for all theorists is what is consciousness that it could be a product of any physical process.

"No copy (literal or otherwise) is identical to the original. An equivalent could be written in a different langauge, for example."

Again you seem to want to explain copying using examples which have nothing to do with the question I'm asking. You claim we hold a copy of that which exists in the world somewhere in our mind/brain. When asked the nature of this copy, you use examples which make no sense whatsoever. I think I've heard enough to conclude that you will not be able to answer the questions I have in this area. This was my last attempt.

There is not such thing as an identical (perfect) copy, this is usually what is intended by the expression "literal copy", unless you are taking the words literally of course."

I suspect it is not a copy at all.

"Same as anywhere else, you copy the information that represents the entity."

And what would that be for a triangle?

"Compare and contrast the behavioral characteristics of the neural network and the pillow."

I assume you have done this and that you have concluded that the different behavioral characteristics favor the neural network theory. What were the behavorial characteristics differences that favored that view?

"I used identity, not tokenism. That entity #1 is compared with entity #2 and declared a fit does not create a token."

Both are tokens of the same type. Even in your theory they are not identical. What they are identified as, however, are tokens of a common type. In order to form this kind of identity relationship requires a concept (type) of sorts that is responsible for recognizing it. The standard (i.e., its type) by which it is recognized is usually thought of as a concept, though Wittgenstein rejects this idea. No standard (nor concept) exists, instead there is only a family resemblance. In this way he avoids Platonism. Perhaps this is your theory as well.

"Axiomatic = self-evident in the dictionary."

"Unless a concept can be self evident, i.e. it is the thing you are experiencing, you end up with regress."

To be self-evident implies that no experience is necessary for its truth to be believed. There is a difference between evidence and self-evidence.

"Experience is contained with our minds, it doesn't need to mean anything else."

Why not?

"The reality of the blue experience is explained in the color vision link provided some while back."

I'm tired of your referring me elsewhere. If you can't explain it to me now, then forget about it. I certainly will.

"To all intents and purposes the conscious experience is of a blue object - the color bluse is associated within the mind."

This tells me nothing about what experiencing a blue object is like.

"The reality is that (absent perceptive abnormlities such as color blindness) we (all humans) can perceive colors uniformly."

We all call what we are perceiving blue uniformly if we learn to associate the experience of it we have with the same object we are experiencing. But this tells me nothing about the experience of it except that we call it by the same name.

quote:
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Originally posted by owleye:
"We can disagree, I think the description is pretty decent definition, IMO the latter does not need to uniquely identify the object."

As I thought. Your strange use of important terms in your paper are going to get you into a great deal of trouble. If you insist on building up a system, you will need to define your terms (or since this term is itself problematic, you will have to tell us what meaning you intend by the words you use) before you begin. That is, you will need a lexicon or glossary of terms so that we can communicate.

"No, we may need a shared lexicon or glossary in order to achieve a truly satisfying intersubjective experience."

If I don't understand what you mean, I certainly won't be able to share something with you, but even if I do come to understand it, this in no way entails that I will have a "truly satisfying intersubjective experience." I'm not in any way optimistic that your theory has any merits whatsoever, even supposing that I will never come to understand it.

"I'm using dictionary definitions - if you could be specific as to the words or expressions you are having a problem with?"

I'm tired of this game you're playing. Your attention span is even less than mine.

owleye

owleye

John...

"The color vision link is valid in locating mental activity concerning colors. If you're talking specifically about "mental" as the seat of consciousness in the brain I can't tell you."

As this is all I've been concerned with, I will take this as an admission that you have accomplished nothing of interest to me.

"Why is mental activity producd? To better understand the present and forsee the future and thereby enhance survival."

Why can't this be done without consciousness?

"Conscious appears to be an account of first hand experience of events in reality as interpreted within the brain."

Is a first hand experience of events material or immaterial? This is among what is being asked when when I asked what consciousness is.

"The conscious mind is somewhere in the brain."

You could not conclude this from the time delay of auditory sensations. Indeed, I would say that a time delay implies that consciousness is not located in the brain just because there is a time lag.

"Yes, and experiences can be imaginary (soemthing that has no correlate in reality external to the mind) or real (there is a correlate that caused the conscious perception). This is the difference I'm trying to highlight. From here, we can suppose there is something in the mind that is not conscious that "created" the imaginary hotel. Hence, there is a subconscious as you are unaware in a dream (say, a nightmare) as to whether its real or imagined."

This all may very well be the case. The question is what is it that is created. You had been using the phrase "copy" to describe it. Since this has been hashed out previously and I've concluded that you have no idea what the brain is doing here, I won't seek any further clarification.

"No, I'm not, I just don't want you to get the impression that I think the brain knows something separately from the mind."

The brain is physical. The question has to do with how anything physical can "know" anything at all. It appears that your theory demands it though since you wish to link the brain and mind in ways that makes it possible to say it.

"If you remove the widow's brain, yet kept the remainder of her body of life support, would the remainder of the widow's body be consciously aware? Experiments prove not. The issue is which part of the widow knows."

That a functioning brain is required for the mind to be produced was not in dispute. But this doesn't imply that the brain knows anything at all. The brain may be part of the body of the widow but this doesn't imply that the widow's brain is what knows something, unless that is, the brain and the mind are the same thing, which is a position that needs more support than you've given it.

"No it isn't. This is anthropomorphism. To know something the knower must contain information about the thing which it knows."

But the pillow _does_ contain information about who slept there through the impression which remains of the head on the pillow. Thus, if the brain knows something in the same way the pillow does, this makes the brain knowing something an anthropomorphism as well. Information is information.


"No problem with the pillow here, but in the context of human knowledge some recognition or understanding is required."

I would agree of course, but you would have to elaborate on this much more. What makes the brain recognize something or understand something such that a pillow cannot recognize or understand?

"So, when know is used in the passive voice it connotes the knower has information, used in the sense of a verb that knowledge is put to use in a process of recognition or understanding."

I think an information based knowledge scheme makes a lot of sense. But how is information used in recognition? Note that machines use information in pattern recognition. Is this what you have in mind? As far as I can tell, however, this doesn't imply that they have minds.

"Yes, physically within and of abstract form."

I don't know what you mean by 'abstract form' but abstractions are not thought to be physical -- rather they are products of the mind. Nevertheless, I respect that you believe the mind is physically located within the brain and, given this "form" I would expect you to provide an example of how an abstraction can be formed in the brain. Is it like an impression left behind on a pillow? Is it reasonable to say that the information it receives is coded? You'd not previously mentioned anything like this. Indeed, you've been rather silent on these questions.

"Similar reality for a start."

What does "similar reality" mean?


"It is more difficult to me to have a concept of an elephant if I've never seen one."

Why? It seems to me that a person without sight can readily form a concept of an elephant through tactile and other sensations. Moreover, through stories that I hear I can form concepts. What do you really mean here?

"The physiology has to support the kind of concepts being communicated and there needs to be a method of communication."

What kind of physiology is that?

"The answer will also depend upon the concept - there would be a lower physiological requirement for the concept of the quantity three than for calculus."

This tells me very little, I'm afraid.

"The topic is the mind/body border. I'm trying to communicate how the dividing line between the physical and abstract part of reality can be conceived as operating."

Yes and I'd say you've done a miserable job, principally because I have no idea what you mean by a dividing line.

"All the symbols are explained where not already in use from logic - but you only read the first page so you wouldn't know that."

Sight unseen, I have strong doubts that you have in fact explained what the symbols mean.

"Unless you read the document you won't understand what the symbols mean - I gave you specific references as to diagram and written explanation of the process. Kant's Critique was a long document, I wouldn't have though one para and a simple diagram would be too much to ask! Up to you."

Sorry, I have no good reason to read anything else of yours. Comparing reading Kant with reading your stuff is ridiculous.

"This is your opinion of what mathematicians do. Numbers are real concepts, quantities exist. Your comment only makes sense in the context of numbers not directly participating in physical reality - this is only part of reality."

I guess we part company here.

"In the middle of page 12 there is a specific reference to mathematics as the study of relations between quantities which in turn are specialized entities that are deemed a priori to be homogenous."

Terrific.

"I've answered the first question immediately above. You introduced the term formal science, what definition do you propose?"

I included the modifier 'formal' because I make a distinction between form and content, a distinction originally made by Aristotle which Kant makes heavy use of. I hesitate to suggest you read what these thinkers have to say. With respect to defining these terms, I can only call attention to what the dictionary says.

"I'm saying you need to distinguish between the two observations and arrive at a conclusion based on the information provided. This sort of methodology was used by Heisenberg and others to come up with new and more accurate interpretations of what was happending in the sub-atomic world."

This sounds like so much misinterpretation of Heisenberg's interpretation of the the sub-atomic world. In any case, it was your theory of identity that made its spatial and temporal coordinates essential to it, as if it couldn't change them. Note the difference between an accidental characteristic and an essential one. An accidental trait is a trait that can change, added, or removed, without changing its identity. An essential trait, on the other hand, cannot be changed, added or removed.

What I think you are getting at is that an essential feature of an object is that it has some location in space and time, and its identity is not changed by changing its location. You think of identity in quite a different way, however. You seem to think of it as a form of identification of a particular object by a unique labeling system. Included in this form of identification is how the object visually appears to us. Thus, humans are required (essential) elements of an objects identity.

"I am observing that you perceive that an object exists continuously in time. This is a function of your perception - it "creates" "objects" in your mind from raw sense data."

What is the significance of placing quotation marks around 'objects'. Does this imply that you don't think perceived elephants are in your mind. But something perceived is in our mind that correlates with the perceived elephant?

"As far as I understand it, mainstream physics does not support a continuous observation on your part - light is only transmitted in quanta. You might find it interesting to consider how cinematography works - basically the # frames per second has to be above the threshold of our eyesight's sampling rate - demonstrating that seeing is not a continuous process."

The problem with the above is that it mixes mental and physical activities as if they were one and the same thing. The eye may sample in discrete packets, but this doesn't mean that seeing isn't continuous. As you are aware, we have a blind spot. This doesn't prevent seeing, merely that we are blind to that area of the world that corresponds to the blind spot on the retina. We fill it in with what's in the background.

"So, when you consciously perceive an object it is because you have detected a persistent effect."

This seems to imply that Kant is correct. Given that motion is something derived from experience, an object moves only because we supply its substance with persistence over time. Moreover, we endow this movement with some causal sequencing. That is, if an object is the same object after having moved it must be because there is some causal nexus (some deterministic law) that connected the two experiences, that maintained itself in time -- i.e., its persistence. This is part of Kant's a priori categories of the understanding that make such experience possible.

"I don't care too much about how you interchange effect and object but the reason your interpretation is wrong is because objects do not last forever - they decay."

I don't see the connection you wish to establish here. There is a distinction between an object's identity and an object's existence.

"That an effect persists over a large number of times is no guarantee that it will continue to do so. Thus, in order to understand reality you need to look at the data as it crosses the sensory boundary and match this up with the mind's interpretation. So, I'm asking you to consider what an object really is and how you come to know of its apparent existence."

I think Kant does an admirable job with this. If you had not ventured into your so-called theory of identity, I wouldn't have entered into the criticism I did.

"Again, I believe this is your confusion about the nature of objects of the perception and the meaning of the word identity - in general usage this is "absolute sameness" and in identity theoiry in math it is "an element in a set unchanged by any operation on it"."

If the spatial-temporal location of an object were part of its identity, it would not absolutely be the same object if it had a different spatial-temporal location. Thus, your use of identity is not in keeping with what it means.

"There is a difference between the concept of a specific instance of a thing (say, the dog you just saw) and the idealised concept of the thing. Maybe "idealised concept" will make more sense in the Kantian context. As you know, I suppose that there is an abstract axiomatic concept that is used to test a particular instance of sense data against. Why do I call it an abstract axiomatic concept (I know you don't like this term)? Because of the dictionary definitions of the words:

Abstract = Of or existing in thought
Axiomatic = Self evident
Concept = An idea of a group or class of objects

An AAC, if I may call it that, would perhaps manifest itself as one or more neurons against which an "incoming experience" is examined.

To compare two objects, (as opposed to recognizing something unknown) simply regard the first object as an AAC and apply the comparison process.

quote:
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Originally posted by owleye:
"Here is the definition of true from the paper you tossed "... true is a word that represents a state that exists when a represented entity is considered equal or equivalent to one or more representational forms."

========
My previous question...What is the state that exists that represents the entity which is considered equal or equivalent to 'A' as it is represented in the statement "A = A"?

"Your question is not quite english. The answer to what I think your question is is 'A'. (This is going to be fun - now we have four instances of 'A' of which there are informational copies persisting over time.)"

Fun for you. But totally uninforming. The 'A's keep proliferating. More grist for the mill.

quote:
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Originally posted by owleye:
Is this the concept (type) 'A'? Or is it merely the representation of the concept (type) 'A'?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LOL. In the case where 'A' is representing itself, its an informational copy. In the case where 'A' is the thing that's being literally represented, the other 'A' is a literal copy!

quote:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by owleye:
In what sense does it make sense to say of the above that a comparison is being made between the state representing the entity and one or more of its representational forms?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second paragraph of section 2.4 in the paper deals with (symbolic) abstractions of symbols. I recommend confusion can be avoided by using a different symbol for every natural language description. It is unclear from the above when you say "one or more of its representational forms" the "its" refers to the original thing or its subsequent representation. (In the case of the former, multiple layers of abstraction might be involved and ontologic can only represent two in any one statement.)

quote:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by owleye:
What sort of comparison is being made here?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Soemthing assumed to be well defined and not subject to change."

Are standards material or immaterial?

"Math takes place in the mind, if all minds are the same then who am I to argue....(I'm not being dismissive, just making a point about the non-universality of the concept of universality)."

That arithmetic takes place in the mind does not imply that what is taking place in the mind is about what is in the mind. Cognition takes place in the mind. This does not imply that cognition is solely about what exists in the mind.

Anyway, if the "universe of discourse" is the "context" I don;t see any big argument here.

quote:
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Originally posted by owleye:
It just means there are different universes. If you insist on universality with respect to the one universe that exists (i.e., the real universe), then if there is some mathematical representation of that universe, then its truth will be with respect to that universe -- i.e., it will be universally true.
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Self fulfilling prophecy, I think. Define the set of universes as the totally of existence then off we go again, you just expanded the "real" universe which is what I said it was for starters - see my reality quadrants.

"Information can be considered merely as data. The meaning of a piece of information can only be intelligible (to a person or process) if its context is known (two what? ducks, pigs etc.). However, the information itself could be merely "two"."

I was hoping you would relate it to Shannon's use. If this is what you mean, then meaning is separate from information. Thus, there is an important difference between asking you what something means and asking you what it tells you. In the former case, you already have other information about it so that this could add or tell you but not someone else what it is. Meaning, on the other hand, is public, such that it is possible to use language to convey it. Meaning can be informationally understood however.

"Sure, a mistake occurs when a process is unreliable when compared with the expected result."

What makes a result expected? Does it require repeated operations giving the same answer? If so, is '2+2=4' what is expected because repeated operations have given the same answer?

"Lack of precision, lack of data, lack of analysis. Standards are assumed by man, not given."

I think I've had enough malarky from you on this.

Signing off permanently.

owleye

DRFseven

Because unless body-state representations are projected into working memory and integrated with emotions, there is nothing for a body-state to "feel like". I think it has been advantageous for us, when we, for instance, hear twigs snapping behind us in the dark, to recognize that we are fearful or wary, rather than to simply freeze or hide or run as a result of the "fear response" going on in our bodies, and to return to normal behavior when the twigs stop snapping. We all know it's a lot more complicated than that, but I think the advantage is obvious.

Ierrellus

John,

If Kant is the roadblock, as Owleye surmises, has no one constructed a viable detour?

Ierrellus
PAX

Toad Master

Quote:
John Page:
"Definition and description sought for the border between the Mind and the Body.
Body = Physical structure of a person
Mind = Non-physical or abstract aspect of a person comprising their mental activity viz. thoughts, emotions, consciousness."

Since you defined the mind in terms of activity, this is like asking where the border is between a car and its motion.

-Toad Master

excreationist

owleye:
I want to finish programs I've been working on about visual and auditory reaction times/awareness delays... I'm going to devote more of my energies to that and retire from this thread. I'll start a new thread about my programs when I've finished making them.