spin

This is pretty hysterical.

Still da mafia boss, huh mountainman baby? Despite the fact that he didn't have control of the empire at that stage. Don Constantino he ain't.

This was when he was still fighting for control of the empire, only defeating the last of his major enemies in 324. Only then did he have the empire. Prior to that your fantasizing about his Grand Conspiracy can't get off the ground. So I'd say once again this harebrained theory is in pieces on the ground. The Edict of Milan forced tolerance. Licinius, according to a letter he wrote in 313 (cited in CAH 12.689-690), restored churches to christians.


This is an even more hysterical rationalization. There are so many dated administrative works coming from periods prior to the Grand Conspiracy date, mixed in with, amongst other things, christian texts and LXX fragments, to be able to supply an excellent palaeographic sequence for Greek hands. Now I know you stick your head in the sand when it comes to palaeography, but that's not because of any knowledge you have in the field, it's because you need to ignore it as it is another nail in the coffin of the Grand Conspiracy. Christian material mixed in with all sorts of other texts, evincing scribal hands for various periods when compared with the numerous dated texts.

After all this time mountainman, you've had time to come up with some substance to your Grand Conspiracy, but up to now you've shown nothing:

1. You've grossly misinterpreted Julian.
2. You've cried "interpolation" for Pliny the Younger and Marcus Aurelius without even putting up a philological argument, ie you've only got your a priori commitment to the theory.
3. You've given no reason to reject the palaeography of the Oxyrhynchus texts, no meaningful criticism of the palaeography. In fact one might think that you know nothing at all about it or the range of evidence available for the datings.
4. You've failed to account for the house church at Duro-Europos with a secure dating prior to you date of the Grand Conspiracy and with clearly christian art (as described by Rostovtzeff).
5. You've failed to give a meaningful context for the libelli which coincide with a textual source for a Decian persecution against christians.
6. You've failed to show in the period when Constantine was not sole emperor how he could manage the Grand Conspiracy for the whole empire.
7. You've failed to explain the diversity and conflict of religious views within the earliest members of your Grand Conspiracy, eg at the Council of Nicea.
8. You've even grossly misinterpreted Momigliano on christianity before Constantine.
9. And a ton of other problems I've left out of this collection.

You have so much to account for and not a speck of evidence for your theory. You've been cut to pieces by Occam.

Have you got any evidence that Eusebius was anywhere other than the Levant, mostly at Caesarea in the decade from 310 to 320? Is his information about, and indebtedness to, Pamphilus all a sham? Do you have any evidence that Lactantius ever met Eusebius? If they never met, how did they participate in the Grand Conspiracy together and co-ordinate their stories? If you're in this hand, how come you're holding no cards?


spin

mikem

Maxentius had between 75'000 and 120'000 men, and Constantine had about 50'000. Maxentius took his stand at the head of the bridge, which he had partially destroyed, to prevent Constantine using, and had a wooden pontoon bridge built alongside, for his own troops, and which could be easily sabotaged in the event of a retreat. When the armies engaged, Maxentius was forced into a retreat, and the pontoon collapsed under his retreating army, drowning many, and isolating the rest on the wrong side of the river.

It was this, as well as the fact that Constantine was outnumbered, that made Constantine's victory appear so auspicious, as well as the fact that it occurred on the anniverary of his being crowned Emperor. Wikipedia has a good article on it.

mountainman

Here's what Gibbon says about the whole affair.
Note that the military aspect is not just size, but
the constitution of the army, infantry, heavy or light,
and the experience of the soldiers, etc:

When Hannibal marched from Gaul into Italy, he was obliged, first to discover, and then to open, a way over mountains, and through savage nations, that had never yielded a passage to a regular army. The Alps were then guarded by nature, they are now fortified by art. Citadels, constructed with no less skill than labor and expense, command every avenue into the plain, and on that side render Italy almost inaccessible to the enemies of the king of Sardinia. But in the course of the intermediate period, the generals, who have attempted the passage, have seldom experienced any difficulty or resistance. In the age of Constantine, the peasants of the mountains were civilized and obedient subjects; the country was plentifully stocked with provisions, and the stupendous highways, which the Romans had carried over the Alps, opened several communications between Gaul and Italy. Constantine preferred the road of the Cottian Alps, or, as it is now called, of Mount Cenis, and led his troops with such active diligence, that he descended into the plain of Piedmont before the court of Maxentius had received any certain intelligence of his departure from the banks of the Rhine. The city of Susa, however, which is situated at the foot of Mount Cenis, was surrounded with walls, and provided with a garrison sufficiently numerous to check the progress of an invader; but the impatience of Constantine's troops disdained the tedious forms of a siege. The same day that they appeared before Susa, they applied fire to the gates, and ladders to the walls; and mounting to the assault amidst a shower of stones and arrows, they entered the place sword in hand, and cut in pieces the greatest part of the garrison. The flames were extinguished by the care of Constantine, and the remains of Susa preserved from total destruction. About forty miles from thence, a more severe contest awaited him. A numerous army of Italians was assembled under the lieutenants of Maxentius, in the plains of Turin. Its principal strength consisted in a species of heavy cavalry, which the Romans, since the decline of their discipline, had borrowed from the nations of the East. The horses, as well as the men, were clothed in complete armor, the joints of which were artfully adapted to the motions of their bodies. The aspect of this cavalry was formidable, their weight almost irresistible; and as, on this occasion, their generals had drawn them up in a compact column or wedge, with a sharp point, and with spreading flanks, they flattered themselves that they could easily break and trample down the army of Constantine. They might, perhaps, have succeeded in their design, had not their experienced adversary embraced the same method of defence, which in similar circumstances had been practised by Aurelian. The skilful evolutions of Constantine divided and baffled this massy column of cavalry. The troops of Maxentius fled in confusion towards Turin; and as the gates of the city were shut against them, very few escaped the sword of the victorious pursuers. By this important service, Turin deserved to experience the clemency and even favor of the conqueror. He made his entry into the Imperial palace of Milan, and almost all the cities of Italy between the Alps and the Po not only acknowledged the power, but embraced with zeal the party, of Constantine.

From Milan to Rome, the Aemilian and Flaminian highways offered an easy march of about four hundred miles; but though Constantine was impatient to encounter the tyrant, he prudently directed his operations against another army of Italians, who, by their strength and position, might either oppose his progress, or, in case of a misfortune, might intercept his retreat. Ruricius Pompeianus, a general distinguished by his valor and ability, had under his command the city of Verona, and all the troops that were stationed in the province of Venetia. As soon as he was informed that Constantine was advancing towards him, he detached a large body of cavalry which was defeated in an engagement near Brescia, and pursued by the Gallic legions as far as the gates of Verona. The necessity, the importance, and the difficulties of the siege of Verona, immediately presented themselves to the sagacious mind of Constantine. The city was accessible only by a narrow peninsula towards the west, as the other three sides were surrounded by the Adige, a rapid river, which covered the province of Venetia, from whence the besieged derived an inexhaustible supply of men and provisions. It was not without great difficulty, and after several fruitless attempts, that Constantine found means to pass the river at some distance above the city, and in a place where the torrent was less violent. He then encompassed Verona with strong lines, pushed his attacks with prudent vigor, and repelled a desperate sally of Pompeianus. That intrepid general, when he had used every means of defence that the strength of the place or that of the garrison could afford, secretly escaped from Verona, anxious not for his own, but for the public safety. With indefatigable diligence he soon collected an army sufficient either to meet Constantine in the field, or to attack him if he obstinately remained within his lines. The emperor, attentive to the motions, and informed of the approach of so formidable an enemy, left a part of his legions to continue the operations of the siege, whilst, at the head of those troops on whose valor and fidelity he more particularly depended, he advanced in person to engage the general of Maxentius. The army of Gaul was drawn up in two lines, according to the usual practice of war; but their experienced leader, perceiving that the numbers of the Italians far exceeded his own, suddenly changed his disposition, and, reducing the second, extended the front of his first line to a just proportion with that of the enemy. Such evolutions, which only veteran troops can execute without confusion in a moment of danger, commonly prove decisive; but as this engagement began towards the close of the day, and was contested with great obstinacy during the whole night, there was less room for the conduct of the generals than for the courage of the soldiers. The return of light displayed the victory of Constantine, and a field of carnage covered with many thousands of the vanquished Italians. Their general, Pompeianus, was found among the slain; Verona immediately surrendered at discretion, and the garrison was made prisoners of war. When the officers of the victorious army congratulated their master on this important success, they ventured to add some respectful complaints, of such a nature, however, as the most jealous monarchs will listen to without displeasure. They represented to Constantine, that, not contented with all the duties of a commander, he had exposed his own person with an excess of valor which almost degenerated into rashness; and they conjured him for the future to pay more regard to the preservation of a life in which the safety of Rome and of the empire was involved.

While Constantine signalized his conduct and valor in the field, the sovereign of Italy appeared insensible of the calamities and danger of a civil war which reigned in the heart of his dominions. Pleasure was still the only business of Maxentius. Concealing, or at least attempting to conceal, from the public knowledge the misfortunes of his arms, he indulged himself in a vain confidence which deferred the remedies of the approaching evil, without deferring the evil itself. The rapid progress of Constantine was scarcely sufficient to awaken him from his fatal security; he flattered himself, that his well-known liberality, and the majesty of the Roman name, which had already delivered him from two invasions, would dissipate with the same facility the rebellious army of Gaul. The officers of experience and ability, who had served under the banners of Maximian, were at length compelled to inform his effeminate son of the imminent danger to which he was reduced; and, with a freedom that at once surprised and convinced him, to urge the necessity of preventing his ruin, by a vigorous exertion of his remaining power. The resources of Maxentius, both of men and money, were still considerable. The Praetorian guards felt how strongly their own interest and safety were connected with his cause; and a third army was soon collected, more numerous than those which had been lost in the battles of Turin and Verona. It was far from the intention of the emperor to lead his troops in person. A stranger to the exercises of war, he trembled at the apprehension of so dangerous a contest; and as fear is commonly superstitious, he listened with melancholy attention to the rumors of omens and presages which seemed to menace his life and empire. Shame at length supplied the place of courage, and forced him to take the field. He was unable to sustain the contempt of the Roman people. The circus resounded with their indignant clamors, and they tumultuously besieged the gates of the palace, reproaching the pusillanimity of their indolent sovereign, and celebrating the heroic spirit of Constantine. Before Maxentius left Rome, he consulted the Sibylline books. The guardians of these ancient oracles were as well versed in the arts of this world as they were ignorant of the secrets of fate; and they returned him a very prudent answer, which might adapt itself to the event, and secure their reputation, whatever should be the chance of arms.

The celerity of Constantine's march has been compared to the rapid conquest of Italy by the first of the Caesars; nor is the flattering parallel repugnant to the truth of history, since no more than fifty-eight days elapsed between the surrender of Verona and the final decision of the war. Constantine had always apprehended that the tyrant would consult the dictates of fear, and perhaps of prudence; and that, instead of risking his last hopes in a general engagement, he would shut himself up within the walls of Rome. His ample magazines secured him against the danger of famine; and as the situation of Constantine admitted not of delay, he might have been reduced to the sad necessity of destroying with fire and sword the Imperial city, the noblest reward of his victory, and the deliverance of which had been the motive, or rather indeed the pretence, of the civil war. It was with equal surprise and pleasure, that on his arrival at a place called Saxa Rubra, about nine miles from Rome, he discovered the army of Maxentius prepared to give him battle. Their long front filled a very spacious plain, and their deep array reached to the banks of the Tyber, which covered their rear, and forbade their retreat. We are informed, and we may believe, that Constantine disposed his troops with consummate skill, and that he chose for himself the post of honor and danger. Distinguished by the splendor of his arms, he charged in person the cavalry of his rival; and his irresistible attack determined the fortune of the day. The cavalry of Maxentius was principally composed either of unwieldy cuirassiers, or of light Moors and Numidians. They yielded to the vigor of the Gallic horse, which possessed more activity than the one, more firmness than the other. The defeat of the two wings left the infantry without any protection on its flanks, and the undisciplined Italians fled without reluctance from the standard of a tyrant whom they had always hated, and whom they no longer feared. The Praetorians, conscious that their offences were beyond the reach of mercy, were animated by revenge and despair. Notwithstanding their repeated efforts, those brave veterans were unable to recover the victory: they obtained, however, an honorable death; and it was observed that their bodies covered the same ground which had been occupied by their ranks. The confusion then became general, and the dismayed troops of Maxentius, pursued by an implacable enemy, rushed by thousands into the deep and rapid stream of the Tyber. The emperor himself attempted to escape back into the city over the Milvian bridge; but the crowds which pressed together through that narrow passage forced him into the river, where he was immediately drowned by the weight of his armor. His body, which had sunk very deep into the mud, was found with some difficulty the next day. The sight of his head, when it was exposed to the eyes of the people, convinced them of their deliverance, and admonished them to receive with acclamations of loyalty and gratitude the fortunate Constantine, who thus achieved by his valor and ability the most splendid enterprise of his life.

How was the "miraculousness of Constantine's victory"
described by Gibbon? There was no miracle. Constantine
never lost a battle in 3 decades worth of campaigning.

You do not call success like that by the name of LUCK.
Neither can anyone seriously expect the attribution of
MIRACULOUS to be relevant.

Think again.

Constantine knew he was going to win.
He had already "bonded" with Lucinius in the east.
He had for the last 6 years (305-311) been lying low,
consolidating troops, resources and intelligence.

He waited until the major players had beaten each
other up, and until the time was right for him to move
upon the weak and timid survivor (Max). And then
he moved swiftly and intelligently.

The question remains unanswered:

Why does Momigliano use the word "miracle"
when there was nothing of the miraculous
about the military operation?



Pete Brown

youngalexander

Says who? Gibbon? But he was not around at the time writing dispassionate historical assessments. It very well may have seemed miraculous to the people hearing of the event shortly after. Particularly christians who probably couldn't believe their luck.
Those xians to whom Momigliano refers.

ETA: I read this thread after having voted in spin's poll. Frankly mm I had given up reading your stuff. I think that the thread is a very good example of your problem. You present some supposed positive evidence for your hypothesis, but most reasonable viewers would regard it as negative.

mikem

Reading again the passages that you have cited, I think my previous interpretation of what Momigliano meant by miracle was wrong. It appears that he was referring to "the sign vouchsafed to Constantine". Momigliano could have been a little more careful with his grammar, or perhaps the problem is the translation.
In any event it really doesn't affect the point that has been made by more than one person on this thread, that what Momigliano has written lends support to the view that Constantine's victory was a victory for the Christians insofar as it heralded a turning point in their fortunes.

Whether the "miracle" was the sign given to Constantine, or the battle, or the whole chain of events, starting with Constantine's sign, and ending with the Church's political victory is secondary to the main point, which is that Constantine's conversion and elevation of the church to political power was unforseen and unexpected, and that when it got there, it behaved in a very unchristian way. I see nothing in M's description that would support the theory that Constantine invented Christianity, either by himself, or in cahoots with anyone else.

mountainman

Momigliano was the (English language) editor of a number of papers
which were delivered in a series 1958/1959. AFAIK he had command
of many languages, both modern and ancient. He couched his words
in a very specific sense. He wrote what he did in order to engender
thought. I am glad that you have seen through the first layer.


An excellent analysis (IMO a paraphrase) of "the miracle".

M's description is of a "miraculous event". It is the second time
he had referenced this word in the opening of his paper. He also
mentions that the "revolution carried with it a new historiography".

What he refers to, by the term "a new historiography", is Eusebius'
"ecclesiastical history" (et al) which he differentiates from other
histories (traditionally presenting lists of Kings and philosophers)
by saying that the former (invention) simply added "a list of bishops".

M's descriptions do not directly support the notion that the
christian religious order was an invention of wicked men in the
fourth century, in order to plunder the pagan gold. However,
you'll note that I am not claiming that M supports this notion.

All I am doing is trying to understand "Momigliano's Miracle", and
to that end, I do appreciate your revised analysis, which points
to a number of issues that are not immediately apparent to, and
which can easily escape, an initial reading.

Best wishes,



Pete
Did Constantine create christianity?

mountainman

You have obviously not read Julian's Caesares
(aka the Symposium aka Kronia)



Pete

mountainman

I have noticed that Momigliano's heavy irony passes over the head
of many commentators. The above phrase by Momigliano may be
interpretted as follows:

Nobody knew exactly what the miracle had caused to
happen, but never mind, they spread abroad the miraculous
story regardless.

The christians need not have existed, except in the day of
Constantine's victorious assault on the city of Rome.

Another respondent, when asked:

Responded with this:

If there must be a reason for using the word twice, which
perhaps there need not be when it appears once in the
executive summary and again in the main text, then it is to
emphasise the discredit it sheds on the Christian mythology
of the time.

The heavy irony of Momigliano appears to be entirely lost
on a number of regular posters in this forum.

spin

I don't think you've read it seriously. There is only one bit if I understand correctly that would interest you and it deals with Jesus as he deals satirically with various other people. So?

(And once you've started on that post you might try to get a bit further.)


spin

mountainman

H. W. Fowler, in Modern English Usage, had this to say of irony:

Irony is a form of utterance that postulates a double audience,
consisting of one party that hearing shall hear & shall not understand,
& another party that, when more is meant than meets the ear,
is aware both of that more & of the outsiders’ incomprehension.

Momigliano.
Spin.
Irony.